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1.1 The Mechanical Engineering Industry: 
Characteristics and Trends 
The mechanical engineering industry is primarily concerned with the industrial application of 
mechanics and with the production of tools and machinery (Webster dictionary). It is a very heter-
ogeneous branch with a variety of sub-sectors. Correspondingly, the respective market environ-
ments impose fundamentally different requirements on the companies’ competences and their 
strategic direction (VDMA, 2015, p. 30; Vieweg, 2012a, p. 5). Approximately one third of the indus-
try’s output is intermediary products that are delivered to other companies, such as bearings, gears, 
taps, valves, and engines. Many of these goods are intra-sectoral and made for other mechanical 
engineering companies while further target industries of these products are electrical engineering, 
automotive industry, precision instruments, and others. However, the majority of output consists of 
capital goods dedicated to a broad range of industries. There are sub-sectors that produce products 
for specific client industries such as textile, pulp and paper, construction and mining, and agricul-
tural industry. Other capital goods manufacturers provide products with a broader range of appli-
cations like handling equipment and machine tools (Vieweg, 2012a, p. 10). 
In general, the mechanical engineering industry is recognized as an enabling industry which means 
that the industry supplies machinery and equipment, as well as process know-how, to all its cus-
tomer industries, enabling them to produce their respective goods and services. The industry is one 
of the largest industrial sectors in the European Union (EU) economy in terms of number of enter-
prises, employment, production, and the generation of added value. The sector is characterized by 
smaller family-owned companies with a typical firm size between 500 and 2,000 employees. In the 
EU, it employs approximately three million people and is similarly one of the sectors in the manu-
facturing industry with the highest requirements of staff qualification (European Commission; 
Vieweg, 2012b, pp. 2–9). 
Mechanical engineering is responsible for 9.5% of all the production in EU manufacturing indus-
tries and compared to other industries, the manufacturing depth is relatively high. Moreover, a 
broad range of activities is needed to finalize the products, e.g. engineering, research and develop-
ment (R&D), production, and a growing supply of services. Additionally, the industry is character-
ized by a sophisticated division of labor between companies and complex value chains. This struc-
ture of the industry is notably different from its automotive and aerospace counterparts. Therefore, 
original equipment manufacturers (OEM) do not benefit from the same level of purchasing power. 
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There are several larger suppliers to final product manufacturers that possess a strong position in 
the market, based on their technical expertise and ability to produce components with unique 
characteristics (European Commission; Vieweg, 2012b, pp. 4–7). 
According to Statista, China is by far the leading country in mechanical engineering based on reve-
nue in 2014. With the accumulated revenues of all mechanical engineering companies in the coun-
try, China achieved 826 billion €, followed by the USA with 324 billion €, Germany with 249 billion 
€, Japan with 222 billion €, and Italy with 109 billion € (Statista, 2015). This is the result of a huge 
growth momentum of China over the past two decades. Moreover, deliveries to emerging econo-
mies have grown much stronger than domestic markets and are thusly becoming more and more 
important for developed economies. For the EU-economy, the exports to China are of similar size 
like those to the USA. Additionally, exports from emerging economies, above all China, are gaining 
shares in the global market. Therefore, it is expected that China will be clearly dominating the 
world output of mechanical engineering products within the next decade. However, the growth 
rates of the Chinese mechanical engineering industry exhibited a perceptible decline during 2015 
(Industriemagazin, 2016, Vieweg, 2012b, p. 11, 2012a, pp. 14–15). 
Moreover, a structural change of economic activities of the developed countries and Asia is ex-
pected in the coming years. In the face of the increasing globalization, this structural shift has 
already started and is driven by a specialization in comparative advantages. In the developed 
economies, workplaces have already been lost to low-value added areas and new opportunities 
have been created for the more qualified labor. In general, Asian deliveries consist above all of large 
batch, medium-tech products, whereas in the developed countries, small batch production, and 
customization as a share of total output, grows. This division of labor provides the developed 
countries with opportunities to remain price competitive (Vieweg, 2012a, pp. 10–14, 2012b, p. 10). 
The mechanical engineering industry has to cope with more severe market fluctuations than most 
other branches. As one of the prime supplying industries of capital goods, the industry is highly 
dependent on the investment activities of the purchasing companies. These investment decisions 
are highly sensitive to developments in the overall economy and are a response to actual or ex-
pected changes in capacity utilization, earnings, financing costs or general market conditions. The 
resultant fluctuations in investment activity have a crucial effect on the cyclical up- and downturns 
of the economy as a whole. Thus, the mechanical engineering industry is almost inevitably at the 
core confronted by boom and recession periods. Correspondingly, the global financial and econom-
ic crisis hit the industry in 2009 harder than other industries and production fell by more than one 
fifth, on average, for all EU member states. However, the mechanical engineering industry directly 
benefitted from an early recovery and high growth momentum in 2010. Nevertheless, since 2013, 
the industry has to withstand a slight economic downturn (Kautzsch and Sitte, 2016; VDMA, 2015, 
p. 29, Vieweg, 2012a, p. 6, 2012a, p. 14). 
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Regarding the development and application of high technology, the mechanical engineering indus-
try evolved as a leading branch. Many products from the industry combine mechanical technologies 
with even more advanced technologies, ranging from optoelectronics to new materials, and the like. 
The engineering ingenuity at the creation of innovative products, that combine different technolo-
gies, is one of the strengths of the EU mechanical engineering industry. Moreover, firms of the EU 
mechanical engineering industry strive for an expansion of their product programs to become full-
value suppliers. This has increased the need for system engineering and caused a broader focus on 
product, as well as process innovations. Accordingly, the innovation intensity of the European 
mechanical engineering industry, as measured by the share of innovation expenditure of total sales, 
is higher than the major competing economies, and also higher than the average of other EU indus-
tries. Furthermore, the industry is leading others in terms of the number of patent filings (Vieweg, 
2012b, pp. 7–8, 2012a, p. 17, 2012a, p. 4). 
Especially the structural change of economic activities due to globalization, the increasing competi-
tion from Chinese manufacturers, and the ambition of becoming a full-value supplier, forces me-
chanical engineering companies from developed countries to be innovative, to not just gain 
advantage in the market, but to stay competitive. Competitiveness demands superior solutions to 
problems that are based on market-conforming, promising products and services. On a long-term 
basis, it is not enough to only create incremental improvements or innovations. In order to reach 
fundamentally better products, lower costs, and new product features, radical innovations are 
needed (Bullinger, 1994, p. 39). 
Radicalness might be conceived as the combination of newness and the degree of differentness. The 
most radical innovations would be new to the world and exceptionally different from existing 
products and processes (Schilling, 2010, pp. 50–51). Thus, the level of risk is high, but simultane-
ously the correlated market opportunities of radical innovations are better (Bullinger, 1994, p. 34). 
What is of particular note, especially in consideration of the current global market dynamics in the 
industry, is that radical innovations open up huge differentiation potential. In general, radical 
innovations are often linked to the employment of new technologies. As technological development 
and successful market introduction have independent success parameters, the arising challenges 
for companies are obviously both technical and entrepreneurial in nature (Bullinger, 1994, p. 39). 
Hence, the capability to develop and exploit radical technological innovations needs to be inter-
preted as a complex concept influenced by a variety of factors, internal and external, to the organi-
zation (Terziovski, 2007, p. 19). 
To study the realization of radical technological innovations within the mechanical engineering 
industry is sensible, as their implementation is risky, costly, and time-consuming (Vahs and Brem, 
2012, p. 68). This thesis helps to reduce the existing complexity and serves as guidance for the 
actual implementation of radical technological innovations within the mechanical engineering 
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industry. Therefore, critical success factors for the realization of the innovation process were 
derived. Moreover, distinct innovation archetypes were detected that are based on the project-
specific contextual circumstances, and which predetermine the concrete implementation of the 
respective innovations. Finally, an operational framework was developed that contains concrete 
recommendations for actions regarding forthcoming innovation projects. 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. Figure 1 depicts an overview of the structure of the thesis. 
The first sub-problem critical success factors is addressed by the chapters 4, 5, and 6, the second 
sub-problem innovation archetypes by chapter 7, and the third sub-problem operational framework 
by chapter 8. In the following, a brief description of each chapter is given. 
Chapter 1 contains an introduction to the thesis. Therefore, the characteristics and trends of the 
mechanical engineering industry are outlined, specifically those characteristics which cause the 
demand for radical technological innovations. Furthermore, the structure of the thesis is described. 
Lastly, in this first chapter, related work and related publications are documented and presented. 
Chapter 2 highlights the state of the art analysis and the corresponding problem statement. First, 
basic concepts and terms are introduced that underpin the theoretical background. Then, the 
results of previous studies and related conceptual frameworks are presented. The resulting open 
questions form the underlying basis for the formal problem statement. The three derived sub-
problems, outlined in the problem statement, determine the central research questions of this 
doctoral work. 
Chapter 3 provides the overarching research approach. The methodology of design science is 
described. Then, the corresponding application of the general design science research guidelines 
for the current study is delineated. 
Chapter 4 outlines the heuristics and model building for the initial version of a critical success 
factor framework. As a first step, the methodology of secondary case study analysis is described. 
Next, the TOMP-Framework as the central finding of this first research step is presented. In wrap-
ping up this chapter, the results and the respective limitations are more thoroughly discussed. 
Chapter 5 contains the qualitative validation and modification of the TOMP-Framework as an 
initial critical success factor framework. The results of the conducted literature review, expert 




Figure 1: Structure of the Thesis 
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Chapter 6 presents the quantitative validation of the critical success factor framework. Variables 
and statistically testable hypotheses are outlined. Subsequently, the design of the survey instru-
ment and the correlated pretest are described. Thereupon, a delineation of the data collection and 
preparation processes follows. Finally, the data analysis and the eventual findings are depicted. 
Chapter 7 addresses the second sub-topic: innovation archetypes. First, the cluster analysis as the 
underlying methodology is described. Then, the validation of the cluster solution and the descrip-
tive analysis of the clusters are presented. Afterward, a summary and a cluster overview are deline-
ated. The chapter concludes with a discussion and limitation section. 
Chapter 8 synthesizes the preceding findings into a coherent operational framework as an answer 
to the third sub-problem. This framework suggests a systematic way to deal with the challenge of 
realizing a radical technological innovation within the mechanical engineering industry. The de-
rived critical success factors and innovation archetypes are utilized in the generation of this opera-
tional framework. As the first step, the assignment of new projects to clusters is presented. There-
upon, cluster specific recommendations for action are outlined. Afterward, the qualitative valida-
tion of the generated operational framework is described. Finally, the results and limitations of this 
chapter are reflected. 
Chapter 9 is the final chapter of this thesis. Therefore, the results are summarized and the limita-
tions are discussed. Moreover, the relevance of this thesis is highlighted and an outlook suggests 
potential areas for future research. The chapter ends up with several concluding remarks. 
1.3 Related Work and Publications 
Several contents of this thesis have been presented and discussed at international scientific confer-
ences. The corresponding papers were published in the respective conference proceedings. Fur-
thermore, some contents of the thesis have been published as working papers. Additionally, the 
author has involved several master students, who contributed with their master theses to the 
elaboration of this thesis. 
Therefore, parts of chapter 1.1 and chapter 2.2, as well as the core contents of chapter 4 were 
presented at the International Conference on Engineering, Technology and Innovation (ICE) 2014 
in Bergamo and were subsequently published in the conference proceedings (Wohlfeil and Terzidis, 
2014). Moreover, the main contents of chapter 5.1 were presented at the International Conference 
on Engineering, Technology and Innovation (ICETI) 2015 in Istanbul and were published afterward 
at the International Science Index of the World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology 
(Wohlfeil et al., 2015). In addition, the results of the conducted expert interviews, reported in 
chapter 5.2, were presented at the ISPIM (International Society for Professional Innovation Man-
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agement) Conference 2015 in Budapest. The respective paper was published in the ISPIM confer-
ence proceedings (Wohlfeil and Terzidis, 2015a). Findings of the primary case study research, 
outlined in chapter 5.3, were presented at the R&D Management Conference 2015 in Pisa and 
subsequently published in the conference proceedings (Wohlfeil and Terzidis, 2015b). Further-
more, for each case, an individual case study report was elaborated and published in the KIT Scien-
tific Working Paper series. The case study of the P1.18 bicycle transmission by Pinion was pub-
lished in this series as paper number 28 (Wohlfeil, 2015c), the case study of the Friction Disc by 
SKF as paper number 42 (Wohlfeil, 2015b), and the case study of cryogenic machining by 5ME as 
paper number 29 (Wohlfeil, 2015a). All case studies can be found in Appendix III. Similarly, parts of 
the chapters 6.4, 7, and 8 were published in the KIT Scientific Working Paper series as paper num-
ber 39 (Wohlfeil, 2015d). 
As mentioned above, several students contributed with their master theses to the overall research 
project. Hellmann and Yakubovich were involved in the conduction of the expert interviews, re-
ported in chapter 5.2 (Hellmann, 2014; Yakubovich, 2014). Additionally, parts of chapter 5.1 were 
reported by Hellmann (Hellmann, 2014). Dahl was involved in the creation of and Hilgers in the 
analysis of the quantitative survey. Therefore, parts of the chapters 2.2, 9.2, and 6 were reported by 
Dahl and Hilgers in their master theses (Dahl, 2015; Hilgers, 2015). However, if contents of these 




2 State of the Art and Problem Statement 
2.1 Theoretical Background 
The following section provides a brief overview of the theoretical background of this thesis. Essen-
tial underlying terms and theories will be discussed. To some extent, there are different and even 
contradictory definitions and explanations of the central concepts presented in the literature. To 
ensure a common understanding and to avoid misinterpretations when reading the thesis at hand, 
these definitions and descriptions will be outlined that have been followed in this work. 
2.1.1 Basics of Technology 
2.1.1.1 Concept of Technology 
According to Bullinger, the concept of technology describes a target-mean-relation. Its application 
is meant to solve technical problems. Consequently, technology is rarely a product or a process but 
can be embedded within a product or a process by its application. Along the research and develop-
ment value chain, Bullinger clarified three concepts that should be differentiated: theory, technolo-
gy, and technique (Bullinger, 1994, pp. 32–34). 
Theories display general cause-and-effect relationships and are generated by basic research (Bull-
inger, 1994, p. 32). The aim is to gain fundamental new scientific knowledge regarding the origin of 
phenomena and observable facts. Future commercial usage or applicability is mostly neglected 
(Vahs and Brem, 2012, p. 25). In contrast, technology is the knowledge about potential approaches 
to solving technical problems (Bullinger, 1994, p. 34). They are instructions for technical proceed-
ings to reach an intended goal and are produced by applied research based on theory. The funda-
mental applicability of the technology is a focus (Vahs and Brem, 2012, pp. 25–26). The concept of 
technique relates to the material results of the problem-solving process, its production and applica-
tion (Bullinger, 1994, p. 34). The technique includes the systematic application of technologies to 
reach new or improved materials, artifacts, products, processes, systems, and services (Vahs and 
Brem, 2012, p. 25). Thus, a technical innovation corresponds to a concrete technique as it has been 
realized and implemented within practice (OECD, 2005, p. 25; Vahs and Brem, 2012, p. 2). 
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2.1.1.2 Technology Performance 
Many technologies show an s-curve 
when the relation between effort (e.g. 
accumulated R&D expenses) and result-
ing performance is illustrated in a 
diagram (Foster, 2006, p. 39). Each 
development trajectory represents a 
path of incremental innovations along 
the lifetime of a technology. Typically, 
the performance graph initially exhibits 
slow improvement as the fundamentals 
of the technology are poorly understood 
and potential applications may not be 
apparent (Schilling, 2008, p. 54). 
 
Figure 2: S-Curve of Technology Performance (Schilling, 
2010, p. 54) 
Until the technology has established a degree of legitimacy, it is difficult to attract researchers or 
companies to cooperate and participate in its development. However, once this has been achieved, 
the technology’s potential will be recognized and a deeper understanding will be acquired. Conse-
quently, performance increases rapidly. At some point, the technology reaches its limits; the cost of 
each marginal improvement increases, and as a result, the curve flattens (Schilling, 2008, p. 54). 
This chronological progress of technology maturity can be classified into four phases: embryonic or 
emerging, growth, mature, and aging. Nevertheless, not all technologies go through the entire cycle. 
Some technologies, due to unprofitable development, are abandoned in the early stages (Caragay, 
1983, p. 1641). 
In the early phases of technology devel-
opment, the effort that is invested in a 
new technology may gain lower returns 
than the effort that is invested in the 
current technology (cf. Figure 3). Thus, 
firms are often reluctant to switch 
technologies. Only when the new tech-
nology reaches a higher performance 
level, potential users are willing to 
adopt it. At a certain point, this may turn 
and the returns for the effort invested in 
the new technology are much higher 
 
Figure 3: Substituting Technology (Schilling, 2010, p. 57) 
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than the effort invested in the incumbent technology. When it happens, the rate can vary signifi-
cantly (Schilling, 2008, p. 56). 
Several authors have suggested using the s-curve model as a tool for predicting the time when a 
technology will reach its limits and whether a firm should move to a new technology (Schilling, 
2010, p. 59). Indeed, s-curves can provide an important perspective on what happens to perfor-
mance trajectories at average and aggregate levels. However, when s-curves are used to plan tech-
nology development at the firm level, caution is important (Christensen, 1992, p. 365). As a pre-
scriptive tool, the s-curve model has serious limitations. It is seldom that the true limits of a tech-
nology are known in advance as unexpected changes in the market, component technologies, or 
complementary technologies can shorten or extend the life cycle of a technology (Schilling, 2010, p. 
59). Most of the time, only in retrospect, it will be clear which technological decisions have been 
correct. The future development of a technology s-curve is unknown in advance and thus, a high 
level of uncertainty is associated with the deployment of the s-curve model as a prescriptive tool 
(Bullinger, 1994, p. 128). 
2.1.1.3 Classification of Technologies 
Technology Readiness Levels 
The realization of technological innovations depends on the maturity of the underlying technology. 
A certain level of technology maturity is a precondition for a feasible utilization within a concrete 
innovation project. Therefore, a sound assessment of technology readiness is sensible. The concept 
of Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) can serve as a helpful standard for this assessment. 
The nine scale TRLs (cf. Figure 4) have been introduced by the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) in the mid-1970s as a discipline-independent, systematic approach for 
effective assessment and communication regarding the maturity of new technologies. Later on, 
Mankins (1995) articulated the TRL scale for each level. The TRLs have been used by the U.S. De-
partment of Defense and numerous other organizations. Mankins emphasized that the TRLs have 
proved to be highly effective in communicating the status of new technologies among sometimes 
diverse organizations (Mankins, 1995, 2009, p. 1217). 
According to Mankins, TRL 1 is the lowest level of technology maturity. At this level, basic scientific 
research has resulted in the reporting of basic principles, and thus, more applied research and 
development begins (Mankins, 2009, p. 1217). At TRL 2, Mankins delineates that the concepts for 
practical technology applications could be formulated, but remain on a speculative level. When TRL 
3 is achieved, active research and development have been initiated. This includes analytical and 
laboratory-based studies to physically validate the predictions. These studies and experiments 
should constitute “proof-of-concept” validation of the concepts formulated at TRL 2. At TRL 4, the 
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basic technological elements have been integrated into a coherent system and validated in a labora-
tory environment. After validation of the basic technological elements as part of a coherent system 
in a realistic environment, TRL 5 has been reached. At TRL 6, a representative model or prototype 
system was successfully tested in a relevant environment. When a system prototype of the technol-
ogy demonstrated adequacy in the planned environment, TRL 7 has been reached. After achieving 
TRL 8, the actual system was completed and qualified through test and demonstration in the opera-
tional environment. The highest maturity level of TRL 9 is attained, when a technology has proven 
its usability through successful operation over a longer period (Mankins, 1995, pp. 2–5). 
  
Figure 4: Overview of the TRL Scale (Mankins, 2009, p. 1218) 
Competitive Impact 
The management consulting firm Arthur D. Little has developed and manifested a widely accepted 
classification scheme for technologies according to their competitive impact. Thereby, the correlat-
ing potential of the focal technology is dependent on the concrete area of application and is thus, 
industry specific (Bullinger, 1994, p. 115). 
The following four types of technologies are distinguished: (Bullinger, 1994, pp. 96–97) 
 Emerging technologies are very new. Their competitive impact is promising but highly uncer-
tain. 
 Pacing technologies are expected to have great influence on the market development and 
competitive dynamics in the future. They are still in their development phase but it is al-
ready obvious, that they will have great potential in the specific industry. 
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 Key technologies have currently the highest competitive impact. They significantly influence 
the market situation and are already a fixed component of the technology spectrum in the 
industry. Nevertheless, they are still not accessible to all competitors. 
 Base technologies are, due to their great prevalence rate and the common availability of 
knowledge in the industry, no instrument for differentiation. They shape the current form 
of the industry and the competence to control these base technologies is a prerequisite for 
serious competition in that industry. 
Sustaining versus Disruptive Technologies 
Christensen shaped a distinction principle by addressing the market impact of technologies: sus-
taining versus disruptive technologies. This concept is quite different from the incremental versus 
radical distinction (cf. chapter 2.2.2.3) (Christensen, 1997, p. xv). 
Sustaining technologies improve the performance of established products, along the dimensions of 
performance that mainstream customers in major markets have historically valued. Some sustain-
ing technologies can be radical in character while others may be more of an incremental nature. In 
contrast, disruptive technologies bring a very different value proposition to the market than what 
has previously been available (Christensen, 1997, p. xv). Moreover, this kind of technology can lead 
to the emergence of a completely new market. Generally, disruptive technologies underperform 
established technologies in mainstream markets in the near term, but they have other features that 
a few fringe customers value. Products based on mature disruptive technologies tend to be cheaper, 
simpler, smaller, and, frequently, more convenient to use (Christensen, 1997, p. xv). 
2.1.2 Basics of Innovation 
2.1.2.1 Concept of Innovation 
The concept of the term innovation in the current usage has been shaped by the economist Joseph 
Alois Schumpeter (1883-1950). He used the term for the first time in his work Business Cycles in 
1939, but he had already described the phenomenon in 1912 as the implementation of new combi-
nations in his Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (Schumpeter and Röpke, 2006 reprint of 
1912, p. 162). According to Schumpeter, innovation requires business action, the actual realization 
of the new combinations in the marketplace. The creation of the invention and the carrying out of 
the corresponding innovation are two entirely different things (Schumpeter, 2006 reprint of 1939, 
p. 81; Schumpeter and Röpke, 2006 reprint of 1912, p. 162). This concept manifested in the com-
monly known Schumpeter trilogy of innovation: invention, innovation, and diffusion. Invention refers 
to the generation of a new idea. Innovation is said to be accomplished when the idea from the 
invention is developed into a new product and is subsequently introduced to the market. Diffusion 
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describes the process of broad market penetration of the corresponding innovation. Without diffu-
sion, an innovation has no economic impact (Curlee and Goel, 1989, p. 5; OECD, 2005, p. 17).  
Schumpeter defines innovations as the creation of a new product, the introduction of a new produc-
tion method, the cultivation of a new market, the utilization of a new source for raw materials, or 
the attainment of a new market position such as a monopoly (Schumpeter, 1952, pp. 100–101). 
With this early concept of innovation, it becomes apparent that Schumpeter already distinguished 
different types of innovation. In the following, the most commonly used classifications of different 
types of innovation will be outlined as presented in the literature. These concepts are crucial for 
understanding the realization of radical technological innovations. 
2.1.2.2 Classification of Innovations 
Subject Area 
In the Oslo Manual (guidelines for collecting and interpreting innovation data), the OECD has devel-
oped the Schumpeterian concept further and has created the following classification of innovation: 
"An innovation is the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or 
process, a new marketing method, or a new organisational method in business practices, workplace 
organisation or external relations." (OECD, 2005, p. 46) 
Within this understanding of innovation, there are four basic types to be distinguished: product, 
process, marketing, and organizational innovation (OECD, 2005, p. 47) 
 "A product innovation is the introduction of a good or service that is new or significantly im-
proved with respect to its characteristics or intended uses. This includes significant improve-
ments in technical specifications, components and materials, incorporated software, user 
friendliness or other functional characteristics.” (OECD, 2005, p. 48) 
 “A process innovation is the implementation of a new or significantly improved production or 
delivery method. This includes significant changes in techniques, equipment and/or software.” 
(OECD, 2005, p. 49)  
 “A marketing innovation is the implementation of a new marketing method involving signifi-
cant changes in product design or packaging, product placement, product promotion or pric-
ing.” (OECD, 2005, p. 49) 
 “An organisational innovation is the implementation of a new organisational method in the 
firm’s business practices, workplace organisation or external relations." (OECD, 2005, p. 50) 
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In their definition of process innovations, the OECD only refers to production and delivery methods 
(OECD, 2005, p. 49). For the sake of completeness, this concept of innovation should be applied to 
every value-adding process within the firm, in which innovations could be created, such as sourcing 
and product development. 
Furthermore, the concept of architectural innovation is missing within the OECD’s classification of 
innovation. Product architecture describes the way how the specific product function is linked to its 
physical and logical components (Ulrich, 1995, p. 420). According to Henderson and Clark, “[t]he 
essence of architectural innovation is the reconfiguration of an established system to link together 
existing components in a new way. (...) The important point is that the core design concept behind 
each component - and the associated scientific and engineering knowledge - remain the same.” (Hen-
derson and Clark, 1990, pp. 12) 
The described concepts of innovation include the commercial application of the underlying inven-
tion (Bullinger, 1994, pp. 34–35). Subsequently, to be implemented, a new or improved product, or 
an architecturally changed product, needs to be introduced to the market. New processes, market-
ing or organizational methods are implemented when they are brought into actual use in the firm’s 
operations (OECD, 2005, p. 47). 
Levels of Novelty 
A basic requirement for an innovation is its novelty. In the Oslo-manual three concepts regarding 
the novelty of innovations are distinguished: new to the firm, new to the market, and new to the 
world (OECD, 2005, p. 57). 
The minimum entry level is that the innovation is new to the 
firm. A product, process, marketing, or organizational method 
may already have been implemented by other firms, but it 
might still be an innovation for the contemplated firm if it is 
new or significantly improved in terms of products and 
processes (OECD, 2005, p. 57). If the firm is the first to intro-
duce the innovation on its market, then the focal innovation is 
new to the market. The market is defined as the collective of 
the firm, its competitors, its customers, and its potential 
customers (OECD, 2005, p. 58). 
 
Figure 5: Levels of Novelty 
It can refer to a geographic region or a product area and thus, is dependent on the firm’s own 
conception of its operating market (OECD, 2005, p. 58). In order to be new to the world, the firm 
needs to be the first to introduce the innovation for all markets and industries, domestically and 
new to the world 
new to the market 
new to the firm 
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internationally. Thus, the concept of new to the world implies a qualitatively greater degree of 
novelty than just new to the market (OECD, 2005, p. 58). 
Incremental versus Radical Innovations 
One of the primary distinguishing characteristics of innovation is the extent of change. At this point, 
radical and incremental innovations are differentiated. Thereby, radicalness could be conceived as 
the combination of newness and the degree of differentness regarding the state of the art (Schilling, 
2010, p. 50). Incremental innovations emerge on existing markets and already familiar fields of 
application. The level of risk is low and thus, incremental innovations are relatively easy to handle 
and to steer. Mostly, they are just advanced or improved innovations (Vahs and Brem, 2012, p. 67). 
In contrast, radical innovations have a high level of novelty. They cause deep and complex changes 
within the company. Hence, the level of risk is high, but correspondingly, the correlated market 
opportunities of radical innovations are better (Vahs and Brem, 2012, p. 67). 
Market-Pull versus Technology-Push Innovations 
The triggers for innovations can be diverse. Market induced innovations are called market-pull or 
demand-pull. They have been initiated by customer requirements and by concrete demands and 
needs of the market (Vahs and Brem, 2012, p. 63). These technical solutions emerge, as individuals, 
groups, or organizations formulate a perceived gap which desires satisfaction (Bullinger, 1994, p. 
100). On the other hand, there are cases in which inventors search for market opportunities for a 
given technology. Thereby, potential markets and applications are initially unknown. These types of 
innovations are called technology-push innovations. The most obvious case of technology-push is 
that of a completely new technology originating from science searching for an opportunity for 
application. However, even the challenge of identifying further applications for existing technolo-
gies is an example of technology-push (Henkel and Jung, 2009, pp. 1–2). This approach emphasizes 
that innovations can, due to their technological potential, create new demands and open up new 
markets (Cross, 2008, p. 211). Thus, technology-push innovations have their origin in the applica-
tion drive caused by a technical potential (Bullinger, 1994, p. 100). 
2.1.3 Diffusion of Innovation 
2.1.3.1 Diffusion Process 
Diffusion describes the way in which innovations spread from their very first implementation to 
different consumers, countries, regions, sectors, markets, and firms (OECD, 2005, p. 17). Similar to 
the technology performance, the diffusion of innovations usually follows an s-curve, as shown in 
Figure 6 (Byers et al., 2010, p. 269). 
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These curves are gained by 
plotting the cumulative number 
of adopters of an innovation 
against time. This yields and S-
shaped curve as adoption is 
initially slow when an unfamiliar 
innovation is introduced to the 
market. It accelerates when the 
innovation becomes better 
understood and utilized by the 
mass market. Eventually, the 
market is saturated and thus, the 
rate of new adoptions declines 
(Schilling, 2008, p. 56). 
 
Figure 6: S-Curve of Adoption (Byers et al., 2010, p. 269) 
It is important to note that the s-curves of diffusion are in part a function of the s-curves of technol-
ogy performance: if technologies are better developed, they correspondingly become more certain 
and useful to users, facilitating the adoption of the corresponding technological innovation. Moreo-
ver, as the learning-curve and scale advantages accrue to the technology, the price of finished goods 
often drops (Schilling, 2008, pp. 57–58). 
2.1.3.2 Categorization of Adopters and Users 
The diffusion of innovations describes the process of how innovations spread through a population 
of potential users. Based on their perception of its advantages and risks, customers will adopt an 
innovation. Correspondingly, potential users of an innovation are fundamentally different regard-
ing their personal requirements and needs (Byers et al., 2010, pp. 268–269; Rogers, 2003, pp. 280–
285). 
On this basis, Rogers established a categorization for different groups of adopters. His criterion for 
categorization was innovativeness and the degree to which an individual or another unit of adop-
tion is relatively earlier in acquiring the innovation than other members of a social system. By 
means of statistics, he derived five categories: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majori-
ty, and laggards. One difficulty with this method is incomplete adoption which occurs for innova-
tions that have not reached 100% usage among customers. The five adopter categories are ideal 
types, based on abstractions from empirical investigations (Rogers, 2003, pp. 280–281). 
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Figure 7: Adopter Categorization (Boretos, 2012, p. 35 derived from Rogers, 2003, p.281) 
In the following, an overview of the main characteristics of the different adopter groups will be 
presented: (Rogers, 2003, pp. 282–284) 
 Innovators: They have a great interest in new ideas and in connecting themselves with like-
minded peer groups. Innovators are able to deal with complex technical knowledge and are 
willing to cope with a high degree of uncertainty regarding the innovation at the time of its 
adoption. They play an important role in the innovation diffusion process, as they provide 
the first industrial application of the young innovation. 
 Early Adopters: This adopter category has the highest degree of opinion leadership since they 
are highly respected by their peers. Potential adopters look to early adopters for advice 
and information about an innovation. As the early adopters are not too far ahead of the av-
erage individual in innovativeness, they serve as a role model for the adoption of an inno-
vation. 
 Early Majority: The members of the early majority adopt new ideas just before the average 
member of a system does. They follow with a deliberate willingness in adopting innova-
tions but they seldom lead. As they account for one third of all members of a system, their 
role in the full establishment of an innovation is decisive. 
 Late Majority: The members of the late majority adopt new ideas just after the average mem-
ber of a system does. Like the ones of the early majority, they account for one third of the 
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members of a system. For them, adoption may be both an economic necessity and the re-
sult of increasing peer pressures. Their relatively scarce resources mean that most of the 
uncertainties about a new idea must be removed before they feel safe to adopt an innova-
tion. 
 Laggards: Laggards are the last group in a social system to adopt an innovation. As they are 
traditionally minded, they tend to be suspicious of innovations and change. Their re-
sistance to innovations may be due to their limited resources and thus, the need to be cer-
tain that a new idea will not fail before they can adopt it. 
Besides the adopter categorization of Rogers, there is another user concept established by Eric von 
Hippel. He introduced the so-called Lead User concept. Lead users face needs that will be general in 
a marketplace, but face them a long time before the mainstream users will do. Furthermore, lead 
users would benefit significantly by obtaining a solution to those needs (Hippel, 1986, p. 796). 
Especially, for market research or the development of new product concepts the involvement of 
lead users could be very helpful (Herstatt and Hippel, 1992, p. 213). Lead users often have ideas for 
new products and features or may even innovate themselves. In any case, they are far more likely to 
express their opinion regarding product concepts than average users will do (Henkel and Jung, 
2009, p. 4). Thus, lead users are primarily perceived to be innovators or early adopters (Seitz, 2015, 
p. 26). 
2.2 Previous Studies and Conceptual Frameworks 
The topic of radical technological innovation, in general, and the search for factors fostering innova-
tion success, in particular, have been previously analyzed in several practical and scientific studies 
from diverse perspectives, with various focus areas, and with different methodological approaches. 
In the following section, a brief overview of selected past and contemporary innovation research is 
presented to point out the main findings, perceptions, and open questions. This analysis formed the 
starting base for the conducted research outlined in this thesis. 
2.2.1 Practical Studies and Best Practices 
2.2.1.1 McKinsey and VDMA-Study of the German Mechanical Engineering Industry 
In 2014, the German Engineering Federation (Verband deutscher Maschinen und Anlagenbauer – 
VDMA) and McKinsey & Company conducted a cooperative study regarding success patterns and 
trends within the German power transmission industry. In this study, 333 companies participated 
from all sectors of the mechanical engineering industry with different sizes, ownership, and man-
agement structures. Thus, this sample ensured the involvement of a broad cross-section of the 
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industry. Furthermore, in-depth interviews with more than 50 executives were conducted and 
external data was considered (VDMA and McKinsey, 2014b, p. 13). 
The findings of the study indicate that there is no single formula for high profitability and growth in 
the German mechanical engineering industry. Accordingly, companies find success in very different 
ways. Overall, ten distinct success patterns were detected. For one company, success comes from 
size, innovative strength, and internationalization, but also from focusing on core business and 
operational excellence. Other companies benefit from their industry affiliation or management 
structure, the specific benefits of their solution or component business, a successful after-sales 
program and service business, or a premium position (VDMA and McKinsey, 2014b, p. 18, 2014b, p. 
16). 
In general, the whole German mechanical engineering industry was in a good position. However, 
the market circumstances were changing. Correspondingly, five core industry trends could be 
derived from the study: The demand for customized systems and integration solutions increased. 
The general demand for products and services shifted to countries outside Europe. After-sales and 
service achieved increasing relevance. The competition was rising due to new market participants. 
The competitiveness of Germany as a location was growing in importance (VDMA and McKinsey, 
2014b, pp. 41–45, 2014b, p. 38). 
With respect to these trends, most of the companies within the industry saw themselves in a good 
position. However, to be successful in the long-term, six fields of action were developed that consist 
of an adequate combination of current success patterns and emerging industry trends (cf. Figure 8): 
targeted and granular internationalization and growth strategy; expansion of after-sales/service 
segment through integrated innovative solutions; standardization and modularization, while also 
providing customer specific offers and new business models; continuous optimization of the prod-
uct/portfolio value, especially by innovations; excellence, in particular in domestic operations; 
stringent, risk-differentiated project management, particularly in the solutions business (VDMA and 
McKinsey, 2014b, pp. 51–70). Nevertheless, not all action plans are equally relevant to all compa-
nies. Depending on the context and the respective company strategy, some fields of action are more 
or less important (VDMA and McKinsey, 2014b, p. 74). 
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Figure 8: Fields of Action for the German Mechanical Engineering Industry (VDMA and McKinsey, 
2014b, p. 50) 
2.2.1.2 PwC’s Global Innovation Survey 
PwC conducted, in 2013, a global innovation survey among 1,757 executives to study innovation, 
growth, and business strategy (Shelton and Percival, 2013, p. 41). The interviewed executives 
perceived innovation as a driver for rapid and profitable revenue growth and as being integral to 
sustaining the long-term future of their business. Ninety-three percent of the survey participants 
expressed the view that organic growth through innovation will drive the greater proportion of 
their revenue growth. Therefore, leading innovators can expect significant rewards both financially, 
and in terms of competitive positioning (Shelton and Percival, 2013, pp. 4–5). 
Furthermore, PwC deliberately considered the top and the bottom 20% of innovators to compare 
and contrast their relative characteristics and innovation approaches (Shelton and Percival, 2013, 
p. 41). Regarding the different innovation strategies, they found that leading innovators have a 
deliberate innovation strategy and are taking a more sophisticated approach to innovation. They 
are targeting a higher proportion of breakthrough and radical innovations, particularly around 
products, services, technology, and business models. In some areas, the proportion is around twice 
that of the less innovative companies. Furthermore, they are collaborating much more than the 
bottom 20% and generate a greater proportion of revenue from new products and services. (Shel-
ton and Percival, 2013, p. 13; p. 5). 
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Another result of this survey was that there is no single roadmap for success in innovation. Howev-
er, PwC developed the so-called Innovation Blueprint depicted in Figure 9 to support managers 
thinking through the appropriate approach for growth via innovation, from strategy to execution 
(Shelton and Percival, 2013, p. 18). 
According to PwC, this blueprint 
contains lessons that can be tailored 
and made to work for any business. 
Elements 1 and 2 address the align-
ment of innovation strategy with the 
respective business strategy. Ele-
ments 3 to 7 focus on maximizing the 
company’s ability to come up with 
new innovative ideas. Elements 8 to 
12 target the operational efforts, 
including new ways of working that 
are necessary to bring these new ideas 
to market. As a result, an innovation 
capability will be generated that 
drives new products, services, tech-
nologies, and business models (Shel-
ton and Percival, 2013, p. 22). 
 
Figure 9: PwC's Innovation Blueprint (Shelton and Percival, 
2013, p. 22)  
2.2.1.3 Kienbaum-Survey: The Return of Innovation 
Over a period of seven years, a Kienbaum team led by Berth conducted a longitudinal study within 
116 small, medium-sized, and big enterprises in Germany to analyze the origin and success rate of 
innovations. In sum, 1,919 ideas were considered. The study was called “The Return of Innovation” 
and was finally published in 1993. In this study, neither a distinction was made with respect to the 
industrial origin, nor regarding incremental and radical ideas. However, besides these differences, 
Berth articulates that the study served empirical evidence for an exceptional similarity regarding 
the success rates of the analyzed ideas. Therefore, the sample was entirely considered without 
differentiation of distinct types of innovations (Berth, 1993, 1995, p. 277; Fischer and Risch, 1993, 
p. 212). 
The result of this study was quite disillusioning (cf. Figure 10). Out of 1,919 first ideas, just 524 
preliminary studies were initiated. Based on these, 369 projects were started and finally 176 prod-
ucts were introduced to the market. Five years after market launch, 124 products totally flopped 
and were withdrawn from the market. Out of the remaining products that were still on the market, 
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24 products were loss makers and 17 products achieved a mediocre success level however with a 
lower return on investment rate than the average rate of products within the respective business 
unit. Just 11 products were actually successful which accounts for a total success rate of 0.57% 
(Berth, 1993, 1995, pp. 278–279). 
 
Figure 10: Success Rate of Innovations (Berth, 1995, p. 279) 
2.2.1 Scientific Studies 
In the SAPPHO-project, Rothwell et al. conducted a comparative analysis of 72 successful and 
unsuccessful technological innovations. To systematically discover differences, a successful innova-
tion was paired with an unsuccessful one. The criterion for the formation of a pair was the precon-
dition that the two innovations competed for the same market. Subsequently, five main areas of 
difference emerged: understanding of user needs, efficiency of development, characteristics of 
managers, efficiency of communications, and marketing and sales efforts (Rothwell et al., 1974, p. 
258). 
A study by the OECD regarding the conditions for success in technological innovation highlights 
that success requires the existence of three factors: science and technological capability, market 
demand, and an agent which transforms this capability into goods and services which satisfy the 
demand. According to the study, the characteristics of uncertainty and long-time horizons that are 
both commonly linked to technological innovations pose specific challenges to the management. 
Communication across disciplinary and functional boundaries, a flexible organization to respond to 
market circumstances, and a risk-taking attitude are decisive to raise the chances for success 
(OECD, 1971, pp. 11–13). 
Abetti analyzed five cases of technological innovations along their successive evolutionary stages to 
identify success factors for radical technological innovation. He emphasized that from the list of 
factors technology is not the principal criterion as the market, financial, organizational, and strate-
gic issues are predominant (Abetti, 2000, p. 220). 
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In his study of fifteen successful highly varied and diverse technological innovations, Souder de-
rived several success factors for the technology-push process. Initially targeting minor markets, 
constantly interacting with users, interdisciplinary teams, and an iterative try-and-modify approach 
are decisive to the success of technology commercialization (Souder, 1989, pp. 19–20). 
Within their case study of the MCC (Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation), a US-
based R&D consortium, Gibson and Smilor detected four variables which are central to accelerating 
inter-organizational technology transfer and therewith, for the success of technological innovation: 
communication interactivity, cultural and geographic distance, technological equivocality, and 
personal motivation (Gibson and Smilor, 1991, p. 287). 
Chiesa and Frattini analyzed eight technological innovations launched on consumer high-tech 
markets, regarding the impact of positioning and market introduction decisions on the overall 
success of the focal products (Chiesa and Frattini, 2011, p. 437). The authors found that predomi-
nantly, the support and attitude of early adopters towards an innovation predetermines the succes-
sive success and failure (Chiesa and Frattini, 2011, p. 452). 
Henderson studied the results of innovation investments made by incumbent firms, in contrast to 
entrants, using data derived from a detailed field study of the photolithographic alignment equip-
ment industry. She found that established firms invested more than entrants in incremental innova-
tion, but the research efforts of incumbents seeking to exploit radical innovation were significantly 
less productive than those of entrants (Henderson, 1993). 
With a quantitative survey of three high-tech industries (computer hardware, photonics, and 
telecommunication), Chandy and Tellis tried to answer the question why some firms are more 
successful at introducing radical product innovations than others. The researchers focused their 
studies on organizational factors driving innovation success. Beforehand, many researchers sug-
gested that firm size is the key organizational predictor of radical product innovation. In contrast, 
Chandy and Tellis found evidence for their hypothesis that one main variable that differentiates 
firms with strong radical product innovation records from others is the firms' willingness to canni-
balize their own investments (Chandy and Tellis, 1998). 
McDermott and O’Conner conducted a longitudinal, multidisciplinary, multiple case study of twelve 
radical innovation projects in ten large, established North American firms. The purpose of their 
study was to explore the process of radical new product development from a strategic perspective 
and to outline key observations and challenges that managers face as they move these projects to 
market. As a result, they found that project teams engaging in radical innovation encounter a much 
different set of challenges than those typically faced by NPD teams engaged in incremental innova-
tion. These challenges address the unfamiliarity of new markets and territories, particular re-
State of the Art and Problem Statement 
24 
quirements to people and team competences, the willingness to product cannibalization, and 
organizational issues, as well as the search for a divisional home (McDermott and O'Connor, 2002). 
2.2.2 Conceptual Frameworks 
2.2.2.1 Conceptual Model of New Product Outcome 
The goal of an early study of Cooper was to identify the determinants of commercial success in 
industrial product innovation. Therefore, 102 successes and 93 failures were studied and statisti-
cally analyzed based on a conceptual model. This model of new product outcomes (cf. Figure 11) 
distinguished two categories of variables that have a potential impact on new product success. 
These were controllable and environmental variables. The controllable variables were those that 
described the new product process and its output. The environmental variables described the 
setting in which a new product was developed. In sum, three environments were differentiated: the 
marketplace, the firm (resource base), and the nature of the venture e.g. its source (Cooper, 1979, 
pp. 125–126). 
 
Figure 11: Conceptual Model of New Product Outcome (Cooper, 1979, p. 125) 
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The study indicates that the outcome of new products tends to be more dependent on variables 
over which the firm has control during the innovation process than on situational or environmental 
variables (Cooper, 1979, p. 130). 
2.2.2.2 Advanced Conceptual Model of New Product Outcome 
Within a follow-up study of Cooper and Kleinschmidt, Cooper’s initial conceptual model of new 
product outcome was modified and extended. The new model (cf. Figure 12) postulated that new 
product outcomes are determined by the interaction of the market environment and the new 
product strategy and execution. The new product strategy and execution are the results of the new 
product process, a series of activities that move the product from idea to launch. This process takes 
place within a corporate environment consisting of resources, experience, and skills in marketing, 
production, and technology (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1987, p. 172). 
To test this conceptual framework, a quantitative survey was conducted. Ultimately, 123 successful 
new products and 80 failures were studied and statistically analyzed. Besides the role of market 
competitiveness, all hypotheses outlined in the conceptual model could significantly be retained 
(Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1987, p. 181, 1987, p. 174). 
 
Figure 12: Advanced Conceptual Model of New Product Outcome (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1987, p. 
172) 
State of the Art and Problem Statement 
26 
2.2.2.3 Integrated Framework of New Technology Ventures’ Performance 
Song et al. studied the factors that lead to the success or failure of new technology ventures. In 
doing so, they conducted a meta-analysis by scanning academic literature and collecting data from 
existing empirical studies (Song et al., 2008, p. 7).  
Based on the study’s results and contemporary literature, they derived the theoretical framework 
shown in Figure 13. The entrepreneurial team was defined as the management team of the new 
venture. Entrepreneurial opportunities represent beneficial business situations in which innova-
tions may be implemented while the entrepreneurial resources include all tangible and intangible 
assets that a firm may possess and control. The strategic and organizational fit is perceived as the 
congruence between strategy and organization of the new technology venture and the driving 
forces entrepreneurial team, entrepreneurial opportunity, and entrepreneurial resource. The frame-
work suggests that the better the strategic and organizational fit, the better the ultimate perfor-
mance (Song et al., 2008, pp. 17–19). 
 
Figure 13: Integrated Framework of New Technology Ventures’ Performance (Song et al., 2008, p. 18) 
2.2.2.4 TOE-Framework 
A central model by Tornatzky and Fleischer addresses the influencing factors of adopter behavior. 
This model highlights the three main elements of a firm’s context affecting the process by which it 
adopts and implements technological innovation: technology, organization, and external task envi-
State of the Art and Problem Statement 
27 
ronment. Thus, it is called TOE-framework (Tornatzky and Fleischer, 1990, p. 152). Further re-
search has demonstrated that the framework has broad applicability across a number of technolog-
ical, industrial, and cultural contexts (Baker, 2012, p. 235). 
The characteristics of the organization are typically perceived in descriptive terms: firm size; 
centralization, formalization, and complexity of the managerial structure; quality of human re-
sources; amount of slack resources available internally; and communication processes. The envi-
ronmental context is the area, in which a company conducts its business: its industry, competitors, 
access to resources, and dealing with the government. These environmental impacts may be critical 
to the capacity of a company to make innovation adoption and implementation decisions. Separate-
ly, from the rest of the environment, Tornatzky and Fleischer focused their attention on how fea-
tures of the technologies can influence both the adoption process and implementation. Therefore, 
the availability of a particular new technology and its characteristics is decisive (Tornatzky and 
Fleischer, 1990, pp. 153–154). 
 
Figure 14: TOE-Framework (Tornatzky and Fleischer, 1990, p. 153) 
2.2.3 Critical Review and Open Questions 
The recent VDMA and McKinsey study clearly points out that there is no single formula for high 
profitability and growth in the German mechanical engineering industry. However, innovation is 
one of the ten distinct success patterns. Especially for dealing with the increased competition due to 
new market participants, a continuous optimization of the product portfolio is crucial (VDMA and 
McKinsey, 2014b). Similarly, the interviewed executives of the PwC survey perceived innovation as 
a driver for rapid and profitable revenue growth and as being crucial for the long-term future of 
their business. It becomes obvious that the claim for innovation is not just specific to the German 
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mechanical engineering industry, but is of global relevance. Furthermore, the PwC study emphasiz-
es that leading innovators are particularly focusing on breakthrough and radical innovations (Shel-
ton and Percival, 2013). According to these studies, the topic of radical technological innovations 
within the mechanical engineering industry is highly relevant. Nevertheless, the Kienbaum study 
highlights the low success rate of innovative ideas. Despite the great importance of innovations, the 
risk of failure is high (Berth, 1993). Therefore, the question arises, what factors influence innova-
tion success. PwC’s innovation blueprint lists on an abstract level several elements influencing 
innovation output. These elements represent a list of best practices, rather than a description of 
scientifically validated success factors. 
However, success factors of technological innovation have been previously analyzed in the listed 
scientific studies from diverse perspectives, with various focus areas, and with different research 
approaches. Some studies focus on concrete innovation projects and their correlated success. 
Thereby the studies of Abetti, Gibson and Smilor, and Souder address successful innovations to 
extract the key parameters of success while Cooper, Cooper and Kleinschmidt, Rothwell et al., 
Chiesa and Frattini, and McDermott and O’Conner address successes and failures within one study 
to identify the respective reasons. In contrast, Henderson, the OECD, Chandy and Tellis, and Gibson 
and Smilor analyzed the overall innovation portfolio of firms and sought to find out which circum-
stances are advantageous for the realization and subsequent success of technological innovations. 
However, Souder, McDermott and O’Conner, Chiesa and Frattini, and Chandy and Tellis mainly 
focused on the innovation process to condense the factors that are decisive at the actual implemen-
tation of innovation projects. Rothwell et al., Cooper, and Cooper and Kleinschmidt analyzed suc-
cess factors of the contextual circumstances and the innovation process within one study. The 
research approaches used were quantitative surveys (Chandy and Tellis, Rothwell et al., OECD), 
case study research (Abetti, Chiesa and Frattini, Gibson and Smilor, Souder, McDermott and 
O’Conner), field study research (Henderson), and meta-analysis (Song). 
With the outlined conceptual frameworks, the respective researchers tried to organize the success 
parameters for further statistical testing. In his two conceptual models, Cooper tried to distinguish 
success parameters that are shaped by the contextual circumstances and parameters shaped by the 
innovation process. Both dimensions ultimately determine success or failure. Song addressed solely 
the contextual circumstances for new technology ventures and their impact on the subsequent 
performance. The TOE-Framework of Tornatzky and Fleischer highlights the impacts of the contex-
tual preconditions on the technological innovation decision making from the adopter perspective. 
The adoption by the final user of the technological innovation represents a direct precondition for 
the ultimate innovation success. 
The analysis of these studies and conceptual frameworks showed that there are plenty of factors 
influencing the success of technological innovations. Some of them are controllable from within the 
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organization (internal factors), but others are external and uncontrollable (external factors). Fur-
thermore, the studies are non-uniform, and in some cases, they are even contradictory. Varying 
contexts could be the reason for the contradictory nature of some of the factors. The contexts for 
each individual innovation project determine the appearance or nonappearance of some factors. 
Correspondingly, the situational preconditions regarding the internal and external context for each 
individual innovation project have to be considered. Furthermore, several studies do not differenti-
ate radical and incremental innovations. Accordingly, the meaningfulness and generalizability of 
these studies for the topic of radical technological innovations within the mechanical engineering 
industry have to be questioned (Balachandra and Friar, 1997, pp. 276–277; Vahs and Brem, 2012, 
p. 70). 
Thus, the following questions remain open: 
1. Which factors determine the innovation success of radical technological innovations within 
the mechanical engineering industry? 
2. Which of these factors are controllable and which are not controllable by the innovation 
manager? 
3. How do the contextual circumstances influence innovation realization? 
4. Are there any patterns that can be distinguished regarding the innovation context? 
5. Which recommendations for action could be derived for forthcoming innovation projects 
that are based on the specific contextual circumstances? 
2.3 Problem Statement and Research Questions 
The central research problem of this thesis is the challenge of realizing radical technological inno-
vations within the mechanical engineering industry. Therefore, the goal is to determine, what 
influences the success of these innovations. The thesis creates knowledge that offers guidance for 
innovation managers how to best execute early stage radical technological innovations within the 
mechanical engineering industry. As highlighted in the state of the art review, this research prob-
lem is highly relevant and there is currently a lack of knowledge and understanding on how to deal 
with these innovations in a successful way. 
The central research problem is divided into three sub-problems: (i) detection of critical success 
factors for the realization of radical technological innovations within the mechanical engineering 
industry, (ii) identification of innovation archetypes, and (iii) generation of an operational frame-
work with concrete recommendations for action regarding forthcoming innovation projects. These 
sub-problems provide answers to the open questions outlined in chapter 2.2.3 and contribute to 
closing the corresponding research gap. The three sub-problems are complementary and add up to 
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the central research problem. Accordingly, they represent a way to achieve the ultimate thesis goal 
in a manageable and systematic manner (Leedy and Ormrod, 2009, pp. 54–56). In the following 
section, the three sub-problems and corresponding research questions are outlined in detail. 
2.3.1 Sub-Problem 1: Critical Success Factors 
The concept of Critical Success Factors (CSFs) goes back to ideas of long-time McKinsey & Company 
managing director Ronald Daniel. He introduced the term “Success Factors” as those parameters 
that determine company success. These factors will vary depending on the nature of the industry, 
the size and operating territory of the company, and the acceptance by management of planning as 
an essential function. Nevertheless, in every case it is important for management to both formalize 
and regulate the collection, transmission, processing, and presentation of planning information 
(Boynton and Zmud, 1984, p. 17, Daniel, 1961, p. 116, 1961, p. 117; Hilgers, 2015, p. 15). 
The success factor concept was further examined and refined at the MIT Sloan School of Manage-
ment in the 1970s. CSFs were established as those factors that determine the key information needs 
for successful strategic management (Butler and Fitzgerald, 1999, p. 352). According to Rockart 
(Rockart, 1979, p. 85): 
"Critical success factors thus are, for any business, the limited number of areas in which results, if they 
are satisfactory, will ensure successful competitive performance for the organization. They are the few 
key areas where ‘things must go right’ for the business to flourish. […] As a result, the critical success 
factors are areas of activity that should receive constant and careful attention from management." 
However, CSFs should not be confused with the concept of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). While 
CSFs form the underlying cause for success or failure, KPIs indicate the achieved success by meas-
uring performance (BSC Designer, 2015). The latter managerial task concentrates on collecting 
adequate performance indicators and consolidates them into KPIs (Samsonowa, 2012, p. 41). 
Especially, the realization of a radical technological innovation represents a specific challenge. 
Subsequently, knowing the relevant CSFs is a precondition for designing the innovation process in a 
successful way. Therefore, the first central research question (RQ) is: 
RQ 1: What are the Critical Success Factors for the realization of a radical technological              
innovation within the mechanical engineering industry? 
Within this study, radical technological innovations are clearly targeted. Therefore, incremental 
innovations are not of focus. At the analysis of the CSFs, the definition of Rockart is followed. Fur-
thermore, controllable and uncontrollable factors are distinguished, while the internal and external 
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contextual circumstances of the respective innovations are considered. Correspondingly, the open 
questions 1, 2, and 3 outlined in chapter 2.2.3 are addressed by answering RQ 1. 
2.3.2 Sub-Problem 2: Innovation Archetypes 
In general, CSFs are rather a lens for analysis and managerial attention than concrete recommenda-
tions for action (Leidecker and Bruno, 1984, p. 23). Knowing the CSFs does not indicate how the 
challenge of developing and commercializing a radical technological innovation could be realized in 
a specific situation. Moreover, radical innovations are, in principle, unique. Therefore, the factors 
leading to success cannot be totally explained by one universal set of equally important factors for 
all situations. Depending on the contextual nature of the respective innovation projects, the relative 
importance of the CSFs would be different. In some situations, the innovation manager may not 
even have to consider several factors in detail, while other factors have to be very carefully evaluat-
ed because of their high relevance for a given combination of contextual factors (Abetti, 2000, p. 
208; Balachandra and Friar, 1997, pp. 284–285). Based on the assessment of the contextual circum-
stances, the specific realization strategy for the respective innovation has to be formulated. In this 
context, the second central research question arises: 
RQ 2:  Is it possible to distinguish distinct innovation archetypes and corresponding strategies for 
the realization of radical technological innovations within the mechanical engineering in-
dustry that depend on the project-specific contextual circumstances? 
The term innovation archetypes characterizes recurring patterns that depend on the innovation-
specific internal and external context and suggest a distinct realization strategy for the implementa-
tion process of radical technological innovations. Accordingly, the search for innovation archetypes 
has to be based on the set of context specific CSFs detected by answering RQ 1. Moreover, the 
concrete combination and peculiarity of these CSFs need to be analyzed. With RQ 2, the open ques-
tion 4 detailed in chapter 2.2.3 is addressed. 
2.3.3 Sub-Problem 3: Operational Framework 
The process of realizing a radical technological innovation within the mechanical engineering 
industry is highly complex. In general, firms face not one, but a rich multiplicity of, possible strate-
gies for dealing with this challenge (Utterback, 1971, p. 85). According to Bullinger, strategies 
express how a company utilizes its strengths to deal with an existing environment for achieving its 
business goals (Bullinger, 1994, p. 130). Correspondingly, it seems reasonable to base the process 
strategies on the specific contextual circumstances of a distinct innovation project. Therefore, it is 
aimed to support innovation managers with the establishment of concrete recommendations for 
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action regarding the innovation realization strategy. This issue is addressed by the third central 
research question: 
RQ 3:  How can an operational framework be designed for the realization of radical technological 
innovations within the mechanical engineering industry which is based on the project-
specific contextual circumstances and contains concrete recommendations for action? 
With the term operational framework, the author refers to a strategy model that supports innova-
tion managers of forthcoming projects with the generation of an overall plan to realize their respec-
tive innovations. This operational framework should contain concrete recommendations for action 
that are based on the innovation archetypes derived by answering RQ 2. The RQ 3 focuses on the 




3 Research Approach 
3.1 Methodology of Design Science 
For addressing the main research problem and answering the three central research questions, the 
design science approach was followed as the overarching methodology. This research approach 
was shaped by Hevner et al. for the information systems discipline (Hevner et al., 2004). However, 
this method proved to be highly relevant in the field of management science as well (van Aken, 
2005, p. 22). The design science approach describes a problem-solving paradigm and aims to create 
new and innovative artifacts. According to Hever et al., design is both a process (set of activities) 
and a product (artifact) – a verb and a noun. Four potential artifacts are differentiated: constructs 
(vocabulary and symbols), models (abstractions and representations), methods (algorithms and 
practices), and instantiations (implemented and prototype systems). The design process is a se-
quence of activities to build and evaluate the artifact. With the evaluation of the artifact, feedback 
and a better understanding of the problem is provided in order to improve both the quality of the 
product and the design process. This build-and-evaluate loop is typically iterated a number of times 
before the final design artifact is achieved (Hevner et al., 2004, pp. 75–78). 
The underlying principle of design-science is that knowledge and understanding of a design prob-
lem and its solution are acquired in the building and application of the respective artifact. There-
fore, Hevner et al. derived seven guidelines for the implementation of this research approach which 
are outlined in Figure 15. 
According to Hevner et al., the design-science approach requires the creation of an innovative, 
purposeful artifact (guideline 1) for a concrete business problem (guideline 2). The artifact has to 
yield utility for the specified problem and thorough evaluation of the artifact is crucial (guideline 3). 
Novelty is similarly decisive as the artifact may extend the knowledge base or apply existing 
knowledge in new and innovative ways (guideline 4). In this context, design-science research is 
differentiated from the practice of design, because rigorous research methods have to be imple-
mented for the construction and evaluation of the respective artifact (guideline 5). Design is essen-
tially an iterative search process to discover an effective solution to the addressed business prob-
lem (guideline 6). Finally, the results of the design-science research have to be communicated 





Figure 15: Design-Science Research Guidelines (Hevner et al., 2004, p. 83) 
3.2 Application of the Design Science Research 
Guidelines 
Figure 16 gives an overview of the conducted research approach which was composed of a mixture 
of qualitative and quantitative methodologies. As heuristic of this study, a secondary case study 
analysis was conducted to create the initial model of CSFs for radical technological innovations 
within the mechanical engineering industry. This CSF framework was qualitatively validated. 
Therefore, the framework was compared to existing literature, evaluated and adapted based on 
expert interviews, and validated by conducting primary case studies. The following three cases of 
radical technological innovations within the mechanical engineering industry were studied: P1.18 
bicycle transmission by Pinion, Friction Disc by SKF, and cryogenic machining by 5ME. Afterward, 
the CSF framework was quantitatively validated and modified. Correspondingly, a quantitative 
survey was conducted and the results were statistically analyzed. Based on the survey results, 
distinct innovation archetypes were detected. These innovation archetypes formed the underlying 
basis for the extraction of the operational framework. For forthcoming innovation projects, the 
operational framework represents a method to derive concrete recommendations for action which 
are based on the project-specific contextual circumstances. Finally, the operational framework was 




Figure 16: Overview Research Approach (Icons designed by Freepik, 2015) 
Guideline 1: Design as an Artifact 
In this thesis, two fundamental artifacts were designed. These are the CSF framework derived by 
answering the first research question and the operational framework generated by answering the 
third research question. The innovation archetypes as an answer to the second research question do 
not represent an artifact, but formed the underlying basis for the establishment of the operational 
framework. The CSF framework represents a model while the operational framework constitutes a 
method. 
Guideline 2: Problem Relevance 
Within the mechanical engineering industry, radical technological innovations enable companies to 
reach strong market positions and to stand out from its rivals. The identification of CSFs for these 
innovations is sensible as their realization is risky, costly, and time-consuming. Therefore, the 
knowledge of these factors helps to reduce complexity and to focus on the main aspects of the 
planning, development, and implementation. Furthermore, the establishment of an operational 
framework for the project specific realization of forthcoming innovation projects supports compa-
nies in the successful implementation of the respective innovations (Bullinger, 1994, p. 34; Vahs 





Guideline 3: Design Evaluation 
As previously outlined, the CSF framework was qualitatively and quantitatively evaluated. Accord-
ingly, a thorough literature review, expert interviews, primary case studies, and a quantitative 
survey were conducted. On this basis, the CSF framework was evaluated and subsequently modi-
fied. Similarly, the established operational framework was applied to the three primary case studies 
and evaluated regarding its applicability. 
Guideline 4: Research Contribution 
By analyzing the state of the art, open questions and the corresponding research gap were derived 
and outlined in chapter 2.2.3. The research contribution of this thesis and similarly the two artifacts 
directly address this gap. Therefore, the artifacts provide a solution approach for the unsolved 
business problem of how to realize radical technological innovations within the mechanical engi-
neering industry successfully and thus, extend the knowledge base in this research domain. Corre-
spondingly, the main contribution of this thesis lies in the elaborate artifacts. 
Guideline 5: Research Rigor 
For the generation and evaluation of the two central artifacts, rigorous research methods were 
utilized. In the following chapters, the respective methods and their implementation within the 
study of this thesis are outlined in detail. Furthermore, the results and limitations of each research 
step are discussed by the end of each methodological section. 
Guideline 6: Design as a Search Process 
As recommended by Hevner et al., the design of the two artifacts was realized as an iterative search 
process. Starting with a secondary case study analysis, a first draft of the CSF framework was 
generated. This was iteratively reviewed, evaluated, and modified within several qualitative and 
quantitative research steps. The operational framework was based on the results of the quantita-
tive and qualitative analyses. Subsequently, the operational framework was qualitatively validated 
by applying it to the three primary case studies. 
Guideline 7: Communication of Research 
The intermediate and final results of this study were documented in the form of research papers 
and were presented at several scientific and practitioner conferences. Furthermore, the results 
were presented to several management representatives of the mechanical engineering industry. On 
these occasions, the two artifacts were discussed and subsequently, feedback was gained. The 
feedback was directly integrated at the generation of the final versions of both artifacts. Chapter 1.3 
provides an overview of the prepared papers. 
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4 Heuristics and Model Building for Critical 
Success Factors 
In order to answer the first research question, a secondary case study analysis was initially con-
ducted. This inductive research approach reflects the heuristics of the study at hand and forms the 
first step of model building for CSFs of radical technological innovations within the mechanical 
engineering industry. The advantage of this methodology is the ability to gain access to condensed 
data of projects that address the concrete realization of such innovations. Through a cross-case 
analysis of multiple case studies, best practices in solving problems of this particular type were 
extracted and thus, patterns of success for this kind of projects could be derived (van Aken, 2005, p. 
25). 
4.1 Methodology of Secondary Case Study Analysis 
Case studies are documented in the form of written texts - completed linguistic material. Therefore, 
the method of qualitative content analysis was chosen as the approach follows content analytical 
rules and step by step models for empirical, methodologically controlled analysis of texts. This 
method consists of two main steps: investigation of the raw material and actual text analysis (Mayr-
ing, 2000, p. 2). 
At first, it was decisive to exactly investigate the raw material. In general, three steps are basic: 
choosing the material to be analyzed, examining the situation-related context, and studying the 
formal characteristics of the material (Mayring, 1997, pp. 46–47). 
4.1.1 Case Study Sample 
Table 1 contains a brief summary of the selected 23 secondary case studies – the sample for analy-
sis. The table includes the companies’ names, time of analysis, region, industry, product area, and 
reference source. Besides of three (Lichtenstein, UK, Japan), all studies deal with cases of US-
companies. This is due to the fact that the pool for cases is far bigger in the US, as case studies are 
systematically produced as teaching cases for US-based Business Schools. All cases are written in 
English and contain approximately 15 to 20 pages. 
The main criteria for selecting case studies were their relevance for the focal topic: the realization 
of radical technological innovations. Therefore, cases were deductively chosen that deal with the 
development and commercialization of mainly radical technology-push innovations with a high 
level of novelty (e.g. 3 D-chip Design for Semiconductors, 1.3-inch Hard Disk Drive). The contem-
Heuristics and Model Building for Critical Success Factors 
38 
plated technologies were largely in an early stage of development but have reached, or were about 
to reach, application maturity (e.g. Digital Printing, Digital Imaging). Primary product innovations 
were focused, in particular goods, not services (e.g. Walkman, Surgical Drapes). In general, cases 
were suitable that went through all phases of the innovation process. Furthermore, companies with 
an affinity for hardware and production (e.g. 3M, IBM) were preferred. 
Table 1: Summary of the Analyzed Secondary Case Studies 






Personal Computers (Gable et al., 1988) 
Biodel 1970-1979 USA Biotechnology 
Contract Research, 
Research Products 
(Crowe and Maidique, 
1988) 
CDC 1957-1983 USA 
Information  
Technologies 
Mainframe Computers,  
Services 
(Poel, M. van den and 
Burgelman, 1988) 
Data Net 1984-1985 USA Mechanical Engineering 
Data Collection  
Terminals 
(Frevola and Maidique, 
1988) 
IBM 1960-1975 USA 
Information  
Technologies 
Hard- & Software (Cohen et al., 1988) 
PC&D 1965-1976 USA Mechanical Engineering Industrial Machinery 
(Christiansen et al., 
1988) 
TI 1975-1980 USA Consumer Electronics 
Hand-Held Learning  
Device 







Mechanical Engineering Pipe Hanger System 
(Herstatt and Hippel, 
1992) 
Sony 1978-1991 Japan Consumer Electronics Walkman 
(Sanderson and Uzume-
ri, 1995) 
HP 1991-1994 USA 
Information  
Technologies 
Hard Disk Drive 
(Christensen and 
Rogers, 1997) 
3M mid-1990s USA Health Care Surgical Drapes (Hippel et al., 1999) 
3M 2000 USA 
Manufacturing,  
Health Care, etc. 




ARM 1990-2002 UK Semiconductor Industry 
Chip Design for RISC  
Processors 
(O’Keeffe, 2002) 
3M 1997-2002 USA Electronics 
Adhesives, Chemicals,  
etc. 
(Conceição et al., 2002) 
TechCo1 1995-1999 USA 
Electronics,  
Telecommunication 
Network Service  
Platform 
(Pavia and Dodson, 
2008) 
Donnelley 1993-1995 USA Printers Digital Printing (March, 2009) 
Elio 1998-1999 USA Automotive Industry 




Intel 2000-2006 USA 
Information  
Technologies 
Centrino Platform (Burgelman et al., 2009) 
Matrix 1997-1999 USA Semiconductor Industry 3 D-Chip Design (Denend et al., 2009) 
Pixim 1999-2001 USA Semiconductor Industry 
Semiconductor-Design  
Based on DPS 
(McVie et al., 2009) 
Pitney Bowes 2006 USA Mechanical Engineering 
Stamp Expressions:  
Amita 
(Christensen and Yu, 
2009) 
SMaL 1999-2003 USA Cameras 




Vitreon 2004-2005 USA Automotive Industry 




In this first empirical phase, the mechanical engineering industry was not exclusively studied. 
Instead, cases of further industries and branches (e.g. Information Technology Industry, Consumer 
                                                                    
1 TechCo's true identity was disguised 
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Electronics Industry) were included. This broad approach was deliberately chosen to initially 
integrate impulses from other industries as well. Consequently, the analyzed cases covered various 
fields and industries (e.g. Health Care, Mechanical Engineering), and addressed B2B-markets (e.g. 
Semiconductor Industry, Automotive Industry) as well as B2C-markets (e.g. Consumer Electronics, 
PCs). Among the companies were small technology start-ups with less than 10 employees (e.g. Elio, 
Matrix), middle-size companies between 10 and 500 employees (e.g. SMal, Pixim), and major cor-
porations with more than 10,000 employees (e.g. IBM, HP). The time slots of analyses ranged from 
the late-1950s until the mid-2000s. However, the companies were all technology driven so that 
their cases were relevant for the present research endeavor. The criteria, if the projects were 
perceived to be successful, have been qualitative as well: If the project has been canceled, then the 
case was emphasized as a failure. The first stage of success was the actual market introduction of a 
technological innovation; the second stage was its sustainable commercial success. 
4.1.2 Data Analysis 
Within the next step, the distinct analysis method had to be selected. For the detection of CSFs for 
radical technological innovations, the step model of inductive category development seemed to be 
adequate (cf. Figure 17). The developed categories corresponded to the CSFs. The central questions 
for analyzing the 23 selected case studies were what companies have done correctly and what they 
have done wrong at the realization of their innovation. Thus, the aim was to understand why com-
panies either succeeded or failed so that the reasons for success could be generated and eventually 
CSFs could be derived. Hence, the criteria for the category development and the corresponding 
abstraction levels were determined by the definition of CSFs for radical technological innovation. 
 
Figure 17: Step Model of Inductive Category Development (Mayring, 2000, p. 4) 
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Following these criteria, CSFs were tentatively identified and then further scrutinized as each case 
was reviewed and evaluated. The TOE-framework by Tornatzky and Fleischer (cf. chapter 2.2.2.4, 
Figure 14) and the conceptual models of new product outcome by Cooper and Kleinschmidt (cf. 
chapter 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.2.2, Figure 11 and Figure 12) were combined and used as research roadmap 
for the categorization of the derived CSFs. As outlined in the state of the art review, Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt distinguished two categories of variables influencing new product success: controlla-
ble and environmental variables. The controllable variables address the new product process and 
its output while the environmental variables address the contextual circumstances for the process 
(Cooper, 1979, pp. 125–126, 1987, p. 172). This general differentiation has been followed while 
analyzing the case studies. Moreover, regarding a more detailed perspective on the contextual 
variables, Tornatzky and Fleischer’s framework was utilized and slightly modified. 
Consequently, the following four perspectives were applied for the categorization of the CSFs: 
technology, organization, target market, and innovation process. The categories technology, organi-
zation, and target market reflect the environmental and the innovation process the controllable 
variables. 
After five case studies had been analyzed, the so far derived CSFs were revised and checked with 
respect to their reliability. Afterward, the remaining case studies were worked through. Six itera-
tive feedback loops were conducted to finally revise those factors, eventually, reduce them to main 
factors, and check their reliability (Mayring, 2000, p. 4). 
4.2 Findings: The TOMP-Framework 
Figure 18 gives an overview of the 25 CSFs that have been derived from the secondary case studies. 
As written above, these factors were matched to the four main categories: technology, organization, 
target market, and innovation process. Correspondingly, the framework was named Technology-
Organization-Market-Process (TOMP) framework. 
Compared to the Schumpeter trilogy of innovation (invention, innovation, and diffusion), the inno-
vation process in the TOMP framework was composed of three different stages, namely product 
development, market introduction, and diffusion. This is due to the indications found in the case 
studies. Therefore, the innovation phase has been split into its two elements: product development 
and market introduction. Additionally, the invention phase was incorporated into the product 
development phase, as they are thematically closely related and difficult to separate. 
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Figure 18: TOMP Framework 
The universality of the induced factors cannot be totally verified due to the sample of 23 analyzed 
cases. However, in analyzing case studies, it is essential to show that distinct patterns repeatedly 
emerge in a similar form. Thus, quantitative means can potentially underpin the relevance of cer-
tain CSFs. Therefore, Table 2 delivers an overview of the concrete indications with page numbers 
and thus, the frequencies of the CSFs that were found in the case studies. As the indications may be 
difficult to read, the table has been split and reprinted in Appendix I in a larger font size. 
In the following, each category and the associated CSFs will be explained. Furthermore, a concrete 
example from the analyzed case studies will be given that underpins the essence of the respective 
CSFs. 
4.2.1.1 Technology 
The first contextual element that determines success or failure of the innovation process is the 
value of the focal technology. The value a new technology offers depends on the attractiveness of a 
technological opportunity and the degree of difficulty a producer will encounter in exploiting it 
(Christensen, 1997, pp. 38–39). More precisely, the ratio of benefits to costs of obtaining the tech-
nology determines a technology’s value (Schilling, 2010, p. 77). The following two CSFs addressing 
the technology have been derived: Relative Advantageousness and Feasibility & Maturity. 
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Table 2: List of Indications for CSFs Derived from Case Studies with Page Numbers 
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Relative Advantageousness – Relative advantage is the degree to which a new technology is per-
ceived to be better than the incumbent technology it would replace (Rogers, 2003, p. 15). This 
advantage could contain economic benefits to the adopter or better performance (Byers et al., 2010, 
p. 268). Successful technology commercialization depends on the advantageousness of the central 
technology. Only if the adopters gain a significant advantage they would be willing to adopt it. 
In their case study of Matrix, Denend et al. highlighted the relative advantage of the 3D-chip tech-
nology for semiconductors. Traditionally, chips were developed in two dimensions. To improve the 
performance, engineers expanded the area of each chip. In the case of 3D-chips, functional transis-
tors were placed on multiple layers of a single chip and thus, dramatically increased the density of 
circuits on the chip. Since the price of silicon was roughly proportional to the area (not the volume) 
consumed per chip, this has a significant impact on the semiconductor cost model (Denend et al., 
2009, p. 108). 
Feasibility & Maturity – The degree of difficulty a producer will encounter in exploiting its technolo-
gy will be a CSF for technological innovation (Christensen, 1997, pp. 38–39). This depends on the 
feasibility & maturity of the technology. As technologies are better developed, learning-curves and 
scale advantages accrue, and the technologies become more certain and useful to users, facilitating 
their adoption (Schilling, 2008, pp. 57–58). In general, the technology in question must have a 
higher benefit-cost-ratio than the technology to be replaced (Keinz and Prügl, 2010, p. 274). 
Shapiro described in his case study of the Vitreon Corporation the Hyalite technology. By using an 
innovative glass-forming and coating process, Vitreon produced a specialized automotive glass and 
attained a strong market position. The process itself was very complex, hard to control, and subse-
quently quite difficult. Thus, the technology was mature, but its feasibility was closely linked to the 
involved personnel. When several process experts left the company, Vitreon faced tough problems 
that resulted in a significant sales decline (Shapiro, 2009, pp. 1014–1021). 
4.2.1.2 Target Market 
The first element shaping the context for the innovation process is the target market. According to 
Utterback, market factors appear to be the primary influence on technological innovation (Utter-
back, 1974, p. 621). The decisive question in technology commercialization is to find a target mar-
ket that values the characteristics of the focal technology. Hence, this is a marketing challenge, not a 
technological one (Christensen, 1997, pp. 208–209). The following market-related CSFs were 
identified to be crucial for the success of radical technological innovations: Market Match, Oppor-
tunity, Market Barriers, Environmental Context, and Competition. 
Market Match – The experience of technology driven companies shows that an extraordinary 
technical idea or solution will not coercively lead to commercial success (Bullinger, 1994, p. 85). 
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For utilizing a new technology an adequate market has to be identified at first. Therefore, the 
results of technology development have to be matched to a market need or a new market has to be 
developed for them (Ullman, 2003, p. 69). The ability to identify and exploit opportunities is seen as 
a major driver of the potential market success (Henkel and Jung, 2009, p. 1). 
With the case study of SMaL Camera Technologies, Christensen and Anthony pointed out that a 
strategic selection of the target market is essential for success. The company, building kits for ultra-
small cameras, decided to serve the market for consumer cameras first. It then planned to address 
the security and surveillance market with the long-term vision of selling to the automotive industry. 
The automotive opportunity seemed to be the largest, but due to long lead times within this indus-
try, the chances of overall success for SMaL were supposed to be higher when firstly taking the 
other two options (Christensen and Anthony, 2009, p. 352). 
Opportunity – An opportunity is a timely and favorable juncture of circumstances providing a good 
chance for market success (Byers et al., 2010, p. 26). As developing innovations usually require an 
extensive amount of capital investment, identifying an adequate market opportunity is essential to 
recover these costs and to become profitable (Ullman, 2003, p. 69). Choosing the right opportunity 
depends on the question where the best chances for success are available within the context of the 
marketplace (Byers et al., 2010, p. 36). 
O`Keeffe reported in her case study of a great market opportunity for ARM that determined the 
company’s global success. Nokia did not emphasize the microprocessor as a key differentiator for 
their products. Thus, ARM had the chance to become the defacto global standard for microproces-
sor designs as Nokia did not care that its competitors were using the same design. ARM was able to 
license its design to a huge range of customers from different markets and industries (O’Keeffe, 
2002, p. 17). 
Market Barriers – The access to markets can be hampered by existent market barriers. Dependent 
on the industry, the obstacles can differ. Some of these barriers are spontaneous or sudden while 
others are purposefully designed by established companies to prevent others from stepping in. 
According to Kotler, the main market barriers are economies of scale, high capital demand, patent 
situation, image requirements, and lack of appropriate locations, resources or suppliers (Kotler et 
al., 2007, p. 1092). 
The case study of Elio Engineering Inc. by Sankara and Winkmann serves as a good example of how 
market barriers could affect the opportunities of technology driven companies. Elio developed a 
seat design which was easier to use, had a higher comfort level, and was potentially safer (Sankara 
and Winkmann, 2009, p. 16). OEMs within the automotive industry emphasized reliability and 
standardized processes combined with certification norms and thus, prefered to deal with only a 
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very limited number of suppliers. Hence, it was extremely difficult for a new entrant like Elio to 
compete with the incumbent companies (Sankara and Winkmann, 2009, pp. 28–29). 
Environmental Context – As companies are acting in an environment which is influenced by parame-
ters that are not controllable by the firm itself, they have to be very sensitive to these impacts at the 
point of strategic decision making (Kerth et al., 2007, p. 117). At analyzing the environmental 
context, six components are essential: political, economic, social, technological, legal, and environ-
mental influences (Kotler et al., 2007, p. 237). 
Christensen and Yu reported on Pitney Bowes, a company that developed a postage printer called 
“Stamp Expressions”. The printer was supposed to be owned by individuals as a more convenient 
alternative to postal stamps and allowed customers to print-on-demand postage in their homes or 
offices that featured their own corporate logos or photographs (Christensen and Yu, 2009, p. 878). 
Historically, U.S. regulations have prohibited individuals from owning a postal value storage device. 
Therefore, the company had to negotiate with the U.S. Postal Service as it was dependent on their 
permission (Christensen and Yu, 2009, p. 885). 
Competition – To be the main party to reap the benefits of a technology the innovating company has 
to be carefully aware of existent and emerging competition in the target market. If the technology 
proves to be valuable, it is just a question of time until competitors will enter the market (Schilling, 
1998, p. 277). Being aware of competition could help to increase warning times before competitors 
would introduce competing innovations (Brockhoff, 1991, p. 91). 
With the case study of SMal, Christensen and Anthony gave a vivid example of how competitors 
could affect a company’s business. The MIT spin-off proved with its credit card-sized camera that a 
market existed for very small cameras. Soon after the first successes, competitors entered the field 
and forced SMal to change their strategic direction (Christensen and Anthony, 2009, p. 359). 
4.2.1.3 Organization 
The organization itself can facilitate or hamper the innovation process due to several internal 
characteristics, including its resources, personnel, and patterns of communication and decision 
making (Utterback, 1974, p. 621). Some of these characteristics are formal and represent the way 
an organization divides its labor into distinct tasks while others are informal through their natural-
ly occurring behavioral patterns (Tornatzky and Fleischer, 1990, pp. 154–155). As radical techno-
logical innovations pose particular challenges to an organization, the following CSFs have been 
derived that address the organizational context: Company Culture, Internal Communication, People, 
Size, Flexibility & Autonomy, Finance & Funding, Management & Owner Commitment, and Organiza-
tional Home. 
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Company Culture – Company Culture is the sum of values, beliefs, codes of conduct, and mindsets 
within the company (Vahs and Brem, 2012, p. 191). It represents the collective personality of a 
company and predetermines its basic attitude towards innovation (Birkenmeier and Brodbeck, 
2010, p. 27). Consequently, an innovation-friendly company culture is fundamental for the 
successful realization of technological innovations. Therefore, an open atmosphere, areas of free-
dom for the innovators, and a climate of risk tolerance has to be created (Vahs and Brem, 2012, p. 
190). 
Around the globe, 3M is recognized as one of the world’s most innovative companies. The reasons 
are closely linked to the company’s innovation-friendly culture. To promote the innovative spirit, 
the 3M management cultivates a climate of informality, failure tolerance as part of the innovation 
process, entrepreneurship and intrapreneurship, and technology exchange within the company. 
This is formally manifested by the 30% and the 15% rule. 30% of 3M’s sales must result from 
products introduced in the last four years and technical people are allowed to spend 15% of their 
time on their own projects (Conceição et al., 2002, pp. 30–32). 
Internal Communication – The innovation process is a highly uncertain endeavor. Hence, there is a 
need for an intensive information exchange across disciplinary and functional boundaries to evalu-
ate and respond to new and often unforeseen technical and market circumstances (OECD, 1971, p. 
13). Especially at product development, a lack of internal communication can be extremely unfa-
vorable and can subsequently lead to a poor fit between product attributes and customer require-
ments (Schilling, 2010, p. 266).  
Correspondingly, O’Keeffe reported of ARM’s perception that oiling the wheels of internal commu-
nication is one of the keys to successful innovation (O’Keeffe, 2002, p. 15). 
People – The employment of a technological innovation is strongly dependent on the involved 
people. Firstly, technological knowledge is mainly person-embodied. Secondly, in the meanwhile 
successful innovations are not due to genius inventions of individuals (OECD, 1971, p. 16), but due 
to the cooperation of integrative development teams (Vahs and Brem, 2012, p. 204). Hence, the 
appropriate composition of team members depends on specialist knowledge on the one hand, and 
on the personalities of the individuals on the other hand (Schilling, 2010, pp. 267–268). 
In the case study of HP’s attempt to commercialize the 1.3-inch hard disk drive, the team was 
composed of risk takers with a strong can-do attitude. Though the project failed, none of the team 
members was laid off, as the company attested that they performed well (Christensen and Rogers, 
1997, p. 18). 
Size, Flexibility & Autonomy – As uncertainty is high in the case of radical technological innovations, 
the ability to respond to market needs in a flexible manner is decisive. Flexibility within product 
Heuristics and Model Building for Critical Success Factors 
47 
development is closely linked to company size (Schilling, 2008, p. 91). In the case of large organiza-
tions the danger of too much bureaucracy which hampers flexibility and the ability to respond 
rapidly to market needs, is factual (Vahs and Brem, 2012, p. 82). Christensen stated that the only 
instances in which mainstream firms have successfully established a timely position in a radical, 
disruptive technology were those in which the firms’ managers set up an autonomous organization 
in charge of building a new and independent business for the disruptive technology (Christensen, 
1997, p. xix). Large organizations strive for efficiency and well-defined processes. However, true 
innovations, as a rule, and supported by research in the field, do not evolve within tight structures 
and hierarchies. Thus, for commercializing technologies either the technology needs to be spun out 
or a fully autonomous organization within the parent company has to be established (Holzschuher 
and Pechlaner, 2007, p. 45). 
Christiansen et al. underlined in their Case Study of PC&D Inc. that employing a distinct business 
idea or technology affords flexibility at research and development efforts. To reach this aim, PC&D 
Inc. followed a strategy of setting up small, independent subsidiaries to leverage technology com-
mercialization. Especially regarding decision making, this has been an effective approach (Christi-
ansen et al., 1988, pp. 528–529). 
Finance & Funding – One fundamental issue to the overall innovation process is finance & funding 
as financial capital is one of the elementary resources enterprises need to operate (Cassar, 2004, p. 
261). If the technology remains within the company, funding is generally realized by the parent 
company. However, involving the executing staff in funding could increase the entrepreneurial 
spirit of these people and raise their motivation to bring the project to success. In the case of spin-
offs or start-ups, these companies need to acquire investors or take on debt or equity. This should 
be considered carefully due to the fact that capital decisions and the use of debt and equity during 
the ramp-up phase have important implications for business operations, firm performance, the risk 
of failure, and the potential of business expansion (Cassar, 2004, p. 263). 
Poel and Burgelman described with their case study of the computer company CDC how CDC tried 
to handle the funding of their corporate spin-offs. The company facilitated a number of spin-offs in 
high-technology fields to stimulate new businesses. Therefore, CDC wanted to retain some interest 
within the spin-offs but help the entrepreneurs by providing them significant freedom (Poel, M. van 
den and Burgelman, 1988, p. 581). Consequently, those spin-offs were funded by a CDC minority 
participation and a venture capital group created for that purpose (Poel, M. van den and Burgelman, 
1988, p. 591). 
Management & Owner Commitment – Management commitment or in the case of a spin-off or start-
up investor commitment is important for the success of any strategy. For the innovation process 
this appears to be even more relevant (Saleh and Wang, 1993, p. 15). In the face of high uncertain-
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ties and long-time horizons, technological innovations open up specific challenges. Therefore, top 
management’s commitment, especially regarding risk taking, is needed (OECD, 1971, p. 13). By 
investing into a new technology the managers or investors show initial commitment, but beyond 
that deep support, cautiousness, and goodwill are required to reach market maturity and commer-
cial success (Meier, 2007, p. 282). 
Before the very successful Centrino-launch, Intel’s platform addressing the mobile computer mar-
ket, Centrino managers wanted to create a buffer in case demand exceeded expectation. As the 
production of Pentium 4 had to be reduced it was a question of manufacturing capacity. Intel’s top 
management supported the Centrino project. This was a real proof of confidence because the 
product was new and the demand could not be accurately predicted (Burgelman et al., 2009, pp. 
1156–1157). 
Organizational Home – For technologies that are not totally spun out, but stay e.g. as an autono-
mous division within the parent company, there eventually comes a time to decide where in the 
organization they should be integrated. To fully reap the benefits of a technology, an adequate 
organizational home must be found. Thereby, the difficulty is that potentially game-changing tech-
nologies are not underresourced if they do not fit the company’s current infrastructure (O`Connor 
and DeMartino, 2006, p. 487). 
Christensen reported on an ‘orphaned’ technological innovation within the postage meter company 
Pitney Bowes. The company developed a document management solution for hospitals that signifi-
cantly increased hospital profitability, but as no adequate organizational home was found, the 
project was abandoned (Christensen and Yu, 2009, p. 883). 
4.2.1.4 Innovation Process 
Besides the context for radical technological innovations, the innovation process itself has naturally 
a great impact on success or failure. While less successful organizations treat the innovation pro-
cess as a series of separate steps that cannot be tightly managed, the leading organizations view the 
process as a set of action demanding high discipline (Nevens, 1990, p. 21). Due to the fact that the 
process is not unidirectional, different sets of functions, activities, and networks must occur simul-
taneously to overcome obstacles and barriers (Gibson and Smilor, 1991, p. 292). As written above, 
the innovation process contains the stages product development, market introduction, and diffusion.  
Product Development 
Within the product development stage, the following CSFs for radical technological innovations 
have been identified: Intellectual Property, Lead User Integration, Risk Management, and Speed & 
Costs. 
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Intellectual Property – A crucial element is the question whether, and to what extent, a firm should 
protect its intellectual property. To be the first to benefit from a technological innovation’s rewards, 
a company has to plan carefully its protection strategy. If a firm neglects the protection of its inno-
vation, competitors could easily imitate and benefit from it. On the other hand, not to vigorously 
protect an innovation can help to increase its diffusion and support the establishment of a domi-
nant design position (Schilling, 2008, p. 182). 
Denend et al. described in their case study the intellectual property strategy of Matrix, a company 
that developed 3-D semiconductor chips. Matrix aggressively filed for a broad patent protection 
across the 3-D semiconductor space and therewith protected multiple generations of its products. 
Thus, the company could license its technology to other companies and gain royalties if it would 
decide not to actively address all of the areas it has ultimately protected (Denend et al., 2009, p. 
111). 
Lead User Integration – In the case of radical technological innovations conventional market re-
search methods face limitations (Herstatt and Hippel, 1992, p. 213). To overcome these obstacles, 
Eric von Hippel created a method to integrate lead users in the product development process. In his 
definition, lead users display two significant characteristics: They face needs earlier than other 
users and they benefit significantly by obtaining a solution to those needs (Hippel, 1986, p. 796). By 
integrating them into the product development process, the probability of success will be higher. 
Christensen reported that Pitney Bowes a U.S. postage meter company made very positive experi-
ence with their customer-centered approach which was heavily influenced by Eric von Hippel’s 
method for finding new growth opportunities. Their approach focused on understanding emergent 
and unspoken customer needs and values by using prototypes (Christensen and Yu, 2009, pp. 883–
884). 
Risk Management – Risk is the chance or possibility of loss with regard to financial, physical, or 
reputational issues (Byers et al., 2010, p. 138). Introducing a radical technological innovation into 
the market means to be in a high-risk, low-data state (Moore, 2005, p. 90). Correspondingly, the 
risk of failure is high and thus, the need for strategic risk management is obvious. By constantly 
asking about potential challenges to the product, the brand, and its business model, a company can 
effectively manage risks (Byers et al., 2010, p. 156). 
O’Keeffe described how ARM managed their biggest risk in their business. By licensing its chip 
designs to semiconductor companies, the fate of ARM was in the hands of its customers (O’Keeffe, 
2002, p. 5). The company knew that it needed partnerships to get the ARM chip design embedded 
into end products. Thus, ARM strategically chose its partners and similarly cooperated closely with 
market-leading OEMs (O’Keeffe, 2002, p. 8). 
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Speed & Costs – The main impacts on the efficiency of the product development process are speed 
and costs. Time-to-market becomes increasingly an important parameter for the commercial 
success of innovations, as the length of product life cycles generally decreases. Hence, the period in 
which investments can be earned back diminishes. Furthermore, within product development, a 
great portion of the costs will be determined by the product design and consumed by the develop-
ment process itself. Therefore, product development is from a cost-perspective a very important 
phase (Bullinger, 1994, p. 118), (Verburg et al., 2005, p. 8). 
The Sony Walkman case study by Sanderson and Uzumeri can serve as a good example for efficient 
product development. By their platform strategy, Sony managed to realize design changes at a very 
low-cost level, that Sony only needs to sell 30,000 units worldwide to break even on a new model 
(Sanderson and Uzumeri, 1995, p. 777). Additionally, Sony was consistently faster than its competi-
tors in getting new models to market. This capability enabled Sony to occupy a leading position 
over decades (Sanderson and Uzumeri, 1995, p. 761). 
Market Introduction 
The market introduction stage is shaped by these CSFs: Value Proposition, Cope with Uncertainty, 
Sensitiveness to Market Needs, and Timing. 
Value Proposition – The central element of a company’s market offer is its value proposition (Os-
terwalder et al., 2010, p. 22). Wouters defines value in business markets as the worth in monetary 
terms of the technical, economic, service, and social benefits a customer company receives in ex-
change for the price it pays for a market offering. The best way to understand customer value is to 
compare it to the next-best alternative (Wouters, 2009, p. 1028). 
With the establishment of the digital division, Donnelley & Sons, one of the world leading compa-
nies in the commercial printing business, offered their customers a totally new value proposition. 
Traditionally, a printing order was linked to high fix costs which could be abolished through digital 
printing. Donnelley became much more flexible especially for short runs and was able to get signifi-
cantly higher margins therewith (March, 2009, pp. 905–910). 
Cope with Uncertainty – Especially in the early stages of the innovation process, uncertainty is high. 
Both emerging and pacing technologies are characterized by vague competitive impact and their 
final application areas may not be apparent (Schilling, 2008, p. 54), (Bullinger, 1994, p. 96). Tradi-
tional management methods relying on a stable business environment are inadequate. Just to trust 
on planning and forecasting without any customer feedback during the commercialization phase 
may be fatal and lead to failure (Ries, 2011, p. 9). 
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The case of HP, as reported by Christensen and Rogers, represents an impressive example of how a 
company failed to deal with uncertainty. HP formed a team to develop a revolutionary 1.3-inch 
20MB drive which was code-named Kittyhawk. The team focused on the PDA market and thus, 
followed a thoroughly derived requirements list. The Kittyhawk-drive was developed on time and 
introduced in the schedule, but the PDA market never emerged as expected (Christensen and 
Rogers, 1997, pp. 1–8). In retrospect, the HP project managers view their faith on the initial market 
forecasts as their biggest mistake. Given a second chance, they would choose a more exploratory, 
flexible approach toward product design (Christensen, 1997, p. 153). 
Sensitiveness to Market Needs – Numerous companies offered technologically advanced products 
but have failed to match customer requirements and were subsequently rejected by the market 
(Schilling, 2010, p. 240). Thus, sensitiveness to market needs is a decisive success parameter for 
technological innovations especially as uncertainty is high. 
Conceição et al. described in their case study 3M’s strong commitment to developing products 
driven by the marketplace and the company’s emphasizing on sensing market needs. In order to 
create products that really satisfy the customer needs, both sales representatives and technical 
people had to be in frequent contact with the customer where the products being used (Conceição 
et al., 2002, p. 32). 
Timing – To profit fully from technological innovations requires finding the appropriate time to 
launch (Jolly, 1997, p. 320). The optimal timing of entry is a function of several factors, including 
the degree of advantage, the state of enabling technologies, the customer expectations, the competi-
tor’s position, and a firm's resources (Schilling, 2010, p. 104). 
Burgelman et al.’s case study of the Intel Centrino launch contributes to the CSF of timing. The 
company feared losses upwards of hundreds of millions of dollars as the Centrino’s launch had to 
be delayed from January to March 2003 due to the fact that the wireless component was not ship-
pable. As the wireless component was one of the key components of their Centrino platform, Intel 
decided to postpone the launch. Subsequently, the platform was very successful (Burgelman et al., 
2009, pp. 1155–1157). 
Diffusion 
For the diffusion stage, the subsequent set of CSFs were defined: Marketing, Platform Strategy & 
Product Family, and Strategic Alliances / Partnerships. 
Marketing – Good technological innovations do not usually sell themselves (Gibson and Smilor, 
1991, p. 291). Thus, appropriate marketing is essential to recover the efforts made for product 
development and to become profitable. In general, marketing means taking actions to create, grow, 
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maintain, or defend markets (Moore, 2005, p. 28). When designing the marketing plan, the firm 
must take into account both the characteristics of the innovation and the characteristics of the 
market (Schilling, 2008, pp. 293–294). 
In their case study of the Data Net Corporation, Frevola and Maidique described how the company 
marketed its product – a Factory Data Collection Terminal (Frevola and Maidique, 1988, p. 389). 
The company sold the first systems with a 100% money-back guarantee if the system did not work 
to gain trust in the conservative manufacturing market. Data Net chose a direct sales strategy and 
promoted their product through trade shows, targeted advertising and a direct-mail campaign that 
finally led to huge commercial success (Frevola and Maidique, 1988, pp. 407–409). 
Platform Strategy & Product Family – To commercialize a technology and exhaust all success from it, 
an elaborate platform strategy is essential. This is the basis for deriving a well-organized product 
family which builds the offer of a company to its market. A firm can take advantage of its platform 
and component commonality by sharing parts between its end-products. Nevertheless, products 
can be effectively differentiated in the eyes of the customer by e.g. various designs, equipment, and 
performance categories (Dahmus et al., 2001, p. 409). 
An outstanding example of an exceptional platform and portfolio management is covered in the 
case study of the Sony Walkman served by Sanderson and Uzumeri. In the 1980s, Sony offered 
almost 250 models just in the U.S. market. With the platforms as a basis, only small changes in 
features, packaging, and appearance were needed to create these models (Sanderson and Uzumeri, 
1995, p. 770). 
Strategic Alliances / Partnerships – The establishment of strategic alliances and partnerships could 
help a company to employ a technological innovation successfully. Partnerships are composed of 
the company’s network of suppliers, customers, and partners. The aim is to utilize the synergy 
potential between the partners and to reduce costs, risks, and development time (Vahs and Brem, 
2012, p. 84). 
For commercializing the Wi-Fi-Technology which was the key element of the Centrino platform, 
Intel was dependent on two important partners: the hot-spot location owners and the Wi-Fi service 
provider. Hence, to guarantee broad Wi-Fi-availability for its laptops, Intel cooperated closely with 
airports and hotel chains as the majority of the users were corporate employees at the time of the 
Centrino-launch (Burgelman et al., 2009, p. 1155). 
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4.3 Discussion and Limitations 
In general, the two decisive criteria determining the quality of research undertaken are reliability 
and validity. Reliability describes the stability and accuracy of the measurement while validity 
reflects if it has been measured what was intended. Within the secondary case study analysis, 
reliability was reached by iterative feedback loops to check and revise the induced CSFs. To fulfill 
the criteria of validity, the case studies have been selected carefully (cf. Chapter 4.1.1). One fact 
additionally contributing to the achievement of validity with respect to construct validity is that all 
CSFs found in previous studies (cf. Chapter 2.2) have been detected by our analysis as well (Mayr-
ing, 2010, p. 116). 
Essentially, theory generated from case studies is rich in detail about specific phenomena but lacks 
the simplicity of an overall perspective. The risks are that the theory describes a very idiosyncratic 
phenomenon and is thus, difficult to generalize (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 547). However, analyzing 
multiple case studies has the advantage to gain access to condensed data of several radical techno-
logical innovation projects. 23 cases of companies with various sizes from different fields and 
industries that addressed different markets have been analyzed. Obviously, the cases are disparate 
in nature, but the involved companies were all technology driven and the cases fulfilled the initially 
described criteria for case selection. Correspondingly, this disparate set enriches the theory gener-
alization as various fields are covered that all face a similar challenge. Thus, the capability for 
theory generalization rises with this case compilation as this cross-case analysis delivers success 
patterns in the domain of consideration. Nevertheless, one limitation of the chosen approach is the 
retrospective nature of the analyzed case studies. Hence, the processes have probably been viewed 




5 Qualitative Validation of Critical Success 
Factors 
5.1 Literature Review 
Linking scientific results to literature is important in most research, but it is particularly crucial to 
building theory based on case study research. Case study findings often rest on a very limited 
number of cases and the strength of the results can be supported and further validated by a link to 
existing literature (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 544–545). Similarly, because the TOMP framework is 
based on the analysis of only 23 case studies, a thorough literature review is critical. 
5.1.1 Methodology 
The comparison of generated theory with existent literature involves analyzing similarities, contra-
dictions, and their underlying reasons. Conflicting literature is important for two reasons: first, the 
reader`s confidence might be reduced if conflicting findings would have been ignored by the re-
searcher (a challenge of internal validity) or the reader may assume that the findings are idiosyn-
cratic to the specific sample of the study (a challenge of generalizability). Second, the juxtaposition 
of conflicting literature represents an opportunity for researchers as they are forced to thoroughly 
question their findings to potentially achieve sharper theory and finally better results. Confirming 
results, on the other hand, is important as it ties together similarities of phenomena normally not 
associated with each other. Hence, the applicability of the underlying theory may be enlarged 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 544–545). In summation, comparing the TOMP framework with the existent 
literature corroborates its internal validity and generalizability for conflicting as well as for con-
firming results. 
Taking the TOMP framework as a reference model and research guide, a structured and focused 
literature review of eleven standard books on the topic of radical technological innovation was 
conducted. With this approach, the aim was to compare, complement, and clarify the set of CSFs 
detailed in the TOMP framework. 
The central research questions for the literature review were the following: Which factors are 
mentioned in the literature to be critical for the success of radical technological innovations? Are 
these factors congruent to the compiled set of CSFs in the TOMP framework? Are any factors miss-
ing or superfluous? Is there any distinction made between CSFs that are influenced by the innova-
tion context and CSFs that are influenced by the innovation process? Do the four main categories of 
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the TOMP framework (technology, organization, target market, and innovation process) serve as a 
sound classification of the relevant CSFs? 
To answer these questions, the focus was laid on secondary literature, in particular, books. Books 
and monographs are written for specific audiences. Academic books follow an especially theoretical 
slant and provide a thorough overview of the state of research within a defined scope. The material 
is usually presented in a more ordered and accessible manner than it is in journals. Therefore, 
books are particularly useful when it comes to a comprehensive analysis of a complex topic – such 
as the realization of radical technological innovations (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 88). 
5.1.1.1 Sample of Books 
Before conducting the focused literature review outlined in this chapter, a large number of academ-
ic textbooks that address the topic of technology and innovation management was checked for 
relevance. As it is impossible to review every single piece of literature, the purpose was to study the 
most relevant books that stress the central topic in the best way. For selecting appropriate books, 
clearly defined criteria were followed to evaluate the books’ relevance. This included a considera-
tion of the subject area, the overall quality, the literature type, the language of publication, the 
geographical area, and the publication period. The set of the ultimately selected books contains the 
most suitable books with respect to these criteria. To assess sufficiency, it was iteratively checked 
what constitutes an acceptable amount of content, in terms of both quality and quantity (Saunders 
et al., 2012, p. 108, 2012, p. 115, 2012, p. 74, 2012, p. 91). 
Finally, eleven books were chosen that address the topic of technology and innovation management 
on a holistic base and in a way that they have been adopted as academic standards for the afore-
mentioned topics (cf. Table 3). The chosen books were published from 1978 until 2013 in the USA, 
UK, and Germany. Ten of the eleven books were written in English. The book written in German 
was deliberately added to at least take into account the German-speaking scientific literature. 
Timeless factual-books (e.g. Kelly and Kranzberg, 1978, Christensen, 1997) and multiple released 
academic textbooks (e.g. Tidd et al., 2005, Schilling, 2010, Byers et al., 2010) were selected. With 
respect to quality, a focus was placed on books that were based on sound data and were composed 
of recognized scholars within the field. The chosen Books should follow a clear scientific style, be 
quoted in renowned studies, and accurately utilize references. 
5.1.1.2 Data Analysis 
In order to derive both similarities and differences in the perception of the CSFs for radical techno-
logical innovation, the literature has been deductively scanned. The TOMP framework was taken as 
a research guide. The index and the table of contents of each book were scanned for each CSF. If a 
CSF was described in a book, the corresponding phrases were highlighted and a short summary of 
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the author’s opinion was written. Following this procedure, the eleven books were reviewed and 
each CSF was checked in a step-by-step progress. For collection, storage, organization, and catego-
rization of the data, the reference management software Citavi 4 was used. 
Table 3: List of Analyzed Books 
Authors Title Year Reference 
Kelly & Kranzberg 
Technological Innovation - A Critical Review of Current 
Knowledge 
1978 




Processes of technological innovation 1990 (Tornatzky et al., 1990) 
Christensen 
The Innovator's Dilemma - When New Technologies Cause 
Great Firms to Fail 
1997 (Christensen, 1997) 
Jolly 
Commercializing New Technologies - Getting from mind to 
market 
1997 (Jolly, 1997) 
Tidd, Bessant & 
Pavitt 
Managing Innovation - Integrating Technological, Market 
and Organizational Change 
2005 (Tidd et al., 2005) 
White & Bruton 
The Management of Technology and Innovation - A 
strategic approach 
2007 




Managing Global Innovation - Uncovering the Secrets of 
Future Competitiveness 
2008 (Boutellier et al., 2008) 
Schilling Strategic management of technological innovation 2010 (Schilling, 2010) 
Byers, Dorf & Nelson Technology Ventures – From Idea to Enterprise 2010 (Byers et al., 2010) 
Trott Innovation Management and New Product Development 2012 (Trott, 2012) 
Vahs & Brem 
Innovationsmanagement - Von der Idee zur erfolgreichen 
Vermarktung 
2013 (Vahs and Brem, 2012) 
5.1.2 Findings 
5.1.2.1 Main Categories 
Within the TOMP framework, a distinction was made between CSFs that are influenced by the 
innovation context on the one hand and the innovation process on the other hand. The analysis of 
the eleven books showed that most of the authors similarly distinguish between the innovation 
context and the innovation process. As the framework of Tornatzky and Fleischer and the frame-
works of Cooper and Kleinschmidt (cf. Figure 12, Figure 11, and Figure 14) were used as a research 
roadmap for the secondary case study analysis, this basic differentiation of context and process is 
fundamental to the TOMP framework and based on the conception of these frameworks. Tornatzky 
and Fleischer state that the context in which technological innovation takes place can have a signifi-
cant influence on the outcome of the innovation process. To further emphasize, the innovation 
context itself does indeed either constrain or facilitate the concrete process meaning that a perfect-
ly executed process may even result in failure (Tornatzky and Fleischer, 1990, p. 174, 1990, p. 152). 
Four CSF-categories are central to the TOMP framework: technology, organization, market, and 
process. It was estimated that there is a correlation between certain categories. To achieve success 
in innovation, the categories must also match. The organization needs to match to the target mar-
ket. The technology needs to match to the organization and to the target market. Furthermore, the 
innovation process itself needs to match to the complete innovation context. These estimations 
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were confirmed by the literature review. According to Christensen, exploiting radical technological 
innovations in commercial organizations requires that the addressed market matches the charac-
teristics of the concrete organization. Regarding this, he emphasize that, for example, small, emerg-
ing markets cannot solve the near-term growth and profit requirements of large companies (Chris-
tensen, 1997, p. 121). Furthermore, Byers stresses that the customers in the addressed target 
market want a solution to their problem and usually do not care what technology is employed 
(Byers et al., 2010, p. 27). Nevertheless, Trott outlines that excellent technology can help companies 
to achieve competitive advantage and long-term financial success (Trott, 2012, p. 2). According to 
Christensen, matching the market to the technology is decisive to success. It is important to find a 
market that values the characteristics of a concrete technology. While developing a concrete prod-
uct is a technological challenge, finding the right market is a strategic marketing challenge (Chris-
tensen, 1997, pp. 226–227). Additionally, Schilling point out that numerous new products have 
offered technologically advanced features compared to its alternatives, but have failed to match 
customer requirements and were subsequently rejected by the market (Schilling, 2010, p. 240). In 
their efforts to provide better products than their competitors, suppliers often overshoot the re-
quirements of their target market. They serve customers more than they need and are willing to 
pay for (Christensen, 1997, p. xvi). For the customers it is the ratio of benefits to cost that deter-
mines the value (Schilling, 2010, p. 77). 
However, Trott emphasizes that technology by itself will not lead to success. Organizations must be 
able to convert intellect, knowledge, and technology into concrete products that customers want. 
Therefore, new ideas are the starting point for innovation. The process of transferring these intel-
lectual thoughts into products represents innovation exploitation and thus, commercialization 
(Trott, 2012, p. 178, 2012, p. 15). 
5.1.2.2 Concrete CSFs 
As the four main categories of the TOMP framework (technology, organization, target market, and 
innovation process) have been found to be a sound classification of the CSFs for radical technologi-
cal innovations, the concrete CSFs will be addressed by focusing on each of these categories. The 
origin of each statement taken from the analyzed books will be indicated by referencing the authors 
directly after each statement. 
Due to the sample of eleven analyzed books the universality of the CSFs cannot be totally validated. 
However, to highlight the relevance of the CSFs, it could help to show the frequencies of each factor. 
Therefore, Table 4 delivers an overview of the concrete indications with page numbers that were 
found in the analyzed eleven books. 
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Technology 
In the analyzed books, great importance is attached to the category of technology. Thereby, a tech-
nology’s relative advantageousness seems to be crucial for the innovation success. However, it is not 
sufficient to carry out a simple technical comparison to gain the competitive advantage of a focal 
technology (Byers et al., 2010, pp. 66–69). The customer’s perception of the technology, rather, is 
key (Tidd et al., 2005, p. 412). It is necessary to identify why a potential customer might look for an 
alternative to the existing solution. This may be caused by lower costs, superior performance, or 
greater reliability (Boutellier et al., 2008, p. 183; Tidd et al., 2005, p. 412). 
Besides its advantages, the technology’s behavior should be predictable and there should be few 
possibilities of errors (Tornatzky and Fleischer, 1990, pp. 128–129). Only a fully developed, high 
quality, and error-free product will be successful in the market. Therefore, the underlying technolo-
gy needs to be feasible and mature (Vahs and Brem, 2012, p. 75). 
Both factors relative advantageousness and feasibility & maturity are discussed in the studied books. 
However, the CSF relative advantageousness is described in much more detail (eight times) than 
the factor feasibility & maturity (three times). This is likely because a customer’s perception of a 
technology mainly addresses the relative advantages of the technology. Nevertheless, the relative 
advantages of a technology depend on its feasibility & maturity and are thus, a precondition for the 
market success. 
Target Market 
Besides Jolly, all authors value the importance of the target market for radical technological innova-
tions. The choice of the right target market is crucial (Vahs and Brem, 2012, p. 416) and the compa-
ny has to make sure that there is an interesting market for their product with respect to market size 
and potential (White and Bruton, 2007, pp. 68–69). Therefore, the opportunity in that addressed 
market should be big enough. As already mentioned, this is a question of market match. Small 
markets do not satisfy the growth targets of big companies, but may be suitable for start-ups or 
medium-sized companies (Christensen, 1997, pp. 164–165). The innovating organization has to 
ensure that the intended product suits the market (Schilling, 2010, p. 240). Thus, the company has 
to assess its own technological capability and the current market needs (Trott, 2012, p. 62).  At that 
point, it is important to monitor the market continuously and to be aware of what the market needs 
are. This is not only important for existing markets but also for new and changing markets and is 
especially crucial in dynamic market environments (Tidd et al., 2005, pp. 350–354).  
The ease of market entry depends on its structural characteristics. Potential market barriers are 
economies of scale, government regulations, switching costs, capital requirements or a patent 
situation that offers protection against competition (Byers et al., 2010, pp. 85–86; White and Bru-
ton, 2007, pp. 50–51). That these barriers are significant incentivizes innovation leaders to deliber-
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ately establish them to hinder their competitors to enter the market (Boutellier et al., 2008, pp. 16–
17). High entry barriers particularly discourage completely new entrants to the market as com-
pared to existing competitors since they make it difficult or expensive to enter an industry. One way 
to deal with existing entry barriers is to choose a cooperative strategy, i.e. entering a partnership 
(Schilling, 2010, pp. 96–97; Vahs and Brem, 2012, p. 422). 
Several of the authors value the analysis of a company’s environmental context to be important for 
the subsequent innovation success. The goal is to detect possibilities and opportunities but also 
threats and problems from outside the organization. Two common tools for the external analysis 
are Porter’s five-forces model, as well as stakeholder analysis (Schilling, 2010, pp. 110–114; Trott, 
2012, pp. 388–389; White and Bruton, 2007, pp. 47–53). One important part of external monitoring 
is to pay attention to the competition in the target market. The company should have a competitive 
strategy which drives new product planning (Trott, 2012, pp. 386–389). Additionally, benchmark-
ing and learning from competitors can help to strengthen the company’s position in the market. 
Subsequently, there are positive and negative impacts of competitive rivalry on a company’s inno-
vativeness (Kelly and Kranzberg, 1978, pp. 95–96; Tornatzky and Fleischer, 1990, pp. 169, 171). 
Nearly all five CSFs that have been assigned to the category target market in the TOMP framework 
are discussed in rich detail in the chosen sample of books. The factors market match, market barri-
ers, external environment, and competition are each mentioned by five to eight authors. Opportunity, 
though, is only described three times. The fact that all the other CSFs contribute to the factor oppor-
tunity of a certain target market could explain this disparity. Depending on the level of market 
barriers, the competitive situation, the external market environment, and the matching of the market 
with the technology and the central organization, the attractiveness of the correlated market oppor-
tunity is shaped. 
Organization 
The conducted literature analysis highlights that the innovating organization has a huge impact on 
the probability of innovation success. The firm itself, its internal structure, and the degree to which 
it uses formalized and standardized procedures and controls can constrain or facilitate the realiza-
tion of radical technological innovations (Schilling, 2010, p. 213). Tornatzky and Fleischer define 
the organizational context in terms of firm size, centralization & formalization, complexity of its 
managerial structure, internal communication, quality of its human resources, and the amount of 
slack resources available internally (Tornatzky and Fleischer, 1990, p. 153). Especially for radical 
innovations, an innovation-friendly company culture is crucial. This should be built on trust, open-
ness, communication, creativity, conflict management, and error tolerance (Boutellier et al., 2008, 
pp. 28–29; Byers et al., 2010, pp. 294–297).  
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The influence of company size on innovation success, however, is ambiguous (Kelly and Kranzberg, 
1978, p. 91). Size and the structure of a big company bring advantages like economies of scale in 
R&D and learning benefits, but similarly disadvantages such as inertia and governance problems 
(Schilling, 2010, pp. 208–216). The challenge is to find the most appropriate fit with the particular 
circumstances (Tidd et al., 2005, pp. 473–476). When it comes to radical technological innovations, 
the organic and flexible structures of small units are more suitable than the mechanistic structures 
of big entities (Trott, 2012, pp. 101–103). Flexible structures facilitate free communication (Byers et 
al., 2010, pp. 283–287). Internal communication is an important factor for successfully coordinating 
the innovation process and pursuing innovation goals (Vahs and Brem, 2012, pp. 399–406). 
Since the innovation process is costly, securing funds is decisive for the success of an innovation 
project (Kelly and Kranzberg, 1978, p. 71). In big companies, new innovation projects have to 
compete with other projects whereas small companies and start-ups have to face the problem of 
finding external investors (Tidd et al., 2005, pp. 536–539; Trott, 2012, pp. 295–298). As the realiza-
tion of radical technological innovations is a very uncertain endeavor, management and owner 
commitment is important to encourage and motivate the operational team. The management should 
clearly communicate the organization’s goals, foster a climate favorable for innovation, support the 
project, and strongly reward innovation success (Tornatzky and Fleischer, 1990, p. 160). 
To fully reap the benefits of an innovation an adequate organizational home must be found. Compa-
nies should seek to embed the innovation project in an organization that fits the requirements of 
the innovation (Christensen, 1997, pp. 134–135). However, it is often hard to fold back the project 
team into the organization if the project is completed (Schilling, 2010, pp. 270–271). 
The involved people are the most important element in the innovation process and should be 
motivated and enthusiastic (Kelly and Kranzberg, 1978, pp. 12–14). Cross-functional and interdis-
ciplinary teams help to foster innovation and the management needs to assign the right people in 
the different stages of the innovation process (Jolly, 1997, pp. 374–377; Schilling, 2010, pp. 262–
265). 
The factors company culture, internal communication, finance & funding, and management & owner 
commitment are described and analyzed in detail in the selected literature and thus, seem to be 
relevant factors for the realization of radical technological innovations. As the factors people and 
size, flexibility & autonomy are mentioned in ten of eleven books, these factors can be argued to 
have a great influence on the innovation success. The factor organizational home has not been 
emphasized and discussed in most of the reviewed literature (only twice). Moreover, the books by 
Tidd et al. (Tidd et al., 2005), Schilling (Schilling, 2010), and Byers et al. (Byers et al., 2010) empha-
size the importance of a company’s strategic direction for the success of a radical technological 
innovation. 




At product development, the question of how to protect a company’s intellectual property immedi-
ately arises. Since knowledge and innovation are vital for competitive success, the management of 
intellectual property is important (Byers et al., 2010, pp. 237–239). Protecting an innovation en-
sures that the innovating company earns the majority of the returns created from introducing the 
innovation to the market (Schilling, 2010, pp. 198–199). The optimal protecting strategy has to be 
adjusted to the company-specific needs and should be linked to the commercialization strategy 
(Jolly, 1997, pp. 110–119; Vahs and Brem, 2012, p. 459). To ensure that the final product meets 
customer requirements, involving customers or end-users in the new product development process 
is crucial. Lead user integration is one possibility to get early market feedback and to support the 
diffusion process of technology-intensive products (Schilling, 2010, p. 240; Trott, 2012, p. 67). 
Dealing with radical technological innovation implies high risks and uncertainty. Risk can be de-
scribed as the possibility of loss (Byers et al., 2010, p. 138). Within radical innovation projects, risks 
have to be constantly identified and assessed. Finally, to take calculated risks, a sound risk man-
agement should be in place (Trott, 2012, p. 95). In the face of shorter product life-cycles, the time 
period to reap the returns is ever shrinking for the innovating company (Boutellier et al., 2008, p. 
18). Thus, being efficient with respect to speed & costs within product development is essential 
(Schilling, 2010, pp. 234–335). 
The factors intellectual property, lead user integration, risk management, and speed & costs which 
have been assigned to the product development phase within the TOMP framework were found in 
several books. Each factor is mentioned five to eight times by the authors and described in rich 
detail. Hence, these factors can be considered crucial for the success of radical technological innova-
tions. 
Market Introduction 
In the phase of market introduction, the value proposition of a product predetermines how an 
innovation will be accepted in the market (Kelly and Kranzberg, 1978, p. 53). The value of an inno-
vation is multidimensional and comprises the worth, importance or usefulness to the customer 
(Byers et al., 2010, p. 56). It forms the comparative advantage of an innovation over similar prod-
ucts in the market and depends on the customers’ expectations and perceptions (Schilling, 2010, p. 
77; Vahs and Brem, 2012, p. 43). This implies that innovative products have to meet customer 
needs and values to be successful (Byers et al., 2010, p. 56). Therefore, sensitiveness to market needs 
and a strong customer focus is necessary (Boutellier et al., 2008, p. 168). Especially at the beginning 
of the product lifecycle, it is crucial for a company to know who the customers are and why they 
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might buy the product (Byers et al., 2010, pp. 253–255). Numerous new products which offered 
technologically advanced features were rejected since they failed to match customer requirements 
(Schilling, 2010, pp. 233–234). For a commercially viable new product, bridging technological 
uncertainty and market needs is decisive (Trott, 2012, p. 65). Even if all technical problems are 
solved, the uncertainty of commercialization remains to be high (Boutellier et al., 2008, p. 168). 
Uncertainty implies that the outcome of an action is not known or is likely to be variable (Byers et 
al., 2010, pp. 138–146). Coping with uncertainty is a central task of managing the innovation pro-
cess (Trott, 2012, pp. 85–89). Furthermore, the right timing of market entry is one of the most 
strategic decisions in innovation management (Christensen, 1997, pp. 122–124). The optimal 
timing depends on a variety of factors such as the innovation’s advantages, the state of enabling 
technologies, the threat of competitive entry, and the customer expectations (Schilling, 2010, pp. 
89–99). In principle, there are four strategic options: leader, early follower, late follower, and me-too 
(Vahs and Brem, 2012, pp. 108–110). 
The importance of market introduction is described in all analyzed books. The four CSFs value 
proposition, sensitiveness to market needs, cope with uncertainty, and timing have been extensively 
illustrated and are each mentioned six to ten times. Correspondingly, they seem to be relevant. 
Diffusion 
From a business perspective, an innovation is not a success until it has not been established and 
leveraged throughout the market (Schilling, 2010, p. 229). The earlier discussion of market intro-
duction highlighted some CSFs crucial to the launch strategy, but the act of bringing a product to the 
market is not an end in itself. On the contrary, it is the beginning of its commercialization (Trott, 
2012, p. 402). Usually, there is a gap between the adoption of an innovation by early adopters and 
by the mainstream market. To get across this chasm, marketing is an important factor. Marketing is 
a set of activities with the objective of winning, serving, and retaining customers for the firm’s 
product offering (Byers et al., 2010, pp. 252, 270-274). Thus, customers are central and their needs 
should always be focused (Tidd et al., 2005, pp. 422–425). A good chance to recoup the high initial 
investments of radical technological innovations is by sharing the underlying technology across 
different market fields and product families by deploying a platform strategy (Tidd et al., 2005, pp. 
31–32). Using standardized manufacturing platforms or components that can be mixed and 
matched in a modular production system is a good way to balance between efficiency and flexibil-
ity. This enables companies to achieve efficiency and reliability advantages at the component level 
while achieving variety and flexibility at the end product level (Schilling, 2010, p. 222). Innovation 
often demands collaboration, either in the development or commercialization process. Strategic 
Alliances and Partnerships can reduce the costs, risks, and time of development and commercializa-
tion (Boutellier et al., 2008, pp. 21–22; Tidd et al., 2005, pp. 461–490). Successful collaboration 
requires choosing partners that have both a resource fit and a strategic fit (Schilling, 2010, p. 177). 
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All reviewed books address the importance of the diffusion stage with the respective factors mar-
keting, platform strategy & product family, and strategic alliances & partnerships. These factors are 
mentioned seven to nine times in the chosen sample of books and can be considered to be im-
portant for the success of radical technological innovations. Several authors assign the CSF platform 
strategy & product family to the later phases of the innovation process and, correspondingly, the 
diffusion phase. However, they emphasize that this factor is more an issue of the product develop-
ment strategy (Trott, 2012, p. 381). Furthermore, the factor, strategic alliances and partnerships, 
was allocated in the TOMP framework to the diffusion phase and thus, to the later stages of the 
innovation process. This allocation should be questioned as several authors emphasize the im-
portance of collaboration in the product development phase as well. 
5.1.2.3 Summary 
When analyzing the sample of eleven standard books from innovation management literature, it 
becomes obvious that each book has a certain focus. Some books mainly address the innovation 
context for the emergence of radical technological innovations (Kelly and Kranzberg, 1978), (Tor-
natzky et al., 1990), (White and Bruton, 2007), while Jolly is targeting primarily the innovation 
process (Jolly, 1997). The remaining seven books discuss the innovation context and simultaneous-
ly the innovation process as parallel phenomena (Christensen, 1997), (Tidd et al., 2005), (Boutellier 
et al., 2008), (Schilling, 2010), (Byers et al., 2010), (Trott, 2012), (Vahs and Brem, 2012). White & 
Bruton and Boutellier et al. focus on big established organizations (Boutellier et al., 2008; White 
and Bruton, 2007), while Byers et al. mainly target new ventures (Byers et al., 2010). Trott, Schil-
ling, Tidd et al., and Vahs & Brem present the topic of radical technological innovations from both 
perspectives – established organizations and new ventures (Trott, 2012), (Schilling, 2010), (Tidd et 
al., 2005), (Vahs and Brem, 2012). Some books highlight the contrast of new, disruptive technolo-
gies and sustaining technologies, and the correlated consequences for the organizational structure 
of the innovating company (Christensen, 1997), (Jolly, 1997), (Trott, 2012). 
With these different perspectives on the topic of radical technological innovation, it becomes clear 
that their realization is strongly dependent on the respective innovation context. Correspondingly, 
there seems to be no universal set of factors for predicting the success of a specific radical techno-
logical innovation as the relative importance of the factors would be different depending on the 
contextual nature of the particular innovation. Depending on the situation, different CSFs will be 
more or less crucial, and some factors may even hinder rather than support the success of an inno-
vation (Balachandra and Friar, 1997, pp. 284–285). Besides the distinction of the innovation con-
text and the innovation process, the four main categories of the TOMP framework and their necessi-
ty to match to each other, were validated by the literature analysis. 
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Furthermore, the general arrangement and the concrete 25 CSFs within the TOMP framework were 
found to be sound. In the considered sample of books, the concrete CSFs of the categories target 
market and technology are described in detail. Within the category organization, the factor organi-
zational home is not emphasized or discussed in depth. Organizational home addresses the necessi-
ty that a radical innovation eventually has to be integrated into the coherent whole of the compa-
ny’s organizational structure if it is not to be totally spun out. That this factor is not detailed in the 
analyzed books is interesting. Immediately the question emerges if this factor is not critical for the 
success of radical technological innovations or if this represents a lack in literature. Furthermore, 
the books by Tidd et al. (Tidd et al., 2005), Schilling (Schilling, 2010), and Byers et al. (Byers et al., 
2010) claim that an organization’s strategy is equally important for the success of a radical techno-
logical innovation and that the respective innovation should be compatible to the company’s strate-
gic direction. This factor has not been part of the original TOMP framework. 
The factors that have been allocated to the product development and market introduction phases 
were validated by the literature review. With respect to the diffusion phase, several authors de-
scribe the CSF platform strategy & product family to be late in the innovation process. However, in 
contrast to the TOMP framework, they assign this factor to be part of the product development 
strategy. Additionally, some authors emphasize that in the product development phase, collabora-
tion is of great importance for radical technological innovations. Previously the factor strategic 
alliances and partnerships was allocated to the diffusion phase. This should be analyzed in more 
detail. It is likely that the types of strategic alliances change along the innovation process. While in 
the early stages strategically involving customers and lead users is important to cope with uncer-
tainty and design a product in accordance with the market needs, setting up a strategic network of 
suppliers, customers, and partners is crucial to the broad market penetration in the diffusion stage. 
In the TOMP framework, the innovation process is composed of the chronologically ordered phases 
of product development, market introduction, and diffusion. Perhaps it is prudent to classify these 
stages as three correlated fields of action and not chronological phases. 
5.1.3 Discussion and Limitations 
There are some limitations with respect to the conducted structured and focused literature review. 
Since the central research objective was to evaluate the TOMP framework, one limitation is the fact 
that the research project was not started in an unbiased way. Furthermore, due to the sample size 
with just eleven books, the results of the analysis are not generalizable. Although there has been a 
structured preselection of the ultimately analyzed books, this number represents just a small 
excerpt of the overall existing literature and thus, cannot claim universality. Extending this sample 
might lead to a better basement for the derived results. Moreover, books may contain out-of-date 
material even by the time they are published (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 88). Another limitation could 
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be the fact that there is no uniform concept of the central terminologies. This involves a slightly 
differing understanding of the central concepts in the analyzed literature. The definitions the 
author is following are presented in chapter 2.1. 
Through the analysis, the distinction of the innovation context and the innovation process was 
found to be central to the CSFs of radical technological innovations. Moreover, most of the CSFs of 
the TOMP framework could be identified in the reviewed books as well. More research is required 
to clarify how the innovation context concretely affects the innovation process. Therefore, the 
central questions are which factors constitute the sphere of concern and which the sphere of influ-
ence. As the realization of radical technological innovations is a very complex endeavor, a qualita-
tive research approach seems to be appropriate. Thus, non-standardized, guided interviews with 
experts in the field of technological innovation could help to generate an answer to these questions 
and validate the CSFs detailed in the TOMP framework. 
5.2 Expert Interviews 
According to the Oxford dictionary, an expert is a person who is very knowledgeable about or 
skillful in a particular area (Oxford dictionary, 2015). Experts have acquired knowledge that is not 
easily attainable to common sense through their specific educational and professional background. 
Systematically harvesting this knowledge can significantly foster the understanding and perception 
of a particular topic like the realization of radical technological innovations (Bogner et al., 2014, pp. 
9–10; Flick, 2007, p. 215). Accordingly, conducting expert interviews was meant to evaluate, ex-
pand, and clarify the set of CSFs detailed in the TOMP framework. 
5.2.1 Methodology 
To find access to the subjective knowledge of experts in a methodologically controlled manner with 
limited time and a specific focus, a non-standardized, guided interview format is appropriate (Flick, 
2007, p. 219). In non-standardized interviews, neither the questions of the interviewer nor the 
answers of the interviewee are standardized. An interview guide helps to address all important 
aspects of the focal topic and to structure the interview (Gläser and Laudel, 2010, p. 111, 2010, p. 
41). 
In the study, two rounds of expert interviews were conducted. In the first round, nine experts were 
interviewed in a rather inductive and unbiased mode. The questions were more open and free than 
in round two and detached from the TOMP framework. In the second round, ten experts were 
interviewed. In a deductive style, the questions were consequently focused on the TOMP frame-
work and the containing CSFs. At the end of the interviews in round two, the TOMP framework was 
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shown to the experts and they were asked for feedback. According to the different purposes of the 
two interview rounds, two separate interview guides have been developed. The interview guides 
formed the basis for the interviews and served as a memory aid and orientation framework. They 
consisted of a prepared list of open, clear, and neutral questions to be asked and answered in the 
interviews. Neither the formulation nor the order of the questions was binding (Gläser and Laudel, 
2010, p. 149, 2010, p. 143, 2010, p. 111; Lamnek, 2005, p. 367). 
To check the quality of the two interview guides, the first interview in each round was set up as a 
pretest. In both pretests, only slight modifications of the interview guide were needed. The final 
interview guides were used situation-related with respect to the wording, the order, and the timing 
of the questions. Both interview guides can be found in Appendix II – 1 & 2. 
5.2.1.1 Expert Sample 
According to the principle of theoretical sampling, selecting experts was carried out deliberately. It 
was a requirement that the potential interview partners had been involved in the realization of 
radical technological innovations. Intentionally, the sample of interviewees was heterogenic, con-
sisting of experts from organizations of different size and structure, which allowed for the gaining 
of a holistic perspective on the topic. The interviewed experts work as innovation managers, tech-
nology scouts, design and application engineers, business consultants, entrepreneurs, and scholars, 
and have different levels of work experience. 
The aim was to have a comparable sample of experts in both interview rounds. The recruitment of 
the experts was done from the southern part of Germany via the personal and business network of 
the author. Furthermore, the lists of participants of diverse industry and research conferences were 
screened for potential interview partners. In sum, 19 interviews were conducted – nine interviews 
in the first and ten in the second round. An overview of the interviewees of both rounds is given in 
Table 5. In Appendix II – 3 & 4 a more detailed description of the expert profiles is provided. 
5.2.1.2 Data Collection and Preparation 
The first interview round was conducted between April and July 2014 while the second round was 
conducted between August and October 2014. All interviews of the first round were recorded with 
a digital voice recorder. In round two, nine interviews were recorded and only for one interview, a 
protocol was prepared, as the corresponding expert refused to get recorded. In both rounds, two 
interviews were conducted in the premises of the researchers’ institute and the remaining inter-
views (seven in round one and eight in round two) were conducted at the respective workplace of 
the expert. The interviews of both rounds were scheduled for 90 minutes and lasted between 60 
and 110 minutes while the arithmetic mean amounts to 88 minutes. The total recording time of the 
19 interviews accumulate to 28 hours. 
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Table 5: Overview of the Interviewed Experts 






Round 1     
E1a Science Business Developer 1-3 1,000-10,000 
E1b Industry Independent Scientist 
and Consultant 
> 15 < 25 
E1c Industry Entrepreneur, CEO 7 - 15 25-100 
E1d Industry Manager Application 
Engineering 
> 15 > 10,000 
E1e Industry Entrepreneur, CEO > 15 25-100 
E1f Science Managing Director of 
a Research Institute 
> 15 100-1,000 
E1g Industry Head of New Tech-
nologies 
> 15 > 10.000 
E1h Industry Entrepreneur, CEO 7 - 15 < 25 
E1i Industry Innovation Manager > 15 1,000-10,000 
Round 2     
E2a Industry Entrepreneur, CEO 7 - 15 25-100 
E2b Science Managing Director of 
a Research Institute 
> 15 100-1,000 
E2c Science Head of Technology 
Transfer 
> 15 1,000-10,000 
E2d Industry Head of Innovation 
Department 
> 15 > 10,000 
E2e Industry Innovation Manager > 15 > 10,000 
E2f Industry Business Consultant > 15 < 25 
E2g Industry Business Developer 1-3 > 10,000 
E2h Industry Head of Business 
Development  
7 - 15 100-1,000 
E2i Industry Head of Advanced 
Development 
> 15 > 10,000 
E2j Industry Head of Innovation 
Department 
> 15 1,000-10,000 
 
Four of the interviews of round one and all interviews of round two have been conducted in a team. 
The team in round one was composed of the author and Konstantin Yakubovich, who was super-
vised in his master thesis by the author (cf. Yakubovich, 2014 for further details). In round two, the 
author was supported by Louisa Hellmann, who was similarly supervised in her master thesis by 
the author (cf. Hellmann, 2014 for further details). Generally, the idea was that two interviewers 
hear and see more than a single interviewer. Correspondingly, the interview quality could be en-
larged (Gläser and Laudel, 2010, pp. 154–155). 
Before analysis, the data was prepared and processed. In the case of interview data, the audio 
material, stored on the digital voice recorder, was transcribed for being available in a readable form 
(Lamnek, 2005, pp. 402–404). Mayring defines transcription as a complete textual capturing of the 
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collected oral material that forms the foundation for the subsequent interpretative evaluation 
(Mayring, 2002, p. 89). All of the recorded interviews were transcribed by using the F4-software. By 
following Kuckartz (Kuckartz, 2012), a set of rules was established to standardize transcription (cf. 
Appendix II – 5). The 19 interviews accumulate to roughly 270,000 words and 780 pages of written 
text. 
5.2.1.3 Data Analysis 
Data analysis was carried out by using the software MAXQDA 11 and by following the method of 
qualitative content analysis, in particular, content structuring. For content structuring, Mayring 
presents a general process model for systematically scanning texts for particular information. This 
process contains ten steps (cf. Figure 19). Relevant information is taken from the text and assigned 
to a category system which is the central instrument for content analysis (Mayring, 2010, p. 98). 
This process was followed to analyze the 19 interview transcripts. 
 
Figure 19: Process Model for Content Structuring (Mayring, 2010, pp. 93, 99) 
For defining the analysis unit, the smallest and largest part of the material that can be assigned to a 
category needs to be defined. The smallest part can be a segment of a sentence and the largest part 
can be whole sections of the conversation with more than one speaker change. Taking the TOMP 
framework as a basis, the initial category system was established (cf. Appendix II – 6). A concrete 
coding agenda with definitions, anchor examples, and coding rules was set up while running 
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through the first few interviews. Afterward, all interview transcripts were scanned by documenting 
each indication and the associated place of recovery for the corresponding CSFs. During this pro-
ceeding, the initial category system – derived from the TOMP framework – was iteratively reviewed 
and revised. Finally, the extracted text passages were paraphrased and a summary for the main 
categories and their subcategories (the CSFs) was written. 
5.2.1.4 Quality Criteria 
There is an ongoing discussion related to the question of which criteria should be applied for evalu-
ating the scientific quality of the qualitative research approach of expert interviews. As the common 
quality criteria of quantitative research (with respect to objectivity, reliability, and validity) are not 
easily transferable, Mayring proposed six quality criteria which were followed in this thesis: process 
documentation, argumentative protection of the interpretation, rule-based approach, proximity to the 
object, communicative validation, and triangulation (Bogner et al., 2014, p. 92; Mayring, 2002, pp. 
144–149). 
Process documentation – Data collection, preparation, and analysis need to be documented in detail 
to be traceable. In the previous part of this chapter, the crucial process steps, decisions, and associ-
ated reasons were described in detail. Moreover, besides one, each interview was recorded and 
stored together with the interview transcripts on the server of the EnTechnon. The interview 
guides of both rounds can be found in Appendix II – 1 & 2. 
Argumentative protection of the interpretation – As it is hardly possible to prove that an interpreta-
tion is correct, all interpretations should be conclusive and supported by arguments. In the subse-
quent results chapter, each statement and interpretation are supported by citations of the experts 
to back up the argumentations and conclusions. Furthermore, an explanatory and illustrative 
writing style has been chosen. 
Rule-based approach – Qualitative research may not be chaotic, but has to follow systematic rules. 
For each research phase, clearly defined rules have been followed. At the data collection phase, 
explicit criteria were applied for the expert selection and the preparation of the interview guides. 
Both interview guides were tested in a pretest. For data preparation, similarly clear rules were 
followed at transcription. At data analysis, the content structuring approach of Mayring was used 
for the content analysis of the interview transcripts. 
Proximity to the object – Qualitative research aims to be close to the research object and to his 
everyday world. In both rounds, just two interviews were conducted on the premises of the au-
thors’ institute and the remaining interviews were conducted at the respective workplace of the 
expert. 
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Communicative validation – The validity of research results can also be proven by discussing them 
with the interview partners or further experts. In the second round of expert interviews, the ex-
perts were asked to give concrete feedback on the TOMP framework and the current state of 
knowledge was discussed with them at the end of the interview. Moreover, at the ISPIM Conference 
2015 in Budapest, the results of this study were presented and discussed with an expert audience, 
which primarily consisted of innovation researchers and practitioners. 
Triangulation – The quality of research can be increased by comparing the results with the conclu-
sions of additional analysis rounds of further researchers. Four interviews of the first round were 
analyzed by Konstantin Yakubovich and all ten interviews of the second round by Louisa Hellmann. 
Their conclusions were compared with the analysis results of the author. 
5.2.2 Findings: The ICPS Framework 
In the following section, the findings are presented as summarized feedback by quoting the experts. 
The references are added in brackets utilizing abbreviations for the respective experts. Table 5 
provides an overview of the assigned abbreviations. 
At the end of interview round two, the TOMP framework was introduced and explained to the 
experts and they were asked to give feedback. Their spontaneous reaction was generally positive. 
The experts confirmed that the TOMP framework would capture the CSFs for radical technological 
innovations quite well and they generally found the framework in relation to its contents plausible 
and comprehensible (E2a, E2b, E2c). The interviewees followed the framework within its separa-
tion of context and process. They emphasized that several success factors of the innovation context 
could be addressed and shaped for maximizing the probability of success. However, the innovation 
context was cited to be much more difficult to influence than dealing with the success factors of the 
innovation process. The context for innovation forms the preconditions for the realization of inno-
vations, which generally, cannot be influenced greatly or directly by innovation managers (E2d, 
E2h). Thus, in the interviewees’ opinion, the innovating entity needs to deal with these conditions. 
In contrast, the innovation process itself can be handled much more flexibly and hence forms the 
direct sphere of influence for the innovation managers. Depending on the concrete innovation 
project, the process realization will be different (E2i). Accordingly, this would result in multiple 
permutations of the innovation process (E2h). 
Nevertheless, several experts expressed some suggestions for improvement. These interviewees 
stressed that the innovation success forms the key target figure of any innovation project and 
should, therefore, be added to the framework. They pointed out, that in the end, this is the key 
aspect and central metric for assessing an innovation project (E1g, E2h, E2i). 
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The experts perceived the three main categories (organization, technology, and target market) of 
the innovation context in the TOMP framework to be sensible. However, they emphasized that 
there is another category that should range on the same level: the entrepreneurial team. In the 
TOMP framework, the factor people has been listed as a CSF within the main category organization. 
The unanimous assent of the experts was that the involved people and especially the entrepreneuri-
al team are central for the realization of a radical technological innovation. Innovating people 
represent the key to success and thus, play an extremely important role in the realization of innova-
tions (E2b, E2c, E2f, E2h). 
Several experts missed the category opportunity identification (E2c, E2d, E2e, E2h). The question of 
how to get valuable ideas and to subsequently realize them if they indeed represent opportunities, 
should not be neglected (E2c). Furthermore, some experts criticized the schematic diagram of the 
innovation process as appearing to be sequential and determined (E2d, E2f, E2g). The innovation 
process should not be composed of three sequential stages as it is in the TOMP framework, but has 
to be iterative with integrated feedback-loops and interaction between its stages. This should be 
consciously visualized in the conceptual framework (E2b, E2g). 
Based on the direct feedback of the experts on the TOMP framework in round two and on the 
overall results of the analysis in both interview rounds, the TOMP framework has been revised. In 
particular, the general arrangement, the main categories, and the concrete set of CSFs have been 
reworked. The resulting framework (cf. Figure 20) contains 25 CSFs. These were arranged in the 
two dimensions innovation context and innovation process and have an impact on the ultimate 
innovation success. Correspondingly, the framework will be named Innovation-Context-Process-
Success (ICPS) framework and forms a conceptual framework for the further research process. As 
suggested by the experts, entrepreneurial team has been integrated as a main category within the 
innovation context. Thus, the innovation context is shaped by the four main categories technology, 
target market, organization, and entrepreneurial team. In the TOMP framework, the innovation 
process was composed of the chronologically ordered phases of product development, market 
introduction, and diffusion. After reworking the model, the different stages will be perceived as 
iterative fields of action instead of chronological phases. Consequently, the market introduction and 
diffusion stages have been combined into the commercialization action field as both stages address 
the commercial exploitation of the central innovation. Moreover, opportunity identification has been 
added as another action field. Accordingly, the innovation process consists of the following three 
iterative fields of action: opportunity identification, product development, and commercialization. 
Due to being the key target figure of each innovation project, innovation success has been added as a 
third dimension to the framework. A professional graphical designer has been involved for the 
graphical preparation of the ICPS framework. The initial version is printed in Appendix II – 8 and a 
larger version of the ICPS framework in Appendix II – 7. 
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Figure 20: ICPS Framework 
In the following, the concrete CSFs are outlined and discussed within the three dimensions of the 
ICPS framework: innovation context, innovation process, and innovation success. 
5.2.2.1 Innovation Context 
Technology 
Several experts valued the technology that underlies an innovation as being a major driving force 
for the innovation (E1a, E2b, E2c). The CSFs feasibility & maturity and relative advantageousness of 
the technology category in the TOMP framework have been kept in the ICPS framework, as the 
experts noted their importance. For commercializing, the technology has to have a certain maturity 
level (E2b, E2c, E2e, E2g). It has to be proven that an industrial user can integrate the technology 
into his products without larger efforts (E1e, E2d). It should be functional, error-free, and ready to 
use before market introduction since the market does not tolerate many attempts and errors (E1a, 
E2c, E2d, E2j). At the latest, when series production starts, the technology should be developed to 
an extent that it works reliably (E2d). 
Furthermore, the relative advantageousness of a technology is decisive for its acceptance. The 
competitive advantage and the concrete customer benefit compared to existing alternatives are 
crucial (E1a, E1e, E1f). Therefore, potential alternatives need to be monitored (E1f). And there are 
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always alternatives, even if the alternative is doing nothing (E1g, E1i). Especially in the case of 
radical innovations or when entering new markets, the competitive benefit has to be very distinct 
to overcome the market acceptance hurdles (E1a, E1h, E2d, E2g). This benefit results from a com-
bined effect of the market needs and the technology offer (E2a, E2b). 
Target Market 
Only after being implemented on a market, an idea becomes an innovation (E1f). Finally, the market 
determines what will be successful. Correspondingly, the target market plays a fundamental role in 
each innovation (E1f, E2i). The main category, target market, within the ICPS framework, is com-
posed of the CSFs industry context, competitive situation, market barriers, and opportunity. Besides 
some minor naming changes compared to the TOMP framework, the factor market match has been 
integrated into the opportunity factor. This is because a specific market needs to match to the 
respective technology and organization to represent an adequate market opportunity. 
The industry context shapes the overall circumstances for commercializing an innovation on a 
market. Influencing factors are political regulations, subventions, or lobbyism (E1b, E1e, E1h, E2e, 
E2g). Moreover, economic cycles, business hypes, and trends impact the market situation (E1c, E2a, 
E2h). Another critical factor is the competitive situation within a market (E1b, E1g, E2d). The 
strengths and weaknesses of competitors have to be monitored continuously (E1f, E1h). Especially 
in a dynamic environment, competitor analysis is important (E1b, E2h). Strong competition can be 
a high market barrier (E2a). Further barriers are a broad patent protection of established market 
players (E1d, E2a) and reluctant business policies regarding start-ups and newcomers (E1f, E2d, 
E2e). However, the highest market barrier is the problem of acceptance by customers, due to which 
organizations do not dare to adopt radical innovations based on their newness and differentness 
(E1e, E1h, E2h, E2j). Nearly all experts described the market opportunity to be central to the subse-
quent innovation success. A target market needs to be big enough, profitable, and should exhibit a 
high potential for market growth (E1b – E1i, E2a, E2b, E2d – E2j). Furthermore, the innovation has 
to match to the market and its requirements (E1h, E2b, E2j). 
Organization 
The innovating organization constitutes the internal circumstances for innovation realization (E1d, 
E2c, E2d). Within the main category organization in the ICPS framework, several CSFs of the TOMP 
framework have been summarized. The factors size, flexibility, & autonomy and organizational home 
have been combined to the factor structure & processes. Similarly, the factors finance & funding and 
management & owner commitment have been reduced to the overall factor funding & commitment. 
As the experts perceive the factor internal communication as a part of company culture, it has been 
removed. Moreover, the CSF strategy has been added to the organization category, because the 
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experts value the strategic direction of an organization to be decisive for the realization of radical 
technological innovations. As mentioned before, the entrepreneurial team has been integrated as a 
main category within the innovation context instead of listing the factor people within the main 
category organization. 
The strategy of an organization indicates its business direction and similarly its general objectives 
for innovation creation (E1g, E1i, E2a). It forms the guardrails and legitimations for each innovation 
activity. If a project does not fit the overall strategy, there would be no mandate to execute it (E1e, 
E1g, E1i, E2e, E2g, E2h, E2j). Furthermore, it is a strategic decision to strive for innovation leader-
ship or price leadership (E2b, E2d). This decision has fundamental consequences for an organiza-
tion`s set up regarding its structure and processes. Especially at realizing radical innovations, the 
employees need a certain level of freedom from their everyday business (E1d, E2d, E2h, E2i). Thus, 
flexible structures and low hierarchies are crucial for being successful (E2b, E2g, E2f). However, the 
degree of freedom needs to be reduced in the course of the project. It is desirable to establish 
processes that enable the creation of many ideas which will subsequently be evaluated according to 
clear abort criteria, and which will be realized in an efficient process afterward (E1g, E2a, E2b, E2d, 
E2f, E2h, E2j). Another important factor when it comes to organizational preconditions for innova-
tions is company culture (E1g, E1i, E2b). Radical technological innovations are very risky and many 
fail during realization (E2b). Thus, tolerance regarding mistakes and uncertainty is needed (E2a, 
E2d, E2f, E2i). Occurred mistakes must not be punished (E2j, E2b). Otherwise, no one will dare to 
break new ground (E1d, E2j). In contrary, an innovation-friendly company culture has to be charac-
terized by an atmosphere of openness regarding novelty and change (E1e, E1i, E2a, E2j). For the 
actual realization of an innovation project, adequate funding and commitment have to be granted 
(E1e, E2e, E2h). There has to be a clear intention of the investor or respectively the involved man-
agement that warrants a sufficient budget (E1d, E1i, E2b, E2f). If this support is missing, the innova-
tion realization will be hopeless (E1c, E14, E2i). 
Entrepreneurial Team 
Several experts valued the entrepreneurial team as being most important for the realization of 
radical technological innovations (E1e, E1f, E2b, E2c, E2f, E2h). Three CSFs have been described by 
the experts to be central for an entrepreneurial team. The team should be composed of people that 
have the appropriate competences and attitude and they need to work as a team. The involved 
people should display profound professional competences on the one hand, and soft skills on the 
other hand (E1e, E2b, E2i). For being successful, it is necessary to recognize and adequately utilize 
the strengths and weaknesses of each team member (E1f, E2a). Thereby, it is necessary to reach a 
good composition of a complementary, multifaceted, and diverse team that can properly work 
together (E1h, E2a, E2d, E2f, E2g). Nevertheless, the attitude and mindset of the involved people 
are crucial. The team members should be passionate, enthusiastic, and highly motivated to bring 
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the innovation to success (E2c, E2d, E2j). As radical innovations are risky and uncertain, the inno-
vating people need to have a high level of personal initiative and perseverance (E1i, E2a, E2c, E2d, 
E2e). 
5.2.2.2 Innovation Process 
Opportunity Identification 
Before realization of a radical idea can take place, it has to be identified that there is actually a 
promising opportunity. Without opportunity identification, there will be no innovation. As several 
experts missed the category opportunity identification in the TOMP framework, this category has 
been added to the innovation process dimension in the ICPS framework (E2c, E2d, E2e, E2h). Ac-
cording to the experts, recognizing an opportunity depends on personal gut feeling, pivoting, and 
timeliness. The former factors sensitiveness to market needs and coping with uncertainty previously 
located in the market introduction phase have been assessed by several experts to be more or less 
congruent. Moreover, the experts emphasized that addressing these factors is already important at 
identifying an opportunity and could be realized by pivoting (E1b, E1c, E1g, E1h, E2d, E2h). Corre-
spondingly, these factors have been left out in the ICPS framework and the factor pivoting has been 
included. 
The personal gut feeling is a soft factor and quite intangible. It is based on personal market 
knowledge and work experience of the idea provider. However, radical ideas correlate with a high 
level of uncertainty and predicting their success probability is like looking into a crystal ball (E1g, 
E1i, E2h). Thus, in the end, opportunity identification depends on a disproportionate amount of 
instinct (E1a, E2c, E2e, E2h). Moreover, the initial market conceptions should be tested, evaluated, 
and adjusted in an iterative, agile, and repetitive approach as soon as possible (E1c, E1i, E2a, E2f, 
E2g, E2i). Pivoting supports an effective and efficient evaluation of the focal opportunity (E1d, E1i, 
E2f). Therefore, customers should be involved in an early stage of the innovation process to gener-
ate concrete feedback on the actual market needs with respect to the aimed products and business 
models (E1i, E2f, E2g, E2j). Mostly, time slots for potential opportunities are limited and narrow 
(E1c, E2j). Timeliness is correspondingly a crucial prerequisite for being successful. In the case of 
entering the market too late, the addressed market needs may already be satisfied (E1c, E2a, E2c, 
E2d, E2e). Being too early may also be problematic if the market is not ready to adopt the innova-
tion (E1h, E2j). 
Product Development 
For product development, the experts have emphasized the following CSFs: lead user integration, 
development partnerships, risk & quality management, platform strategy, and intellectual property. 
Compared to the TOMP framework, the factor strategic alliances / partnerships previously located 
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in the diffusion phase has been split into two different types of partnerships, as both are important 
in their respective action fields: development partnerships and commercialization partnerships. 
Furthermore, the factor platform strategy has been integrated into the product development action 
field of the ICPS framework, as it is more a development rather than a commercialization issue. The 
former factor, risk management, has been expanded by the task of quality management as both 
tasks address similar directions. Finally, the factor speed & costs previously included in the product 
development phase of the TOMP framework has been relocated to the innovation success dimension 
and has been renamed as efficiency in the ICPS framework. 
Conventional market research methods face limitations when it comes to radical technological 
innovations, as customers often cannot express their needs explicitly or even do not know them 
(E1c, E2i). Lead user integration can help to overcome this uncertainty as they reflect needs earlier 
than mainstream users and can thusly serve as orientation (E2a, E2b, E2d). Lead users are ahead of 
the mainstream market and have a strong interest in a technical solution for their problems (E2b, 
E2h). Furthermore, they can serve as references, which are very important for radical innovations 
(E1d, E1g, E1i, E2a, E2j). Similarly, strategic partnerships, e.g. with customers or research institutes, 
can vastly foster the development process. By sharing knowledge and resources, partners can 
utilize synergies and take advantage of their cooperation (E1c, E1e, E1i, E2a, E2b, E2d, E2h). Radi-
cal innovation projects are risky undertakings. Thus, preventing risks is impossible. However, 
figuring out the greatest technical and business-related risks is crucial for taking deliberate deci-
sions (E2b, E2d, E2i). Risk & quality management helps to improve the overall probability of success 
by steering the innovation process (E1f, E1g, E1i, E2a). Nevertheless, not everything is ascertaina-
ble and too much formalism could hamper the speed and progress of the innovation process (E2b, 
E2h). 
In the later phases of the innovation process, it is decisive to think about reducing production costs 
and rising efficiency (E2a, E2b, E2h). An adequate instrument therefor is platform strategy. Without 
much effort, customer-specific adjustments of the basic components and thus, faster development 
cycles are realizable (E1b, E1g, E2h, E2i). Another important aspect of the innovation process is 
protecting intellectual property. However, patent registration is expensive (E1e, E1g). Correspond-
ingly, an organization should carefully consider in which situation filing for a patent is sensible 
(E1g, E1h, E1i). This also depends on the enforceability of a concrete patent idea and the overall 
intellectual property strategy of an organization (E2a, E2b, E2e, E2f, E2h, E2j). 
Commercialization 
In the ICPS framework, the former market introduction and diffusion stages have been combined to 
the commercialization action field. Correspondingly, the CSFs of both previous categories are con-
tained in the united commercialization category: value proposition & business model, commercializa-
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tion partnerships, timing, and marketing. As written above, the former factors sensitiveness to mar-
ket needs and coping with uncertainty have been combined, relocated to opportunity identification, 
and renamed as pivoting. Furthermore, some experts underlined that the factor value proposition 
should be expanded by the associated business model. 
The centerpiece of an organization’s value proposition is customer benefit (E1c, E2i, E2j). This 
depends on customer needs and the associated added value of the organization’s market offer 
compared with alternative solutions (E1h, E2b, E2e). If the focal market offer has no added value 
for the customer, it will not be successful (E1d, E2h). Apart from the value proposition, the associat-
ed business model is decisive for the innovation success (E1e). The business model describes the way 
the organization creates value and how it generates profit (E1f, E1i). In this context, commercializa-
tion partnerships become important. Strategic suppliers support the organization with value crea-
tion and strategic sales partners while customers support with revenue generation (E1e, E2b). 
Exchangeability of partners is often impossible as radical innovations are mostly associated with a 
high level of complexity. Hence, partnerships thrive on mutual trust and long-term relationships 
(E1d, E1g, E2a, E2d, E2i). The timing of market introduction depends on the strategic direction of 
the organization regarding the chosen pioneer or follower strategy (E2b, E2d). In principle, an 
innovation should be introduced to the market as fast as possible after reaching technological 
maturity (E1d, E1e). Nevertheless, further factors like the competitive situation and market readi-
ness affect the appropriate time to launch (E2b, E2h). A sound marketing concept should accompa-
ny the market launch (E1d, E2a). However, marketing in the B2B-sector, is quite different from the 
B2C-sector, especially for technically complex innovations that require explanation. B2B-marketing 
has to be more rational, less emotional, and based on a sound technical argumentation (E1e, E2d). 
Effective B2B-marketing channels are trade shows, press releases, and technical press (E1f, E2e, 
E2h). 
5.2.2.3 Innovation Success 
Promising prospects of innovation success are the underlying motivation for starting any innovation 
project (E1g, E2h, E2i). As it forms the key target figure for innovation projects this dimension has 
been added to the ICPS framework. The interviewed experts expressed three factors contributing to 
innovation success: sales performance, product performance, and efficiency. These metrics are 
difficult to capture in the beginning. However, in the end, they manifest whether an innovation 
project is determined successful (E2g, E2i). 
Finally, an organization wants to make money with the innovation (E2d, E2i). Therefore, the central 
figures reflecting sales performance are revenue and profit (E2d, E2g). In general, the aim is to 
achieve a quick return on investment (E1g, E2a). However, to obtain sustainable earnings, a high 
market share and prospective revenue growth are addressed (E1i, E2d, E2h). Product performance 
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is another important assessment criterion for innovation success. The quality and performance of 
the central innovation are crucial for customer satisfaction (E2h). Only if the customers are satis-
fied with the product performance they will report positively about the innovation (E2d, E2e, E2i). 
This is an essential prerequisite for sustainable sales that furthermore contributes to a positive 
reputation of the organization (E2c, E2e). Moreover, efficiency within the innovation process plays a 
major role in the overall innovation success (E1c, E2e). The challenge is to achieve an error-free 
product without major failures and with a limited amount of time and budget. Hence, a sensible 
combination of effectivity and efficiency needs to be reached (E2a, E2d, E2h). 
5.2.3 Discussion and Limitations 
There are some limitations with respect to the research approach outlined in this chapter. Large 
sample sizes are generally not possible with qualitative expert interviews (Lamnek, 2005, p. 365). 
In order to counter this, 19 experts have been deliberately selected with the method of theoretical 
sampling. However, these interviews only reflect the opinions of a small group and the results of 
the interview analysis are thus, not generalizable. Moreover, the interviews followed a retrospec-
tive nature. The experts were asked to report about their experience with radical technological 
innovation projects. In retrospect, the projects may potentially seem to be more rational and well-
ordered than they originally were. 
As detected during the literature review, there is no uniform concept of the innovation terminology. 
Similarly, to the authors of the analyzed books, the understanding of the term innovation differs 
considerably among the experts. On the one hand, all experts agreed that an innovation has to 
reflect a certain level of newness. On the other hand, the experts disagreed on the second prerequi-
site for innovation – commercial exploitation. Certain experts required market implementation 
while others claimed an economic benefit for the innovating organization, and still others demand-
ed overall market success of the innovation. These different conceptions of innovation had to be 
considered when analyzing the interviews. Furthermore, the research approach was not started in 
an unbiased way, as the TOMP framework was used as a research guide for conducting the inter-
views. Nevertheless, the six quality criteria for evaluating the scientific quality of qualitative re-
search proposed by Mayring have been accurately applied as reported in chapter 5.2.1.4. 
5.3 Primary Case Study Research 
In principle, radical innovations are unique (Abetti, 2000, p. 208). Depending on the situation, the 
company type, and the respective industry, different CSFs probably become more or less important. 
Thus, the ICPS framework, which seeks to capture an overall and comparative understanding of 
radical innovation, should be tested in real life environment for verification and validation. To gain 
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a deeper systemic, holistic view with respect to the specific combination, peculiarity, and signifi-
cance of the identified CSFs, primary case studies can help. These are multi-perspectival analyzes 
that serve as an instrument to analyze and to understand complex issues in real life (Tellis, 1997). 
This method is most likely to be appropriate for "how" and "why" questions (Yin, 2009, p. 27). 
Therefore, taking the ICPS framework as a theory model, three real life cases of radical technologi-
cal innovations within the mechanical engineering industry have been studied: P1.18 bicycle 
transmission by Pinion, Friction Disc by SKF, and cryogenic machining by 5ME. 
5.3.1 Methodology 
5.3.1.1 Case Study Design 
The multiple-case study design has been chosen to analyze the realization of radical technological 
innovations with varying innovation contexts. Yin proposes a procedural model (cf. Figure 21) for 
conducting multiple-case studies that has been followed. The initial steps were theory develop-
ment, case selection, and design of the case specific data collection protocols. Within this study, the 
ICPS framework represented the underlying theory (cf. Figure 20) and was used as a reference 
model and research guide. Each individual case study consisted of a whole study, in which conver-
gent evidence was sought regarding each CSF of the ICPS framework. Afterward the results of the 
individual case studies were compared and cross-case conclusions were drawn. Thereby, it was 
checked if modifying the ICPS framework was needed. The findings and associated strategy implica-
tions for innovating organizations were documented in the cross-case report of the multiple-case 
study (cf. Wohlfeil and Terzidis, 2015b). The dashed-line feedback loop in Figure 21 indicates that 
case study research follows an iterative approach (Yin, 2009, pp. 56–58). 
 
Figure 21: Multiple-Case Study Procedure (Yin, 2009, p. 57) 
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5.3.1.2 Case Selection 
Case selection was based on theoretical replication logic. Therefore, a defined set of operational 
criteria to select appropriate cases was followed (Yin, 2009, p. 91). The main criterion for choosing 
cases was their relevance for the current topic: radical technological innovation within the mechan-
ical engineering industry. The search was focused on product and process innovations with a high 
level of novelty. These innovations should have reached application maturity and should have 
already been implemented in the market. Furthermore, the innovation contexts of the potential 
case study candidates should have varied. Another distinguishing characteristic of the case sample 
was the innovation trigger in the sense of technology-push and market-pull. For not implementing 
too many degrees of freedom into the case study design primarily successful innovations were 
focused. Moreover, several research-related pragmatic factors were considered (e.g. data access). 
Consequently, three cases were selected: P1.18 gearbox transmission by Pinion as competitive 
shifting system for bicycles, Friction Disc by SKF as intermediate disc for highly loaded flange 
couplings in the industrial drive branch to lift the friction coefficient between the contact surfaces, 
and cryogenic machining by 5ME as alternative to traditional flood coolants for industrial machin-
ing processes. Each of these innovations represented a product or in the case of 5ME, a process 
innovation within the mechanical engineering industry that exhibited a high level of novelty com-
pared to the established solutions. The selected cases were successfully implemented in the market 
and the specific contexts of these innovations were different. Each case had a different type of 
organizational background (start-up, major corporation, spin-off), target industry (bicycles, wind 
power, machine tools), and of course, entrepreneurial team. The innovation trigger for the SKF 
Friction Disc was market-pull while it was technology-push for the Pinion P1.18 and cryogenic 
machining by 5ME. 
5.3.1.3 Data Collection 
In case studies, the richness of phenomenon, the extensiveness of real-life context, and the absence 
of routine procedures turn data collection into a complex endeavor. In response, Yin postulates 
three principles of data collection for high-quality case studies: (a) using multiple, not just single, 
sources of evidence; (b) creating a case study database; and (c) maintaining a chain of evidence 
(Yin, 2009, p. 100).  
Following these recommendations, data for this study were collected from multiple sources, includ-
ing primary (expert interviews and discussions), as well as secondary sources (e.g. presentations, 
data sheets, test reports, research papers, and press releases), for reasons of triangulation. The 
main data source formed the conducted non-standardized, guided interviews with key stakeholders 
and experts that were responsible for the realization of the addressed innovations. Furthermore, 
the software “Citavi 4 Pro” was used to establish a database that contained the raw data in an 
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orderly and retrievable compilation. To maintain a chain of evidence, the reader of the case study 
reports should be able to follow the derivation of any evidence from the initial research questions 
to the ultimate case study conclusions. Thus, the report needs to contain a clear link to the underly-
ing data (Yin, 2009, pp. 122–123). To achieve this, any data were documented and archived in the 
database (e.g. by recording interviews and storing internet links). Lastly, a data collection protocol 
for each individual case was prepared that contained the specific circumstances for data collection 
and the concrete case study questions. In Appendix III – 1 an aggregated version of the three proto-
cols can be found. 
5.3.1.4 Data Analysis 
Data analysis on the single case level consisted of examining, categorizing, testing, and recombining 
evidence, to draw empirically based conclusions. The ICPS framework served as the theoretical 
orientation guiding the case study analysis as a general analytic strategy. This approach helped to 
focus attention on certain data, to ignore other data, and to organize the entire case study (Yin, 
2009, pp. 126–131). Correspondingly, each case was analyzed based on the three fundamental 
dimensions (innovation context, innovation process, and innovation success) and the associated 
CSFs. 
Additionally, the technique of explanation building was utilized. Explanation building aims to 
analyze the single case study data by building an explanation about the case. Explaining a phenom-
enon is to stipulate a presumed set of causal links about it (Yin, 2009, p. 141). Therefore, the specif-
ic characteristics of each CSF within the concrete innovation projects were studied to investigate 
the impacts on the overall innovation success. On the multiple-case study level, the results of the 
individual case studies were compared and cross-case conclusions were drawn. 
5.3.1.5 Quality Criteria 
For judging the quality of case study research, four dimensions are essential: construct validity, 
internal validity, external validity, and reliability. Yin presents certain tactics to address these quali-
ty criteria within the different research phases (cf. Appendix II - 2). Each of his recommendations 
has been applied successfully. 
The quality test construct validity judges if the operational measures for the concepts being studied 
are correct. The advised usage of multiple sources of evidence and the establishment of a chain of 
evidence has been previously described in the data collection section (cf. 5.3.1.3). Having key 
informants review the draft of the case study reports is an additional method that has been fol-
lowed. Their feedback has been integrated into the final case study version. Informants may disa-
gree with an investigator’s conclusions and interpretations, but should not disagree over the actual 
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facts of the case. This is a way of corroborating the essential facts and evidence presented in the 
case report (Yin, 2009, pp. 182–183). 
A high level of internal validity can be achieved by establishing a stringent causal relationship from 
raw data to conclusions. This is primary an issue of the data analysis. As written above, the analysis 
technique of explanation building was utilized (Yin, 2009, p. 40). 
External validity is tested to check if a study’s findings can be generalized to the domain the re-
search design pretends. This can be addressed by using straightforward theory in single case 
studies and following replication logic in multiple-case studies (Yin, 2009, p. 40). Within the single 
cases, data collection was based on the ICPS framework and overall case selection was done delib-
erately following theoretical replication logic. 
Demonstrating that the operations of a study can be repeated, with the same results is represented 
by the quality criteria of reliability (Yin, 2009, p. 40). To address this issue, a case study protocol 
was elaborated for each single case study and a case study database was developed (cf. 5.3.1.3). 
5.3.2 Case 1: P1.18 Bicycle Transmission by Pinion 
Two engineers founded the Pinion GmbH to develop and exploit the P1.18 gearbox transmission 
concept as a competitive shifting system for bicycles to overcome the existent disadvantages of 
traditional derailleur systems and internal gear hubs. 
5.3.2.1 Innovation Context 
Technology 
The P1.18 was designed as a spur gear consist-
ing of two transmission structures that were 
connected in series. It was placed at the bottom 
bracket and had thus, an optimal position within 
the two-wheeled vehicle bicycle. Via pedal, the 
first of the two parallel partial shaft transmis-
sions, equipped with three pairs of gears, was 
driven. The second shaft transmitted the power 
on six pairs of gears. The multiplication of six by 
three ratios gave 18 real ratios (Pinion, 2013a, 
pp. 3–6). In principle, there were two basic 
alternatives to the Pinion transmission: internal 
gear hubs and derailleur systems. 
 
Figure 22: P1.18 Gearbox (Reidl, 2012) 
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To get a better overview of the relative advantages of the P1.18 bicycle transmission, three of the 
most competitive internal gear hub concepts and one representative and widespread derailleur 
concept have been compared to the P1.18. Therefore, eight evaluation criteria have been derived 
from diverse bicycle test reports. The different shifting systems have been evaluated with respect 
to the degree of which they met these evaluation criteria on a ten-stage scale (cf. Figure 23). The 
detailed comparison is available in Appendix III – 3. 
Compared to its alternatives, the advantages of the P1.18 gearbox were the great overall ratio 
range, the number of real gears, and the position of the center of gravity. In contrast, the high 
system weight, the obligatory need for frame construction change, and the currently high price 
were its disadvantages. The deployed technology of the P1.18 was mature and entered series 
production in July 2012 (Schäfer, 2013). Thus, the Pinion team brought their technology from TRL 
4 (as the fundamental concept was transferred) to TRL 9. 
 
Figure 23: Overview of the Relative Advantages of the P1.18 
Target Market 
The P1.18 was meant to be a premium product. With the German niche market for the high-end 
mountain, trekking, and touring bikes, Pinion had a regional, model segment, and quality level 
focus. However, the company was planning to cover the entire bicycle market little by little in 
Europe and at some point afterward, globally. In both model segments, the advantages of the gear-
box were highly visible. Overall, the industry context was predominantly positive for Pinion. Envi-
ronment and sustainability have become important topics in society and politics. Different laws and 
regulations already reflected this growing environmental awareness. A maintenance free bicycle 
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gearbox seemed to match the spirit of the time and to be a product with good prospects (Pinion, 
2013b, 2013a, p. 16). 
Pinion was the only company to distribute this specific gearbox technology. Thus, it just had to 
compete with its technological alternatives. The main barrier that hampered the market introduc-
tion of the P1.18 was the skepticism towards the new technology and even more towards the young 
start-up company. Regarding absolute numbers, the German bicycle market was very big and even 
the high-end sector of a submarket served a very attractive opportunity for a start-up like Pinion. 
There were still several thousand gearboxes potentially saleable (Pinion, 2013b). 
Organization 
It was the strategy of the two engineers to develop and commercialize the P1.18 bicycle transmis-
sion in accordance with automotive standards. To reach this goal, Pinion developed primarily 
independently and waited long before presenting their gearbox to the public. The Pinion GmbH, the 
company’s full name to include the German legal form abbreviation, had a small size and corre-
spondingly, the structure and processes were relative loose. The company had a flat hierarchy and 
few predefined processes including a low level of bureaucracy. Accordingly, the company culture 
was very innovation-friendly and open-minded with respect to new ideas (Pinion, 2013b, 2014b). 
As gear manufacturing, in particular, the creation of prototypes, was expensive, the company had to 
search for financial resources quite early. Pinion had an advantage in this search, as their product 
innovation was already quite tangible. This meant it was not a big challenge for the team to get 
access to potential investors. The team finally met an investor who was a supplier of the automotive 
industry and showed great interest in the project. After several discussions and tough negotiations, 
the team officially founded the company together with this investor in October 2008. Nevertheless, 
with the emergence of the automobile crisis by the end of 2008, this investor abandoned his short-
term cooperation (Pinion, 2013b; Reidl, 2012). After some unoccupied months, the team got in 
contact with another investor and signed a partnership contract with him in October 2009. The 
team was quite lucky, as their new investor was enthusiastic about the product and provided not 
just money, but additionally technical and personal interest (Donner, 2012). He was not just an 
investor but a mentor and consultant as well (Reidl, 2012). 
Entrepreneurial Team 
Since the beginning of 2014, Pinion has nine employees not counting the two founders. The newly 
recruited staff mainly consisted of university graduates and first-time employees. These young, 
enthusiastic employees were very motivated, creative, had many ideas, and worked together as a 
team. Nevertheless, Pinion lacked experienced personnel that possessed serenity, sovereignty, and 
know-how to deal with challenging situations. The two founders were aware of this and were, 
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therefore, planning to hire, preferentially, senior professionals within the next recruiting round 
(Pinion, 2013b, 2014b). 
5.3.2.2 Innovation Process 
Opportunity Identification 
For the Pinion team, the ambition to solve the central technological challenge was the main trigger 
to start their own business. The enthusiastic mountain bikers were unsatisfied with traditional 
derailleur systems with their typical problems of stuck chains, bent derailleurs, and the need for 
time-consuming care and maintenance after each ride. They asked themselves why there should be 
maintenance free gearboxes in cars and motorbikes but not in bicycles. Having found no satisfacto-
ry answer to this question, the time seemed right to realize their vision of developing a competitive 
gearbox for bicycles in accordance with automotive standards in order to offer a real alternative to 
the traditional derailleur system. Starting with rough paper sketches, various transmission con-
cepts were developed, discarded, and revised on their way to a mature product (Pinion, 2013b). 
Product Development 
At product development, Pinion integrated lead users to test gearbox prototypes. Primarily, these 
were skilled amateur cyclists that contributed to product development by providing detailed feed-
back. The breakthrough of the P1.18 was accomplished when in 2010 a friend of the two Pinion 
founders and extreme cyclist crossed the Himalayas riding a P1.18. Naturally, Pinion had to cooper-
ate with frame-builders that designed and produced the modified frames for the gearbox. Apart 
from that, Pinion followed an autonomous development approach (Pinion, 2013b). 
The company had no structured risk and quality management system. Intuition and collective 
decision making after a short conversation among the founders formed the main basis for their risk 
evaluation. As much as possible, Pinion was trying to establish a common part and platform strate-
gy. During the development of the P1.18, the company had developed a modularized system with 
different components and mechanisms. At the conception of new products, these could be trans-
ferred with little modification as the basic development has been done. Obtaining a patent for the 
fundamental gearbox concept has not been possible as this idea was not new. As a result, Pinion 
strived for protecting individual aspects of the principle concept. Further, the IP-strategy of the 
company was dependent on its financial situation. In general, Pinion filed for patent protection with 
respect to inventions that were strategically decisive from a market point of view (Pinion, 2014b). 
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Commercialization 
Besides the technical and economic benefits, the value proposition of a company is shaped by its 
service benefits. By offering a complete spare parts program, Pinion tried to ease and support the 
use of the P1.18 for its customers. As the company did not directly sell their gearboxes to the end-
user, the P1.18 was solely available as an OEM component for volume bicycle manufacturers. Thus, 
they cooperated with several bicycle manufacturers, who were Pinion’s customers and the de facto 
technology disseminators. Finally, the bicycle dealers sold Pinion equipped bicycles to the end-
users. All parts of the gearbox were completely developed and designed by Pinion but fabricated in 
contract production by strategic suppliers (Pinion, 2013b). Pinion deliberately chose their first 
trade fair attendance in 2010. As Pinion’s customers needed one to two years for preparing bicycle 
models for the usage with the P1.18, Pinion had to assume the specific moment in time when the 
P1.18 had achieved a maturity level that series production of the gearbox could be reached within 
the next one to two years. Pinion’s assumptions were good as the company reached series maturity 
in 2012. Since their first attendance, Pinion steadily exhibits at big trade fairs and strategically 
plans its marketing efforts (Pinion, 2014b). 
5.3.2.3 Innovation Success 
By 2014, more than 1,000 gearboxes have been sold since the P1.18 entered series production. 
Pinion expected to reach sales figures of the mid-four-digit range within the subsequent years. On a 
scale from great skepticism if Pinion would still have a product on the market in the future until the 
P1.18 was a natural alternative to the established shifting components, Pinion estimated to be 
positioned right in the middle (Pinion, 2013b). 
The P1.18 gearbox was a mature product by 2014 that met its high requirements with respect to 
load, durability, and performance. Several benchmark tests have been conducted and the reaction 
and response to the gearbox were predominantly positive (Reidl, 2012). In comparison with alter-
native shifting systems, the P1.18 had concrete advantages as well as concrete disadvantages (cf. 
Figure 23). Therefore, it was essential to hit the customer preferences of the chosen target group. 
Since idea generation, it took Pinion seven years to gain a mature product. For the sake of efficien-
cy, the team tried to save costs as much as possible. The founders did not take high salaries, first 
worked with student licensees of their CAD-software, and installed an own test rig since external 
testing was very expensive (Pinion, 2013b). 
  
Qualitative Validation of Critical Success Factors 
88 
5.3.3 Case 2: Friction Disc by SKF  
The requirements for power transmission within the industrial drive branch increased over the 
recent years. To satisfy this demand SKF engineers developed the Friction Disc as intermediate disc 
for highly loaded flange couplings to lift the friction coefficient between the contact surfaces. Con-
sequently, the power transmission could be clearly enhanced (Gläntz, 2011). 
5.3.3.1 Innovation Context 
Technology 
The Friction Disc consisted of a defined sum of sector shaped elements that were inserted into the 
interspace of a flange coupling and screw-fastened. These elements were coated on both sides with 
a galvanic hard-dispersion layer which contained hard particles (Baumann, 2009, p. 38). 
At screw-fastening, the hard particles were pressed into the flange material and achieved a me-
chanical interlock between the device and the two shaft ends. Therewith it was possible to signifi-
cantly increase the transmissible torque and thus, reduce the main dimensions of the powertrain. 
Furthermore, the assembly process could be considerably shortened. (SKF, 2014b; Baumann, 2009, 
p. 38; Gläntz, 2011). 
 
Figure 24: Friction Disc (Gläntz, 2011) 
In general, there were three potential alternatives to the Friction Disc to transmit the operating 
torque in the drive train of a wind turbine: friction shims, shrink discs, and blank flange couplings. 
For assessing the relative advantages of these solutions, eight evaluation criteria have been estab-
lished in consultation with a team member of the Friction Disc project at SKF. Based on these 
criteria, the technological alternatives have been assessed with respect to the degree to which they 
met the eight evaluation criteria on a ten-point scale (cf. Figure 25). 
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Figure 25: Overview of Relative Advantages of the Friction Disc 
The unique advantage of the Friction Disc compared to its alternatives was the great downsizing 
potential for the wind turbine that ultimately could lead to huge cost savings. The Friction Disc 
offered much leeway for the designer and opened up great opportunities to create new and innova-
tive solutions. However, the corresponding price of the Friction Disc had to be considered. 
As the Friction Disc was introduced to the market in 2009, the product was mature and achieved 
TRL 9. Before technological development started, the friction increasing coating procedure had just 
been applied for relatively small surfaces like drills and tools. Thus, the technology was on the 
maturity level TRL 3. 
Target Market 
The field of application for the Friction Disc was heavy mechanical engineering. Initially, the wind 
industry was addressed as a first target market. In 2006, the development was started for Senvion’s 
3.3-megawatt onshore turbine. SKF and its customer established a development contract and 
assured mutual exclusivity within the wind industry (SKF, 2014b, 2014d; Senvion, 2014, p. 1). The 
industry context for wind turbines had been mainly positive. Wind energy was clearly on the rise 
and characterized by a massive increase of power range. Similarly, keeping the individual item 
weights within the nacelle controllable was a central task. The Friction Disc helped to deal with this 
challenge (Gläntz, 2011). 
As SKF was single supplier of the Friction Disc, there was no competition for this innovation. A 
general prerequisite to entering the wind energy market was the certification process. With its 
partners, SKF managed to achieve the required certification and thereby the permission to enter 
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the market. Further market barriers were the requirements of SKF’s customer, but SKF was able to 
satisfy these needs (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). Due to the mutual exclusiveness, SKF’s success was linked 
to its customer’s success (SKF, 2014d). This appeared not to have a negative effect, as the market 
for 3.3-MW wind turbines – the primary application area of the Friction Disc – grew steadily over 
several years (p. 32). Moreover, there were additional opportunities for the Friction Disc each time 
it was required to transmit high torques, e.g. in industries like rolling mills, turbo-machines, marine, 
or power plant construction (SKF, 2014d). 
Organization 
The Friction Disc has been developed within SKF Germany. The SKF Group being a leading global 
supplier of products, solutions, and services within rolling bearings, seals, mechatronics, services, 
and lubrication systems had more than 45,000 employees by 2014 (SKF, 2014a, p. 1). The project 
has been initiated within the innovation department Flexi Force and was carried out by a cross-
functional project team. With the Friction Disc project, a dedicated customer focus when delivering 
sustainable value was realized. Thus, the project was actually in line with the SKF group goals as 
well as with the Flexi Force department goals (SKF, 2014b, 2015, p. 11). 
The product innovation process of the Friction Disc was realized based on the Stage-Gate process 
according to Cooper. The process worked well and allowed enough flexibility for the team. On the 
other hand, the transfer into series production turned out to be more difficult. The Friction Disc 
was meant to be a niche product. While the SKF was well positioned to handle high volumes, the 
handling of brand-new innovations was challenging due to the initially low volumes. Correspond-
ingly, the overall company culture was mainly shaped by a low level of failure acceptance and little 
appreciation for radical innovative initiatives like the Friction Disc. This situation presented real 
challenges for the project. In the beginning, the team had to defend their project against tough 
internal criticism. Thus, an essential support for the team to overcome these internal hurdles was 
the high level of upper management commitment. When the first test results turned out to be 
positive, any further expenses were sanctioned without major discussions having to take place 
(SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
Entrepreneurial Team 
The core entrepreneurial team within SKF was composed of three persons: an innovation manager, 
a project manager, and the key account manager for SKF’s customer. The people fulfilling these 
roles had a high level of experience and professional competence. Correspondingly, the team saved 
a lot of time and costs during the innovation process. Despite several setbacks during the project 
caused by internal and external skepticism and contradictions, the core team members showed 
great perseverance. They were highly motivated to make the project a success and were convinced 
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of its potential. Furthermore, they trusted each other and worked as a team. After the development 
contract with the customer was signed, the core team was joined by further representatives from 
production, design, and quality management. Having this broad and profound team network in 
place ensured an efficient innovation process (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
5.3.3.2 Innovation Process 
Opportunity Identification 
SKF’s key account manager had to constantly have his finger on the pulse when it came to the 
customer and had to monitor the market closely. He observed that SKF’s customer faced technical 
challenges during the conception phase of the 3.3-MW wind turbine, the largest onshore wind 
turbine at that point in time. A major challenge was to design the turbine in such a way that it was 
still transportable on the streets. Based on discussions with the customer, the idea emerged that a 
friction increasing intermediate disc for flange couplings could enhance the transmissible torque 
capacity. According to his personal gut feeling, he realized that this represented an opportunity for 
SKF. The time was right as SKF’s customer was just starting the development of its new wind tur-
bine. The team followed an iterative process to align the customer needs to the product (SKF, 
2014b, 2014c, 2014d). 
Product Development 
In the case of the Friction Disc, SKF’s customer was also the lead user of the product. Both parties 
signed a non-disclosure agreement and subsequently concluded a development contract as a basis 
for their cooperation. Thus, SKF’s customer was closely integrated into the product development 
and was updated frequently on a regular basis. SKF involved two further strategic partners in the 
development process. One partner took responsibility for the coating process. Furthermore, SKF 
cooperated with the technical university of Chemnitz for testing the ultimate friction coefficient 
(SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
During the process, SKF followed a detailed risk and quality management. Potential risks were 
constantly analyzed and every process step was documented in detail (SKF, 2014b). SKF finally 
achieved an assured coating process that could be utilized not just for the Friction Disc, but for 
many other shapes of blanks. SKF’s customer was the patent owner and SKF received the license to 
produce the Friction Disc. SKF subsequently protected the coating process, its associated measure-
ment method, and the technical configuration of the Friction Disc (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
Commercialization 
Because of the mutual exclusivity regulated in the contractual agreement, commercialization of the 
Friction Disc in the wind industry was limited to this customer. In other industries, SKF was free to 
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commercialize. The central value proposition of the Friction Disc was the possibility to downsize 
the main dimensions of the powertrain, its associated potential for weight reduction, and the sim-
plified assembly process. Moreover, SKF consulted, extensively, its customers regarding application 
engineering. In general, the SKF value creation contained product development, application engi-
neering, parts of the manufacturing process, and taking the overall responsibility for the final 
product. For any further value-creating step, partners were involved. Thus, SKF strategically coop-
erated with a supplier that produced the disc blanks and with another company that took responsi-
bility for the coating process. The timing of market introduction was exactly right, as SKF managed 
to synchronize the development process of the Friction Disc with that of the wind turbine power-
train of SKF’s customer. A few trade fair exhibitions and some supporting promotional material 
attracted some customer attention. However, to increase customer awareness of the Friction Disc 
and its benefits, a greater focus on marketing should have taken place (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
5.3.3.3 Innovation Success 
By 2014, every wind turbine of SKF’s customer in the 3.3-MW-class was equipped with the Friction 
Disc. Since its market introduction in 2009, the yearly sales figures have been constantly rising and 
by 2014, a medium three-digit sales number has been reached. The Friction Disc became a particu-
larly profitable and sustainable business for SKF and overall it has provided a very good return on 
investment. However, notwithstanding the great potential of the Friction Disc for further applica-
tions in other industries, there were just a few alternative applications that have been equipped 
with the Friction Disc (SKF, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d). 
The product performance of the Friction Disc was very high and met the exact requirements of the 
customer. Several field tests have proven its performance and the friction coefficient, which was the 
main feature of the Friction Disc, has been certified by an accredited certification organization. 
Even after several years of use, the Friction Disc exhibited no loss of quality and by 2014, SKF had 
not a single return from the customer (SKF, 2014d). 
The overall efficiency of the innovation process was considered quite high regarding both dimen-
sions – costs and duration. The period between the first customer contact and series production of 
the Friction Disc amounted to a very short duration of 2.5 years. Furthermore, the team took par-
ticular care to keep the development costs down (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
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5.3.4 Case 3: Cryogenic Machining by 5ME 
5ME was founded as a spin-off from the global machine tool manufacturer MAG IAS to develop and 
implement cryogenic machining on the market for industrial machining processes. In contrast to 
traditional flood coolants, the cutting heat was dissipated by means of liquid nitrogen. 
5.3.4.1 Innovation Context 
Technology 
Machining generates heat at the cutting edge due to friction, shearing, and abrasion. The faster the 
cutting speeds, the higher the heat. With rising heat, tool wear and thus, costs increase rapidly. 
Correspondingly, the heat needs to be dissipated. Any cooling media helps to reduce the cutting 
heat (5ME, 2014c). 
The 5ME technology utilized vacuum 
jacketed feed lines for transmitting small 
flow rates of liquid nitrogen at -196°C 
through the machine, through the spin-
dle, and through the tool directly to the 
cutting edge to maximize cooling effec-
tiveness (5ME, 2014i, p. 32; MAG IAS, p. 
2). The tools for cryogenic machining 
needed to be specifically designed to 
interface with the cryogenic system for 
reasons of proper functionality and safety 
(5ME, 2014g). 
 
Figure 26: Cryogenic Machining (5ME, 2014i, p. 30)  
There were several alternative cooling methods to dissipate the heat generated by the machining 
process. 5ME targeted hard to machine materials and thus, just these technological alternatives 
have been analyzed that also addressed this kind of material. According to 5ME, there were five 
alternatives worth analyzing. To gain the relative advantageousness of the LN2 cryogenic machin-
ing, ten evaluation criteria have been derived in consultation with 5ME’s Cryogenic Engineering 
Manager (5ME, 2014k). With respect to the degree of which they met these criteria on a ten-stage 
ordinate scale, the cooling alternatives have been assessed (cf. Figure 27). 
Especially, for tough-to-machine materials, the technology had great advantages regarding tool life, 
cycle time, and product quality. Accordingly, the productivity of this process was on a very high 
level compared to its alternatives. This became additionally apparent if the low running costs and 
low downtime rates were placed as the focus, which led to a higher profitability of the overall 
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process. Furthermore, LN2 cryogenic machining was a green and safe technology. Nevertheless, 
regarding investment costs and construction change the technology was among the lowest ranked. 
In 2007, MAG IAS took over the technology from an engineering and development firm that validat-
ed its applicability in a laboratory environment (TRL 4). From 2007 until 2013, MAG IAS developed 
the technology further until TRL 7 and showcased a prototype machine at several industry trade 
shows (5ME, 2014n). With spinning-off, 5ME pushed the technology development. By the end of 
2014, the first machine was shipped and was brought into industrial use in the first quarter of 
2015. Thus, the technology had reached application maturity and achieved TRL 9. Nevertheless, the 
market was not properly familiar with the technology by 2015 (5ME, 2014j). 
 
Figure 27: Overview of Relative Advantages of 5ME`s LN2 Cryogenic Machining 
Target Market 
5ME’s long-term vision was to eliminate coolants on every machining operation and shift the 
market to cryogenic machining. In the short term, 5ME was focusing on the difficult-to-machine 
materials as these applications gained an intermediate effect from the new technology (5ME, 
2014j). These materials were most commonly used in four industries, which correspondingly form 
the target market of 5ME: aerospace, oil & gas, automotive, and construction and agriculture. The 
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initial geographic focus was the Northern American market (5ME, 2014l). From a customer stand-
point, 5ME addressed companies that machined parts and machine tool builders. For the first 
group, 5ME aimed to sell the cryogenic system in the form of retrofit kits. With the other group of 
customers, 5ME planned to cooperate by applying cryogenic machining to their machines before 
they would have been shipped to end-users (5ME, 2014n). 
Within the American metalworking machinery manufacturing industry, improving business condi-
tions have led to an increased demand for machine tools by 2015 (Gardner Research, 2014, p. 2). 
These industry trends strongly supported the establishment of cryogenic machining. From a mar-
ket opportunity standpoint, there were several thousands of machines that fitted the criteria of 
cryogenic machining. One of the basic barriers to entering the market with cryogenic machining 
was obligatory approvals, especially in the aerospace industry. 5ME already achieved approvals for 
several processes and was constantly working on further ones. Apart from the certification re-
quirements, cryogenic machining was a radical new technology that required a lot of change. Un-
derstandably, this led to a great uncertainty on the customer side. Most of the potential customers 
wanted to see references. With respect to cryogenic machining, there was actually no competitor in 
the market. 5ME’s job was more about convincing the end-user to change the way they traditionally 
machined parts (5ME, 2014j, 2014n, 2014o). 
Organization 
The non-machinery units of the former MAG IAS machine tool manufacturer were spun-off and 
emerged as 5ME from then on. Their strategy was to increase their customers’ manufacturing 
efficiency to generate profitable, competitive, and sustainable businesses. The organization was 
very flat and flexible from an organizational standpoint (5ME, 2014n). Correspondingly, the 
decision making processes within the company were very lean. Due to the flexibility of a start-up, 
5ME was able to adapt its technology goals and strategy roadmap very quickly according to the 
feedback of its customers (5ME, 2014n). Overall, the innovation climate was very good within 5ME 
and the whole team was absolutely committed to the technology and the company (5ME, 2014l). 
5ME had a single investor that owned the company and allocated the funds. In the face of this risky 
endeavor, strong management and owner commitment was essential and, in the case of 5ME, 
present (5ME, 2014l, 2014n). 
Entrepreneurial Team 
By 2015, 5ME had about 45 employees. The team consisted of managers, engineers, and employees 
that have originally worked for the former MAG IAS business units, which have been incorporated 
when spinning-off. With respect to their machine tool background and the standard machining 
operations, the team was very experienced right from the start. According to 5ME’s president, the 
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team was strongly committed to the company’s goals, passionate regarding technology commercial-
ization, and willing to take risks (5ME, 2014n). 
5.3.4.2 Innovation Process 
Opportunity Identification 
As mentioned, MAG IAS took over the technology from an engineering and development firm that 
validated its applicability in a laboratory environment. In 2007, a visit of their laboratories was 
made by the MAG IAS management team. Once they witnessed what the engineering and develop-
ment firm was doing, they realized the big opportunities of cryogenic machining (5ME, 2014n). 
After profound technology development and spinning-off, the timeliness for commercializing 
cryogenic machining within 5ME’s focus industries seemed perfect by the end of 2014. Large cus-
tomers in the automotive and oil & gas industry made significant capital investment approximately 
15 to 20 years ago and were up to retool their facilities. In the aerospace industry, the F-35 Joint 
Strike Fighter program reflected another great chance for cryogenic machining, as the technology 
had great advantages for machining the F-35 titanium components (5ME, 2014o). 5ME started with 
a concrete roadmap of technology goals, but as the company was closely in touch with its customers 
and constantly asked questions, 5ME altered its roadmap based on this market feedback and pivot-
ed. Interestingly, the first order the company received was of hardened steel, this was completely 
different from what 5ME initially focused on, but represented a good chance for initial business 
success (5ME, 2014n). 
Product Development 
At product development, lead-user integration played a big role for 5ME. By listening to these lead-
users, 5ME understood their needs and derived the markets, where to commercialize first. Especial-
ly in the ramp-up phase of a radical new technology, it was essential to have a close relationship 
with the first users. Not everything went right at the forefront of technology implementation. Thus, 
it was important to find those customers that have the right culture and mindset to dare the risks. 
In these early phases, constant feedback was decisive. Furthermore, these users helped 5ME to 
offset their development costs by funding test runs (5ME, 2014n, 2014o). 
5ME also established a limited number of strategically chosen development partnerships with 
several customers and certain universities (5ME, 2014n). They closely cooperated at bringing 
cryogenic machining to practice. 5ME did not have a detailed risk and quality management system 
but established some instruments to deal with emerging risks and quality issues. By 2014, the 
company was working towards a platform strategy to share common parts. However, everything up 
to this point had been unique regarding the first sets of machines (5ME, 2014o). Any time, 5ME 
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came up with a good idea that had a vital commercial potential, the company tried to protect it and 
filed for a patent (5ME, 2014j). 
Commercialization 
The customer value 5ME was addressing with cryogenic machining was manufacturing efficiency. 
5ME’s business model was to generate the main revenue out of the peripheral tooling and selling 
the cryogenic kits cheap. The company expected that this would lower the entrance barriers and 
foster the commercialization of cryogenic machining. As the margins were even higher for the tools, 
the revenue opportunities of cutting tools were much higher than for the kits (5ME, 2014j, 2014o). 
The company designed and engineered all parts of the cryogenic system, but did not produce them. 
All components were manufactured by suppliers according to 5ME’s specification and shipped to 
5ME. Therefore, the company had established several strategic relationships with specifically 
selected suppliers (5ME, 2014j). Since spinning out, 5ME did considerably more marketing. The 
company addressed the market with a new brand-name (5ME, 2014n). With a focused marketing 
approach, 5ME was positioning cryogenic machining as a premium solution for niche applications 
of tough material completely dedicated to manufacturing efficiency. Thereby, the company followed 
the timing strategy of a pioneer (5ME, 2014l). 
5.3.4.3 Innovation Success 
Until the end of 2014, virtually all of 5ME’s revenue was generated by customer testing. The first 
customer machine was shipped and was going into production in the first quarter of 2015. Due to 
positive test runs in 2014, 5ME expected to win another eight to ten retrofit orders during 2015. 
This would start to cover 5ME’s investments. Because of the lead times of these systems, 5ME 
estimated to reach the break-even point for cryogenic machining within 2017. From then on, the 
cryogenic machining business would be profitable (5ME, 2014n). 
The performance results of cryogenic machining in the tech center were robust, repeatable, and 
thus reliable. Hence, the involved customers were very excited with respect to the achieved test 
results. However, no industry performance data were available by the end of 2014 (5ME, 2014o). 
To keep the costs down, 5ME tried to get test funding from its customers. Moreover, the engineer-
ing team saved time and resources by following a smart testing approach. Overall, the company 
worked quite efficiently. However, commercializing this radical technology took time and invest-
ment. With respect to commercialization, the low amount of incoming orders was frustrating as 
5ME wants to see things happen much faster. On a scale from one to ten, 5ME ascribed the techno-
logical development a seven and the commercialization a five by the end of 2014 (5ME, 2014n). 
Qualitative Validation of Critical Success Factors 
98 
5.3.5 Cross-Case Conclusions 
In fact, it was found that each company chose a unique strategic approach to realize their innova-
tion that could be clearly reported on the basis of the ICPS framework. Depending on their individ-
ual context and the innovation trigger, the innovation process was organized. Some CSF character-
istics were quite similar and some rather different. In the following, these similarities and differ-
ences will be reported within the three dimensions of the ICPS framework: innovation context, 
innovation process, and innovation success. 
5.3.5.1 Innovation Context 
The biggest differences about the innovation context were found in the organizational characteris-
tics of the analyzed cases. 5ME and Pinion were founded for realizing their innovation. Thus, the 
structures and processes, as well as the strategic direction, were completely arranged to bring the 
innovation to success. Accordingly, the company culture was shaped by a great innovation climate. 
In contrast, the Friction Disc was developed within the cumbersome structures and processes of a 
major corporation. The strategic direction of SKF has been aligned to high-volumes and incremental 
advancements of existing products. Thus, the resulting situation caused challenges for the Friction 
Disc project. On the other hand, funding and resource allocation was easier for SKF. Equally, 5ME 
was in a comfortable situation as the company owner was the single investor at the same time. 
Pinion, on the contrary, had to struggle for sufficient investments while not giving away too many 
company shares. The investor commitment was good for each of the companies. 
Regarding the technologies that underlay the respective innovations, there were similarities. All 
technologies were mature, as the associated innovations had already been implemented in the 
market. Furthermore, these technologies had distinct technological advantages compared to their 
alternatives. A common disadvantage of the technologies was their high price. In the case of Pinion 
and 5ME, a further handicap was their need to rebuild or construct infrastructure. 
Another similarity of the analyzed cases was the fact that the involved people realizing the innova-
tion projects formed a great entrepreneurial team. The teams were characterized by a high level of 
professional competence and experience. They were highly motivated, showed a great level of 
perseverance, and worked as a team. 
The situation with respect to the target markets for the analyzed innovations exhibited both differ-
ences and similarities. The industry contexts and the overall opportunities were promising for the 
central innovations and offered enormous potential. On the other hand, the competitive situation 
and the market barriers differed for the three cases. 5ME and Pinion followed a technology-push 
approach. Thus, there were established alternatives on the market that the companies aimed to 
substitute based on their technological advantages. The innovation trigger for the SKF Friction Disc 
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was market-pull, as SKF’s customer had a concrete problem to solve. Hence, there was no techno-
logical alternative available. Correspondingly, the market barriers for SKF have just been technical 
ones. In the cases of Pinion and 5ME, the main obstacle, besides technological maturity, was to 
convince and persuade end-users to turn to their solution. However, they could potentially address 
any application in their target markets. In contrast, the Friction Disc was a solution that was specif-
ically developed for the powertrain design of SKF’s customer and was thus, not easily transferable 
to other wind turbines. Moreover, this was prohibited due to an exclusivity agreement. Hence, this 
agreement represented a temporal insurmountable hurdle for targeting the whole wind industry. 
5.3.5.2 Innovation Process 
Opportunity identification was quite similar. In each of the three cases, it was primarily based on 
the personal gut feeling of the respective protagonists who realized that the time was right for their 
invention. By pivoting, the companies figured out the requirements of their customers and elabo-
rated a basic product concept. 
Regarding product development, the three companies followed diverse strategies. Pinion followed 
a primarily autarkic approach while SKF and 5ME intensively involved external partners like re-
search institutes and customers. All of the organizations involved lead users to gain concrete feed-
back. In the case of SKF, Senvion was both customer and lead user of the Friction Disc and thus, SKF 
intensively cooperated with this company. Risk and quality management was diversely formalized 
within the analyzed cases. Due to their company structures, SKF had the highest level of formaliza-
tion followed by 5ME and Pinion. In general, all companies strove for common parts as much as 
possible. However, none of them had already achieved a sophisticated platform strategy, which was 
probably due to the high level of novelty of the analyzed innovations. The primary objective was the 
successful establishment of the innovation at their target market while standardization of the 
product components was a secondary goal. Just like the product development approaches differed, 
the strategies for protecting intellectual property varied within the three cases. Pinion and 5ME 
followed a broad protection strategy for their innovation to become the single patent owner while 
SKF shared the resulting intellectual property with its customer. 
With respect to the commercialization strategy, many commonalities were observable within the 
three cases. The business models and commercialization partnerships were quite similar. Each 
company focused its value creation on engineering, and thus, the proportion of component suppli-
ers was correspondingly high. The timing of market introduction of the analyzed innovations was 
primarily based on technological maturity. All companies followed the innovator strategy and 
wanted to access the market as fast as possible. Nevertheless, the marketing efforts differed for the 
analyzed cases. Presumably, due to the explicit focus on its single customer, SKF was comparably 
reluctant at promoting the Friction Disc. Pinion and 5ME, on the other hand, followed an intense 
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marketing strategy to promote their innovation. This was probably due to the different kind of 
innovation trigger. As Pinion and 5ME followed a clear technology-push approach, they invested 
more than SKF who was following a market-pull approach. 
5.3.5.3 Innovation Success 
It was a precondition for case selection within the conducted study that the cases have been intro-
duced to the market and exhibited a certain level of success. Since market introduction, Pinion’s 
and SKF’s product innovations were sold several hundred times. In contrast, 5ME had just intro-
duced its innovation on the market and correspondingly only equipped one customer by 2014, the 
time the study was conducted. However, all products were mature, reliable, and the existing cus-
tomers were satisfied with their quality. The efficiency of each innovation project has been very 
high. The companies tried to keep the costs on a low level and strived for quick innovation realiza-
tion. Remarkably, it took SKF less than three years, Pinion less than five, and 5ME less than seven 
years to reach market introduction. The differing realization time might have been due to the clear 
application and customer focus of SKF and the broader market penetration strategy of Pinion and 
5ME. 
5.3.5.4 Summary 
The main purpose of the conducted multiple-case study was to gain a deeper holistic view with 
respect to the specific combination, peculiarity, and significance of the CSFs and to ultimately 
validate the ICPS framework by applying it to real cases. Therefore, three cases of radical techno-
logical innovation within the mechanical engineering industry have been analyzed, namely P1.18 
gearbox by Pinion, Friction Disc by SKF, and cryogenic machining by 5ME. Regarding the innovation 
context, the three cases differed mainly with respect to their organizational background and the 
characteristics of the addressed target market. Analyzing the different innovation processes, the 
cases varied mostly regarding the product development strategy. Furthermore, the marketing 
efforts of the different companies could be differentiated within the commercialization strategy. All 
analyzed innovation projects could be perceived as being successful. 
Based on the varying contexts, each company followed a distinct, and with respect to the CSFs 
detailed in the ICPS framework, clearly differentiable strategy approach for the realization of their 
respective radical technological innovation. Depending on the situation, the organizational 
background, and the target market, CSFs like marketing or intellectual property protection became 
more or less important. Other CSFs like lead user integration and strategic partnerships were 
uniformly decisive while CSFs like platform strategy and deliberate timing strategies were less 
crucial within the analyzed cases. In general, the ICPS framework seems to be a sound basis to 
differentiate strategic approaches for the realization of radical technological innovations within the 
mechanical engineering industry. Each CSF detailed in the ICPS framework demonstrated its ra-
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tionale, and in combination, they are a strong theory model of factors being crucial for the success 
of this kind of innovation. Based on the conducted multiple-case study, the ICPS framework does 
not need modification and thus, was confirmed. 
5.3.6 Discussion and Limitations 
There are several limitations associated with the conducted case study approach. One of the great-
est concerns associated with case study research is the general allegation regarding lack of rigor 
and the absence of systematic procedures. To address this issue, Yin’s guidelines for conducting 
high-quality case study research and his suggested quality tactics have been rigorously followed (cf. 
chapter 5.3.1 and 5.3.1.5). Nevertheless, the study is limited by the number of three analyzed cases. 
A natural suggestion for future research is therefore to increase the number of cases. 
Another criticism is that the results of this qualitative multiple-case study may be rich in detail, but 
lack the simplicity of an overall perspective (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 547). Correspondingly, a common 
concern is that case studies universally provide little basis for scientific generalization as the stud-
ied cases may describe only a very idiosyncratic phenomenon. According to Yin (2009), the short 
answer is that case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions like the 
ICPS framework and not to populations. In this sense, the three cases do not represent a "sample", 
and in doing these case studies, the goal was to validate the ICPS framework (analytic generaliza-
tion) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization). The ICPS framework is used as a 
template with which to compare the empirical results of the case studies. One goal was to build a 
general explanation that fits each individual case (CSFs detailed in the ICPS framework), even 
though the cases varied in their details. As the three cases showed to support this theory, replica-
tion can be claimed. The empirical results can be considered yet more potent as the cases support 
the same theory, but do not support an equally plausible, rival theory (Yin, 2009, p. 142, 2009, pp. 
38–39, 2009, pp. 14–15). The issue of statistically testing the ICPS framework will be addressed by 
the conducted quantitative study (cf. chapter 6). 
Another limitation that is inherent to the chosen study design is that only successful innovation 
projects have been analyzed in the study. This was mainly because the innovation projects should 
have run through all the phases of the innovation process for being able to completely analyze each 
CSF. Therefore, the perspective of innovation failures was not studied which has to be considered. 
Furthermore, the retrospective nature of the analyzed cases may have led to the situation that the 
innovation projects could have been viewed as much more rational and well-ordered by the key-
informants than they were in fact (Utterback, 1974, p. 625). 
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6 Quantitative Validation of Critical 
Success Factors 
6.1 Variables and Hypotheses 
To quantitatively assess the impact of the individual CSFs on the innovation success, a theoretical 
framework for each category of the ICPS framework has been established. Theoretical frameworks 
represent relationships among variables and describe the nature and direction of these relations. 
Therefore, independent and dependent variables were differentiated. An independent variable 
influences a dependent variable in either a positive or negative way. For quantifying this impact, 
both variables need to be measured. As each factor detailed in the ICPS framework was not directly 
measurable, the CSFs were operationalized into observable elements to render them measurable in 
a tangible way by reducing the level of abstraction (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010, p. 127, 2010, p. 80, 
2010, p. 72). 
For this approach, previous studies were reviewed for existing measures of abstract factors (cf. 
Appendix V – 1). Based on the theoretical frameworks, five testable hypotheses have been derived. 
These hypothesized relationships were then tested by statistical analyses (cf. chapter 6.4.3). In the 
following, the variables, the theoretical frameworks, and the derived hypotheses will be delineated 
within the three dimensions of the ICPS framework. An overview of the operationalization can be 
found in Appendix IV. 
Innovation Success 
Innovation success forms the ultimate goal of each innovation project. Correspondingly, the three 
dimensions of innovation success form the three dependent variables of the elaborated theoretical 
frameworks. These variables are sales performance, product performance, and efficiency. As these 
variables are latent and thusly not directly measurable, they were further operationalized (cf. 
Appendix IV). Accordingly, sales performance was split up into the two elements sales figures and 
market share. Product performance is assessed by measuring the product quality, customer satisfac-
tion, and internal satisfaction. Finally, efficiency was captured by evaluating emerging costs and the 
overall speed of the innovation process and the query if the process was on time and in the budget. 
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Innovation Context 
The operationalization of the innovation context was elaborated within its four categories: technol-
ogy, target market, organization, and entrepreneurial team. The derived elements represent inde-
pendent variables that influence the three dependent variables sales performance, product perfor-
mance, and efficiency. Accordingly, the respective hypotheses were generated. 
Technology 
The first dimension, relative advantageousness, from the category technology, was operationalized 
to the variables performance advantages, cost advantages, reliability and safety, and technology 
potential. The second dimension, feasibility & maturity was broken down to the variables execution 
challenges, application maturity, and investment efforts (cf. Appendix IV). In Figure 28, the theoreti-
cal framework I that has been associated with the technology category is depicted. 
 
Figure 28: Theoretical Framework I Associated to Technology 
Based on this theoretical framework, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H1: There is a significant correlation between each independent variable associated with 
the category technology and at least one of the three dependent variables of the over-
all innovation success, namely sales performance, product performance, and efficiency. 
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Target Market 
The category target market has been operationalized to the following independent variables: 
market size, market barriers, environmental impacts, competition, market match, timeliness, and 
market growth (cf. Appendix IV). The factor timeliness was originally listed within the ICPS frame-
work as a CSF of the opportunity identification action field. However, within the theoretical frame-
work V associated to the category innovation process just controllable and measurable process 
instruments were considered. As the parameter timeliness additionally contributes to the oppor-
tunity caused by the target market, it was thusly relocated to this category. Figure 29 represents the 
respective theoretical framework II. 
 
Figure 29: Theoretical Framework II Associated to Target Market 
Accordingly, the second hypothesis was established: 
H2: There is a significant correlation between each independent variable associated with 
the category target market and at least one of the three dependent variables of the 
overall innovation success, namely sales performance, product performance, and           
efficiency. 
Organization 
Within the category organization, three dimensions are differentiable: culture, structure, and strate-
gy. Culture can be further operationalized to the variables internal communication, adequate re-
source allocation, management support, and risk tolerance & failure acceptance. Structure has been 
broken down to the variables flexibility, product home, and lean decision making. Finally, the strate-
gy dimension has been split into the variables strategy fit and dedication to innovation (cf. Appendix 
IV). The corresponding theoretical framework III is depicted in Figure 30. 
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Figure 30: Theoretical Framework III Associated to Organization 
The corresponding hypothesis is the following: 
H3: There is a significant correlation between each independent variable associated with 
the category organization and at least one of the three dependent variables of the 
overall innovation success, namely sales performance, product performance, and           
efficiency. 
Entrepreneurial Team 
The following variables were derived from the category entrepreneurial team: teamwork, profes-
sional competence, perseverance/attitude, social competence, interdisciplinarity, personal network, 
and experience (cf. Appendix IV). Theoretical framework IV constitutes accordingly (cf. Figure 31). 
 
Figure 31: Theoretical Framework IV Associated to Entrepreneurial Team 
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Thus, hypothesis 4 reads as follows: 
H4: There is a significant correlation between each independent variable associated with 
the category entrepreneurial team and at least one of the three dependent variables of 
the overall innovation success, namely sales performance, product performance, and           
efficiency. 
Innovation Process 
For quantitatively validating the success factors of the innovation process, only the controllable and 
measurable process instruments have been considered. There was no differentiation of the three 
separate action fields of the innovation process within the ICPS framework: opportunity identifica-
tion, product development, and commercialization. This was due to the fact that some process in-
struments are relevant in various action fields. Quality management and strategic partnerships, for 
example, are decisive for product development, as well as for commercialization. Thus, a separate 
query would generate redundancies without major further insights and would cause a prolonged 
processing time. For these research pragmatic factors, the category innovation process has been 
broken down to the following process instruments that have been treated as independent variables 
in the subsequent analyses: intellectual property protection, lead user integration, customer feed-
back, promotion, platform strategy, positioning, timing, strategic partnerships, quality management, 
risk management, and open innovation (cf. Appendix IV). Figure 32 depicts the corresponding 
theoretical framework V. 
 
Figure 32: Theoretical Framework V Associated to Innovation Process 
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The fifth hypothesis claims the following: 
H5: There is a significant correlation between each independent variable associated with 
the category innovation process and at least one of the three dependent variables of 
the overall innovation success, namely sales performance, product performance, and           
efficiency. 
6.2 Design of the Survey Instrument and Pretest 
To statistically test the five hypotheses, a quantitative survey was conducted within the German 
power transmission industry. Therefore, a standardized survey instrument, a questionnaire, was 
developed. Questionnaires are pre-formulated written sets of questions to which respondents 
record their answers. It is an efficient data collection mechanism (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010, p. 
197). 
6.2.1 Focus and Direction of the Survey 
For the main part of the survey, the participants were asked to retrospectively relate their answers 
to a concrete project. They were explicitly requested to focus on one specific innovation project 
within the German power transmission industry (the target industry cf. chapter 6.3.1) in which 
they participated. The respective innovation should have represented a radical technological prod-
uct innovation that was characterized by a high level of novelty. This product innovation should 
have been developed and subsequently introduced to the market. With this study design, it was 
possible to statistically assess the impact of each CSF on the innovation success on the basis of 
individual projects. This formed the basis for testing the five hypotheses. Nevertheless, abandoned 
and incomplete projects were not considered in this study. The latter projects have not gone 
through each phase of the innovation process and thus, no measurable innovation successes have 
been achieved (Dahl, 2015, pp. 46–47). 
6.2.2 Wording and Scales  
For constructing the questionnaire, question wordings and response scales are decisive and need to 
complement each other. Both dimensions are crucial for good survey results since the quality of 
verbalization directly affects data quality. A slight mistake can cause misunderstandings that induce 
potential problems in data analysis due to incorrect results (Dahl, 2015, pp. 50–52; Raab-Steiner 
and Benesch, 2008, pp. 47–48). 
The first step of questionnaire construction was an analysis of previous studies for potential 
measures of the variables detailed in chapter 6.1. Proven question wordings and scales were uti-
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lized and adapted according to the purpose of each question. For variables without previously 
validated measures, these have been newly developed. All questions measuring the variables were 
posed close-ended which means that the answer options were predefined. However, the option “no 
response” was included for respondents that did not know or were not willing to give a concrete 
answer regarding the posed question. The queried variables were posed as statements and the 
respondents should indicate their consent on a five-point Likert scale. Although a Likert scale, 
technically, is an ordinal scale, it can approximate an interval-level measurement. Correspondingly, 
it is legitimate to use the collected data for parametric statistical tests and general quantitative 
analysis (Hilgers, 2015, p. 30; Norman, 2010, pp. 628–630). Furthermore, several qualitative ques-
tions were posed to gather descriptive information regarding the respective innovation projects. 
These questions were also closed-ended and utilized dichotomous, ordinal, nominal, interval, and 
also Likert scales, but were complemented with an open comment field (Dahl, 2015, pp. 50–54). 
As the target group was the German power transmission industry, the questions were posed in 
German. In general, simple and short questions were preferred. Correspondingly, the danger of 
misunderstandings was reduced, and furthermore, the barriers to participating were lowered. 
Special attention was devoted to preventing socially desirable responses and double-barreled 
questions. Instead of phrasing all questions positively, some negatively worded questions were 
included as well for minimizing the tendency of respondents to mechanically circle the points 
toward one end of the scale (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010, pp. 199–202). An overview of the question 
wordings for measuring the variables and the corresponding measures of previous studies is de-
picted in Appendix V -1. 
6.2.3 Questionnaire Design 
The survey consisted in total of 76 questions which were arranged in six fundamental parts (cf. 
Appendix – 2). It was designed for self-administered completion. At first, the term radical innova-
tion was explained to prevent misconceptions due to the underlying terminology. After several 
initiating and warm-up questions about the respondent himself, the interviewee was asked to focus 
on a specific innovation project from his past work experience within the power transmission 
industry as outlined in chapter 6.2.1 (Dahl, 2015, pp. 47–50; Hilgers, 2015, p. 29). 
The following questions were focusing on the selected specific innovation project and constituted 
the main body of the survey. These questions were based on the variables outlined in chapter 6.1 
that were developed through the conducted operationalization. Within the first part of the main 
survey body, the independent variables of the innovation context were addressed. Thus, questions 
regarding the target market, the organization, the technology, and the entrepreneurial team were 
posed. The next section targeted the dependent variables of the overall innovation success. Finally, 
the utilization of specific innovation process instruments was measured. Each question set of the 
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main survey section was introduced with a short explanatory text which included concrete instruc-
tions and definitions of specific terms (Dahl, 2015, p. 51; Hilgers, 2015, p. 29). 
The questionnaire was concluded by questions regarding firm demographics, a text box for addi-
tional comments or feedback, and the query if the respondent wants to receive the results of the 
study and wants to take part in a lottery for gift certificates. These were used as an incentive for 
participation (Hilgers, 2015, p. 30). 
It was aimed to design a questionnaire as short as possible to lift the completion rate of partici-
pants. The completed printout version of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix V – 3. Fur-
thermore, to make participation as easy and convenient as possible for the respondent, an online 
version was created using the web application of the freeware LimeSurvey (Dahl, 2015, p. 44). 
6.2.4 Pretest 
After completion of the questionnaire design, a pretest was conducted to test the capability of the 
survey instrument. Thereby, four main aspects deserved special attention: reliability and validity, 
linguistic and content-related comprehensibility of questions, the uniqueness of categories, and 
specific data gathering problems (Atteslander, 2008, pp. 277–278). To guide and support this 
process a feedback form was generated and distributed among the pretest participants (cf. Appen-
dix V – 4). The feedback form contained questions regarding the usability of the questionnaire, 
linguistic and content-related comprehensibility of the questions (clear instructions, wording, 
terminology, content, possible bias due to directed questions), the related scales, and the pro-
cessing time (Dahl, 2015, p. 60). 
For the pretest, the online version of the survey was utilized. 20 invitations for participation have 
been sent to potential participants. Ultimately, 11 completed questionnaires were retrieved. The 
pretest participants consisted of three different groups of experts: the research methodology 
consulting at the House of Competence (HoC) at KIT, scientific staff members at EnTechnon and 
IPEK, and industrial experts of the power transmission industry. Additionally, two intense feedback 
sessions were conducted with the two scientific supervisors of the author by utilizing the technique 
“think-aloud”. Furthermore, the printout version was reviewed by 4 colleagues of the author for 
analyzing clarity and form of the questionnaire (not content). Consequently, the survey instrument 
was considered from a methodological, a scientific, and an industrial perspective. All pretest activi-
ties were conducted in October 2014 (Dahl, 2015, p. 60). 
The linguistic and content-related comprehensibility of questions has been thoroughly analyzed. 
The suggested improvements were implemented and contained a few wording changes to question 
items, the sequence of several questions, and the content of the lead-in questions. In summary, the 
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results of the pretest showed that the developed survey instrument hold for the criterion of validi-
ty. The posed questions were unambiguous and comprehensible. Due to the standardized form, the 
criterion of reliability was fulfilled. The uniqueness of categories within several descriptive queries 
could be confirmed, as well as the estimated processing time of roughly 15 minutes for survey 
participation. The web tool was reliably working and thus, no data gathering problems emerged 
(Dahl, 2015, pp. 59–61). 
6.3 Data Collection and Preparation  
6.3.1 The German Power Transmission Industry as Target Industry 
The overall study of the thesis at hand addresses the mechanical engineering industry. However, 
this industry is quite diverse and contains several sub-branches, including, inter alia, textile ma-
chines, packaging machines, robotic & automation, and power transmission. Accordingly, the 
competitive conditions differ greatly within these branches (VDMA and McKinsey, 2014c, p. 12). 
This heterogeneity in the industry might have caused the situation that possibly few, or hardly any, 
statistically measurable relations were detectable. To have a realistic chance to detect statistically 
significant relations, it was decisive to choose a target industry with satisfactory homogeneity. 
Therefore, it seemed reasonable for data collection to focus on a distinct sub-branch within the 
mechanical engineering industry. 
For the conducted study, the German power transmission industry has been chosen as a target 
industry. In 2014, this industry generated 17 billion € and therewith approximately 8% of the 
overall revenue of the German mechanical engineering and plant manufacturing industry (Statista; 
Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015). Thus, the power transmission industry was the biggest sub-branch 
of the mechanical engineering and plant manufacturing industry in Germany. Nearly all global 
innovation leaders within this branch are German companies that invest considerable resources in 
research and development. Accordingly, the patent intensity regarding product- and process inno-
vations is quite high. Furthermore, the market is shaped by high domestic demand as important 
customers have production sites in Germany (VDMA and McKinsey, 2014a, pp. 22–24, 2014a, pp. 
10–15). 
Companies of the power transmission industry are engaged in drive train technologies, i.e. with 
technical systems that generate and transmit power. The products include rolling bearings, gear-
boxes, gears, and further drive elements. Accordingly, companies of this branch are mostly suppli-
ers in the business-to-business (B2B) sector, especially for the mechanical engineering and the 
automotive industry (Hilgers, 2015, p. 13; Statista). Several industrial megatrends like electric 
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mobility, energy efficiency, resource optimization, and industry 4.0 are directly affected by the 
products of the power transmission industry (Dahl, 2015, p. 56; VDMA and McKinsey, 2014a, p. 22). 
In summary, the German power transmission industry was highly suitable as the target industry for 
the quantitative study. It provided a large sample of potential survey participants from different 
manufacturing industries with sufficient homogeneity due to its functional product purpose. In 
addition, the industry is characterized by a great economic importance and innovativeness. Fur-
thermore, the branch comprises firms with different organizational sizes and structures. The 
different industrial and organizational backgrounds and their potential effects on the innovation 
process are interesting, especially regarding the variables and hypotheses outlined in chapter 6.1 
(Dahl, 2015, pp. 56–57). Due to the focus on Germany, no language or cross-cultural issues emerged 
when designing the questionnaire. Moreover, potential differences regarding competitive condi-
tions, political situation, and diverse business practices within different countries were prevented 
in advance (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010, p. 218). 
6.3.2 Target Population, Survey Channels, and Response Rate 
As outlined in chapter 6.2.1, the survey participants were requested to retrospectively relate their 
answers to a concrete project in which a radical technological innovation within the German power 
transmission industry was realized. To answer the questionnaire properly, the respondents needed 
a profound overview on each dimension of the innovation context, innovation process, and subse-
quently innovation success. Therefore, they should have been deeply involved in the respective 
project. The target population, then, for the survey was inter alia, project managers, marketing- and 
sales representatives, development engineers, production experts, and business developers that 
have been involved in the realization of a radical technological innovation for the German power 
transmission industry. 
Experts that were interested in scientific research were most likely to respond. They have been 
attracted by the promise to receive the survey results after analysis. Additionally, three 30€-
Amazon vouchers were raffled among the participants to lift the response rate. Moreover, the 
respondents have been assured anonymity and confidentiality. 
For distributing the questionnaire, an online and a printout version were prepared in order to meet 
the personal preferences of the respondents and thus, increase the response rate. The online ver-
sion was created with the web application of the freeware LimeSurvey and was available as a 
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website on the WWW.2 For reasons of better usability, an alternative URL was generated for the 
survey.3 To reach the target population, three different survey channels were utilized. 
A great number of potential respondents was addressed at the 43rd annual conference of the Ger-
man Research Association for Power Transmission Engineering (Forschungsvereinigung Antrieb-
stechnik, FVA) on the 2nd and 3rd of December 2014 in Würzburg. According to its website, the FVA 
is the globally leading innovation network within the target industry. It encourages general re-
search, exchange of experience within the industry, and the education of young scientists. It sup-
ports and enables joint research projects between small, medium, and large companies, as well as 
research institutes. The diverse variety of members and a large number of participants at the 
conference helped to approach potential respondents (FVA; Hilgers, 2015, pp. 30–31). 
A second approach was to search for representatives of the target population via the social net-
working platform XING4. In order to ensure that the professionals to be contacted correspond to the 
target population, filter criteria were defined. Only those candidates were included that worked in 
project management, technical development, production management, marketing, sales, consulting, 
or were responsible for decision making processes within the power transmission industry. Fur-
ther keywords like power train, drive train, engine, coupling, gear box, transmission, gear unit, and 
differential were used to find appropriate participants for the survey. This group of people has 
subsequently been contacted by personal mail due to platform limitations of XING regarding the 
limits for sent messages. Four weeks after the first contact, a reminder has been sent (Dahl, 2015, 
pp. 57–58; Hilgers, 2015, p. 31). 
Finally, the author made use of his personal network which he acquired during his previous profes-
sional career working for an established player of the power transmission industry. The online 
version of the survey was sent to his contacts in the industry kindly asking to respond and to for-
ward it to their respective companies. Once again, a reminder has been sent four weeks after the 
first contact (Hilgers, 2015, p. 31). 
The data collection period lasted from December 2014 until March 2015. At the FVA-conference, a 
total of 617 potential survey participants received the questionnaire. This number has been 
adapted by subtracting the number of 130 attending PhDs and PhD-Students, as they were not part 
of the target population. Thus, 487 potential respondents were addressed. 46 responses were 
collected which results in a response rate of 9.45%. Based on the XING-search, 372 people were 
contacted with 50 returns resulting in a response rate of 13.44%. The utilization of the author’s 
personal network reached 173 professionals and resulted in 51 responses. The associated response 
                                                                    
2 http://kit-csf.limequery.com/index.php/365651/lang-de, now defunct 
3 http://www.kit-umfrage.de, now defunct 
4 http://www.xing.com 
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rate of 29.48% is by far the highest, as can be expected when using personal contacts. In total, 147 
responses were collected after contacting 1032 potential survey participants within the target 
population. The resulting overall response rate is thereby 14.24%. 100 respondents completed the 
survey online while 47 chose the printout version. An overview of the response rates is depicted in 
Table 6 (Hilgers, 2015, p. 31). 
Table 6: Survey Response Rate (Hilgers, 2015, p. 32) 
 
6.3.3 Data Preparation 
The web application LimeSurvey allowed direct export of the collected data to the statistical analy-
sis program SPSS Statistics5 by IBM which was used for the subsequent analysis. Nevertheless, the 
printout responses had to be added manually to the data set. Before analysis, the variables had to 
be named properly. Each variable represented one question of the survey. LimeSurvey automatical-
ly named the variables using the corresponding question as a basis. To simplify the handling during 
analysis, the independent and dependent variables outlined in chapter 6.1 have been renamed. 
Therefore, abbreviations of the superordinate category names were used and the variables were 
enumerated based on their sequence in the questionnaire. The abbreviations were as follows: 
Innovation Success (IS), Target Market (TM), Organization (ORG), Technology (TEC), Entrepreneur-
ial Team (ET), and Innovation Process Instruments (PI) (Hilgers, 2015, pp. 32–33). 
Afterward, the problem of missing data had to be resolved. 147 questionnaires were completed but 
only 45 of these were free of missing data. When focusing on the main body of the survey measur-
ing the variables described in chapter 6.1, 52% of the respondents did not answer at least one 
question. In total, 300 values were missing which corresponds to 4% of the overall captured values 
(cf. Figure 33). The observed cases of non-response are due to the offered “no-response”-option in 
the questionnaire, involuntary or voluntary omission of questions, or invalid answers. As most 
statistical procedures require complete data sets without any missing data, sophisticated methods 
of dealing with missing data had to be applied (Brosius, 2013, p. 284; Hilgers, 2015, p. 34). 
                                                                    
5 In the following just called SPSS 
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At first, the missing data were analyzed to identify the patterns and relationships underlying the 
missing data. By using Little’s MCAR test, it could be determined that the data were missing com-
pletely at random (MCAR). In simple terms, this means, that the cases with missing data were 
indistinguishable from cases with complete data. This situation was preferable, as it allowed the 
widest range of potential remedies to deal with missing data (Hair, 2010, p. 49, 2010, p. 42; Hilgers, 
2015, p. 33). 
 
Figure 33: Overview of Missing Data (Hilgers, 2015, p. 34) 
In general, there are two main categories of treating missing data: deletion and imputation. The 
first more traditional approach significantly reduces the sample size by deleting any case affected 
by missing data and was thus, not applied. In contrast, imputation procedures replace missing data. 
Correspondingly, it is possible to include all given responses in the subsequent analyses and thus, 
keep the sample size constant and on a maximum. For the study at hand, imputation was applied 
(Hair, 2010, p. 45; Hilgers, 2015, pp. 34–35). 
Instead of mean or median imputation, the more sophisticated approach of regression imputation 
was combined with preceding maximum likelihood estimation. At first, the five theoretical frame-
works of chapter 6.1 have been combined into an overall model containing all independent and 
dependent variables. By maximum likelihood estimation, several model parameters like variance 
and covariance of the initial model have been estimated. A linear regression utilizing these estimat-
ed parameters was used to predict the unobserved values for each case as a linear combination of 
the observed values for that same case. Predicted values are then plugged in for the missing values. 
The software IBM SPSS AMOS was used for the described procedure (Arbuckle, 2013, p. 461; 
Blunch, 2013, pp. 220–227; Enders, 2010, pp. 44–48; Hilgers, 2015, pp. 35–36). 
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After successfully dealing with missing data, negatively keyed items of the main survey part (cf. 
variables described in chapter 6.1) were recoded so that a high score on the Likert scale of the 
independent variables was expected to have a positive influence on the dependent variables. Sub-
sequently, the suffix “_REC” was added to the names of the reverse-coded variables. As the last step 
of data preparation, outliers were searched by using the SPSS boxplot analysis. Even though some 
boxplot outliers could be identified for individual items, no respondent generated conspicuously 
many outliers which would have justified a deletion of the respective case (Hilgers, 2015, p. 36). 
6.4 Data Analysis and Findings 
6.4.1 Survey Sample 
In summary, 147 representatives of the German power transmission industry took part in the 
survey. The two dominating industries, for which the respondents were working, were the mechan-
ical engineering (40%) and the automotive industry (38%). Just 22% of the survey participants 
were working for other industries like electrical engineering or automation technologies. The big 
corporations with more than 10,000 employees were vastly dominating with a great majority of 
nearly 70%. The percentage of stock (60%) and limited companies (40%) was correspondingly 
high. 
The most respondents have much professional experience. 49% have worked longer than 15 years 
and 30% worked between 7 and 15 years. Accordingly, the most survey participants have been 
involved in several innovation projects. Nearly 60% were involved in 2 to 5 projects, 15% in 6 to 10 
projects, and 17% were involved in even more than 10 projects. With respect to their position 
within the concrete innovation project which they were focusing on in the survey, 43% were devel-
opment engineers, 26% project managers, and 12% part of the decision committee. A clear majori-
ty of the survey participants were satisfied with the results of the project. 47% of the respondents 
were satisfied and even 28% were very satisfied. Thus, successful projects were predominantly 
selected within the survey. As depicted in chapter 6.2.1 this was part of the survey design and thus, 
expected. 
30% of the survey participants indicated that the process of the innovation project was not stand-
ardized at all. 32% of the respondents pointed out that their innovation projects have been man-
aged in accordance with a common process, but were not formally standardized. 38% of the re-
spondents described the process of their selected innovation project as formally standardized. 
From the number of these formally standardized projects, 82% have been managed according to a 
stage-gate-process. Regarding the project organization, the matrix organization was greatly domi-
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nating with 74%. 24% of the projects have been carried out in an autonomous organization and just 
2% of the projects were realized in a newly founded, own company. 
 
Figure 34: Overview Survey Sample (Hilgers, 2015, p. 46) 
6.4.2 Goodness of Data and Measures 
Before starting with statistical analyses, several quality tests with respect to the quality of data and 
the applied measures were conducted. This contributed to the scientific rigor that has gone into the 
conducted research study. First of all, it was essential to test the variables regarding normal distri-
bution. Afterward, it was important to make sure that the developed instrument was accurately 
measuring the variables of interest and that it measured them accurately. Especially, the measure-
ment of the dependent variables (innovation success) had to be analyzed as these variables were 
latent and were thus, not directly measurable. To establish construct validity of the measures, an 
explorative factor analysis was performed and to guarantee internal consistency, a reliability 
analysis based on Cronbach’s alpha was carried out (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010, p. 157, p. 324). 
6.4.2.1 Test of Normal Distribution 
Numerous statistical procedures require that the data to be analyzed are parametric. Parametric 
variables are at least interval scaled and approximately normally distributed. As outlined in chapter 
6.2.2, Likert scales can be treated as interval scaled. Thus, the measured independent and depend-
ent variables of the survey had to be checked for normal distribution before conducting any statis-
tical procedure based on parametric data (Wittenberg et al., 2014, p. 150). 
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Normality of variables can be assessed by either statistical or graphical methods. As the 
sophisticated statistical Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test should just be applied for samples below 100, it 
could not be utilized for the conducted study. Instead, skewness and kurtosis have been analyzed to 
assess normality of the respective variables. Skewness reflects the symmetry and kurtosis the 
peakedness of the variable-distribution within the sample. There are significance tests for both 
parameters that test the obtained values against the null hypotheses of zero. Thus, the normal 
distribution assumption of a single variable could just be retained if the associated values of skew-
ness and kurtosis lie within a critical range at a previously defined significance level (Tabachnick 
and Fidell, 2007, p. 79; Wittenberg et al., 2014, p. 159). 
According to Wittenberg et al., in order to retain the normal distribution assumption for the varia-
bles measured in the conducted study with a sample size of 147 (n>120), the values for skewness 
and kurtosis had to range from -1.96 to +1.96 for each variable at a significance level of <0.05%. 
Besides one variable, the values of skewness and kurtosis of any measured variable in the survey 
laid within this value range (cf. Appendix V – 5). Correspondingly, these variables could be desig-
nated as approximately normally distributed with 95 percent accuracy (Wittenberg et al., 2014, p. 
159). Furthermore, the graphical analysis of the variable histograms confirmed these statistical 
results. 
Just the kurtosis of the variable TEC_1 (“From the customer perspective, the technology was more 
powerful than potential alternatives”6) was out of range with a value of 2.007 (cf. Appendix V – 5). 
However, according to Tabachnick, the impact of departure from zero kurtosis diminishes in a large 
sample and like skewness, often does not deviate enough from normality to make a substantive 
difference in the analysis. Therefore, graphical analysis of frequency histograms is decisive to 
visually assess if the distribution of a variable is approximately normally distributed or not 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007, pp. 80–81). This was conducted for the variable TEC_1. As depicted in 
Figure 83 the kurtosis of the variable is not that extreme (cf. Appendix V – 5). Hence, this variable 
was treated as approximately normally distributed within the subsequent statistical analyses. 
6.4.2.2 Explorative Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis is a multivariate technique to reduce complexity. In contrast to confirmatory factor 
analysis, the distinctive feature of explorative factor analysis (EFA) is that the factors are derived 
from statistical results and not from theory. Therefore, the data were systematically analyzed for 
underlying patterns that determine the factor structure. The EFA was conducted without knowing 
how many factors really exist or which items belong to these constructs. Established guidelines 
were utilized to determine which items load on the particular factors and how many factors were 
appropriate. Therewith, it was tested if the three dimensions of the ultimate innovation success 
                                                                    
6 „Aus Kundensicht war die Technologie leistungsfähiger als mögliche Alternativtechnologien“ 
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(sales performance, product performance, and efficiency) could be found as underlying factors in 
the data and if their associated, operationally defined items (cf. Appendix IV) load on them. In 
general, EFA is an iterative process. On the search for a stable factor structure the following main 
steps were repeatedly taken: analysis of correlation matrix, factor extraction, rotation, factor inter-
pretation, and factor estimation. Step-by-step, the EFA led to the omission of three items (IS 3, IS4, 
and IS5) as these prevented a stable factor solution. This was due to low factor loadings, loadings 
on two rival factors, or the loading on a separate factor (Brosius, 2013, p. 793; Hair, 2010, p. 693; 
Sekaran and Bougie, 2010, p. 161). 
At the analysis of the fundamental correlation matrix, the detection of several high correlations 
between single items indicated the adequacy of the correlation matrix for factor analysis. Neverthe-
less, it was useful to take further statistical criteria into consideration. The highly significant Bart-
lett‘s test of sphericity ( = 0.000) of the final EFA admitted the rejection of the hypothesis that the 
items of the overall sample were uncorrelated (cf. Table 20; Appendix V – 6). Moreover, the Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin-criterion (KMO) was assessed, as it is regarded as the best available measure to test 
the correlation matrix. It indicates how the individual items belong together and if a factor analysis 
is useful. This criterion is based on the anti-image-correlation matrix and is also designated as a 
measure of sampling adequacy (MSA). Besides the overall correlation matrix, the assessment of 
single items is possible with the MSA. The MSA of the single items can be found in the diagonal of 
the anti-image-correlation matrix. The final EFA led to a KMO of 0.654 which caused a mediocre 
adequacy of the data for factor analysis. The MSA-values of the finally considered items fell in the 
range of 0.621 and 0.760. Thus, they indicated a mediocre or middling adequacy for factor analysis 
(cf. Table 20 – Table 22; Appendix V – 6) (Backhaus et al., 2016, pp. 395–399; Brosius, 2013, pp. 
794–798). 
The two mostly applied factor extraction methods are principal axes factor analysis (PFA) and 
principal component analysis (PCA). In contrast to PFA, all variance is analyzed with PCA. However, 
the mathematical processes are similar, except in preparation of the observed correlation matrix 
for extraction (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007, p. 609). In the conducted study, the PCA extraction 
method was utilized. For the actual factor extraction, the eigenvalues of the associated factors were 
considered. Eigenvalues represent the proportion of variance that is explained by each factor. The 
eigenvalue of 1 is called Kaiser-criterion and represents a sound basis for extraction. Additionally, 
the scree plot was analyzed. As a rule of thumb, the distinct number of factors should be extracted 
at which the graph exhibits a kink (the so-called elbow criterion). Correspondingly, three factors 
were extracted in the conducted study as their associated eigenvalues were above or approximately 
1 and the graph indicates a kink at this number of factors. Ultimately, the cumulative percentage of 
variance explained by the factors accounted for 83.15% (cf. Table 23 & Figure 67; Appendix V – 6). 
The communalities of the considered variables ranged between 0.75 and 0.93 (cf. Table 24; Appen-
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dix V – 6). As these values approximated the value of 1, nearly the complete distribution of these 
variables was represented by the three factors (Brosius, 2013, pp. 800–802).  
The extracted factors were initially difficult to interpret. As the factors were mathematical artifacts, 
it was possible to transform them without distortion. A common transformation is the rotation of 
the factor loading matrix. The underlying concept is the idea to exhibit the factor loadings in a 
coordinate system and rotate the axes at its origin. In general, this rotation could be performed 
orthogonally or obliquely. As oblique rotation is closer to the data than orthogonal rotation, oblique 
rotation, in particular, oblimin rotation with Kaiser-normalization, was performed in the conducted 
study. Kaiser-normalization should ensure that each variable had the same impact on the rotated 
factor solution (Backhaus et al., 2016, p. 419; Brosius, 2013, pp. 806–807, Schendera, 2008, p. 211, 
2008, p. 254). After six iterations, the final factor solution was found. The final pattern matrix 
contains the ultimate loadings of each variable on the extracted factors (cf. Table 25; Appendix V – 
6). 
Afterward, the extracted factors were interpreted, named, and compared with the initial theory. 
Similar to the theoretical operationalization of innovation success (cf. Appendix IV), sales figures 
(IS_8) and market share (IS_9) loaded on factor 1 (factor loadings: 0.95 and 0.937). Thus, this factor 
was named sales performance. Speed (IS_1) and costs (IS_2) loaded on factor 2 (factor loadings: 
0.883 and 0.846) and internal satisfaction (IS_6) and product quality (IS_7) loaded on factor 3 
(factor loadings: 0.845 and 0.835). Accordingly, factor 2 was named efficiency and factor 3 product 
performance.  
Finally, the factor values had to be estimated and stored in the data set, as further statistical proce-
dures should be performed. In the conducted study, the regression method was utilized as appro-
priate estimation method (Brosius, 2013, p. 811). Table 7 gives an overview of the results of the 
final EFA. In particular, the factor loadings of each item, the eigenvalues of the respective factors, 
and the percentage of variance of all items that was explained by each factor are depicted in this 
table. 
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Table 7: Overview of EFA Results 
 Items 
Factor 1:  
Sales Performance 
Factor 2:  
Efficiency 
Factor 3:  
Product Performance 
IS_8 Der erzielte Umsatz 
entsprach den zu Projektbeginn 
formulierten Erwartungen. 
0.950 0.022 0.007 
IS_9 Der mit der Innovation 
erreichte Marktanteil entsprach 
den zu Projektbeginn formulier-
ten Erwartungen. 
0.937 0.015 0.060 
IS_1 Die Geschwindigkeit des 
Entwicklungsprojektes war 
hoch. 
0.140 0.883 -0.176 
IS_2 Die vorhandenen Res-
sourcen wurden im Innovati-
onsprojekt effizient eingesetzt. 
-0.078 0.846 0.227 
IS_6 Die Produktperformance 
der Innovation entsprach den 
zu Beginn des Projektes formu-
lierten Vorgaben. 
-0.032 0.118 0.845 
IS_7 Die erreichte Qualität des 
neu entwickelten Produktes war 
auf einem hohen Niveau. 
0.136 -0.099 0.835 
Eigenvalues 2.856 1.159 0.1974 
% of explained variance of all 
items 
47.595 19.317 16.239 
Remarks: Principal Component Analysis with Oblimin-Rotation; KMO = 0.654; Bartlett-Test 
Chi²=357.406, p<0.000 
6.4.2.3 Reliability Analysis 
In general, reliability of a measure indicates the extent to which it is without bias and thus, ensures 
consistent measurement across time and across the various items in the instrument. In this study, 
interitem consistency reliability was tested based on Cronbach’s alpha to analyze the consistency of 
respondents’ answers to all the items in a measure. In particular, it was tested how well the items 
measuring the three innovation success factors hang together as a set. To the degree that items are 
independent measures of the same concept, they will be correlated with one another. Therefore, 
Cronbach's alpha is computed in terms of the average intercorrelations among the items measuring 
the associated factor. The closer Cronbach's alpha is to 1, the higher the interitem consistency 
reliability (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010, pp. 157, 161-162, 324). 
According to Sekaran and Bougie, Cronbach's alpha values less than 0.60 are considered to be poor, 
those in the 0.70 range acceptable, and those over 0.80 good. In Table 8 the results of the conducted 
reliability analysis are presented. Cronbach’s alpha of the factors 2 and 3 range around 0.70 and the 
first factor achieved a value of 0.924 (cf. Appendix V – 7). Hence, the interitem consistency reliabil-
ity in this study can be considered to be acceptable for the efficiency and product performance 
factors and to be very good for the sales performance factor (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010, p. 325). 
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Table 8: Results of Reliability Analysis 
Factor Number of Items Cronbach’s alpha 
Factor 1: Sales Performance 2 0.924 
Factor 2: Efficiency 2 0.714 
Factor 3: Product Performance 2 0.673 
6.4.3 Methodology and Findings of Correlation Analysis 
6.4.3.1 Methodology 
To statistically test the five hypotheses described in chapter 6.1, several correlation analyses were 
conducted. The aim of these correlation analyses was to measure the degree of the linear relation-
ships between the independent and the dependent variables. In general, there is a correlation 
between two variables if a variation of one variable has an impact on the variation of the second 
variable (e.g. high value of variable 1  high value of variable 2). An appropriate measure for the 
strength and direction of a relationship between two interval-scaled variables is the Pearson corre-
lation coefficient r. It is the most frequently used measure of association and the basis of many 
multivariate calculations. Pearson r is limited to identify linear relations and to quantify this by 
calculating a single value. It is computed by dividing the covariance between X and Y by the product 
of the standard deviations of X and Y. Its value ranges between -1.0 and +1.0. A positive value 
indicates a positive linear relationship; a negative value characterizes a negative linear relationship. 
The greater the value of Pearson r, the stronger is the relation between the analyzed variables. If 
Pearson r is equal to zero, there is no measurable association between the variables. For interpret-
ing the detected r values, an orientation guideline developed by Brosius was applied (cf. Table 35; 
Appendix V – 8). Within the conducted study, just statistically significant correlations (<0.05  
symbol: * and <0.01  symbol: **) were considered (Brosius, 2013, p. 517; Heumann and 
Toutenburg, 2006, p. 134; Sekaran and Bougie, 2010, p. 322; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007, pp. 56–
57). The superscript value of -1 within the illustrations of Figure 35 until Figure 39 indicates, that 
the corresponding items have been recoded to mainly have positive correlations. 
6.4.3.2 Correlations of the Category “Technology“ and “Innovation Success” 
The theoretical framework I was associated with the technology that underlay the considered 
innovation (cf. Figure 35). Regarding the analyzed relationships, just three independent variables 
indicated a significantly positive correlation to at least one of the three dependent variables of the 
overall innovation success. In the case of three independent variables, no statistical evidence of 
significant associations with any of the three dependent success variables could be found. Moreo-
ver, the matter that the technology has been implemented elsewhere correlated significantly and 
negatively with all of the dependent success variables. The strengths of the detected correlations 
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were in the weak and middling range. As the hypothesis H1 predicted a significant correlation 
between each independent variable associated with the category technology and at least one of the 
three dependent success variables, H1 was rejected. However, four technology associated CSFs 
have a significant correlation and their impact has to be considered at the realization of radical 
technological innovations. 
 
Figure 35: Correlations of the Category "Technology" and “Innovation Success” 
It is quite understandable that high cost advantages do not necessarily correlate with product 
performance or process efficiency. However, the fact that high cost advantages do not correlate 
positively with sales performance was a surprise. The same was the case for the variable high 
capability regarding competitive technologies. Apparently, the reliability of a technology was pri-
marily decisive for radical technological innovations in the power transmission industry instead of 
cost or performance advantages. A high reliability and safety of the technology exhibited a statisti-
cally significant positive relation between the dependent variables of sales and product perfor-
mance. Probably this is due to the conservative mechanical engineering and automotive industry 
for which the power transmission industry is primarily developing. Not until the operability of a 
technology was demonstrated, the rather conservative users are willing to adopt despite the poten-
tial advantages regarding competitive and especially working technologies. Nevertheless, product 
success and process efficiency were dependent on the performance capability of the technology 
regarding potential alternatives. This was verified statistically. The less the difficulties with tech-
nical development were, the greater was product success. Interestingly, no statistically significant 
correlation was found with respect to process efficiency, although one could have expected that the 
process would have been faster and more economical in case of fewer difficulties with technical 
development. Similarly, no significant correlation was detected between investment costs for tech-
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nical development and the three dependent success variables. To some extent, it is understandable 
that a great potential for further applications does not necessarily correlate significantly and posi-
tively with sales and product performance as well as with process efficiency. 
However, the significant and negative correlations between the matter that the technology has been 
implemented elsewhere and the three dependent success variables were quite astonishing. The 
negative correlation of sales performance may be explained by the lower level of newness and the 
associated lower potential for differentiation. Potential customers may have felt a minor necessity 
substituting their working solution by a newly developed innovation. The significant negative 
association regarding process efficiency is also surprising, as one could expect that a higher maturi-
ty level of the central technology would enable a more economic and faster development. A poten-
tial reason may be the unbiased development approach for new developments in contrast to 
lengthy and cost intensive optimization efforts in case of further developments. A similar perspec-
tive might help to explain the significant negative correlation between product performance and the 
matter that the technology has been implemented elsewhere. An unbiased new development may 
potentially lead to higher performance increases regarding product performance and product 
quality compared to steady optimizations of existing solutions. 
6.4.3.3 Correlations of the Category “Target Market“ and “Innovation Success” 
The theoretical framework II was elaborated for the category target market (cf. Figure 36). Similar 
to the category technology, there were just three independent variables associated with the target 
market category that demonstrated significant and positive correlations to at least one dependent 
success variable. The strengths of these correlations were on a weak level. Four analyzed inde-
pendent variables did not have any statistically detectable relation to the dependent success varia-
bles. Thus, hypothesis H2 was rejected, as H2 predicted a significant correlation between each 
independent variable associated with the category target market and at least one of the three 
dependent success variables. Nevertheless, the influence of the mentioned three CSFs, which have a 
significant positive correlation to at least one of the three innovation success variables, cannot be 
neglected. 
The recoded variable that other markets would have had a better market fit indicated a significant 
and positive correlation to product performance and efficiency. The better the market matched to 
the innovation idea, the more efficient was the innovation realization and the better the innovation 
satisfied the performance and quality requirements. At the same time, it was a surprise that the 
market fit did not correlate significantly and positively with sales performance. Similarly, one could 
have anticipated that a low level of market barriers, the level of competition, and an interesting 
market size would have been positively correlated with sales performance. With regard to product 
performance and efficiency, an interesting market size and the level of competition also did not play 
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any traceable role. A low level of market barriers was found to correlate significantly and positively 
with product performance, but not with process efficiency. In the case of low market barriers, intui-
tively a faster and more economical process could have been expected. Moreover, the level of 
obstacles caused by external impacts did not exhibit any statistically verifiable association regarding 
the three dependent success variables. 
 
Figure 36: Correlations of the Category “Target Market” and “Innovation Success” 
A potential explanation of the low level of significant correlations associated with the characteris-
tics of the target market might be due to the fact that the German power transmission industry 
within the B2B-sector is shaped by a close customer-supplier-relation. Thus, lengthy customer 
relationships were established which stay relatively stable in economic fluctuations or even if the 
level of competition increases. Nevertheless, the right timing for market entry was found to be 
important for each success variable: sales performance, product performance, and efficiency. 
It was quite understandable that a high potential for market expansion did not correlate significant-
ly and positively with the current sales performance as this is probably more decisive for future 
sales success. The same explanation seemed to fit for the dependent variables of product perfor-
mance and process efficiency. 
6.4.3.4 Correlations of the Category “Organization“ and “Innovation Success” 
The independent variables associated with the category organization which were listed in the 
theoretical framework III, indicated significant and positive correlations to nearly each of the 
dependent success variables sales performance, product performance, and efficiency (cf. Figure 37). 
Just the variables lean decision making and strong innovation culture did not correlate significantly 
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with product performance. The values of the associated correlation coefficients ranged primary on a 
weak to middling strength level. Hypothesis H3 predicted a significant correlation between each 
independent variable associated with the category organization and at least one of the three de-
pendent success variables. Correspondingly, H3 was retained. 
 
Figure 37: Correlations of the Category “Organization” and “Innovation Success” 
The highest values of all correlation coefficients associated with the organization indicated the 
correlation between the independent variable of good management support and the dependent 
variables sales performance and process efficiency. As a further significant positive correlation to 
product performance was detected, good management support seems to be decisive for the success 
of the innovation project. Only if the management supports the project realization, the project can 
be successful. If this support would be missing, it would be very difficult for the project team to 
succeed. Besides the management support, the variables open & honest internal communication and 
high risk tolerance exhibited statistically traceable positive associations with each of the three 
dependent success variables. Together with a strong innovation culture which correlated signifi-
cantly and positively with sales performance and process efficiency, both are crucial for a positive 
climate for the innovation realization within the organization. This seems to be decisive to bring the 
innovation project to success. Furthermore, an adequate resource allocation is a precondition for 
success which could be validated by the significant positive correlations with each of the three 
dependent success variables. Additionally, the probability of success would be increased if the 
organization enables a flexible realization of the project and if the decision making processes are 
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lean. Therefore, a faster and more efficient project realization will be possible. Moreover, it is easier 
to address customer requirements which additionally influences sales performance positively. 
Finally, a significant positive correlation between the three success variables and the strategic 
direction of the organization as well as the ability to find an adequate product home within the 
organization were detected. If the parent company actually has a strategic interest in the innovation 
and could easily integrate it into its organizational structure, this tremendously eases innovation 
realization. Correspondingly, it would be certainly much easier to persuade potential project advo-
cates and acquire resources. 
Correlations of the Category “Entrepreneurial Team“ and “Innovation Success” 
Throughout each of the independent variables associated with the category entrepreneurial team 
being outlined in the theoretical framework IV, statistically significant and positive correlations 
were detected with at least one of the three dependent success variables (cf. Figure 38). The corre-
lation values also ranged from weak to middling strength levels. As hypothesis H4 predicted a 
significant correlation between each independent variable associated with the category entrepre-
neurial team and at least one of the three dependent success variables, H4 was retained. 
 
Figure 38: Correlations of the Category “Entrepreneurial Team” and “Innovation Success” 
The experience of the team members regarding innovation realization of comparable projects 
correlated significantly and positively with sales and product performance. This result was not a 
surprise as the higher level of routine lifts the success probability. However, it was interesting that 
no statistical evidence was found for a significant correlation with process efficiency and the level of 
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experience. Apparently, inexperienced teams could also be efficient at innovation realization maybe 
due to their unbiased and creative new approaches. 
Multidisciplinarity of team members just correlated significantly and positively with product perfor-
mance. With respect to sales performance and process efficiency no statistically traceable correla-
tions were detected. In contrast, the variable that the right professional competences were present 
in the team indicated significant positive correlations to each of the three dependent success varia-
bles. For process efficiency, it did not seem to be crucial if the team itself is multidisciplinary as long 
as the team has access to the essential professional competences. The statistically demonstrated 
positive correlation of a big personal network of the team members and the subsequent process 
efficiency could serve as an evidence for this explanatory approach. However, sales and product 
performance did not correlate significantly with a big personal network of the team members. For 
these success dimensions, the team itself seemed to be more important. This estimation could be 
supported by the relatively high correlation values of the variable right professional competences 
which were present in the team and sales and product performance. 
Besides the professional competences, a great teamwork, a great attitude of the team members, as 
well as their level of social competence were decisive for the innovation success. Each of these 
independent variables correlated significantly and positively with all three dependent innovation 
success variables. Especially with respect to process efficiency, the attitude of the team members 
was found to be crucial. 
6.4.3.5 Correlations of the Category “Innovation Process“ and “Innovation Success” 
As outlined in chapter 6.1, just the controllable and measurable process instruments have been 
considered within the category innovation process. There was no differentiation of the three sepa-
rate action fields: opportunity identification, product development, and commercialization which 
were arranged in the theoretical framework V. To support the interpretation of the detected corre-
lations, several descriptive data which have been collected within the survey as well, were consid-
ered for the respective process instruments. 
Besides platform strategy and the formation of strategic partnerships during innovation realization, 
any of the other nine process instruments which were listed in the theoretical framework V, exhib-
ited significant and positive correlations to at least one of the dependent success variables (cf. 
Figure 39). However, the values of the correlation coefficients lay in a range from very weak to 
weak height. One reason could be the complexity of the overall innovation process which causes 
several process instruments to be important and not just a few being the main reasons for the 
subsequent innovation success. Hypothesis H5 predicted a significant correlation between each 
independent variable associated with the category innovation process and at least one of the three 
dependent success variables. Accordingly, H5 was rejected. Nevertheless, nine of eleven process 
Quantitative Validation of Critical Success Factors 
128 
instruments exhibited a significant positive correlation to at least one success dimension and hence 
should be considered at the realization of a radical technological innovation. 
 
Figure 39: Correlations of the Category “Innovation Process” and “Innovation Success” 
Concrete marketing instruments like deliberate communication, market positioning, and timing of 
market entrance correlated significantly and positively with sales performance. The more purposely 
the commercialization of an innovation was realized, the more successful was the innovation 
regarding market share and revenue. It was quite comprehensive that for deliberate promotion and 
for timing of market entrance no statistical correlation could be detected with product performance 
and process efficiency. In contrast, in the case of deliberate positioning of the innovation at the 
market e.g. as a premium product, a significant positive correlation could be detected regarding 
product performance and efficiency. One reason for this result could be the matter that due to the 
deliberate positioning goal, quality and performance were already focused during product devel-
opment and therefore the process became quite efficient. Regarding market introduction, 71% of 
the participants indicated that they acted as a pioneer, 24% as a follower, and just 5% as a laggard. 
A great majority of 77% of all respondents articulated that they followed the differentiation strate-
gy for market positioning, 18% followed the niche strategy, and nearly 5% stated that they strived 
for cost leadership. Looking at the purpose of the study addressing radical technological innova-
tions, these results are not at all surprising. 
The integration of customer feedback correlated significantly and positively with product perfor-
mance and process efficiency. This is quite understandable, as the concrete cautiousness of custom-
Quantitative Validation of Critical Success Factors 
129 
er requirements and product requirements enable a much faster and more economic realization of 
the innovation to achieve the required product quality and performance. Just 12% of the respond-
ents stated to have never solicited customer feedback, 15% asked sporadically for feedback, 30% at 
certain milestones within the project, 20% frequently, and 23% continuously. This feedback was 
sporadically integrated into the development process by 15% of all survey participants, at certain 
milestones by 25%, frequently by 23%, continuously by 27%, and never by 10%. With respect to 
the way the customer feedback was collected, articulated 45% of the respondents via interview at 
the project start, 60% presentation of the product concept, 63% presentation of the prototype, 63% 
field test of the prototype, 51% field test of the end product at the customer side, 15% interview 
before market introduction, and 15% interview after market introduction. 
In general, a profound quality and risk management supports the satisfaction of product require-
ments and thusly contributes to product performance and subsequently sales performance. This 
could be statistically validated by a significant and positive correlation. Maybe the additional doc-
umentation efforts prevented that risk and quality management correlated significantly and posi-
tively with process efficiency. Interestingly, no statistically traceable relation could be found be-
tween the establishment of a platform strategy for deliberate product portfolio planning and the 
three dependent success variables. Probably, such an extensive standardization of product compo-
nents is not primary relevant for the realization of a radical innovation as the urgent issues are 
technical development and prompt market introduction. After the innovation has achieved series 
maturity, standardization projects to gain a more efficient production process are certainly very 
sensible. 
Especially open innovation and the integration of lead users are meant to gain external impulses for 
innovation realization. These approaches are particularly useful for the development of a radical 
innovation, as the market requirements are often not clear in the beginning. Open innovation, as 
well as the integration of lead users, correlated significantly and positively with sales performance. 
Furthermore, a significant positive correlation of the integration of lead users and process efficiency 
was detected. The knowledge of actual requirements of real users could potentially ease the realiza-
tion process quite a lot. Regarding the integration of lead users articulated 32% of the respondents 
that they have never involved lead users. 19% involved them at idea generation, 40% at require-
ments analysis, 36% at product development, 46% at product tests and 22% at market introduc-
tion. 
With respect to the establishment of strategic partnerships, no significant positive correlations with 
the dependent success variables were found. This was additionally astonishing, as just 9% of the 
respondents articulated that they did not involve any strategic partners at the innovation realiza-
tion. 68% articulated that they have involved suppliers, 62% integrated customers, 35% involved 
scientific institutes, 25% integrated end users, and 18% involved distribution partners at innova-
Quantitative Validation of Critical Success Factors 
130 
tion realization. Besides the obligatory supplier-customer-relationships, the companies apparently 
did not put emphasis on the involvement of further strategic partners. Thus, they developed pri-
marily independently. 
A significant positive correlation was found between the protection of intellectual property and sales 
performance. An intellectual property offers a sales monopoly which is granted for a limited period 
of time for the underlying invention. Thus, intellectual properties potentially foster sales perfor-
mance, as they prevent competitors from market engagement. Interestingly, an additional signifi-
cant positive correlation could be detected between intellectual property protection and process 
efficiency. Intuitively, one would not expect an association. Probably, organizations that put empha-
sis on a proper intellectual property strategy are generally quite efficient regarding their project 
realization. This circumstance may cause the correlation. Furthermore, 55% of the survey partici-
pants stated that they have applied for intellectual properties protecting the underlying technology, 
52% aimed to protect the core product, 43% wanted to protect additional components, and just 
14% articulated that they did not file for any intellectual property application. 
6.4.4 Summary and Adjusted ICPS-Framework 
By conducting the correlation analyses, the five theoretical frameworks and associated hypotheses 
were statistically tested. As a result, several significant positive correlations were detected between 
the independent variables of the innovation context and innovation process and the dependent 
success variables sales performance, product performance, and efficiency. This result confirmed a 
statistically verifiable linear connection between these variables. All independent variables associ-
ated with the categories organization and entrepreneurial team indicated significant positive corre-
lations to at least one of the three dependent success variables. With respect to the categories 
technology and target market, approximately half of the considered independent variables correlat-
ed significantly and positively with at least one dependent variable. Besides platform strategy and 
strategic partnerships, all of the analyzed instruments of the innovation process exhibited statistical-
ly verifiable correlations of this sort. The detected Pearson coefficients indicated just very weak to 
middling correlation strengths (0.16 – 0.49). However, this result was not surprising. It led to the 
conclusion that all of the independent variables, correlating significantly and positively with the 
dependent success variables, might influence the innovation success at approximately the same 
level. The realization of a radical technological innovation is a very complex endeavor with a lot of 
impact parameters. Correspondingly, there seems to be no limited set of factors with a dominating 
effect on the ultimate innovation success. Thus, any of the independent variables exhibiting a 
significant positive correlation with the dependent variables is supposed to be important and not 
just a few dominating factors. The corresponding hypotheses test recommended retaining the 
hypotheses H3 and H4, while rejecting the hypotheses H1, H2, and H5. 
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Based on the results of the correlation analyses, the ICPS framework was adjusted. Therefore, the 
independent variables, which correlated significantly with at least one of the three dependent 
success variables, were considered and listed within their associated categories in the adjusted 
ICPS framework (cf. Figure 40). The subsequent framework contains just statistically verified CSFs. 
These CSFs are less abstract and more concrete than the CSFs of the previous ICPS framework (cf. 
Figure 20), as they are the result of the conducted operationalization at the generation of the theo-
retical frameworks of chapter 6.1. 
 
Figure 40: Adjusted ICPS Framework 
For designing the survey instrument, no differentiation of the three separate action fields of the 
innovation process within the ICPS framework opportunity identification, product development, and 
commercialization was considered at the operationalization of the individual items. This was done 
for several research pragmatic reasons (cf. chapter 6.1). Accordingly, the operationalized items 
associated with the innovation process had to be rearranged when adjusting the ICPS framework. 
As open innovation is a process instrument which is meant to gain external impulses, especially in 
the idea generation phase, this instrument was allocated to the opportunity identification action 
field. Within the original ICPS framework, the factor timeliness was listed as a CSF of the opportunity 
identification action field. However, in the survey, it was captured as a parameter of the theoretical 
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framework II associated to the target market. This was due to the fact that just controllable and 
measurable process instruments were considered in the theoretical framework V associated with 
the innovation process. Nevertheless, when adjusting the ICPS framework, the CSF timeliness was 
rearranged to the opportunity identification action field within the innovation process category. 
According to the original ICPS framework, the factors lead user integration, risk & quality manage-
ment, and intellectual property were listed within the product development action field. As the 
survey participants articulated to integrate customer feedback especially for product development, 
this factor was similarly arranged within this action field. In contrast, the three marketing instru-
ments positioning, promotion, and timing were clearly assigned to the commercialization action 
field. 
6.4.5 Discussion and Limitations 
A sound methodological design and a good theoretical base add rigor to the conducted quantitative 
study. Therefore, the survey instrument was based on testable variables and hypotheses which 
were outlined in chapter 6.1. The aim of this study was to statistically test whether or not the data 
support these hypotheses that were developed after a careful qualitative pre-study of the problem 
situation (cf. chapter 5). To do this on a broad base, a questionnaire survey was applied. This meth-
od is best suited when information is to be obtained on a substantial scale through structured 
questions, at a reasonable cost, from a sample that is widely dispersed geographically (Sekaran and 
Bougie, 2010, p. 218, 2010, pp. 19–20). The target population for the survey included representa-
tives of the German power transmission industry who have been involved in the realization of a 
radical technological innovation. Correspondingly, a questionnaire survey represented an adequate 
instrument for data gathering. To precisely study the CSFs of radical technological innovations, the 
participants were asked to retrospectively relate their answers to a concrete innovation project (cf. 
chapter 6.2.1). Thereby the CSFs which were relevant to this concrete project, were analyzed and 
their value not weakened by an abstract consideration of a variety of factors stemming from several 
different projects. Thus, the closeness of the findings to reality was respected (Sekaran and Bougie, 
2010, p. 21).  
The design, the wording, and the scales of the questionnaire were developed according to common 
research guidelines. Subsequently, a pretest was conducted to test the capability of the resulting 
survey instrument (cf. chapter 6.2). However, this content-validity check was qualitative as statisti-
cal measures could not be applied (Dahl, 2015, p. 65). A general limitation of questionnaires is that 
one cannot be sure if the data obtained are biased since the non-respondents may be different from 
those who did respond (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010, p. 218). 
For the quantitative study, the German power transmission industry was chosen as target industry 
(cf. chapter 6.3.1). Correspondingly, a further limitation is that the survey results cannot be doubt-
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lessly generalized to the mechanical engineering industry as the overall target industry of the 
thesis. Although the power transmission industry is a sub-sector of the mechanical engineering 
industry, the latter industry is quite diverse (Dahl, 2015, p. 65; VDMA and McKinsey, 2014c, p. 12). 
To enlarge the applicability of the research findings, the conducted survey needs to be replicated in 
the different sub-sectors of the mechanical engineering industry by further research (Sekaran and 
Bougie, 2010, p. 22). 
Furthermore, it should be questioned if the survey sample really represents the target population. 
One of the main data collection channels was the FVA. The FVA includes many of the main players 
within the German power transmission industry, but not all companies being active in this branch. 
Correspondingly, the survey sample might represent the FVA-membership structure rather than 
the structure of the overall German power transmission industry. To address this issue, a triangula-
tion of different data collection channels (FVA symposium, Xing, personal network) was estab-
lished. Each survey channel contributed approximately the same number of respondents (roughly 
50 each) to the overall amount of participants (cf. 6.3.2). Another way to deal with this potential 
bias was a comparison of the collected descriptive data about the survey sample (cf. 6.4.1) with the 
characteristics of the target population. Therefore, the study of the VDMA and McKinsey & Compa-
ny (cf. chapter 2.2.1.1) and several information portals (Statista; Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015) 
were considered. Additionally, the survey results were discussed with several industry experts. 
These comparative analyses confirmed the representativeness of the sample on a qualitative basis. 
A further potential bias may be due to the inconsistency regarding the concept of the innovation 
terminology. As it was with the literature review and the expert interviews, this issue emerged 
during the data collection at the FVA-symposium. Thus, one of the most frequent questions was 
how a radical technological innovation is defined. In the subsequent discussion, it became clear that 
the survey participants did not share a uniform concept of radical technological innovations. Be-
cause of the experience made in the qualitative pre-study, this was expected (Dahl, 2015, p. 64). 
Therefore, a detailed explanation was given at the first page of the questionnaire to prevent mis-
conceptions (cf. 6.2.3). Furthermore, the newness of the respective innovation was inquired. Most 
of the respondents articulated that their innovation was at least new to the respective market. This 
meets the requirements for the considered innovation projects within the survey (cf. chapter 6.2.1). 
As it was with the primary case study research, one limitation that is inherent to the study design is 
that mainly successful innovation projects were studied. For conscientiously answering the survey, 
it was important that the selected innovation project has gone through each phase of the innovation 
process. Thus, the respective innovations had to be implemented in the market. Failed innovation 
projects usually do not reach the commercialization stage and could therefore not be chosen by the 
survey participants. Additionally, there might be a bias towards more successful projects because it 
is usually more pleasant to look back upon successful than unsuccessful experiences. These effects 
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might have caused a positive selection of the considered innovation projects. This suspected bias is 
reflected by the high satisfaction rates of the respondents with the selected projects (Hilgers, 2015, 
p. 80). 
Before actual analysis, the collected data have been prepared. Therefore, missing data were re-
placed by imputation. Correspondingly, the subsequent statistical analyses were based on manipu-
lated data. The central tradeoff lies in the loss of confidence due to the usage of estimated values 
and the profit of using sophisticated statistical methods. As the data were missing completely at 
random and the elaborate approach of regression imputation combined with preceding maximum 
likelihood estimation was utilized, the missing values were substituted quite realistically. Neverthe-
less, the achieved results have to be treated with caution (Brosius, 2013, p. 285). 
Another limitation is caused by the applied explorative factor analysis. The specific goal of EFA is to 
reduce a large number of observed variables to a smaller number of factors. Thus, there is a general 
tradeoff between the level of dimension reduction, on the one hand, and explanation quality of the 
extracted factor model, on the other (Brosius, 2013, p. 792; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007, p. 608). 
However, the factors were derived from statistical results, not from theory. Established guidelines 
were used to determine which variables load on which particular factor. Afterward, a reliability 
analysis verified the detected factor solution (Hair, 2010, p. 693). 
To finally test the hypotheses outlined in chapter 6.1, correlation analyses were applied. The varia-
bles to be tested were measured on a Likert-scale and the subsequent data were normally distrib-
uted. Thus, the precondition of parametric data for this statistical technique was fulfilled. Due to the 
confidence level of  < 0.05, the probability that the detected correlations are correct will be true in 
95% of all cases and that there is only a 5% chance of being wrong. On the other hand, it is just an 
indication that the two variables are associated with each other. There is no evidence that one 
variable causes the other (Sekaran and Bougie, 2010, p. 322, 2010, p. 21). 
By conducting the correlation analyses, several significant positive correlations were detected 
between the independent variables of the four innovation context categories (technology, target 
market, organization, and entrepreneurial team) as well as the innovation process and the depend-
ent success variables. Nevertheless, the hypotheses associated to the five theoretical frameworks 
were just retained if each CSF within the respective framework exhibited a significant positive 
correlation to at least one of the three dependent variables of the overall innovation success. As a 
consequence, only the hypotheses H3 and H4 were retained, while the hypotheses H1, H2, and H5 
were rejected. Maybe the granularity of the five hypotheses was too low and more detailed hypoth-
eses on the CSFs-level would have been better. However, the results of the correlations analyses 
were utilized and an adjusted ICPS framework was created. 
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The adjusted CSF-framework highlights the statistically verified CSFs for the challenging task of 
realizing a radical technological innovation in an easy and accessible manner. Correspondingly, the 
adjusted ICPS framework meets the requirements of research parsimony (Sekaran and Bougie, 
2010, p. 23). However, the chronological and factual contribution of each CSF to the overall innova-
tion success is quite difficult. The great complexity of the innovation process with its manifold 
cause and effect relationships prevents, in general, an exact determination of the concrete impact of 
a specific factor on the subsequent innovation success (Vahs and Brem, 2012, p. 69). Nevertheless, 
the adjusted ICPS framework has highly managerial implications if the CSFs are taken as a lens for 




7 Innovation Archetypes 
The implementation of a radical technological innovation in the mechanical engineering industry is 
highly complex. Therefore, the CSFs outlined in the ICPS-framework can help to reduce complexity 
within innovation realization. However, the relative importance of each CSF depends on the respec-
tive innovation context (Balachandra and Friar, 1997, pp. 284–285; Vahs and Brem, 2012, p. 69). 
This issue was addressed by the second central research question: are there certain distinguishable 
innovation archetypes based on the innovation context that suggest distinct realization strategies 
for the subsequent innovation process? To answer this question, the statistical technique of cluster 
analysis was utilized. 
7.1 Cluster Analysis 
7.1.1 Methodology 
The primary purpose of cluster analysis is to group objects based on the characteristics they pos-
sess. The goal is that the objects in the same cluster are more similar to one another than they are 
to objects in other clusters. The intent is, therefore, to maximize the homogeneity of objects within 
the clusters, while also maximizing the heterogeneity between the clusters. Cluster analysis con-
tains the following main steps: selecting variables, preparing the data, measuring similarity, select-
ing a clustering algorithm, and determining cluster size (Backhaus et al., 2016, p. 456; Brosius, 
2013, pp. 712–714; Hair, 2010, pp. 505–508). 
According to the second central research questions, the variables associated with the innovation 
context were selected for the cluster analysis which exhibited significant positive correlations to at 
least one of the dependent success variables within the previously conducted correlation analyses. 
With these characteristics, an analysis should be conducted to determine whether there are distinct 
innovation archetypes that are based on the contextual circumstances. 
A common form of data preparation is standardizing the variables. The process converts each raw 
data score into a standardized value with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, and in turn, 
eliminates the bias introduced by the differences in the scales of the considered variables. As the 
variables taken for cluster analysis within the study at hand were all measured on the same Likert-
scale, no standardization was needed (Hair, 2010, p. 524). 
As a next step, the similarity between the objects had to be measured. Similarity represents the 
degree of correspondence among objects across all of the characteristics used in the analysis (Hair, 
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2010, p. 511). Several similarity measures have been developed by previous research. Their appro-
priateness depends on the scales of the respective variables (Backhaus et al., 2016, p. 458). For this 
study, the squared Euclidean distance was selected. It is the recommended distance measure for 
Ward’s method of clustering which was utilized (Hair, 2010, p. 521). 
The heart of cluster analysis lies in the clustering procedure. A multiplicity of potential methods 
was prepared for distinct scales and variable characteristics like size, shape, or distribution. In this 
research study, the hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s method was utilized which is a com-
mon procedure for interval-scaled variables. In Ward’s method, the clustering is based on the 
minimal increase in error sum of squares (Backhaus et al., 2016, p. 484; Schendera, 2008, pp. 24–
26). 
As the last step, the cluster solution being most appropriate within the conducted analysis was 
determined. This was based on the dendogram which visualized the step-by-step clustering of the 
147 cases (cf. Figure 86, Appendix V - 10). The length of the horizontal lines within the dendogram 
indicated the increasing heterogeneity of the associated cluster solutions. Finally, the conclusion 
was drawn that five clusters represented the most suitable number of clusters (Schendera, 2008, 
pp. 59–61). 
7.1.2 Findings 
The cluster analysis produced five clearly distinguishable clusters. As these clusters represented 
typical contextual project circumstances, they were thusly regarded as the sought innovation 
archetypes. The size of the respective clusters ranged from 20 to 40 cases, each representing a 
percentage of 18 – 27% regarding the overall 147 cases (cf. Figure 41). The cluster symbols were 
composed of the four colored sub-symbols of the associated categories target market, organization, 
entrepreneurial team, and technology. The coloration of the sub-symbols was due to the relative 
height of the arithmetic mean which was calculated from the average characteristics of the individ-
ual variables per category. Dark green means that within this cluster the arithmetic mean of the 
individual variables of this category was particularly positive compared to the other clusters. Light 
green indicates above-average, gray as average, orange as below-average, and red as particularly 
low characteristic of the arithmetic mean. According to their characteristics, the clusters were 
named as archetypical project contexts: cluster 1 as inventor`s friendly innovation paradise, cluster 2 
as conservative development sphere, cluster 3 as highly productive innovation system, cluster 4 as 
mediocre implementation circumstances, and cluster 5 as fruitless innovation wasteland. The de-




Figure 41: Process and Results of Cluster Analysis 
7.2 Validation of the Cluster Solution 
7.2.1 Analysis of Variance 
7.2.1.1 Methodology 
For validating the clusters as innovation archetypes, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conduct-
ed to test whether the clusters could be distinguished regarding their realization strategies for the 
innovation process. ANOVA is a statistical technique used to compare two or more means to see if 
there are any significant differences among them. To perform this analysis, the eleven process 
instruments were taken as dependent variables and were tested for equality across the groups 
(Hair, 2010, pp. 440–444; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007, p. 37). 
ANOVA is based on a comparison of two estimates of variance. The first estimate comes from 
differences among scores within each group and the second estimate comes from differences in 
group means. If these two estimates of variance do not differ appreciably, it is concluded that the 
entire group means come from the same sampling distribution of means and that the slight differ-
ences among them are due to random error. If on the other hand, the group means differ more than 
expected, it is concluded that they were drawn from different sampling distributions of means, and 
the null hypothesis that the means are the same should be rejected (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007, p. 
38). While a nominal scale is sufficient for the independent variable, the dependent variables need 
to be parametric and their variances have to be homogeneous (Brosius, 2013, p. 500). The cluster 
variable was nominally scaled and the innovation process instruments as dependent variables were 
Innovation Archetypes 
139 
parametrically scaled (cf. chapter 6.4.2). If these variables, additionally, exhibited variance, then 
homogeneity was tested by conducting a Levene-test. This test examined the null hypothesis that 
all variances of the respective variables were identical within each cluster on a significant level of 
<0.107. In cases of values higher than 0.1, the null hypothesis was retained and in cases of values 
lower than 0.1, the hypothesis was rejected (Brosius, 2013, p. 500; Wittenberg et al., 2014, p. 232). 
For the variables with homogeneous variances, ANOVA represented the appropriate test. In con-
trast, for variables with inhomogeneous variances, a Welch-test was applied. This test is also based 
on the similarity of cluster means, obtains an approximate solution, and is well suited for unequal 
variances (Brosius, 2013, p. 514; Rüger, 2002, p. 135). Within SPSS, both tests were conducted for 
all variables. Accordingly, just the results of the relevant tests were considered for the respective 
variables. 
7.2.1.2 Findings 
The Levene-test indicated for the following five innovation process instruments a significance level 
of >0.1 and thusly variance homogeneity: PI_2, PI_4, PI_7, PI_8, and PI_10. For the following six 
process instruments, the significance level was lower than 0.1 and the null hypothesis that the 
variances of the associated variables were homogeneous was therefore rejected: PI_1, PI_3, PI_5, 
PI_6, PI_9, and PI_11 (cf. Table 36, Appendix V – 11). 
Correspondingly, for the first half of the dependent variables the results of the ANOVA were consid-
ered. The results exhibited for PI_8 a significant level and for the other process instruments even a 
highly significant level (cf. Table 37, Appendix V – 11). The results of the Welch-test indicated a 
highly significant level for each of the process instruments from the second half of dependent 
variables (cf. Table 38, Appendix V -11). 
These results clearly confirmed the detected five cluster solution. The innovation realization strate-
gies of the five clusters could be then distinguished, as significant associations were detected 
throughout any of the eleven process instruments. 
7.2.2 Analysis of Cramer’s V  
7.2.2.1 Methodology 
With ANOVA, the clusters could be significantly distinguished regarding the characteristics of the 
process variables. To furthermore assess the individual strengths of the associations between each 
of the eleven process instruments and the cluster assignment, Cramer’s V was calculated. In gen-
eral, there is no universal measure of association which could be applied for any kind of scale. 
                                                                    
7 Significance level was lifted to reduce the risk of ß-error (Wittenberg and Cramer, 2000, p. 216) 
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Cramer’s V is appropriate for nominal scales and naturally for upper measurement scales as well. 
As the cluster variable was nominally scaled, this measure was selected. Cramer’s V is based on the 
chi-square-value and its values range from zero to one. However, a value near to one is quite rare 
and an accurate indication that the strength of association will not be possible. The coefficient is 
primarily appropriate for assessing the relative strength of association in comparison to content-
related questions or with respect to previous experiences on similar matters (Backhaus et al., 2000, 
p. 239; Brosius, 2013, pp. 432–434; Wittenberg et al., 2014, p. 208). With this context in mind, the 
calculated values were mainly used for comparing the individual strengths of associations between 
each of the process instruments and the cluster assignment. 
7.2.2.2 Findings 
Besides PI_1, PI_8, and PI_11, the Cramer’s V values of each process instrument indicated signifi-
cant, or highly significant, associations with the cluster assignment (cf. Table 9). Even PI_1, PI_8, 
and PI_11 exhibited a significance level of at least <0.1. This means that the way the process 
instruments are realized is significantly associated with the clustering. Therefore, the initial estima-
tion that there are innovation archetypes that determine the way the innovation process is ar-
ranged can be confirmed. The absolute values of the process variables were nearly in the same 
range from 0.278 to 0.439. Correspondingly, there is no individual process instrument that domi-
nates the cluster assignment. The concrete manifestation of each process variable is decisive for the 
overall cluster-related strategy for the realization of the innovation process. 
Table 9: Cramer's V for 5-Cluster Solution 
  PI_1 PI_2 PI_3 PI_4 PI_5 PI_6 PI_7 PI_8 PI_9 PI_10 PI_11 
Cramer's V .278 .334 .369 .334 .399 .399 .437 .357 .411 .417 .439 
Sig. .057 .007 .000 .045 .009 .004 .000 .091 .000 .000 .065 
7.2.2.3 Comparison of Cluster Solution with Top-Performer Classification 
Intuitively, one might expect that the top performers should be taken as a role model for arranging 
the innovation process. It seems then sensible to analyze the way top performers, average perform-
ers, and worst performers are organizing their innovation processes. Based on this analysis, align-
ing the process strategy to the top performers does sound reasonable. This action strategy pre-
sumes that the arrangement of the process instruments is similar within these three categories. 
Correspondingly, it should be possible to detect strong significant associations between each of the 
eleven process instruments and the categorization of top performers, average performers, and 
worst performers. To test this assumption, the 147 cases have been categorized by three performer 
groups within the innovation success dimensions sales performance, product performance, and 
efficiency. Therefore, the best quartile, the two medium quartiles, and the worst quartile with 
respect to the three innovation success dimensions were filtered from the 147 cases and grouped. 
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Based on this classification, Cramer’s V was calculated for the individual associations between the 
process instruments and the performer group assignments. Accordingly, one table for each success 
dimension was created (cf. Table 10, Table 11, and Table 12). 
Table 10: Cramer's V for Performer Groups regarding Sales Performance 
  PI_1 PI_2 PI_3 PI_4 PI_5 PI_6 PI_7 PI_8 PI_9 PI_10 PI_11 
Cramer's V .197 .275 .187 .355 .349 .320 .316 .333 .289 .335 .383 
Sig. .781 .324 .591 .044 .292 .465 .600 .342 .137 .105 .590 
 
Table 11: Cramer's V for Performer Groups regarding Product Performance 
  PI_1 PI_2 PI_3 PI_4 PI_5 PI_6 PI_7 PI_8 PI_9 PI_10 PI_11 
Cramer's V .195 .239 .248 .311 .335 .399 .341 .321 .370 .366 .401 
Sig. .797 .666 .113 .243 .418 .026 .366 .449 .002 .025 .424 
 
Table 12: Cramer's V for Performer Groups regarding Efficiency 
  PI_1 PI_2 PI_3 PI_4 PI_5 PI_6 PI_7 PI_8 PI_9 PI_10 PI_11 
Cramer's V .241 .305 .248 .281 .329 .360 .333 .272 .279 .321 .423 
Sig. .380 .126 .115 .506 .475 .145 .441 .866 .192 .175 .233 
 
When looking at the Cramer’s V values, one will recognize that just a few variables indicated signifi-
cant associations with the performer classification. These were the variables PI_4 within the sales 
performance dimension as well as PI_6, PI_9, and PI_10 within the product performance dimension. 
Correspondingly, none of the performer classifications is a good categorization with respect to 
significant associations to the process instruments. 
In contrast, the five cluster solution indicated significant associations (at least <0.1) to each of the 
eleven process instruments (cf. Table 9). In the case of radical technological innovations for the 
German power transmission industry, it thusly seems rational to orientate the strategy for the 
innovation process on the five detected clusters. These clusters are based on the contextual circum-
stances and exhibit an overall innovation pattern for the subsequent innovation process. Hence, 
they could be regarded as innovation archetypes. Only looking at the top performers seems to be 
the wrong way of dealing with radical technological innovations. The innovation process is highly 
complex and strongly dependent on the innovation context. Therefore, it seemed reasonable to 
qualitatively study the contextual circumstances of the five innovation archetypes in depth, analyze 
the way they were arranging the innovation process and examine their subsequent innovation 
success (cf. chapter 7.3). 
Innovation Archetypes 
142 
7.3 Descriptive Analysis of the Clusters 
For the descriptive analysis of the five clusters, the cluster-specific characteristics and average 
means of the interval-scaled variables were compared to the sample averages to derive representa-
tive attributes for each cluster. Furthermore, the descriptive and qualitative data regarding the 
respective innovation projects and firm demographics were considered. Based on this information, 
the clusters were described and subsequently named. 
Within the first part, descriptive information regarding the organizational background and the 
selected innovation projects of the different clusters will be presented. Then, the cluster specific 
innovation contexts with respect to its categories organization, entrepreneurial team, technology, 
and target market will be characterized. Afterward, the innovation process and corresponding 
utilization of distinct process instruments will be depicted. Finally, the subsequent innovation 
success will be outlined. 
7.3.1 Cluster 1: Inventor`s Friendly Innovation Paradise 
The conditions for the projects in cluster 1 were very positive for the realization of the respective 
innovations. Thus, cluster 1 was named inventor’s friendly innovation paradise. 
7.3.1.1 Cluster Description 
26 cases were assigned to cluster 1. This accounts for a percentage of 18. The first half of the pro-
jects was realized in companies being active in the mechanical engineering industry and the second 
half in companies within the automotive industry. These companies were characterized by an 
extraordinarily high revenue share of products which were younger than five years. Nearly half of 
the firms had more than 10,000 employees while the other half was split into equal parts of organi-
zations with 100 to 1,000 and organizations with 1,000 to 10,000 employees. Correspondingly, the 
two dominating corporate forms were stock and capital companies. 
The considered innovation projects were primarily technology-push rather than market-pull inno-
vations and represented mainly new-to-the-market innovations. Additionally, several new-to-the-
world and new-to-the-firm innovations were among the cases of this cluster. Regarding the project 
organization, the matrix organization clearly formed the majority compared to just a few cases of 
autonomous project organization. With respect to process standardization, no distinct pattern 
could be derived, as the projects were conducted with an equal share of three types of processes: 
first, no standardized process approach at all, second, a common approach that was not formalized 
within the organization, and last, a formally standardized approach. If the process was formally 
standardized, in nearly all cases it was a stage gate process. 
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7.3.1.2 Innovation Context 
The organizational context for the innovation projects of cluster 1 was very positive. The strategic 
direction of the respective companies was very supportive of the projects and the organizational 
structure enabled a particularly flexible realization or implementation. The processes for decision 
making were lean and there were no problems to find an organizational home for the product 
innovations within the corresponding companies. Both resource allocation and management sup-
port were also very good. Furthermore, the companies of cluster 1 were shaped by a strong innova-
tion culture combined with a high risk tolerance and an open communication atmosphere. 
In general, the innovating team was quite conducive for the realization of the innovation projects. 
Throughout all projects of cluster 1, fairly experienced people were involved with a high level of 
professional competence. The entrepreneurial teams were multidisciplinary but averagely net-
worked. Moreover, the involved people were characterized by a high level of social competence, 
great teamwork, and a strong attitude to bring the innovation project to success despite all the 
setbacks. 
The technologies which underlay the innovations, were very reliable and safe within the analyzed 
projects. From the customer perspective, they were more capable than potential alternatives but 
exhibited just average cost advantages. The utilized technologies were rarely implemented in 
existing products so far. However, they had a great potential to be implemented in further applica-
tions. Due to the great newness, the technological development until market maturity was associat-
ed with difficulties and high investments. 
The target markets of the innovations of cluster 1 were generally very interesting. Accordingly, the 
markets were quite big and exhibited good chances for market growth. The market barriers were 
on an average level. Furthermore, there was just a low level of competition and hardly negative 
external market impacts like political or macroeconomic influences. From today’s point of view, the 
respondents valued the market selection and the timing of market introduction as absolutely right. 
7.3.1.3 Innovation Process 
Regarding the innovation processes of cluster 1 projects, relatively low emphasis was put on stra-
tegic partnerships. If such cooperation was established, then mainly with customers, suppliers, and 
rarely research institutes. Accordingly, the open innovation approach was little utilized and the 
companies primarily followed an autonomous development approach. In order to include external 
impetuses in the development process, a deliberate strategy was the integration of lead users. This 
process instrument was applied intensively at the generation of requirements, within the actual 
product development phase, at product testing, and before market implementation. Gathering and 
integrating customer feedback in the innovation process was quite important on a regular basis, 
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especially, the presentation of the product concept as well as the presentation and practical test of 
the prototype to the customer proved to be crucial. 
During the development process, a lot of weight was attached to a sound quality and risk manage-
ment strategy. Additionally, the protection of intellectual property was stringently implemented. In 
more than half of the projects, the companies have applied for intellectual property rights with 
respect to the underlying technology, the core product, as well as complementary components. The 
establishment of a platform strategy did not play an important role for the projects of cluster 1. 
Very low importance was attached to a deliberate timing of market entrance. Most probably, this is 
due to the fact that the companies from cluster 1 mainly introduced their innovations as pioneers in 
the market. Therefore, in leading as pioneers, the technological maturity of the respective innova-
tions was primarily crucial for the timing of market launch instead of external reasons like 
competitive situation or seasonal influences. Additionally, a deliberate promotion strategy was not 
stressed. In contrast, conscious positioning was realized. In this regard, the companies of cluster 1 
mainly tried to stand out from their competitors by following the differentiation strategy. 
7.3.1.4 Innovation Success 
In general, the projects of cluster 1 were particularly successful. Correspondingly, the average 
satisfaction of the respondents with the project results achieved the highest level compared to the 
other clusters. The majority of survey participants was very satisfied while the remaining quarter 
was at least satisfied with the project results. Just in one case, a respondent was unsatisfied. 
Both revenue and market share predominantly met the expectations. This confirmed the great 
success with respect to sales performance. At the moment of maximal market penetration, the 
product innovations on average had a market share of up to 10%. Accordingly, approximately half 
of the projects achieved a market share of up to 5% and almost a third of the projects obtained a 
market share between 5 and 10%. 
Moreover, the success regarding product performance was extremely high. Thus, the quality of the 
newly developed products was excellent. Similarly, the product performance continuously met the 
requirements and achieved a particularly high customer satisfaction. 
Compared to the other clusters, the projects of cluster 1 were quite efficient. Both speed of the 
innovation realization and consumption of available resources were primarily efficient. Neverthe-
less, the project teams rather could not adhere to the initial project schedule as well as to the initial-
ly calculated budget. 
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7.3.2 Cluster 2: Conservative Development Sphere 
The characteristics of the contextual success factors were not so favorable for the realization of the 
innovation projects of cluster 2. Especially, the target market and the organizational context ham-
pered the innovation process. Thus, this cluster was named conservative development sphere. 
7.3.2.1 Cluster Description 
Based on the cluster analysis, 31 cases were allocated to cluster 2 which represents an overall share 
of 21%. Most projects of this cluster were realized in companies of the mechanical engineering 
industry and just a few in companies of the automotive industry. Clearly dominating were large 
enterprises with more than 10,000 employees and a below average revenue share of products 
younger than five years. Nearly two thirds of the companies were stock companies and approxi-
mately one third had the corporate form of a capital company. 
The projects were mainly based on technology-push innovations and made up either new-to-the-
firm or new-to-the-market innovations. Regarding the form of project organization, the matrix 
organization clearly dominated compared to the autonomous organization. Moreover, there was no 
uniform approach for process standardization. The projects in cluster 2 were either not standard-
ized at all, organized according to a common company-specific approach, or formalized according 
to a stage gate process. 
7.3.2.2 Innovation Context 
The organizational circumstances of the analyzed projects in cluster 2 were rather negative. Ac-
cordingly, the strategic direction of the companies, as well as the rigid organizational structure, 
impeded innovation realization. This also resulted in an unfavorable resource allocation and a low 
level of management support. All in all, the companies in cluster 2 were characterized by a weak 
innovation culture, little risk tolerance, and a bad internal communication. The decision making 
processes were lean only to a mediocre level. Additionally, it was not easy to find an adequate 
organizational home for the product innovations. 
Similar to the organizational circumstances, the entrepreneurial team within the projects of cluster 
2 hampered innovation realization. On the one hand, the involved people were highly motivated, 
but on the other hand, they had just average professional competence and little experience in the 
implementation of such innovation projects. However, the teams were shaped by a high level of 
multidisciplinarity and a great personal network. Nevertheless, their social competence and their 
teamwork were relatively weak. 
The technologies that underlay the innovation projects of cluster 2 were quite advantageous. 
Although capability, reliability, and safety of the respective technologies were on an average level, 
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the technologies had relatively high cost advantages. Primarily, technologies were applied which 
had already been implemented in previous products and which additionally exhibited huge further 
application potential. However, the technological development was elaborate. 
The target markets for the respective innovations were very unfavorable. Despite the interesting 
market sizes and good prospects for market growth, the respondents retrospectively assessed the 
market selection and the timing of market introduction as wrong. This was mainly due to the high 
market barriers, the tough competitive situation, and the disadvantageous external market influ-
ences being characteristic to these markets. 
7.3.2.3 Innovation Process 
The innovation processes of cluster 2 projects were shaped by a strong focus on the establishment 
of strategic partnerships. The companies perceived, at various levels, their customers (in nearly all 
cases), suppliers, (often), research institutes (often), and end users (occasionally) as strategic 
partners. However, they did not go as far as opening up their innovation processes in terms of open 
innovation. Instead, a lot of weight was attached to regular customer feedback and to the integra-
tion of lead users. Especially, the companies of cluster 2 involved lead users at the generation of 
requirements, at the development process, and at product testing. Customer feedback was received 
through interviews at the project start, the presentation of the product concept, and the prototype, 
as well as the practical test of the prototype and the end product. 
Relatively little emphasis was put on quality and risk management. The establishment of a platform 
strategy also did not play an important role. However, the filing for intellectual property rights was 
consequently realized. Thereby, primarily the core products, and additionally in half of the cases, 
the underlying technologies and complementary components were protected. 
As it was with cluster 1, the timing for market introduction was not purposefully chosen. The 
pioneer-strategy was dominating, while in one third of all cases, the product innovation was intro-
duced to the market right after other pioneering companies. Comparatively, low attention was put 
on deliberate promotion and positioning actions. In some projects of cluster 2, a market niche was 
addressed, but in general, the differentiation strategy was prevailing. 
7.3.2.4 Innovation Success 
The innovation projects of cluster 2 were generally less successful. In cluster comparison, the 
average satisfaction of the respondents exhibited the second lowest level. Nevertheless, more than 
half of the survey participants were still satisfied, and even two of them very satisfied, with the 
results of their particular projects. However, six respondents were not satisfied, and another six 
were undecided regarding their respective results. 
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Regarding sales performance, the success level was below average. The achieved revenues and 
market shares did not meet the expectations. Interestingly, there were two main groups with 
respect to market share at the moment of maximal market penetration. Each group accounted for 
approximately half of the projects. The first group obtained a market share of up to 5% and the 
second group a market share of 10 to 30%. 
The product performance of the particular innovations mainly met the requirements and also the 
corresponding product quality was mostly on a high level. Accordingly, the customers were gener-
ally satisfied with the product innovations. Nevertheless, the overall result was below average 
compared to the results of the other clusters. 
Similarly, process efficiency of the projects in cluster 2 was below average. The speed of innovation 
realization was rather low and the available resources were not utilized efficiently. Moreover, the 
initially set time schedule could not be realized, and also, the calculated budget was exceeded. 
7.3.3 Cluster 3: Highly Productive Innovation System 
The contextual circumstances were very beneficial for the implementation of the innovation pro-
cess within the projects of cluster 3. The particular organizations were aligned to steadily generate 
innovations which were directly absorbed by the markets. Hence, cluster 3 was named highly 
productive innovation system. 
7.3.3.1 Cluster Description 
The third cluster contains 40 cases which make up an overall share of 27%. The projects were 
mainly realized in companies of the automotive industry, followed by companies in the mechanical 
engineering industry, and lastly companies from smaller industry segments. The revenue shares of 
products younger than five years exhibited an average level. Regarding company size, large enter-
prises made up the vast majority. The dominating corporate form was the stock company followed 
by the capital company. 
The projects were primarily based on technology-push innovations and mainly represented new-
to-the-market innovations. With respect to project organization, the matrix organization prevailed 
and approximately half of the projects were standardized according to the stage gate process. 
7.3.3.2 Innovation Context 
The organizational background was mainly beneficial for the realization of the innovation projects 
of cluster 3. The strategic direction and the organizational structure of the respective companies 
allowed a flexible and expedient project handling. The innovating organizations were characterized 
by a positive innovation culture and a high level of risk tolerance, as well as good internal commu-
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nication. The management supported the projects and provided all required resources. No prob-
lems emerged when searching an adequate organizational home for the product innovations. 
Finally, the decision making processes were on an average lean level. 
A great contribution to the subsequent success of the respective innovation projects of cluster 3 
was the entrepreneurial team. The involved people were quite experienced at the realization of 
such innovation projects and had a high level of professional competence. Furthermore, the teams 
were multidisciplinary and had a great personal network. Moreover, the team members exhibited 
good social competences, worked together as a team, and were highly motivated to bring the inno-
vation projects to success. 
The technologies which underlay the innovations of cluster 3 fostered the project realization on an 
average level. This might be due to the high level of newness. The technologies had not been im-
plemented in previous products but demonstrated good potential for further applications. Fur-
thermore, the technologies were characterized by a great capability, relatively high cost ad-
vantages, and a good level of reliability and safety. However, the technical development was elabo-
rate, associated with distinct difficulties, and high investments. 
Finally, the target markets were quite advantageous for innovation implementation. Thus, the 
respective market size and the forthcoming market growth were beneficial for the corresponding 
innovations. Even in retrospect, the respondents assessed the market selection and the timing of 
market introduction to be good. The competitive situation and the external influences were on an 
average level while the market barriers were quite low. 
7.3.3.3 Innovation Process 
Relatively high priority was put on the establishment of strategic partnerships in the innovation 
projects of cluster 3. Correspondingly, suppliers and customers were perceived as strategic part-
ners within the majority of the analyzed projects. Furthermore, in one third of all cases end users of 
the product innovations, distribution partners, or research institutes were strategically involved. 
Similar to the clusters 1 and 2, the open innovation approach was not of intense focus. Although 
there was little integration of lead users in idea generation, they were involved in the generation of 
requirements, during product development, and while subsequently testing the product innova-
tions. Additionally, a regular gathering of customer feedback and consequent integration in the 
innovation process was stressed. This customer feedback was mainly generated through interviews 
at the project start, the presentation of the product concept and the prototype, as well as the practi-
cal testing of the prototype and the end product. 
A lot of weight was attached to a solid quality and risk management. Furthermore, an intensive 
intellectual property strategy was followed. Particularly, the underlying technologies, the core 
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products, and occasionally, complementing components were protected. The implementation of a 
platform strategy was also fostered. 
Even though the innovation companies introduced their innovations primary as innovators, they 
stressed a deliberate timing strategy of market launch, and also focused on a deliberate promotion 
strategy. The companies of cluster 3 positioned their product innovations deliberately and distin-
guished themselves from their competitors by following the differentiation strategy. 
7.3.3.4 Innovation Success 
The innovation projects of cluster 3 were very successful. Correspondingly, the average satisfaction 
of the survey participants was very high. More than half of the respondents were satisfied, and 
several respondents were even very satisfied with the results of their innovation projects. 
With respect to sales performance, the projects of cluster 3 indicated the highest overall value of all 
clusters. Both revenue and market share predominantly met the expectations. Approximately half 
of the projects had a market share of up to 5% at the moment of maximal market penetration. Four 
projects exhibited a market share of 6 to 10%, four of 11-30%, three of 31-50%, and two even more 
than 50%. 
The product quality of the considered innovations was at a very high level. Moreover, the product 
performance met the initial requirements, and hence, the customers were mainly satisfied. Com-
pared to the other clusters, the overall product performance of the innovation projects of cluster 3 
achieved a level above average. 
Regarding process efficiency, the projects of cluster 3 were very successful. The speed of innovation 
realization was relatively high and also the available resources were utilized quite efficiently. 
Regarding the initially set time schedule and calculated budget, there was no identifiable tendency 
among the analyzed projects. 
7.3.4 Cluster 4: Mediocre Implementation Circumstances 
The innovation context of the projects in cluster 4 had only a slight positive impact on the innova-
tion process. While the organizational circumstances neither influenced the innovation realization 
positively nor negatively, the underlying technology and the addressed target market challenged 
the implementation of the innovation project. Correspondingly, the cluster was named mediocre 
implementation circumstances. 
7.3.4.1 Cluster Description 
20 cases were allocated to the fourth cluster which represents 14% of all cases in the sample. Once 
again, the projects were mainly conducted in enterprises with more than 10,000 employees. Corre-
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spondingly, the corporate form of stock companies was clearly dominating compared to capital 
companies. The main industry in which the considered innovations were realized was the automo-
tive industry followed by the mechanical engineering industry. Interestingly, these companies 
were, in general, quite innovative, as their revenue share of products younger than five years was 
high if compared to the other clusters. 
The projects were rather based on technology-push than market-pull innovations but had the 
lowest level of newness within the whole sample. Mainly new-to-the-market and new-to-the-firm 
innovations were realized. The matrix organization was the major organizational form, followed by 
the autonomous project organization. Additionally, the projects of cluster 4 were characterized by a 
high level of standardization. Hence, a lot of projects were organized according to a stage gate 
process. 
7.3.4.2 Innovation Context 
The organizational circumstances for the projects in cluster 4 had an averagely positive influence 
on the innovation implementation. While the organizational structure and the strategic direction 
fostered a flexible project realization, the resource allocation and the management support ranged 
on a mediocre level. Additionally, the innovation culture, the risk acceptance, the decision making 
process, and the internal communication were also on average positive. However, in the search for 
an organizational home, problems occasionally occurred. 
The entrepreneurial team had a quite positive impact on the innovation realization. While the team 
members had a distinct level of experience in the implementation of such projects, they interesting-
ly had just mediocre professional competences. They overcompensated this by their great personal 
network and the multidisciplinarity within the team. Furthermore, the team members were charac-
terized by a high level of social competence, very good teamwork, and a great attitude. 
In contrast to the entrepreneurial team, the technologies which underlay the innovation projects of 
cluster 4 were mainly hampering the innovation implementation. The technologies exhibited just 
an average level of performance capability and low cost advantages compared to alternatives. 
Moreover, the future application potential of the technologies was quite low and their safety and 
reliability were below average. Although the technologies were implemented in previous products, 
the technological development was elaborate and associated with high costs. 
The target markets were also unfavorable. In general, the market size was interesting but com-
pared to other clusters, slightly below average. Moreover, the prospects of forthcoming market 
growth were relatively low. Additionally, the competitive situation was on an average level, the 
market barriers were quite high, and external forces, like political or macroeconomic impacts, 
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negatively influenced the innovation implementation. Nevertheless, the survey participants mainly 
evaluated the moment for market launch in retrospective as right. 
7.3.4.3 Innovation Process 
Within the projects of cluster 4, no particular weight was attached to strategic partnerships. Occa-
sionally, suppliers, and rarely, customers and research institutes, were recognized as strategic 
partners. Accordingly, open innovation was not stressed. The innovating companies of cluster 4 
developed primarily autonomously. Thus, little emphasis was put on the integration of customer 
feedback or lead user. Occasionally, lead users were involved in product testing. Customer feedback 
was mainly obtained through the presentation of prototypes, sometimes through interviews at the 
project start or when the prototypes or respectively the end products were tested. 
Much attention was attached to a solid quality and risk management, and additionally, the imple-
mentation of a platform strategy. Moreover, generated intellectual property was intensively pro-
tected. The companies especially filed for intellectual property rights with respect to the underlying 
technologies and occasionally the core products and complementary components. 
In two thirds of all cases, the innovating companies implemented the product innovations as pio-
neers and in one third as early followers on the market. The companies set up a deliberate timing 
strategy for market launch. Furthermore, they stressed purposeful positioning strategies as well as 
corresponding promotion measures. To stand apart from their competitors, the companies primari-
ly followed the differentiation strategy. 
7.3.4.4 Innovation Success 
The innovation projects of cluster 4 were mostly successful and hence, the average project satisfac-
tion of the survey participants was relatively high. 13 respondents were satisfied and four even 
very satisfied. One participant was undecided and one was unsatisfied with the project results. 
With respect to sales performance, the projects were successful. The expectations regarding reve-
nue and market share were primarily achieved. The market share at the moment of maximal mar-
ket penetration achieved the highest value compared to the other clusters. Half of the projects 
obtained a market share of up to 5% while a great part of the projects even obtained a market share 
of 30 to 50%. 
The product success was above average. Both product quality and product performance were on a 
relatively high level. Thus, the customers were mainly satisfied. 
Regarding process efficiency of the analyzed projects, a slightly above average level could be real-
ized. The speed of innovation realization was high while the available resources were efficiently 
utilized. The time schedule and the calculated budget could not be retained. 
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7.3.5 Cluster 5: Fruitless Innovation Wasteland 
The general context of the projects in cluster 5 influenced innovation implementation very nega-
tively. Accordingly, the team, the organization, as well as the technology impinged on the innova-
tion success in a negative way. For this reason, cluster 5 was named fruitless innovation wasteland. 
7.3.5.1 Cluster Description 
Cluster 5 includes 30 innovation projects corresponding to 20% of the total sample. Half of them 
were implemented in mechanical engineering companies. The remaining projects were realized 
either in the automotive industry, in companies producing electronic equipment, or in companies 
focusing on further vehicle construction. To a great extent, the innovation projects were imple-
mented in larger concerns, although also in companies of medium size. Concerning the corporate 
form, the stock company prevailed followed by the capital company and the company constituted 
under public law. The companies of this cluster had the lowest overall innovation rate which corre-
sponds to a revenue share of less than 5% regarding products younger than five years. 
Once again, the projects were mostly based on technology-push innovations and mainly resulted in 
new-to-the-market innovations. The process standardization was quite below average, as nearly 
half of the projects neither was standardized nor were arranged according to a common procedure. 
Concerning project organization, the matrix organization highly dominated and was followed by the 
autonomous project organization. 
7.3.5.2 Innovation Context 
The organizational circumstances for the projects of cluster 5 extremely hampered innovation 
realization. Correspondingly, the strategic direction, as well as the rigid organizational structure, 
obstructed project implementation. Moreover, the innovating companies were characterized by a 
very low innovation culture, little risk acceptance, and a low level of internal communication. The 
management refused essential resource allocations and similarly their overall project commitment. 
Accordingly, the processes of decision making were not lean and the search for an organizational 
home within the organization was accompanied by huge difficulties. 
Similar to the organizational circumstances, the entrepreneurial team composition of the projects 
in cluster 5 was detrimental to a successful project realization. The involved people had little expe-
rience in the implementation of such projects and relatively low professional competences. Moreo-
ver, the teams were not multidisciplinary and had quite limited access to a strong personal net-
work. Therefore, it was not surprising that the motivation and the teamwork among the members 
were quite weak. At the same time, the survey participants assigned their team members a low 
level of social competence. 
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Compared to the other clusters, the technologies of cluster 5 displayed the lowest overall values. 
The technologies were neither beneficial in terms of performance capability, nor in terms of cost 
advantages towards existing alternatives. Moreover, these technologies were not reliable and safe, 
had only been applied in previous products in a few cases, and did not display good potential for 
further utilization. Nevertheless, their technological development was time-consuming and expen-
sive. 
The target markets of cluster 5 projects neither showed clear advantages nor clear disadvantages. 
On the one hand, the market sizes and the prospects of forthcoming market growth were relatively 
poor, but on the other hand, the market barriers were relatively low. With few exceptions, no 
external factors influenced the markets negatively and just a few competitors were active. In retro-
spective, the survey participants evaluated the market selection as appropriate, whereas the timing 
of the market launch was evaluated as unfavorable. 
7.3.5.3 Innovation Process 
Within the projects of cluster 5, a little weight was attached to the establishment of strategic part-
nerships. Primarily, suppliers, customers, and sometimes research institutes were perceived as 
strategic partners, but mainly in an operative and not strategic mode. Similarly, the concept of open 
innovation and the integration of lead users were not stressed during innovation implementation. 
Even customer feedback was rarely implied. In just approximately half of all projects, customer 
feedback was obtained by presentation and field test of prototypes. Interviews at the project start, 
presentation of the product concept, and field test of the final product were just performed in 
approximately one third of all projects. 
Little emphasis was put on the implementation of structured quality and risk-management and the 
realization of a platform strategy. Concerning the protection of intellectual property, the innovating 
companies in cluster 5 were also not very active. In approximately one third of all cases, they pro-
tected the underlying technologies, the core products, and complementary components. 
The timing of market introduction was not made consciously and was additionally not supported 
by deliberate promotion measures. Primarily, the innovating companies appeared as pioneers and 
tried to disassociate themselves from their competitors by following the differentiation strategy. 
However, they did not stress a conscious positioning of the product innovations in the markets. 
7.3.5.4 Innovation Success 
The projects in cluster 5 displayed the lowest level of innovation success. Accordingly, the survey 
participants indicated the least level of satisfaction with respect to their project results. Neverthe-
less, it was surprising that even half of the respondents of cluster 5 were satisfied. 
Innovation Archetypes 
154 
In comparison with the other clusters, the projects of cluster 5 achieved the lowest level of com-
mercial success. Predominantly, the revenue and the market share did not meet the expectations. 
At the same time, the market share at the time of maximal market penetration displayed the lowest 
level of all clusters. Thus, the market share of the outweighing majority accounted for less than 5% 
and just a few projects achieved a percentage between 5 and 10. 
Overall, the product quality reached a high level and product performance mostly met the expecta-
tions. Nevertheless, it did not totally satisfy the customers. Accordingly, the product success of the 
innovation projects in cluster 5 displayed the lowest figure compared to the other clusters. 
Regarding process implementation, the projects were sparsely efficient. The innovation realization 
progressed slowly and the available resources were deployed rarely efficiently. Moreover, the 
initial time schedule was not met and also the initially calculated budget was exceeded. 
7.4 Summary and Cluster Overview 
The conducted cluster analysis highlighted five clearly distinguishable clusters. These clusters were 
derived from the characteristics of the variables associated with the innovation context. As it was 
the goal to maximize homogeneity of objects within the clusters while maximizing heterogeneity 
between the clusters, the five detected clusters exhibited comparable preconditions for the subse-
quent innovation process (Hair, 2010, p. 505). The conducted Welch and ANOVA tests confirmed 
that the clusters could furthermore be distinguished with respect to the way the companies were 
realizing the innovation process. Additionally, the Cramer’s V test indicated significant associations 
between each of the eleven process instruments and the cluster assignment. A comparison with the 
performer classification based on the three innovation success dimensions highlights the quality of 
the cluster solution. The way companies were realizing the innovation process could be better 
distinguished, when looking at the contextual circumstances than looking at the subsequent inno-
vation success. Thus, the second central research question could be answered. The five clusters 
were clearly distinguishable based on the contextual circumstances and correspondingly could be 
perceived as innovation archetypes. The way the innovation processes were arranged within each 
cluster, could serve as orientation guideline for forthcoming innovation projects. 
According to their characteristics, the clusters were named as archetypical project contexts. An 
overview of the main characteristics of the five clusters is presented in Figure 42. At the presenta-
tion of the innovation process instruments, the plus indicates that the companies within this cluster 
put above average weight on the implementation of the respective process instrument. A minus 





Figure 42: Cluster Overview  
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7.5 Discussion and Limitations 
The conducted cluster analysis did not at all address the question of whether there was an underly-
ing cluster structure within the data. Therefore, it could not be neglected that the obtained cluster 
solution did not reflect the underlying cluster structure correctly or was even totally artificial. 
However, cluster analysis is an explorative approach of multivariate data analysis which is based on 
the raw data. The clusters were not known before and the identification of object groups within the 
sample was the result of this inductive data analysis technique (Backhaus et al., 2016, p. 455; 
Schendera, 2008, p. 94). 
Moreover, the hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s method was applied in this research study. 
As the clustering of this method is based on the minimal increase in error sum of squares, it was a 
good approach to obtain very homogeneous clusters. Nevertheless, it tends to cluster solutions with 
approximately the same amount of cases in each cluster. Thus, it faces problems to detect small or 
stretched clusters and is furthermore vulnerable to outliers. Before statistical analysis, the data 
were scanned for potential outliers (cf. chapter 6.3.3). There were just a few slight outliers found in 
the data. Accordingly, this should not effect cluster analysis (Backhaus et al., 2000, pp. 359–360, 
2016, p. 484; Schendera, 2008, p. 24). 
The applied clustering method started with each case in an individual cluster and agglomerated 
step-by-step these objects ending up with a single cluster. Hence, the appropriate cluster solution 
had to be determined (cf. chapter 7.1.1). This decision caused a trade-off between the cluster ho-
mogeneity on the one hand and the manageability of the cluster solution on the other hand. To 
resolve this conflict, content-related and research pragmatic arguments were considered. Never-
theless, this just addressed the number of clusters and did not affect the allocation of cases to 
particular clusters. Furthermore, the potential cluster solutions were verified with respect to 
interpretability, stability, and validity. Thus, Cramer’s V and ANOVA tests were conducted and 
validated the appropriateness of the five cluster solution (Backhaus et al., 2016, pp. 494–495; 
Schendera, 2008, p. 94). 
In general, Cramer’s V is suitable for nominal scales. As the process instruments were measured on 
a Likert scale, this association measure led to distinct information loss on behalf of these variables. 
However, the cluster assignment variable was nominal scaled and thus, no other appropriate 
association measure was available. Furthermore, the absolute values of Cramer’s V were just of 
relative importance. Correspondingly, the particular coefficients of the process instruments were 
only considered relative to each other. For the comparison with the top performer classification, 
only the significance level of the associations was in the focus (Brosius, 2013, pp. 432–434). 
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Although the ANOVA and Welch tests indicated that the five clusters could be significantly distin-
guished, these tests did not pinpoint where the significant differences lay among the clusters. In 
principle, several a posterori tests were available for further investigating the cluster differences. 
However, these tests were not applied, as this issue was not of primary interest in this research 
study. The primary goal was to detect context-specific strategies for the innovation process and not 
to statistically distinguish these strategies from other contexts. Thus, the descriptive analysis of the 
different clusters was focused in the conducted study (Hair, 2010, p. 472). 
The cluster analysis was based on the data of the quantitative survey. Hence, any limitations which 
are due to the study design of the survey, data collection, and data preparation are also relevant for 
the results of the cluster analysis. These limitations are profoundly outlined in chapter 6.4.5 and 




8 Operational Framework 
As previously outlined (cf. 5.2.2), in the first stage of the innovation process it is decisive to identify 
if the innovation context represents an entrepreneurial opportunity. The innovation manager has 
to assess the circumstances of the innovation context and base the product development and 
commercialization strategy on this assessment. To support innovation managers of forthcoming 
projects, an operational framework was designed for the early stages of innovation projects, which 
target the realization of radical technological innovations within the mechanical engineering indus-
try. Therewith, the third central research question was addressed and the second artifact generat-
ed. 
The operational framework contains two fundamental parts. At first, the cluster has to be detected 
which most closely resembles the contextual circumstances of the specific innovation project. 
Therefore, the statistical method of discriminant analysis is utilized. The second part includes 
concrete recommendations for action, which are based on the cluster assignment of the new project 
and address the three stages of the innovation process opportunity identification, product develop-
ment, and commercialization. 
8.1 Assignment of New Projects to Clusters 
8.1.1 Discriminant Analysis 
The goal of the discriminant analysis is to explain the values of a dependent variable by the values 
of several independent variables. Therefore, cases that exhibit the characteristics of both types of 
variables have to be analyzed for statistical relationships. These relationships need to be expressed 
algebraically. This can subsequently be utilized to estimate the dependent variable for cases of 
which just the characteristics of the independent variables are known. For discriminant analysis, 
the dependent variable has to be nominal-scaled and the independent variables need to be para-
metric. Furthermore, this method measures the prediction accuracy of the generated prognosis 
model (Brosius, 2013, p. 649; Hair, 2010, p. 339; Schendera, 2008, pp. 299–300). 
As the contextual circumstances for new innovation projects could be evaluated quite early within 
the innovation process, the independent variables are known, while the cluster classification (de-
pendent variable) is unknown. Thus, discriminant analysis is the appropriate statistical technique 
to predict the cluster assignment of new projects. In general, discriminant analysis iteratively 
follows six steps: group definition, formulation of discriminant function, estimation of discriminant 
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functions, assessment of independent variables, assessment of discriminant functions, and classifi-
cation of new elements (Backhaus et al., 2016, p. 219). 
Due to the previously conducted cluster analysis, group definition was based on the cluster solu-
tion. In this context, the available data had to be taken into account. There were several recommen-
dations regarding the appropriateness of data for discriminant analysis. The case numbers within 
the individual groups must not be too small. As a practical guideline, Hair suggests requesting at 
least 20 cases in each group. Furthermore, wide variations in the groups' size will impact the esti-
mation of the discriminant function and the classification of observation. Additionally, the number 
of groups should not exceed the number of independent variables. For the minimum overall sample 
size, it is proposed to have five observations per independent variable (Backhaus et al., 2016, p. 
220; Hair, 2010, p. 353). With initially 23 independent variables, 147 cases as an overall sample 
size, 20 cases in cluster 4 as the smallest cluster, and 40 cases in cluster 3 as the largest cluster, 
these guidelines were fulfilled. 
As a next step, the discriminant function had to be formulated as a linear combination of the inde-
pendent variables. This was based on the selection of characteristic variables which would presum-
ably help distinguish the respective groups. Similar to the conducted cluster analysis, the variables 
associated with the innovation context were selected for the discriminant analysis which exhibited 
significant positive correlations to at least one of the dependent success variables within the previ-
ously conducted correlation analyses. The actual discriminatory ability of these independent varia-
bles was assessed later on (Backhaus et al., 2016, pp. 220–221; Hair, 2010, p. 353). 
The estimation of the discriminant function was based on the discriminant criterion. This criterion 
measures group differences by calculating the ratio of distribution between the groups and distri-
bution within the groups. Correspondingly, the estimation of the discriminant function was carried 
out in such a way that the discriminant criterion reached its maximum. If there are more than two 
groups, further discriminant functions can be established. Accordingly, four discriminant functions 
were estimated within the conducted study (Backhaus et al., 2016, pp. 223–224; Hair, 2010, pp. 
356–360). 
At the assessment of independent variables regarding their discriminatory importance, two varia-
bles were deleted from the discriminant function. Wilk’s lambda was utilized and a subsequent F-
test indicated the significance of the respective variables (cf. Table 39, Appendix VI - 1). As the 
variables TEC_1 and TEC_5 did not significantly differ across the clusters, they were of little use for 
the discriminant analysis and hence, left out (Backhaus et al., 2016, p. 243; Hair, 2010, p. 353). 
For assessing the quality of the potential discriminant functions, the most utilized criterion is Wilk’s 
lambda. It is calculated by dividing the non-defined distribution by the overall distribution and can 
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be transformed into a probabilistic variable which is based on the chi-squared-value. Thus, a statis-
tical significance test of the discriminant function is possible. Wilks’ Lambda indicated for the first 
three discriminant functions highly significant values (cf. Table 41; Appendix VI – 1). Furthermore, 
the individual importance of the functions expressed by the respective eigenvalues generally de-
clined quite steeply (cf. Table 40; Appendix VI – 1). Thus, just the first three discriminant functions 
were utilized. An overview of the discriminant functions coefficients is depicted in Table 43 (cf. 
Appendix VI – 1). A second way to assess the quality of the discriminant functions is to compare the 
ultimate classification based on the discriminant analysis with the actual cluster assignment. Table 
45 gives an overview of the classification results. In sum, 76.9% of all cases were correctly classified 
which represents a solid accuracy (Backhaus et al., 2016, pp. 236–241). 
The probability concept was selected for the classification of new cases, as it offers the most flexi-
bility of all potential techniques. Accordingly, the classification probabilities of new cases with 
respect to the five clusters could be calculated on the basis of the existing distances and a-priori-
probabilities by utilizing the Bayes-theorem. The highly significant Box’s M test indicated that the 
null hypothesis of equal distributions of the covariance matrices could not be retained (cf. Table 46; 
Appendix VI – 1). Thus, the unequal distributions of the covariance matrices had to be considered at 
classification (Backhaus et al., 2016, pp. 249–253). 
8.1.2 Instructions 
For the classification of new projects, in which radical technological innovations are realized, four 
concrete steps have to be followed: assessment of the independent contextual variables, recoding of 
several variables, entering the data in SPSS, and execution of classification. 
The questions of the survey instrument were originally designed for retrospective answering. 
However, in contrast to the conducted survey, the projects to be assessed within the operational 
framework are in an early phase of innovation realization. Therefore, the wording of the questions 
was adapted. The respondents are asked to relate their answers to the concrete project, in which 
they participate. The queried variables are posed as statements and the respondents should honest-
ly indicate their consent on a five-point Likert scale. In Appendix VI – 2, the 21 questions addressing 
the independent contextual variables with corresponding answer options are listed. 
As the variables TM_5, ORG_6, ORG_8, ET_4, and ET_7 are negatively-keyed, these items have to be 
recoded. Afterward, the complete data of the 21 variables need to be entered in SPSS. For this 
purpose, the original dataset containing the collected data of the quantitative survey has to be 
utilized. The 21 variables have to be inserted in a new data row in the data view window of SPSS. 
For classification, the discriminant analysis has to be conducted according to the syntax depicted in 
Figure 87 (cf. Appendix VI – 1). This syntax has to be inserted in the syntax editor of SPSS and 
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executed. Finally, the ultimate cluster assignment with corresponding classification probability can 
be deduced from the output file of SPSS. 
8.2 Cluster Specific Recommendations for Action 
On the basis of the five detected clusters, concrete recommendations for action were derived with 
respect to the three stages of the innovation process: opportunity identification, product develop-
ment, and commercialization. Depending on the classification of the new projects, the correspond-
ing cluster specific recommendations should be considered when realizing these innovation pro-
jects. Figure 43 gives an overview of the cluster-specific recommendations for action. 
The formulation of recommendations for the challenge of opportunity identification was based on 
the descriptive analyses of the contextual circumstances and the subsequent innovation success of 
each cluster. With respect to the realization of product development and commercialization, the 
correlation analyses regarding the innovation process in the overall sample (cf. Figure 39), as well 
as the descriptive analyses of the innovation process within each cluster were fundamental. 
 
Figure 43: Overview of the Cluster Specific Recommendations for Action 
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8.2.1 Recommendations for Cluster 1 
8.2.1.1 Opportunity Identification 
The contextual circumstances for the innovation projects allocated to the first cluster were in 
general, very positive. Accordingly, the critical success factors of the organizational context, the 
entrepreneurial team, the technology that underlies the innovation, and the target market were 
fostering the innovation realization. Moreover, these projects were very successful, as they 
achieved a high level of sales performance, the highest value of product performance compared to 
the other clusters, and high process efficiency. If the contextual circumstances of new innovation 
projects most closely resemble the innovation contexts of the projects allocated to cluster 1, these 
projects could be started doubtlessly as they represent a great business opportunity. 
8.2.1.2 Product Development 
The product development of these new projects should be realized quite autonomously within the 
company borders. Thus, strategic partnerships should only, if ever, be established with customers, 
suppliers, and/or research institutes. However, to not miss the market needs, lead users should be 
integrated especially at requirements analysis, product development, product test, and subsequent 
market introduction. In this context, it is furthermore decisive, to continuously gather and conse-
quently integrate customer feedback in the innovation realization. In particular, the presentation of 
the product concept, as well as the presentation and subsequent testing of the prototype at the 
customer represent crucial occasions for feedback generation. 
Additionally, great emphasis should be put on a solid quality and risk management as both 
measures are important for the subsequent sales and product performance. Moreover, the protec-
tion of intellectual property should be stressed. As far as possible the underlying technology, the 
core product, and complementary components should be protected. 
8.2.1.3 Commercialization 
For commercialization, the innovating companies should implement the respective innovations as 
pioneers in the market. The innovations should be deliberately positioned, in particular as a premi-
um solution. To stand out from its competitors, the companies should follow the differentiation 
strategy instead of cost leadership or excessive niche strategy. To additionally increase sales per-
formance, deliberate communication measures and a conscious timing strategy of market introduc-
tion is considered helpful. The latter two marketing measures are not obligatory for this kind of 
project, however, they exhibit a reinforcing effect. 
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8.2.2 Recommendations for Cluster 2 
8.2.2.1 Opportunity Identification 
The circumstances for a successful project realization were generally quite negative for the projects 
allocated to cluster 2. Similar to the organizational context, the entrepreneurial team and the target 
market were obstructive to project success. Although the technology had a positive effect on inno-
vation realization, the hampering factors clearly dominated. This becomes especially obvious when 
looking at the poor innovation success. The sales performance, the product performance, and the 
process efficiency were on a low level. 
Correspondingly, a natural recommendation for forthcoming projects which have a similar innova-
tion context like the projects of cluster 2 is to reject the project ideas as fast as possible and focus 
on more promising initiatives. If the projects should be initiated despite the poor preconditions, it 
would be recommended to fundamentally change the circumstances for not starting a futile under-
taking. One possibility would be to establish an independent and autonomous organizational unit. 
Within this unit, a specifically selected team which has been released from its operational duties 
should take over the full responsibility of the project. This team should be equipped with the essen-
tial resources and a great amount of freedom to autonomously realize the technological develop-
ment and subsequent commercialization of the respective innovations. In this setting, the team 
must be free to identify the market which matches best to the advantages of the underlying tech-
nology. 
8.2.2.2 Product Development and Commercialization 
If these projects will not be stopped, and correspondingly an independent organizational unit for 
innovation realization will be formed, the strategy for product development has to be aligned with 
the newly generated circumstances. If this will be implemented as recommended in the previous 
chapter 8.2.2.1, the resulting innovation context probably resembles the ones of cluster 1 projects. 
Accordingly, the product development has to be aligned to the strategy recommendations for these 
projects. The same applies to the commercialization strategy of the respective innovations. 
8.2.3 Recommendations for Cluster 3 
8.2.3.1 Opportunity Identification 
Similar to cluster 1, the contextual circumstances of the projects allocated to cluster 3 were very 
beneficial for innovation realization. Especially, the entrepreneurial team exhibited a particularly 
positive influence. Moreover, the organizational background and the target market were also 
fostering innovation success, while the technology which underlies the respective innovations was 
at least on an average level. With respect to the ultimate innovation success, the projects of cluster 
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3 achieved the highest level of sales performance compared to the other clusters as well as a high 
level of product performance and process efficiency. If a new project is classified to cluster 3, this 
corresponds to a great entrepreneurial opportunity. Thus, the project should be started. 
8.2.3.2 Product Development 
As a recommendation for product development, strategic partnerships should be established in any 
case with customers and suppliers. Depending on the situation, further partners like end users, 
sales partners, or research institutes should additionally be involved. Moreover, lead users should 
be integrated into requirements analysis, product development, and product testing. Furthermore, 
it is recommended to continuously generate and integrate customer feedback in product develop-
ment. This feedback should be obtained by interviewing customers at the project start, presenting 
the product concept and the prototype to the customer, and by testing the prototype and the end 
product. 
Additionally, the realization of a profound quality and risk management is decisive for sales and 
product performance. An intensive protection strategy for intellectual property rights is of vital 
importance. In particular, the underlying technology, the core product, and if possible, complemen-
tary components should be protected.  
8.2.3.3 Commercialization 
Regarding the commercialization strategy, the respective innovations should be deliberately posi-
tioned at the market ideally as a premium solution. The innovating company should distinguish 
itself from its competitors by following the differentiation strategy. Furthermore, significant weight 
should be attached to a deliberate timing strategy of market introduction and supporting commu-
nication measures. 
8.2.4 Recommendations for Cluster 4 
8.2.4.1 Opportunity Identification 
The preconditions for successful innovation realization, for the projects allocated to cluster 4, were 
on a mediocre level. While the organizational circumstances were on an average level and the 
entrepreneurial team exhibited a positive influence on innovation implementation, the technology 
and the target market were not favorable. Nevertheless, the innovation projects of cluster 4 
achieved a high level of sales performance, a quite high product performance, and a slightly above 
average process efficiency. 
If the contextual circumstances of a forthcoming project resemble the innovation context of the 
projects of cluster 4, the project could be started. For maximizing the prospects of success, it is 
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recommended to search for alternative target markets. Additionally, the technological development 
should be focused to increase the capability and reliability of the respective technology. 
8.2.4.2 Product Development 
For new innovation projects allocated to cluster 4, the product development ought to be realized 
quite autonomously within the innovating company. Strategic partnerships, if any, should be estab-
lished with suppliers and depending on the situation with customers and research institutes. 
Within the analyzed projects of cluster 4, little weight was attached to the integration of lead users 
and customer feedback. Due to the relatively autonomous product development approach, this 
particularly seems critical as no external market impulses were integrated. For not totally missing 
the market needs, it is recommended to forthcoming projects to urgently integrate either, lead 
users at requirements analysis and product development, or obtain customer feedback through 
interviews at the project start as well as the presentation of the product concept and the prototype. 
Furthermore, much emphasis ought to be put on a solid quality and risk management approach. 
Intellectual property which is generated during the project is supposed to be protected, in particu-
lar, regarding the technology, and if possible, regarding the core product and complementary 
components. Additionally, the implementation of a platform strategy should be considered and 
addressed. 
8.2.4.3 Commercialization 
To distinguish itself from its competitors, the innovating company should follow the differentiation 
strategy and deliberately plan the timing of market introduction. Moreover, the innovations ought 
to be consciously positioned in the market and promoted by purposeful communication measures. 
8.2.5 Recommendations for Cluster 5 
8.2.5.1 Opportunity Identification 
The contextual circumstances of the innovation projects in cluster 5 were very obstructive for their 
realization. The team, the organization, and also the technology hampered the project. Only the 
target market was characterized by an average positive influence on innovation realization. Corre-
spondingly, the innovation success was quite low. Compared to the other clusters, the projects 
allocated to cluster 5 achieved the lowest level of sales and product performance, as well as the 
lowest process efficiency. 
If the contextual circumstances of a forthcoming project are similar to the preconditions of the 
projects within cluster 5, there are two options for action. The natural suggestion is to stop the 
project and reject the idea. The second, much more complex option requires fundamentally chang-
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ing the present circumstances to generally enable a successful project implementation. Based on 
the current innovation context, the project would be doomed to fail in advance. As it was with the 
projects that resemble the projects of cluster 2, an autonomous organizational unit has to be estab-
lished. Within this unit, a newly formed team has to be equipped with the essential resources and a 
great amount of freedom. This team is supposed to take over responsibility for technological devel-
opment, market identification, and market approach. 
8.2.5.2 Product Development and Commercialization 
The same that applies to projects that resemble the projects of cluster 2, applies for projects which 
resemble the projects of cluster 5. If these projects will not be stopped and an autonomous organi-
zational unit for innovation realization will be established, the strategies for product development 
and commercialization have to be aligned with the newly generated circumstances. If the resulting 
innovation context resembles the ones of cluster 1 projects, the respective articulated recommen-
dations for action regarding the product development and commercialization strategy should be 
implemented. 
8.3 Validation of the Operational Framework 
For validation, the operational framework was retrospectively applied for the three conducted 
primary case studies detailed in chapter 5.3. At first, the instructions to assign the projects to one of 
the five clusters outlined in chapter 8.1.2 were followed. Afterward, the respective cluster specific 
recommendations regarding the innovation process were compared with the actual implementa-
tion of the innovation process within the three cases. It was aimed to figure out differences and 
similarities to assess the accuracy, relevance, and usefulness of the operational framework. Alt-
hough the case of cryogenic machining by 5ME (process innovation and not within the power 
transmission industry) originally was not within the scope of the conducted quantitative survey (cf. 
chapter 6.2.1), it seemed beneficial for the evaluation of the operational framework to include this 
case as well. Each of the three cases specifies a successful implementation of a radical technological 
innovation within the mechanical engineering industry. Therefore, the cases were well suited for 
the purpose of validating the operational framework. 
8.3.1 Cluster Assignment of the Cases of Pinion, SKF, and 5ME 
As detailed in chapter 8.1.2, there are four concrete steps that have to be followed for the classifica-
tion of new projects. These steps were conducted by the author of this thesis for the cases of Pinion, 
SKF, and 5ME. Table 47 gives an overview of the answers to the 21 questions addressing the inde-
pendent contextual variables for each case filled in by the author (cf. Appendix VI – 3). In the fol-
lowing subchapters, the cluster specific assessment of the contextual variables will be explained. 
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After the contextual assessment of the three cases, the variables TM_5, ORG_6, ORG_8, ET_4, and 
ET_7 were recoded, and subsequently, the complete data was entered in the original dataset of the 
quantitative survey in SPSS. Finally, a discriminant analysis was conducted for cluster assignment 
of the three cases. 
8.3.1.1 Contextual Assessment of the P1.18 Bicycle Transmission by Pinion 
With respect to the market introduction of the P1.18 bicycle transmission, the market-related 
barriers were not high. The biggest obstacle Pinion had to face was the low level of reliability 
connoted to a young start-up. In general, the market perfectly matched to the innovation, as the 
high end sector of the German bicycle market in total was very big and quite absorptive for such 
product innovations. Furthermore, the timing was right, as the industry context was shaped by 
beneficial trends addressing sustainability and environment. 
The innovation culture within Pinion was very good and the whole company was focused on the 
development and commercialization of its product innovation. Accordingly, the climate within the 
start-up was characterized by a high level of risk tolerance and failure acceptance. As it was the 
original goal of the company to bring the P1.18 to success, the start up’s strategy was aligned with 
this goal. Naturally, the two founders totally supported their employees and allocated the needed 
resources. Therefore, they rose funding from their investors. After a natural setback when the first 
investor left, the second investor finally provided the necessary budget. The structures and pro-
cesses of Pinion were established to provide the best possible organizational surrounding for a 
flexible and lean innovation realization. Moreover, the internal communication was open and 
honest due to the low hierarchical levels. 
The general concept of a maintenance free gearbox utilizing a spur gear had already been imple-
mented in cars and motorbikes. Nevertheless, the overall surrounding for bicycles was totally 
different, and thus, the technology had to be fundamentally adapted. However, Pinion managed to 
achieve a high maturity level when entering the market. Accordingly, the technology was reliable 
and safe. 
Despite the fact that the team was quite inexperienced, the essential competences were present. As 
the team primarily developed autonomously, the average level of personal network did not hamper 
innovation realization. The team was diverse and worked very well together. The involved people 
had a good social competence and really wanted to bring the P1.18 to market success (cf. chapter 
5.3.2). 
8.3.1.2 Contextual Assessment of the Friction Disc by SKF 
The fundamental prerequisite for entering the wind energy market was the certification process. 
Besides this, SKF had no further market barriers to overcome, as the company and its customer 
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Senvion assured mutual exclusivity. The wind industry in general perfectly matched to the Friction 
Disc, as the market was shaped by massively increased power ranges and the challenge to keep the 
weights of the individual components controllable. Moreover, the timing of market introduction 
was right, because SKF’s customer just started the development of its new wind turbine, and thus, 
both development processes could be aligned. 
SKF’s overall strategy was clearly addressing the wind market. Hence, the Friction Disc was abso-
lutely in this focus. Accordingly, the management supported the team and allocated any and all 
resources needed for the realization of the respective innovation. Due to the quite low hierarchical 
level within the company, the internal communication was open and honest. On the other hand, the 
company was not very innovation oriented, and correspondingly, risk tolerance and failure ac-
ceptance were not very high. Understandably, the structures and processes of a big enterprise did 
not particularly foster innovation realization and lean decision making. However, the stage gate 
process provided a measure to canalize these processes. 
Before SKF utilized the coating technology for the Friction Disc, the technology was just applied for 
very small surfaces and low power transmission tasks. Therefore, field tests had to prove its per-
formance. These tests and the certified friction coefficient confirmed the safety and reliability of the 
Friction Disc. 
For implementing the innovation project, the team was extremely beneficial. The involved people 
were quite experienced with the realization of such projects and had the right competences. Fur-
thermore, the team was diverse and the members had a great personal network. Additionally, the 
involved people were socially competent, worked together as a team, and desperately wanted to 
bring the innovation to success (cf. chapter 5.3.3). 
8.3.1.3 Contextual Assessment of Cryogenic Machining by 5ME 
In the case of cryogenic machining, the market barriers contained a certification, as well as chang-
ing the classical machining approach and infrastructure of the customer. The high end sector of the 
American metalworking machinery seemed to represent very good matching, as the benefits of the 
technology were clearly obvious within this market. Furthermore, the timing of market introduc-
tion seemed right, because a lot of machinery spending and production ramp ups were expected. 
5ME was spun out from the global machine tool builder MAG to develop and commercialize cryo-
genic machining. Accordingly, the strategic direction was aligned to this objective. Moreover, the 
structures and processes of the company were set up to provide a supportive organizational envi-
ronment for a flexible and lean innovation realization. Nevertheless, the owner and investor of 5ME 
had to be involved in certain decisions. The team had access to any needed resources and the 
management totally supported project realization. In general, 5ME was characterized by a strong 
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innovation focus, a high level of risk tolerance, and failure acceptance. The internal communication 
was open and honest among the team. 
The technology of cryogenic machining had not been implemented in different industries or com-
panies before. However, 5ME managed to achieve industrial maturity and proved its applicability 
through several field tests and certification approvals. 
Regarding the entrepreneurial team, the involved people had exactly the right competences. Many 
team members were working previously for MAG, and correspondingly, knew the requirements of 
5ME’s customers and machining processes in general. Nevertheless, hardly any of them was in-
volved in the realization of such a radical innovation. The involved people worked together as a 
team and were socially competent. Despite any obstacles, they wanted to implement cryogenic 
machining in the market and make it a success. The team was principally quite diverse and the 
team members furthermore had a great personal network (cf. chapter 5.3.4). 
8.3.1.4 Cluster Classification 
After the data was entered in the dataset of SPSS, the discriminant analysis was conducted. Table 48 
gives an overview of the cluster assignment of the three cases (cf. Appendix VI – 3). With a proba-
bility of 72.5%, the case of the P1.18 bicycle transmission by Pinion was assigned to cluster 1. 
Similarly, the case of cryogenic machining by 5ME was allocated to cluster 1 with a probability of 
72.7%. In contrast, the case of the Friction Disc by SKF was assigned to cluster 3 with a probability 
of 79.1%. 
8.3.2 Comparison of the Cluster Specific Recommendations with the Actual 
Implementation of the Innovation Process 
8.3.2.1 P1.18 Bicycle Transmission by Pinion 
Similar to the projects of cluster 1, the contextual circumstances for Pinion were very positive. In 
accordance with the cluster specific recommendation to start the project, the two founders of 
Pinion trusted their personal gut feeling and realized their vision to develop a gearbox as competi-
tive shifting solution for bicycles. With more than 1,000 gearboxes sold in 2014, a mature product 
with clear advantages, compared to its alternatives, and a highly efficient project realization, the 
subsequent innovation success also corresponds to the results of the projects allocated to cluster 1. 
In line with the cluster specific recommendations, Pinion primarily developed autonomously. 
Customers and suppliers were involved relatively late. However, their involvement was realized 
strategically and deliberately. Accordingly, particular feedback was generated based on the presen-
tation of their prototype at a trade fair and conscious product tests. As recommended for projects 
assigned to cluster 1, Pinion attached much weight to the integration of lead users. Nevertheless, 
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the company did not follow a structured risk and quality management contrary to the cluster 
specific advice. However, they were aware of these issues and tried to address them as far as possi-
ble within the loose structures of a newly founded start-up. Furthermore, the protection of intellec-
tual property was deliberately and strategically realized. Correspondingly, the product develop-
ment strategy of Pinion complied with the cluster specific recommendations. 
Like most of the companies in cluster 1, Pinion introduced their product innovation as a pioneer to 
the market. The P1.18 was positioned as a premium product for the high-end sector of the German 
mountain, trekking, and touring bike market. In the short-term, this corresponded to a niche mar-
ket. However, Pinion was planning to cover the entire bicycle market little by little. Therefore, the 
company aimed to distinguish themselves from their customers by following a clear differentiation 
strategy. According to their timing strategy for market introduction, Pinion deliberately chose their 
first trade fair attendance. Additionally, the start-up consciously utilized particular promotion 
measures to support the market implementation of the P1.18. To sum up, Pinion’s overall commer-
cialization approach was in close conformity with the expressed recommendations for the projects 
classified to cluster 1. 
8.3.2.2 Friction Disc by SKF 
Generally, the innovation context for SKF was quite positive, like it was with the projects allocated 
to cluster 3. However, the organizational background within SKF exhibited positive and negative 
impacts on innovation realization which differed slightly to the average of the projects in cluster 3. 
Based on the personal gut feeling of SKF’s key account manager for Senvion, SKF initiated the 
project. This was in line with the cluster specific recommendations. By 2014, a medium three-digit 
sales number was achieved, what makes the Friction Disc a very profitable business for SKF. Fur-
thermore, product performance and process efficiency were on a very high level. As it was with the 
results of the projects in cluster 3, the overall innovation success of the Friction Disc was particular-
ly high. 
Within the Friction Disc project, SKF’s customer was similarly the lead user of the product. Product 
development was realized in close cooperation between both companies from project start until 
market introduction. As recommended for projects allocated to cluster 3, customer and similarly 
lead user feedback was continuously integrated. Furthermore, the supplier, responsible for the 
coating process, and a technical university were strategically involved. Moreover, SKF followed a 
detailed risk and quality management. Due to the intense cooperation, SKF and its customer shared 
and protected the generated intellectual property. Accordingly, the product development approach 
of SKF corresponded to the recommendations for cluster 3 projects. 
In accordance with the cluster specific advice, SKF consciously positioned the Friction Disc as a 
premium product at the market. The company followed the differentiation strategy and deliberate-
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ly chose its timing strategy. Due to the exclusivity contract with its customer and the respective 
intellectual property situation, SKF put little emphasis on marketing. Regarding the latter issue, this 
differed from the recommendations for projects of cluster 3. 
8.3.2.3 Cryogenic Machining by 5ME 
At the moment of assessment, the innovation context for 5ME was just as positive as it was for the 
majority of the cluster 1 projects. However, this was not the case right from the start of technology 
development. The organizational circumstances within the cumbersome structures of the former 
company MAG IAS hampered innovation realization and the market was small due to the focus on 
MAG IAS machines. An assessment of the innovation context at this point in time probably would 
have led to an allocation to cluster 2 (good technology prospects, weak market opportunity, ham-
pering organizational context, mediocre team). As the MAG IAS management team realized the 
opportunity of cryogenic machining, they did not want to reject the idea. Thus, they ultimately 
spun-out 5ME for establishing better contextual circumstances to commercialize cryogenic machin-
ing. Based on the significant private investment of 5ME’s owner, the newly founded company took 
over the full responsibility for technological development, market identification, and market ap-
proach. This totally corresponds to the recommendations given to projects allocated to cluster 2. 
The resulting innovation context based on the newly founded company resembles the ones of 
cluster 1 projects. The structures and strategy of the company was set-up for a successful innova-
tion realization. Customer interest was high and the first machine was equipped by the end of 2014. 
The reliability and maturity of technology performance could be proofed in 5ME’s tech center and 
thus, their customers were quite excited. However, market introduction just started in 2014. There-
fore, ultimate innovation success seemed promising but had not been achieved by the end of 2014. 
Nevertheless, project realization within the newly founded company was very efficient up to this 
point in time. 
5ME strategically integrated particular customers, certain universities, and lead users for realizing 
product development. These partners were especially involved in requirements analysis, product 
development, and product testing for the generation of specific feedback. Like Pinion, 5ME did not 
have a detailed risk and quality management system, although they utilized certain measures to 
deal with these tasks. The protection of intellectual property played an important role for 5ME, as 
they wanted to secure their development efforts. Accordingly, the product development approach 
of 5ME was in line with the cluster specific recommendations for cluster 1 projects. 
In accordance with the companies of cluster 1, 5ME consciously chose its timing strategy and 
implemented cryogenic machining as a pioneer in the market. The company positioned the tech-
nology as a premium solution for niche applications of tough materials in the short-term. In the 
long-term, 5ME wanted to address any metal machining operations and distinguish cryogenic 
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machining through a clear differentiation approach. To communicate the benefits of cryogenic 
machining, 5ME was intensively engaged in marketing. In summary, the commercialization strategy 
of 5ME predominantly resembled the recommendations posed for cluster 1 projects. 
8.3.3 Summary 
The operational framework was retrospectively applied to the three cases of Pinion, SKF, and 5ME. 
Based on the conducted discriminant analysis, the cases of the P1.18 bicycle transmission by Pin-
ion, and of cryogenic machining by 5ME, were assigned to cluster 1, while the Friction Disc case was 
allocated to cluster 3. The probabilities for these classifications ranged between 72% and 80% 
which represents a solid accuracy. Furthermore, the cluster specific recommendations of the opera-
tional framework addressing the innovation process were in close conformity with the actual 
implementation of the innovation process. As each of the three cases exhibited a particular level of 
innovation success, this reflects the relevance of the expressed recommendations for action. 
Nevertheless, several differences were detected in the actual realization of the innovation process 
compared to the posed recommendations. Neither Pinion nor 5ME followed a structured risk and 
quality management, although this was recommended for the realization of product development 
for projects assigned to cluster 1. A potential explanation of this could be the fact that both compa-
nies were newly founded for the realization of their respective innovations in contrast to the vast 
majority of companies allocated to cluster 1. Correspondingly, these processes were not previously 
established. However, both companies cared for these issues, but not highly structured. 
Contrary to the recommendations stated for the commercialization strategy of projects classified to 
cluster 3, SKF attached little weight to marketing. Maybe this was due to the Friction Disc project 
being based on market-pull, in contrast to the mainly technology-push induced innovation projects 
of cluster 3. As SKF’s commercialization within the wind industry was limited to Senvion, further 
marketing efforts probably would not have increased sales success. 
In summary, the operational framework could be qualitatively validated by applying it to the three 
primary case studies of Pinion, SKF, and 5ME. As the individual contextual circumstances slightly 
differed with respect to the average cluster median, isolated recommendations varied regarding 
their overall importance. However, the expressed cluster specific recommendations for action 
predominantly corresponded to the actual realization of the three respective innovation projects. 
8.4 Discussion and Limitations 
For the cluster assignment within the operational framework, the statistical method of discriminant 
analysis was utilized. One limitation regarding the conducted discriminant analysis is the sample 
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size of cluster 4. This cluster has just 20 cases which represents 14% of the overall sample. Tabach-
nick recommends that the sample size of the smallest group should exceed the number of predictor 
variables. As 21 variables were used as predictor variables, this recommendation was narrowly 
missed (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007, p. 381). Any other recommendations regarding the 
appropriateness of data for discriminant analysis were fulfilled (cf. chapter 8.1.1). 
According to Table 45, 76.9% of all cases were correctly classified by the discriminant analysis. As 
outlined in chapter 8.1.1, this classification result represents the quality of the utilized discriminant 
functions. However, the accuracy rate of the discriminant analysis is generally excessive if it is 
calculated on the basis of the same sample on which the estimation of the discriminant function 
was based. This is the common way of calculation and was also applied within the conducted study. 
This sample effect is due to the fact that the discriminant functions are estimated to achieve the 
optimal accuracy rate within the particular sample. Nevertheless, this effect diminishes with in-
creasing sample size. As the underlying sample of the study accounts to 147 cases, this effect be-
comes less important (Backhaus et al., 2016, pp. 239–241). 
For assigning new cases to the clusters, the classification probabilities with respect to the five 
clusters are calculated on the basis of the existing distances and a-priori-probabilities by utilizing 
the Bayes-theorem. However, the application of the Bayes-theorem excludes the possibility that a 
new case may not belong to any of the predefined clusters. Thus, the classification probabilities do 
not admit a statement regarding the probability of a particular case belonging to none of the clus-
ters. Therefore, a qualitative plausibility check of the cluster assignment of new cases is recom-
mended. This was done for the cases of Pinion, SKF, and 5ME (Backhaus et al., 2016, pp. 249–253). 
The derivation of cluster specific recommendations was based on descriptive and statistical anal-
yses of the quantitative survey. Similarly, the discriminant analysis for cluster assignment was also 
based on the data of the conducted survey. Any limitations that are due to the study design of the 
survey, data collection, and data preparation are once again relevant for both analyses. These 
limitations are outlined in chapter 6.4.5 and will not be repeated in this chapter. Hence, the general-
izability of the operational framework is limited, as the survey was explicitly focused on radical 
technological product innovations within the German power transmission industry. However, for 
this branch, the operational framework represents a sound tool to guide the context specific reali-
zation of radical technological innovations. Nevertheless, the operational framework is meant to 
serve as indication for the creation of a realization strategy. In practice, further qualitative analyses 
have to be conducted to find the appropriate project specific implementation approach. Moreover, 
the question of whether the operational framework also applies to the overall mechanical engineer-




9 Conclusion and Outlook 
9.1 Summary 
The trends and characteristics of the mechanical engineering industry determine the increasing 
need for companies from developed countries to realize radical technological innovations. Many 
factors, led by the pace of technological change, globalization in general, and of particular emphasis, 
the strong position of Chinese manufacturers, cause this situation. These factors combine to form 
the current opportunity of radical technological innovations which open up huge differentiation 
potential. However, the realization of radical technological innovations is accompanied by a high 
level of risk, costs, and uncertainty. Hence, it is sensible to consider the parameters influencing the 
success of these innovations. On the search for these parameters, the analysis of previous scientific 
and practical studies indicated a gap in research, as several questions remained open. These ques-
tions were condensed to three concrete research questions and associated sub-problems: 
RQ 1:  What are the Critical Success Factors for the realization of a radical technological      
innovation within the mechanical engineering industry? 
RQ 2:  Is it possible to distinguish distinct innovation archetypes and corresponding strate-
gies for the realization of radical technological innovations within the mechanical engineer-
ing industry that depend on the project-specific contextual circumstances? 
RQ 3:  How can an operational framework be designed for the realization of radical techno-
logical innovations within the mechanical engineering industry which is based on the pro-
ject-specific contextual circumstances and contains concrete recommendations for action? 
These research questions were addressed with the thesis at hand. Correspondingly, two fundamen-
tal artifacts were designed: the CSF framework derived by answering the first research question 
and the operational framework generated by answering the third research question. As 
overarching research methodology, the design science approach was followed. 
For answering the first research question RQ 1, a secondary case study analysis was conducted to 
create an initial framework of CSFs for radical technological innovations within the mechanical 
engineering industry. This framework was qualitatively validated. It was compared to existing 
literature, evaluated and modified based on expert interviews, and finally, validated by conducting 
three primary case studies (P1.18 bicycle transmission by Pinion, Friction Disc by SKF, and cryo-
genic machining by 5ME). In order to quantitatively analyze the framework, the CSFs were trans-
ferred into measurable variables and testable hypotheses. Subsequently, a quantitative survey was 
conducted and the results were statistically analyzed in the context of the proposed hypotheses. 
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The resulting CSF framework is depicted in Figure 40 and contains 24 factors. These factors were 
arranged in the two dimensions: innovation context and innovation process. All 24 factors correlate 
significantly with at least one of the three variables of the ultimate innovation success. Accordingly, 
the framework was named Innovation-Context-Process-Success (ICPS) framework. The innovation 
context is shaped by its four main categories technology, target market, organization, and entrepre-
neurial team while the innovation process consists of its three iterative fields of action opportunity 
identification, product development, and commercialization. The innovation success as a key target 
figure of each innovation project contains three dimensions: sales performance, product perfor-
mance, and efficiency. From the innovation manager’s point of view, the CSFs assigned to the inno-
vation context are uncontrollable and constitute the sphere of concern. In contrast, the factors 
associated with the innovation process are directly controllable by the innovation manager and 
form his sphere of influence. The finally adapted ICPS framework contains the qualitatively and 
quantitatively validated CSFs for the realization of a radical technological innovation within the 
mechanical engineering industry and serves, therefore, as an answer to the first research question. 
The second research question RQ2 was addressed by utilizing the results of the conducted quanti-
tative survey. Based on the set of context specific CSFs detected by answering RQ 1, a statistical 
cluster analysis was conducted to search for distinct innovation archetypes. Indeed, five clearly 
distinguishable clusters could be detected which represent typical contextual project circumstanc-
es. According to their characteristics, the clusters were named as archetypical project contexts: 
cluster 1 as inventor`s friendly innovation paradise, cluster 2 as conservative development sphere, 
cluster 3 as highly productive innovation system, cluster 4 as mediocre implementation circumstanc-
es, and cluster 5 as fruitless innovation wasteland. Further statistical analyses indicated that the five 
clusters could furthermore be distinguished with respect to the way the companies were realizing 
the innovation process. A comparison with the performer classification, based on the three innova-
tion success dimensions, highlights the quality of the cluster solution. Thus, the manner in which 
companies were realizing the innovation process could be better distinguished, especially, when 
looking at the contextual circumstances than looking at the innovation success. As the five clusters 
were clearly distinguishable, based on the contextual circumstances, they could be perceived as 
innovation archetypes. Therefore, the second research question could be answered. 
The development of an operational framework serves as an answer to the third research question 
RQ3. The term, operational framework, is meant to describe a strategy model which supports 
innovation managers of forthcoming projects with the generation of an overall plan to “operational-
ize” their respective innovation process. It is meant to represent a method to derive concrete 
recommendations for action that are based on the project-specific contextual circumstances. Thus, 
the detected innovation archetypes (RQ2) form the underlying basis for the operational framework. 
First, a cluster has to be detected which most closely resembles the contextual circumstances of the 
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specific innovation project. Therefore, the statistical method of discriminant analysis is utilized. 
Based on the cluster assignment of the new project, concrete recommendations for action are given 
that address the three stages of the innovation process: opportunity identification, product develop-
ment, and commercialization. These recommendations are based on the descriptive analysis of the 
five innovation archetypes (RQ2) and the ICPS framework (RQ1). The operational framework was 
qualitatively validated by applying it to the three conducted primary case studies (P1.18 bicycle 
transmission by Pinion, Friction Disc by SKF, and cryogenic machining by 5ME). Thereby, the third 
research question could be answered. 
In summary, all three research questions have been answered by this study. Therewith, this thesis 
helps to reduce the complexity and uncertainty associated with the realization of a radical techno-
logical innovation within the mechanical engineering industry. Most importantly, it serves as a 
hands-on guidance for the actual implementation of forthcoming projects of this kind. 
9.2 Relevance 
This thesis has both scientific, as well as highly practical relevance. As outlined in chapter 2, the 
critical review of the state of the art highlights several open questions forming the lack in research 
that could then be addressed by this thesis. Correspondingly, the thesis fosters the understanding 
of radical technological innovations within the mechanical engineering industry and thus, contrib-
utes to the scientific community by providing new knowledge in the field of technology and innova-
tion management. Therefore, the challenge of realizing radical technological innovations is illus-
trated and potential strategies to deal with this task are presented. Accordingly, the results of this 
thesis constitute a substantial contribution to the field of innovation research, and particularly, 
provide new insights for the implementation of innovation processes of this kind. 
From a practical perspective, this thesis is of great benefit for technology driven companies within 
the mechanical engineering industry since growth and survival of these firms could be fostered by 
radical technological innovations. The successful realization of radical technological innovations 
creates sustainable competitive capacity and enhances a firm’s potential to succeed in their respec-
tive market (Dahl, 2015, p. 5). In particular, this thesis provides support for the strategic manage-
ment of this kind of innovation. The knowledge and awareness of the concrete CSFs depicted in the 
ICPS framework which impacts the ultimate innovation success reduces the complexity and uncer-
tainty for the realization of these risky and cost-intensive innovations. Moreover, the operational 
framework assists innovation managers in forthcoming innovation projects with the establishment 
of concrete recommendations for action. These recommendations are based on the specific contex-
tual circumstances of the distinct innovation project and therefore directly match the present 
environment. 
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Beside incumbent firms, the results of this thesis can help startups and entrepreneurs in this do-
main as well. As outlined in the ICPS framework, the innovation context for radical technological 
innovations is shaped by four categories. Three out of four categories are similarly important for 
entrepreneurs. Correspondingly, the CSFs listed in the categories technology, target market, and 
entrepreneurial team are highly relevant for entrepreneurs and startups which try to implement a 
radical technological innovation within the mechanical engineering industry. Nevertheless, the 
organizational circumstances, the structures, and processes of these entities are not that rigid and 
fixed like they are for incumbent companies. Instead of the organizational parameters of incum-
bents, the investor quality and relation as well as potential incubator or accelerator programs may 
be important for this kind of innovators. However, the innovation culture and strategy are crucial 
for both types of entity. Moreover, the CSFs of the innovation process are equally decisive, while the 
concrete realization may differ in its details. Therefore, the operational framework as well as the 
detected innovation archetypes may serve as orientation for entrepreneurs and startups due to the 
sample of the survey. 
Another target group of the thesis at hand is business consultants who work on strategy projects in 
technology driven companies. Once a radical technological idea has been generated, the operational 
framework can be used as an easily applicable tool for any project and business environment 
without greater efforts. However, the thesis cannot serve for the generation of new radical ideas. To 
utilize the takeaways of this thesis, it is a precondition that a radical technological idea within the 
mechanical engineering industry is already available. 
Furthermore, technological progress and innovation activity have a positive impact that exceeds 
the company-based value. Correspondingly, technological innovations within the mechanical 
engineering industry positively influence the society, when considering the improvements in the 
quality of life. For example, distinct medical treatments, eco-friendly electricity supply, transporta-
tion, and specific production methods became feasible, more efficient, or affordable through radical 
technological innovations. Additionally, innovation activity is a decisive growth factor for entire 
economies. It fosters company foundation, job and knowledge generation, tax revenues, and ulti-
mately increasing prosperity. By the gross domestic product (GDP), this could be eventually meas-
ured (Dahl, 2015, p. 7; Schilling, 2010, p. 2; Vahs and Brem, 2012, pp. 4–5). 
In summary, the thesis has high relevance from a scientific, macro-, and micro-economical perspec-
tive. During the course of conducting the study, the author regularly came across high interest of 
innovation scholars and representatives of the mechanical engineering industry. This fact, and 
frequent positive feedback regarding the importance of radical technological innovations, and their 
successful management, further emphasizes the relevance of this thesis (Hilgers, 2015, p. 11). 
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9.3 Limitations and Outlook 
The conducted research study outlined in the thesis at hand, however, includes several limitations 
which though normal in research should be documented. The method-specific limitations have 
been described in the respective subchapters (cf. chapter 4.3, chapter 5.1.3, chapter 5.2.3, chapter 
5.3.6, chapter 6.4.5, chapter 7.5, and chapter 8.4). Nevertheless, the consideration of the main 
limitations of the overall study design from an overarching perspective is reasonable and, as noted, 
simultaneously forms the basis for potential future research endeavors. 
First of all, the quantitative study was conducted addressing the German power transmission 
industry as target industry (cf. chapter 6.3.1). As outlined, the power transmission industry is a 
sub-sector of the mechanical engineering industry which is quite diverse. Accordingly, the survey 
results cannot be doubtlessly generalized to the mechanical engineering industry as overall target 
industry of the thesis (Dahl, 2015, p. 65; VDMA and McKinsey, 2014c, p. 12). This represents a 
major limitation, as the central results of this study (the finally adapted ICPS framework, the inno-
vation archetypes, and the operational framework) are based on the findings of the quantitative 
survey. Although the potential transferability of these results to further sub-sectors of the mechani-
cal engineering industry seems to be a natural progression, it currently lacks empirical validation. 
To enlarge the generalizability of the achieved results, the conducted survey may be replicated in 
different sub-sectors of the mechanical engineering industry by future research endeavors (Sekar-
an and Bougie, 2010, p. 22). Any limitations that are due to the survey design, the data collection, 
and the data preparation of the quantitative study are detailed in chapter 6.4.5. 
A central aim of the quantitative study was to statistically test whether or not the data support the 
hypotheses outlined in chapter 6.1 which were based on a sound qualitative pre-study. Therefore, 
correlation analyses were applied. On a probability level of 95%, the detected correlations indicat-
ed that the respective CSFs are associated with the ultimate innovation success. This has been 
manifested in the adapted ICPS framework. However, the chronological and factual contribution of 
each CSF to the overall innovation success has not been analyzed. Correspondingly, future research 
approaches could target the concrete impacts of the detected CSFs on the subsequent innovation 
success. Furthermore, due to the holistic survey design of the quantitative study, the CSFs have not 
been analyzed in depth and remain on a general level. Further studies could focus on the distinct 
CSF categories outlined in the ICPS framework (e.g. organization or entrepreneurial team) and 
delve deeper into the concrete characteristics of the associated CSFs. 
Although the conducted cluster analysis for the detection of innovation archetypes was inductive, 
and based completely on the collected data, the limitation exists that it could not be neglected that 
the ultimate cluster solution did not reflect the underlying cluster structure correctly, or was even 
artificial. This limitation has been detailed in chapter 7.5. To verify the conclusive five clusters, 
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Cramer’s V and ANOVA tests were applied. These statistical tests indicated that the five clusters 
could be significantly distinguished regarding the realization of the innovation process and serve as 
a much better classification scheme than the performer differentiation. However, a qualitative 
analysis of the five clusters could enhance the validity of this cluster solution. Therefore, expert 
interviews or primary case studies could be conducted as further research endeavors. 
The operational framework is meant to be a sound tool to guide the context specific realization of 
radical technological innovations in forthcoming projects. As previously outlined, one limitation of 
the framework is that the assignment of new cases to the five detected clusters excludes the possi-
bility that a new case may not belong to any of these clusters (Backhaus et al., 2016, pp. 249–253). 
In light of this, a qualitative plausibility check of the cluster assignment was conducted by applying 
the operational framework to the cases of Pinion, SKF, and 5ME. Additionally, the cluster specific 
recommendations derived from the operational framework were tested. However, this qualitative 
validation approach was just based on this small sample of three cases, and furthermore, the appli-
cation was done retrospectively. A natural suggestion for further research is to increase this sample 
of case studies. Another potential way to qualitatively test the operational framework is to set up an 
action research endeavor. Therefore, the operational framework should be applied to forthcoming 
projects of radical technological innovations in an early realization stage. The actual implementa-
tion in practice of the generated recommendations could be scientifically tracked within a simulta-
neous research project. 
9.4 Concluding Remarks 
While risky, costly, and uncertain, radical technological innovations open up tremendous opportu-
nities for technology driven companies in the mechanical engineering industry. The thesis at hand 
aims to contribute to closing the existent research gap and to provide assistance in a successful 
realization of these innovations. This capability has to be interpreted as a complex concept, as it is 
influenced by a variety of factors, internal and external, to the organization (Terziovski, 2007, p. 
19). This thesis, however, should help to reduce the complexity and uncertainty associated with 
radical technological innovations. As not each factor and process instrument is equally relevant for 
all companies, the project specific contextual circumstances have to be considered (sphere of 
concern) at the generation of the realization strategy for the innovation process (sphere of influ-
ence). To support innovation managers in forthcoming projects with this challenge, the operational 
framework in this thesis provides a hands-on tool to derive concrete and project specific recom-
mendations for action. However, the operational framework should be thoroughly questioned and 
continuously refined, due to the inherent limitations of this thesis. The great potential of radical 
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Appendix II – Expert Interviews 
1) Interview Guide Round 1 
I. Einleitung 
 Erläuterung der Ziele des Gesprächs  Vorhaben der Dissertation 
 Aufzeichnung/Datenschutz 
 Zeitrahmen für das Gespräch 
 
II. Fragen zur Person und dem Unternehmen 
 Bitte stellen Sie sich kurz vor. Gehen Sie hierbei kurz auf Ihren akademischen und beruflichen  
Werdegang ein? 
 Welche Position / Rolle nehmen Sie in Ihrem Unternehmen ein? 
 Welche Rolle spielen Innovationen ganz allgemein für Ihr Unternehmen? 
 Welche Innovationsstrategie verfolgt Ihr Unternehmen? 
 Wie sieht der Prozess der Innovationsumsetzung in Ihrem Unternehmen aus? 
 Wie hoch liegt in etwa der Umsatzanteil von Produkten die jünger als 5 Jahre sind in Ihrem 
Unternehmen? Wie erreichen Sie das? (Im Hinblick auf Anreizsysteme, Organisation, Technolo-
gien, Markt) 
 
III. Erfolgsfaktoren für die Innovationsumsetzung 
 Was sind Erfolgsfaktoren bei der Realisierung von radikalen technischen Innovationen? 
 Worauf kommt es beim Prozess der Innovationsumsetzung ganz allgemein an? 
 Welche Einflussparameter bestimmen den Erfolg der Produktentwicklung? 
(IP-Management, Effizienz, Lead User, Risikomanagement) 
 Welche Faktoren bestimmen den Erfolg der Kommerzialisierung?  
(Timing, Umgang mit Marktbedürfnissen und damit verbundener Unsicherheit, Plattformstra-
tegie  Produktfamilie, Marketing, strategische Partnerschaften) 
 Welche Rolle spielt das Umfeld für eine erfolgreiche Innovationsumsetzung? 
 Welche Rolle spielt der Zielmarkt? (z.B. im Hinblick auf Markteintrittsbarrieren, Umweltein-
flüsse, vorherrschenden Wettbewerb, Market Match, Opportunity) 
 Welche Rolle spielt die beteiligte Organisation -  Ihr Unternehmen? 
( Unternehmensentwicklung, Flexibilität, Finanzierung, Organizational Home, Management 
bzw. Owner Commitment, Unternehmenskultur, interne Kommunikation) 
 Welche Rolle spielen die beteiligten Menschen bei der Innovationsumsetzung? 
 Inwiefern spielt die Technologie, welche der Innovation zugrunde liegt, eine Rolle für den 
Innovationserfolg? (Vorteile im Vergleich zu Technologiealternativen, Reifegrad) 
 
IV. Prozess der Innovationsumsetzung 
 Aus Ihrer Erfahrung heraus: Wie würden Sie vorgehen bei der Innovationsumsetzung? 
 In welche Phasen würden Sie das Vorgehen unterteilen? (Schritte) 
 Gibt es ein erkennbares Muster im Ablauf bei den Ihnen bekannten Innovationsprojekten? 
 Weshalb scheitern Innovationsprojekte?  
 Wo treten die meisten Schwierigkeiten bei der Umsetzung auf? 
 Welche Rolle spielen die Erfinder, das Unternehmen für die Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeit von 
Innovationen? 
 Wie kommt man von einer Idee zur potentiellen Anwendungen? 
 Welche Kriterien bzw. Eigenschaften der Technologie, die der Innovation zugrunde liegt, 
bestimmen die Relevanz für eine bestimmte Anwendung? 
 Inwiefern sollte man die Technologie gegenüber Technologiealternativen abgrenzen? 
 Welche Kriterien bestimmen die Marktauswahl? 
 Welche Rolle spielen die Vorteile einer Innovation im Vergleich zu ihren Alternativen? 
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2) Interview Guide Round 2 
I. Einleitung 
 Erläuterung der Ziele des Gesprächs  Vorhaben der Dissertation 
 Aufzeichnung/Datenschutz 
 Zeitrahmen für das Gespräch 
 
II. Fragen zur Person und dem Unternehmen 
 Bitte stellen Sie sich kurz vor. Gehen Sie hierbei kurz auf Ihren akademischen und beruflichen  
Werdegang ein? 
 Welche Position / Rolle nehmen Sie in Ihrem Unternehmen ein? 
 Welche Rolle spielen Innovationen ganz allgemein für Ihr Unternehmen? 
 Welche Innovationsstrategie verfolgt Ihr Unternehmen? 
 Wie sieht der Prozess der Innovationsumsetzung in Ihrem Unternehmen aus? 
 Wie hoch liegt in etwa der Umsatzanteil von Produkten die jünger als 5 Jahre sind in Ihrem 




 Was macht nach Ihrer Auffassung den Erfolg von technischen Innovationen aus? 
 Welche Kriterien / Parameter bestimmen den Erfolg? ( Umsatz, Marktanteil, Kundenzufrie-
denheit, Produktperformance) 
 Können Sie eine Definition für den Erfolg von technischen Innovationen formulieren? 
 
IV. Kontext für technische Innovationen: 
 Was beeinflusst Ihrer Meinung nach die Rahmenbedingungen für radikale technische  
Innovationen? 
Organisation: 
 Welche Rolle spielt die innovierende Organisation für den Erfolg von technischen Innovatio-
nen? 
 Welche Faktoren der Organisation beeinflussen den Erfolg? 
 Wie sollte eine Organisation aussehen, damit die Voraussetzungen möglichst gut sind, um 
erfolgreich zu innovieren? 
 Welche Rolle spielt die Kultur für erfolgreiche Innovationen? 
 Welchen Einfluss hat die interne Kommunikation? 
 Welche Rolle kommt den durchführenden Personen zu? 
 Wie wichtig ist eine flexible Organisationsstruktur für den Erfolg? 
 Welche Rolle spielt die Finanzierung? Wie kann eine optimale Innovations-Finanzierung im 
Sinne der strategischen Organisationsziele erreicht werden? 
 Welche Rolle spielt das Management Commitment? 
 Zum Teil können radikale Innovationen in bestehende Unternehmensstrukturen schlecht 
eingebettet werden und finden keine Produktheimat? Was spielt das für eine Rolle für den Er-
folg? Wie geht man damit um? 
Zielmarkt: 
 Welchen Einfluss hat der Zielmarkt für den Erfolg einer Innovation? 
 Welche Faktoren / Kriterien bestimmen die Erfolgsaussichten einer Innovation auf einem 
bestimmten Markt? 
 Welche Rolle spielt der Market Match? 
 Welche Rolle spielen Umwelteinflüsse für den Erfolg einer Innovation ( Subventionen, Regu-
larien, Wirtschaftskrisen etc.) 
 Welche Rolle kommt dem Wettbewerb zu? 
 Wie beeinflussen die Markteintrittsbarrieren die Erfolgsaussichten einer Innovation? 
 Wovon hängt es ab, dass ein bestimmter Markt große Chancen für die Innovation bietet? 
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Technologie: 
 Welche Rolle kommt der Technologie zu, die der Innovation zugrunde liegt? 
 Welche Rolle spielen in diesem Zusammenhang Alternativtechnologien und die   
Eigenschaften der verwendeten?  
 Welchen Einfluss hat der Reifegrad einer Technologie auf den Erfolg der Innovation? 
Allgemeine Fragen zum Kontext: 
 Beeinflussen die Rahmenbedingungen den Prozess der Innovationsumsetzung? Und wenn 
dann in welcher Form? 
 Bei welchen Rahmenbedingungen sollte man die Innovationsumsetzung gar nicht erst  
angehen? 
 Welche Faktoren der Rahmenbedingungen korrelieren? Welche Faktoren sind gegenläufig? 
 
V. Prozess der Innovationsentwicklung: 
 Welche Phasen / Schritte bestimmen den Prozess der Innovationsentstehung? 
Produktentwicklung: 
 Worauf kommt es bei der Produktentwicklung an? 
 Welche Rolle spielt die Prozesseffizienz für den Erfolg? Denken Sie hierbei an Entwicklungs-
kosten und Entwicklungsdauer. 
 Wie wichtig ist Risikomanagement? In welchen Phasen wird das relevant? 
 Welche Bedeutung kommt dem Schutz von geistigem Eigentum bei? 
 Sollte man Lead User in die Produktentwicklung einbeziehen? Wenn ja, warum und wann? 
Markteinführung: 
 Worauf kommt es bei der Markteinführung einer Innovation an? 
 Was bestimmt den Wert, den eine Innovation für einen Kunden hat? 
 Bei der Entwicklung von radikalen technischen Innovationen bewegt man sich in einem Umfeld 
großer Unsicherheit. Wie sollte man damit umgehen? Sind hier besondere Strategien wichtig? 
 Wovon hängt das Timing bei der Markteinführung ab? Sollte man den Zeitpunkt strategisch 
wählen? Wann ist das wichtig? 
 Gibt es auch Situationen, in denen der Zeitpunkt egal ist, weil andere Dinge dominieren? 
 Wie schafft man es die Bedürfnisse des Kunden stets zu bedienen und zu berücksichtigen? Gibt 
es Situationen in welchen man diese ignorieren sollte? 
Diffusion: 
 Was wird in der Diffusionsphase eines Produktes wichtig? 
 Welche Bedeutung kommt hier dem Marketing zu? 
 Inwiefern sind strategische Partnerschaften bei der Innovationsumsetzung wichtig? In welcher 
Phase des Innovationsprozesses werden diese wichtig? 
 Welche Rolle spielt eine geeignete Plattformstrategie für den Erfolg? Wann sollte man diese 
Strategie verfolgen? 
Allgemeine Fragen zum Prozess: 
 Wo treten Schwierigkeiten beim Innovationsprozess auf? 
 Woran scheitern Innovationsprojekte? 
 Wie kann man das verhindern? 
 Welche Faktoren des Prozesses korrelieren? Welche Faktoren sind gegenläufig? 
 
VI. Feedback zum TOMP-Modell 
 Vorstellung des TOMP-Modells  Haben Sie Feedback, offene Fragen oder Kritik?  
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3) Expert Profiles Round 1 
The expert E1a is working as a business developer at the technology transfer service unit of a big 
technical university in Southern Germany. This expert was chosen as she is responsible for identify-
ing potential innovations based on scientific results, the search for cooperation partners in the 
industry, and the initiating of commercial exploitation. 
The expert E1b is an independent scientist and consultant for various areas of innovation and 
research. He has been working in academic research, applied research, and industrial research for 
several years. Major thrusts of his industrial career have been the topics competitive intelligence, 
intellectual asset management, new business development, and technology intelligence. 
The expert E1c is an entrepreneur and CEO of a start-up based on a new technology from the organ-
ic chemistry sector. Based on his PhD-research, he set up a business together with two partners. He 
was selected as an interview partner as he has personally experienced the challenges of technology 
exploitation. 
The expert E1d is a manager of Application Engineering in an established company from the power 
transmission branch with globally more than 40,000 employees. Moreover, he has been responsible 
for a team of innovation and project managers for several years. 
The expert E1e is an entrepreneur and CEO of a technology-based start-up in the mechanical engi-
neering industry. After completing his PhD-project, he has been working for several years in the 
industry. Together with his partner he founded a company based on a radical new welding technol-
ogy. They continually developed this technology and finally reached market maturity. 
The expert E1f is temporary managing director of an application-oriented research institute from 
the information and communication sector. This institute is implementing the latest research 
results in ready-to-use solutions for the industry and clients from the public sector. For gaining 
insights into the perspective of a research institute on the topic of radical technological innovation, 
E1f was selected as an interview partner. 
The expert E1g is head of new technologies in an established company from the mechanical engi-
neering sector with globally almost 40,000 employees. This expert was chosen as his task is to 
identify and evaluate innovative technologies from science for his company and to initiate exploita-
tion projects. 
The expert E1h is an entrepreneur and CEO of a technology-based start-up in the industrial robotics 
segment. He has done his Ph.D. within this field and consecutively started the company with two 
colleagues. With his practical experience of technology entrepreneurship, he serves as appropriate 
interview partner. 
The expert E1i is innovation manager in a medium-sized company in the power transmission 
industry with globally almost 2,000 employees. In this function, he supports and fosters the innova-
tion creation, development, and commercialization. 
4) Expert Profiles Round 2 
The expert E2a is an entrepreneur and CEO of a start-up based on a new technology for additive 
manufacturing. The company serves scientific and industrial customers and develops customized 
solutions and processes for specific industrial applications based on their innovative technology. 
Due to his personal experience, he is well suited to contribute to our research. 
The expert E2b is managing director of an application-oriented research institute for innovation 
research and professor of innovation management. She has broad experience in the field of innova-
tion and technology management and is thus, highly appropriate as an interview partner. 
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The expert E2c is head of the technology transfer service unit of a big technical university in South-
ern Germany. The services of this department range from the protection of intellectual property 
rights based on scientific results to technology marketing, to the initiation of industry cooperation, 
and to the support of spinoffs and shareholdings. 
The expert E2d is head of the innovation department in an established company from the power 
transmission branch with globally more than 40,000 employees. The tasks of this department are 
to initiate, guide, support, and partly manage innovation projects within the company. 
The expert E2e is an innovation manager in an established company from the power transmission 
branch with globally more than 70,000 employees. She was part of the team that has established 
the central innovation department within the corporate R&D. Within her function, she fosters 
ideation, trend research, and innovation management. 
The expert E2f is a business consultant, who has many years of work experience. He primarily 
works in the fields of strategy consulting, technology-based entrepreneurship, innovation, and idea 
management. His clients are small and medium-sized companies as well as large concerns. 
The expert E2g is a business developer in a business incubator of an established company from the 
automotive supplier industry with globally more than 250,000 employees. This incubator has been 
set up with the aim to generate new businesses for the parent group. Internal start-up teams should 
be challenged and promoted to exploit their ideas. 
The expert E2h is head of business development at a technology based, medium-sized company 
from the mechanical engineering industry with more than 500 employees. He is responsible for the 
strategic direction of the company and potential application fields for their technology. 
The expert E2i is head of the advanced development department of an established company from 
the mechanical engineering industry with globally more than 10,000 employees. Detached from 
daily business, the aim of his department is to develop strategically interesting product ideas to 
generate the company’s innovations of the future. 
The expert E2j is head of the innovation department of a medium-sized company. The company he 
is working at has more than 6,000 employees and is producing semi-finished products made of 
carbon. Therewith the company enables their customers to generate radical technological innova-
tions based on their material. E2j is responsible for the topics of innovation, networking, and coop-
eration. He was chosen as interview partner to get insights into the perspective on the innovation 
process from a supplier of semi-finished goods. 
5) Transcription Rules 
 Transcription is done literally, not summarizing. Dialects are not transcribed but standard  
 German was used. 
 Language and punctuation are flattened. 
 Long pauses will be marked by (…). 
 Interrupted or not completed sentences will be separated by “/”. 
 Approving statements (mhm, aha, mh) from the interviewer will only be transcribed if they  
 interrupt the course of the speech.  
 Paragraphs of the interviewers are marked with their name initials “FW:”, “LH:”, and “KY:”.  
 The paragraphs of the experts are marked with the abbreviation described in Table 5. 
 Each contribution to the interview has its own paragraph. 
 If the interview is disrupted, the reason will be noted in brackets. 
 Other vocalizations such as laughter will be noted in brackets. 
 
The transcription rules have been derived from Kuckartz (Kuckartz, 2012). 
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6) Initial Category System 
The initial category system had three levels. The first level distinguishes two dimensions – the 
context and the process of innovation. The second layer defines the main categories within the 
three dimensions (C1-C3 and P1-P3). On the third level, the subcategories of the associated main 
categories are specified by applying the concrete CSFs. Thus, two basic sub-systems have been 
established for subsequent text analysis (cf. Figure 44 and Figure 45). 
 
Figure 44: Initial Sub-System for the Context Dimension (Hellmann, 2014, p. 82) 
 
Figure 45: Initial Sub-System for the Process Dimension (Hellmann, 2014, p. 91) 
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 7) Larger Version of the ICPS framework 
 
Figure 46: Larger Version of the ICPS Framework 
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8) Initial Version of the ICPS Framework 
 
Figure 47: Initial Version of the ICPS Framework 
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Appendix III – Primary Case Studies 
1) Aggregated Case Study Protocol 
According to Yin a case study protocol should have the following sections (Yin, 2009, p. 81): 
• The overview of the case study project includes the main project objectives and auspices, the 
case study issues, and relevant readings about the topic being investigated. 
• The field procedures include the presentation of credentials, a description of the access to 
the case study sites, a section dealing with the protection of human subjects, and a schedule 
of the planned steps within the case study. 
• The case study questions addressing the specific questions that the case study investigator 
must keep in mind in collecting data and the potential sources of information for answering 
each question. 
• The guide for the case study report includes instructions regarding the format and structure 
of the final report and the way the collected evidence are documented. 
1. Overview  
Technology driven companies are forced to be innovative, to not just gain advantage in the market 
but to stay competitive. This is increasingly a question of an adequate employment of innovative 
technologies. The knowledge of the Critical Success Factors (CSFs) for the strategic management of 
radical technological innovations helps to reduce complexity and to focus on the main aspects of 
the planning, development, and employment process. 
Previous work has detected a comprehensive set of 28 CSFs that influence the innovation context 
on the one hand, and the innovation process on the other (cf.  Figure 20). Based on these factors, 
three real life cases (Pinion, SKF, 5ME) addressing radical technological innovations should be 
studied. Case studies are multi-perspectival analyses that serve as an instrument to analyze and to 
understand complex issues. Especially if an in-depth investigation is required, case studies serve as 
a robust research method. The central tasks of the research endeavor are conducting a cross case 
analysis and comparing the emerging concepts. The correlation of the different parameters should 
be analyzed in deep and certain patterns of success should be derived. In a multiple-case study, the 
central goal is to build a general explanation that fits each individual case, even though the cases 
will vary in their details. This should be done within the research endeavor by following the rules of 
the qualitative method of case study research. 
2. Field Procedures 
According to Yin, the following points need to be reflected in data collection (Yin, 2009, p. 85): 
Gaining access to key organizations or interviewees: 
Pinion: 
One of Pinion’s founders will serve as key informant and contact person. As he is difficult to reach 
and has less time, mainly telephone interviews will be conducted. 
SKF: 
In the case of SKF, the key informants are an innovation manager that has been involved in the 
Friction Disc project and the responsible project manager of the Friction Disc project. As the re-
searcher has worked with both of them during his former industrial career in SKF there is still a 
good relationship with them. Thus, they will be directly contacted by telephone and asked for their 
willingness to be interviewed.  
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5ME: 
There is a close relationship from EnTechnon and 5ME. From the 2nd until the 30th of November 
the researcher will carry out a research project and spend one month at the facilities of 5ME. This 
time period will be split up into two main parts. In the first two weeks, the researcher will be at the 
Tech Center of 5ME in Warren, Michigan to analyze the technological development of the cryogenic 
machining. During the second two weeks, the researcher will be at the 5ME headquarters in Cincin-
nati, Ohio to investigate the marketing approach, the company foundation, and it’s funding. During 
the time in the US, the researcher will conduct several interviews with the following key informants 
of the case study to collect data: 5ME’s Cryogenic Engineering & Product Manager, 5ME’s Cryogenic 
Business Development Manager, 5ME's Marketing & Product Manager, and 5ME's President. 
To document the interviews in each of the three case studies the voice recorder Olympus Digital 
Voice Recorder VN-712PC will be used. Later on, the interviews will be transcribed with the soft-
ware F4. 
Having sufficient resources in the field: 
The main research will be done via an Internet search and several personal interviews. For the 
Internet research, a computer of the EnTechnon can be used. The expert interviews will be con-
ducted personally or via telephone. There are two voice recorders available at the EnTechnon. 
During the whole research project, one of these two voice recorders is permanently available. 
Developing a procedure for calling for assistance and guidance, if needed, from other case 
study investigators or colleagues: 
The researcher is in close contact with two of his institute colleagues Dr. Jeanette Siegele and Dr. 
André Presse. They have conducted several case studies in their research project “Baden Stories” 
which addresses the founding story of Start-Ups from the KIT-environment. This serves as valuable 
advice and guideline for the current research endeavor. Furthermore, Abilio Avila a Ph.D.-peer is 
conducting case studies as well. Correspondingly, there is a good possibility of sharing information. 
Making a clear schedule of the data collection activities that are expected to be completed 
within specified periods of time: 
Pinion: 
• Selection of appropriate Case Study Design  week 47/48 in 2013 
• Getting familiar with the company Pinion and its technology  week 49 in 2013 
• Preparation of a guideline for the telephone interview with the founder of Pinion  week 50 
in 2013 
• Telephone interview with the founder  12/17/2013 
• Write down interview transcript  week 51 in 2013 
• Further data collection  week 2-10 in 2014 
• Additional telephone interview with the Pinion’s founder to clarify open questions  
04/03/2014 
• Analyzing data  week 5-12 in 2014 
• Wrap up and write down a draft report  week 5-12 in 2014 
• Send the draft report to Pinion’s founder  04/17/2014 
• Review of the draft report by the founder  until week 19 in 2014 
• Include hints and comments, work out, and publish the final report  week 22 in 2014 
 
SKF: 
• Selection of appropriate Case Study Design  week 21/22 in 2014 
• Getting familiar with the technology of the Friction Disc  week 23 in 2014 
• Collection of data  week 24-32 in 2014 
• Preparation of a guideline for the personal interview with the project manager of the Friction 
Disc project  week 27 in 2013 
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• Additional personal interview with the project manager  07/11/2014 
• Personal interview with innovation manager  07/21/2014 
• Write down interview transcripts  week 30/31 in 2014 
• Analyzing data and wrap up  week 42 in 2014 
• Write down the report  week 36 in 2014 
• Send the draft report to project manager  week 37 in 2014 
• Review of the draft report by the project manager  until week 39 in 2014 
• Include hints and comments, work out, and publish the final report  week 42 in 2014 
 
5ME: 
• Selection of appropriate Case Study Design  week 44 in 2014 
• Getting familiar with the technology of Cryogenic Machining  week 44 in 2014 
• Collection of data  week 44-48 in 2014 
• Preparation of a guideline for the personal interviews with key interviewees  week 44 in 
2014 
• Data Collection with respect to the technological development  week 45-46 in 2014 
• Data Collection with respect to the marketing approach, company funding and foundation  
week 47-48 in 2014 
• Write down interview transcripts  week 49 in 2014 
• Analyzing data  week 49-50 in 2014 
• Wrap up and write down the single case study report  week 2 in 2015 
• Send the draft report to 5ME’s president  week 3 in 2015 
• Review of the draft report by 5ME’s president  until week 6 in 2015 
• Include hints and comments, work out, and publish the final report  week 8 in 2015 
 
Providing for unanticipated events, including changes in the availability of interviewees as 
well as changes in the mood and motivation of the case study investigator: 
The plan is to end up in week 20 of 2014 with the Pinion case study, in week 41 with the SKF case 
study, and in week 8 of 2015 with the 5ME case study. These are not external deadlines as they 
were set by the case study investigator himself. But to keep on track it is useful to communicate the 
dates of the planned draft review to the interview partners for generating external pressure on the 
investigator to conclude the research. 
Describe the procedures for protecting human subjects: 
In the beginning of each interview the interviewee will be asked if it is ok to record the call and 
furthermore, the purpose of this recording will be explained. A draft of the case study report will be 
sent to the key informants, to check if on the one hand all events are historically correct and on the 
other, the publication of the report will not hurt personal human subjects or business internal 
information. As there is no further involved case study investigator, there is no need for further 
sensitization.  
3. Case Study Questions 
According to Yin, there are five levels of questions. Within the protocol, the focus should lay on 
Level 2 questions. 
• Level 1: questions addressing specific interviewees 
• Level 2: questions addressing the individual case  
• Level 3: questions addressing findings across multiple cases 
• Level 4: questions addressing the entire study  
• Level 5: questions going beyond the narrow scope of the study (Yin, 2009, p. 87). 
Level 1:  these questions are detailed in the concrete guidelines for the personal interviews. These 
questions have been derived from the level 2 questions. 




• What was the history of the innovation? 
• How was the project financed during its deployment? 
• How does the technology work? 
• What are the advantages/disadvantages of the technology (relative advantageousness, 
feasibility, maturity)? 
• What are competitive alternatives? 
• What is the target market? 
• What are the properties of the target market (opportunity, market barriers, industry context, 
and competitive situation)? 
• How does the innovation match to the market? 
• What are the organizational circumstances for the innovation realization (strategy, structure 
& processes, company culture, funding, and commitment)? 
• What are the properties of the entrepreneurial team (teamwork, competence, and attitude)? 
• How did the innovation process look like? 
• What was decisive for the opportunity identification (personal gut feeling, pivoting, and 
timeliness)? 
• How has product development been organized (lead user integration, development partner-
ships, risk & quality management, platform strategy, IP-protection)? 
• What was important for the commercialization of the innovation (value proposition & busi-
ness model, commercialization partnerships, timing, and marketing)? 
• Which level of innovation success was achieved with the central innovation regarding sales 
performance, product performance, and efficiency (costs & time)? 
Main Sources: 
• Interviews with key informants 
• Documents: presentations, data sheets, success stories, press releases, brochures etc. 
• Diverse test and press reports 
• Scientific and academic papers 
 
Level 3-5: These questions have not been composed for this protocol in accordance with Yin’s 
recommendation (see section above).   
4. Guide for the Case Study Report and Documentation 
To reach reliability, the way of organizing and documenting the data collected for case studies is 
essential. Yin differentiated between two main data collections: the compilation of evidence and the 
final case study report (Yin, 2009, pp. 118–119). 
As the raw data need to be available for independent inspection, a database should be established. 
For the current research the Software “Citavi 4 Pro” will be used to create a database for collecting 
case study evidence. Written texts, Pdfs, graphs, and links to websites are inserted. Interviews get 
transcribed and stored as text files. Quotations will be tagged and subsequently categorized.  
The final case study report should be written in Word 2010 and will be structured in a linear 
analytical way with chronological elements within the section reflecting the business evolution of 
the different cases. In the beginning, the text will have a methodological part, reflecting the chosen 
research design. Furthermore, it will contain multiple narratives, covering each of the cases singly 
and presented as separate chapters. Additionally, the report will contain a chapter covering the 
cross-case analysis and results. The overall case study report was written in past tense while the 
more detailed individual case studies have been prepared in the present tense (Yin, 2009, p. 171).   
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2) Quality Tactics for Case Study Research 
 
Figure 48: Quality Tactics (Yin, 2009, p. 41) 
3) Case Study Report – P1.18 Bicycle Transmission by Pinion 
Technology 
The main goal of the two Pinion founders was to develop a competitive shifting system for bicycles 
to overcome the existent disadvantages of traditional derailleur systems and internal gear hubs 
(Steinke, 2013). 
After years of development the team 
ended up in July 2012 with a compact, 
totally enclosed, and maintenance free 
gearbox solution ready for series 
production. The P1.18 is a spur gear 
consisting of two transmission struc-
tures that are connected in series 
(Pinion, 2013a, p. 3). Via pedal the 
first of the two parallel partial shaft 
transmissions, equipped with three 
pairs of gears, will be driven. The 
second shaft transmits the power on 
six pairs of gears. The multiplication 
of six by three ratios gives 18 real 
ratios. Contrary to overlapping gears 
of conventional derailleur systems, 
the gears of the P1.18 are evenly 
spaced in steps of 11.5%. 
 
Figure 49: Exposed P1.18 Gearbox (Steinke, 2013) 
In sum, the Pinion transmission achieves a total gear ratio of 636% what is higher than the maxi-
mum transmission ratios of currently available derailleur systems (~620%) and internal gear hubs 
(~530%) (Birkhofer, 2013; Pinion, 2013a, p. 6; Schäfer, 2013). 
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Unlike any current bicycle shifting system, the 
Pinion transmission needs two cables to operate 
its rotary shifting mechanism (Wragg, 2012). This 
mechanism inside the gearbox is actuated with a 
turning handle. Within the shaft of the upper 
cluster gear (not the drive shaft) the intended 
ratio is engaged (Birkhofer, 2013). This shaft is 
constructed as a continuous hollow shaft in 
which a camshaft and switchable pawl free-
wheels are integrated (Lermen, 2011). When you 
call for a shift, the camshaft activates the pawls 
inside the hollow shaft. These pop up underneath 
the selected gears and subsequently lock them in 
place. Thus, the P1.18 engages only two pairs of 
spur gears in each gear to transmit the power 
(Lermen, 2011; Pinion, 2013a, p. 6; Wragg, 2012). 
 
Figure 50: Hollow Shafts with Camshaft and Pawl 
Freewheels (Staudt, 2011) 
The reason for a turning handle as a shifting actuator is the required movement radius of the cam-
shaft. As the shaft reaches a maximum angle of 1020° between the lowest and highest gear, the shift 
cable has to be pulled quite far although there is a planetary transmission to reduce this distance 
(Stahl, 2011). This is the explanation why a conventional thumb shifter would not work (Wragg, 
2012). Even when loaded, the gearbox is switchable: It is possible to upshift at full load and down-
shift at part load. Additionally, the P1.18 can be shifted in standby mode without any problems 
(Lermen, 2010). 
The use of the Pinion P1.18 bicycle transmission is only possible on frames that are specially de-
signed by the manufacturers for the use with Pinion. By using six mounting points on a bridge 
assembly, the gearbox is attached that it forms an integral part of the bicycle frame (Pinion, 2013a, 
p. 21). 
The Pinion transmission is placed at the 
bottom bracket and has thus, an optimal 
position within the two-wheeled vehicle 
bicycle. At this position, the gearbox is in the 
center of all three dimensions what leads to a 
deeper lying center of gravity and an evenly 
distributed rotating mass. The transmission 
includes all the elements that traditionally 
have been in or at the rear wheel: shift cable, 
shifting mechanism, cartridge, and gear hub. 
Consequently, the rear wheel can be designed 
simpler and lighter (Donner, 2012, p. 24). 
Contrary to a derailleur system, the chain 
runs just on two gearwheels of the same size 
and is guided by the chain tensioner that sits 
directly behind the gearbox (Schäfer, 2013; 
Wragg, 2012). 
 
Figure 51: P1.18 Gearbox (Reidl, 2012)  
Alternatively, it is possible to assemble a belt pulley directly at the gearbox to transmit the driving 
force via tooth belt (Stahl, 2013). 
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Table 13: Technical Data of the P1.18 Gearbox (Pinion, 2013a, p. 26) 
Number of Gears 18 
Overall Ratio 636% 
Gear Steps 11.5% 
Gain Ratio in 1st Gear 1.59 
Gain Ratio in 18th Gear 0.25 
Maximum Input Torque 250 Nm 
Overall Weight 2700 g 
Lubrication Splash Lubrication 
Oil Type Synthetic Pinion Oil 
Oil Capacity 60 ml (2.0 oz) 
Oil Change Interval every 6,200 miles / once a year 
Temperature Range -15°C to +40°C / 5°F to 104°F 
Feasibility and Maturity 
The Pinion P1.18 entered series production in July 2012. By 2014, more than 1,000 gearboxes have 
been sold. Thus, the deployed technology is now feasible and mature. Additionally, the Pinion team 
develops the product continually further (Pinion, 2013a, p. 3; Schäfer, 2013; Steinke, 2013). 
This was not obvious in the beginning, as the two founders received relative negative feedback by 
automotive R&D personnel regarding the feasibility of the initial idea. The two engineers derived 
their transmission design from automotive gearboxes and tried to adapt automobile technologies to 
bicycles. The aim to reach less than 3 kg for the bicycle gearbox compared to more than 30 kg for 
automobile gearboxes was a great technological challenge. Less speed and a comparable torque of 
250 Nm was indeed not easy to handle. Furthermore, the standardized calculation methods could 
not be applied as they were designed for automobile gearboxes. Consequently, a test rig has to be 
constructed to display the actual load spectrum for bicycles. In sum, it was a long way to go that 
lasted seven years to gain a mature product (Pinion, 2013b, 2013a, p. 3). 
Technological Alternatives 
There are two basic alternatives to the Pinion transmission: internal gear hubs and derailleur 
systems. In the following section, three of the most competitive internal gear hub concepts and one 
representative and widespread derailleur concept will be presented. 
Rohloff SPEEDHUB 500/14 
The Rohloff SPEEDHUB 500/14 (cf. 
Figure 52) gearbox consists of 
three in line interconnected plane-
tary gear assemblies. It is a fully 
encapsulated maintenance free 
gear mechanism that runs within 
an oil bath. The engagement of the 
14 evenly spaced (13.6%) real 
gears is controlled within the hub 
itself. In sum, the hub achieves an 
overall range of 526%, weights 
approx. 1800 grams and its price is 
starting from 750 € (Rohloff, 2011; 
Warentest, 2013).  
Figure 52: Rohloff Speedhub (Rohloff, 2011) 
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Shimano ALFINE 11 
The Shimano ALFINE 11 offers 11 
gears and an overall ratio range of 
409% (cf. Figure 53). The gear 
steps are nine times 13% and 
twice 17%. The hub transmission 
is realized by a helical-cut plane-
tary gear system in an oil bath. It is 
completely enclosed and nearly 
maintenance free. The gear hub 
weights approx. 1600 grams and 
costs approx. 350 € (Simpel-ch, 
2014; Warentest, 2013). 
 
Figure 53: Shimano Alfine (Shimano, 2011) 
NuVinci N360 
The NuVinci N360 (cf. Figure 54) 
transmits mechanical power with 
spheres instead of gears. It chang-
es the ratio by tilting the axes of 
the spheres with respect to inter-
nal input and output traction rings. 
The nominal ratio range is 360%, 
with an underdrive of 0.5 and an 
overdrive of 1.8 (Fallbrook, 2012, 
pp. 1–2). The N360 is provided 
with permanent lubrication for life 
and completely sealed. The hub 
weighs approx. 2450 grams and 




Figure 54: Nuvinci N360 (Velomobile, 2013) 
Shimano DEORE XT 
By combining three front chain-
rings (with 22-32-44 pinions) and 
nine rear chainrings (between 11 
and 34 pinions), the Shimano 
Deore XT derailleur system (cf. 
Figure 55) has 27 theoretical and 
16 practical gear steps, due to 
overlapping. The shifting proce-
dure will be realized by moving the 
chain from one sprocket to anoth-
er. In total, the ratio range is 618%. 
The price for the complete system 
differs extremely depending on the 
single components. A standard 
version within a complete bike 
costs roughly 400 € (Pro Activ 
GmbH, 2014; Warentest, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 55: Shimano Deore XT (Bergleben, 2014) 
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Relative Advantageousness 
To gain the relative advantageousness of the Pinion P1.18 with respect to the existent shifting 
alternatives, eight evaluation criteria have been derived from diverse bicycle test reports: overall 
ratio range, number of real gears, system weight, center of gravity, shifting performance, service 
and maintenance effort, requirements for construction change, and price. 
Overall Ratio Range 
With 634%, the P1.18 has a higher overall ratio than all available alternatives (cf. Figure 56). It has 
a greater range than the Shimano Deore XT derailleur drivetrain (618%) and moreover, has no 
overlapping or duplicate ratios (Wragg, 2012). The internal gear hub concepts possess an even 
lower ratio range: Rohloff Speedhub - 526%, Shimano Alfine 11 - 409%, NuVinci N360 - 360%. 
 
Figure 56: Ratio Range Comparison (Pinion, 2013a, p. 6) 
Number of Real Gears 
In respect to its 18 real gears evenly spaced in steps of 11.5%, the P1.18 has great advantages. Due 
to its overlapping gears, the Shimano Deore XT only has 16 real gears. The Shimano Alfine has 11 
almost evenly (2x17% and 9x13%) and the Rohloff Speedhub 14 evenly (13.6%) spaced gears. In 
this regard, the NuVinci N360 prevails, as its ratio can be chosen optionally (Fallbrook, 2012, pp. 1–
2; Pinion, 2013a, p. 26; Pro Activ GmbH, 2014; Rohloff, 2011; Simpel-ch, 2014). 
The great range and the finely stepped ratios of the P1.18 enable to choose the appropriate ratio for 
each potential driving situation at any time (Lermen, 2010). On the other hand, the fine steps of the 
gearbox can increase the need to shift. Even though gears could be skipped, there may be riders 
that dislike these small steps (Stiener, 2012). In summary, the evenly spaced 18 real gears com-
bined with the great overall ratio form the outstanding benefit of the P1.18. 
System Weight 
Particularly because manufacturers of high-end bikes generally struggle for each gram, the question 
of weight is an important one. However, not the weight of the single component but the collected 
system weight is decisive. The single P1.18 gearbox weighs 2700 grams. Assembled on the bicycle, 
a Pinion equipped bike weighs roughly 400-700 grams more than a comparable bike equipped with 
the Rohloff Speedhub, 600-900 gram more than one with a Shimano Alfine 11, and approx. 2000 
grams more than one with a Shimano Deore XT derailleur system. However, a Pinion bike is rough-
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Center of Gravity 
As mentioned before, the P1.18 bicycle transmission is positioned at the bottom bracket and is thus, 
in the center of all three dimensions what leads to a deeper lying center of gravity. Furthermore, 
the rear wheel can be designed simpler and lighter causing an evenly distributed rotating mass of 
this wheel. In contrast, the center of gravity of both alternative shifting systems is clearly situated 
nearby the rear wheel (Donner, 2012, pp. 24–26). The fewer rotating mass of the freed rear wheel 
of the Pinion bike leads to more agility and dynamics while driving. While being heavier is a clear 
disadvantage regarding high-end bike designs, the central position of the gearbox and its substan-
tial better center of gravity overcompensates this disadvantage (Donner, 2012, p. 26). 
Shifting Performance 
Familiar with a traditional derailleur system, it takes some time to get used to the turning handle to 
activate the Pinion shifting mechanism. Both the necessary turning movement of nearly 20° for 
each gear change and the augmented shifting demand due to the fine gear steps (11.5%) can lead to 
initial difficulties (Steinke, 2013). However, the Rohloff Speedhub and the NuVinci N360 operate 
with a similar shifting mechanism. A traditional derailleur system like the Shimano Deore XT needs 
two shift levers, one for each chainring. Thus, using just a single shifter to move through every gear 
is an obvious advantage (Wragg, 2012). 
With the P1.18, the rider has to take into account that downshifting will only be possible at part 
load (Lermen, 2010). If this is considered, the gear change follows fluently, properly, and exactly in 
either single or multiple gear steps (Donner, 2012, p. 26; Pinion, 2013a, p. 6). When switching 
gears, the shifter gives direct feedback to the rider that the gear has changed (Pinion, 2013a, p. 19). 
Unlike the Rohloff Speedhub and the Shimano Alfine which are composed of a large number of 
components transmitting the driving force, the P1.18 engages only two pairs of spur gears in each 
gear to transmit the power. This fosters the efficiency and leads to minimal drive noise, high 
smoothness, and nearly lossless power transmission of the Pinion concept (Donner, 2012, p. 26; 
Pinion, 2013a, p. 6). To sum up, after a training period with the P1.18, the advantages of fast and 
reliable shifting become apparent. 
Service and Maintenance Effort 
The Pinion P1.18 has minimal service and maintenance requirements as all components of the 
gearbox are safely protected in an enclosed, sealed housing and suspended in an oil bath. Once a 
year (or respectively every 10,000 km) an oil change should be performed. The gearbox is rated for 
a durability of 60,000 km. However, due to wear, after a while a few components of the system (like 
chainrings and shift cables) potentially need to be replaced (Pinion, 2013a, p. 22, 2013a, p. 6). 
As all three internal gear hub concepts are encapsulated, sealed, and do not require maintenance, 
this feature of the P1.18 is not a unique selling proposition. Nevertheless, the maintenance freedom 
of internal gear hubs, in general, is definitely an advantage compared to traditional derailleur 
systems. Furthermore, none of the defect-susceptible parts of a derailleur system like rear and front 
derailleur, chain guide, and a set of chainrings are existent. This avoids damages and additionally, 
increases the ground clearance and therewith the capabilities of the bicycle in rough terrain (Pin-
ion, 2013a, p. 5; Steinke, 2013). 
Requirements for Construction Change 
The use of the P1.18 is only possible on frames that are specially designed by the bicycle-OEMs for 
the use with Pinion. Together with the frame the gearbox forms a unified ensemble. On the one 
hand, this causes a relatively high level of system integration, but offers no alternatives to the 
P1.18, on the other hand, in the case of disfavor or breakdown. The bicycle manufacturers find 
themselves in a similar situation. They face a higher entrepreneurial risk as well as additional 
expenditures regarding development efforts and costs (Donner, 2012, p. 26; Pinion, 2013a, p. 21; 
Stiener, 2012). 
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In this regard, the alternative internal gear hub concepts gain advantages, as all of them are placed 
within the rear wheel. Thus, they are easy to adapt and do not need construction changes of the 
frame or the rear wheel design. As the derailleur system is the standard mechanism and corre-
spondingly widespread, the current frame designs are specified for this system. 
Price 
Besides the technological advantages, the price is an essential criterion for evaluating the chances 
of mainstream market success. Until now, the Pinion P1.18 is not available as a single component as 
it is merely sold as an integral part of a fully equipped bicycle of certain partner OEMs. According to 
industry experts, the price for the gearbox ranges up to approx. 2,000 €. Depending on the utilized 
components, the price for a complete Shimano Deore XT derailleur system differs extremely. All 
single components can be ordered separately. Altogether a standard version within a complete bike 
costs roughly 400 €. The price for a Rohloff Speedhub is starting at 750 €, the Shimano Alfine costs 
approx. 350 € and the NuVinci N360 costs 360 € (Warentest, 2013). 
It is obvious, that the P1.18 is the most expensive shifting system. This is due to the fact that the 
series production just started and the gearbox has exclusively been integrated into only a few high-
end premium bikes with moderate market distribution. To become a real competitive alternative 
on the mainstream bicycle market, the total price for the P1.18 gearbox must be significantly re-
duced. In view of potential leverage effects by economies of scale, this should be possible in the long 
term. 
Overview of the Relative Advantages of the P1.18 
To get a better overview of the relative advantages of the P1.18 bicycle transmission, the different 
shifting systems have been evaluated with respect to the degree to which they meet the eight 
evaluation criteria on a ten-stage scale (cf. Figure 57). 
 
Figure 57: Overview of Relative Advantages of the P1.18 
Ultimately, the unique advantages of the P1.18 gearbox compared to the existent alternatives are 
the great overall ratio range, the number of real gears, and the position of the center of gravity. In 
contrast, the high system weight, the obligatory need for frame construction change, and the cur-
rently high price are the disadvantages of the Pinion P1.18. 
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It becomes apparent that all shifting systems have their specific advantages and disadvantages. The 
ultimate highflyer fulfilling all potential requirements and needs of a bicycle shifting system is still 
not available. Due to subjective customer preferences, an evaluative comparison from an overall 
perspective is difficult and almost impossible. Decisive for the general success of a single shifting 
system are the individual requirements and needs of the targeted customer groups. Therefore, it is 
essential to know and meet the requirements of the distinct target market. Consequently, in the 
following chapter the target market will be analyzed (Stiener, 2012). 
Target Market 
Naturally, Pinion initially addresses the German bicycle market. Both founders are German and 
additionally enthusiastic cyclists. Thus, they are used to the characteristics of the local market. 
Looking at the market share 
(cf. Figure 58) of the different 
models on the German bike 
market, it becomes obvious 
that the trekking bikes domi-
nate with roughly 33% fol-
lowed by the city- & urban 
bikes with approx. 24%. 
Mountain bikes, all terrain 
bikes, and e-bikes are nearly 
on the same level with about 
10% (ZIV, 2013b, p. 68). 
Pinion is initially focusing on 
mountain bikes as well as the 
trekking and touring sector. 
In both segments, the ad-
vantages of the gearbox are 
highly transparent (Pinion, 
2013b). The enclosed system 
of the P1.18 has no exposed 
shifting elements that could 
be damaged. 
 
Figure 58: German Market Share of Bike Models by 2012 (ZIV, 
2013b, p. 68) 
This additionally increases the ground clearance and therewith the possibilities in rough terrain. 
Furthermore, the advantageous position of the center of gravity fosters bike handling and favors 
the usage of mountain bikes. Especially the maintenance freedom and the steady shifting comfort in 
various situations, forms the benefits of using the P1.18 at trekking and touring bikes (Donner, 
2012, p. 26; Pinion, 2013a, p. 5). 
The P1.18 is meant to be a premium product. As it is relatively expensive, the high-end segment is 
addressed. Furthermore, an expansion of the initial product portfolio seems obvious. The applica-
tion of the gearbox for a recumbent, tandem, and e-bikes is currently under conception. With the 
German niche market for high-end mountain, trekking, and touring bikes Pinion has a regional, 
model segment, and quality level focus. However, the company is planning to cover the entire 
bicycle market little by little in Europe and subsequently, globally later on (Pinion, 2013b; Schäfer, 
2013). 
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Industry Context 
The industry context for the Pinion GmbH was predominantly positive. Environment and sustaina-
bility have become important topics in society and politics. Different laws and regulations already 
reflect this growing environmental awareness. Thus, strict emissions directives for commercial 
vehicles, clear zones in inner-city areas and environmental certificates have been introduced inter 
alia. Correspondingly, a trend towards new and energy-efficient mobility concepts in particular for 
urban spaces is observable. For these reasons, the bicycle gains in importance as an urban 
transport tool. Thus, a maintenance free bicycle gearbox seems to match the spirit of the time and 
to be a product with good prospects (Pinion, 2013a, p. 16; Reidl, 2012). 
Furthermore, the German government supports the creation of technology and knowledge based 
business start-ups with their EXST program. To cover expenses, the entrepreneurs receive a grant 
of 800 to 2,500 € per month, depending on their academic degree, for a maximum period of 12 
months (BWMi). The Pinion team received this grant in 2008 (Pinion, 2013b). 
However, Pinion has to suffer from the economic upturn of the automotive industry. Pinion mainly 
trusts in suppliers of the automobile industry. As these suppliers had full order books, the start-up 
immediately slipped to the end of the order list (Reidl, 2012). 
Competitive Situation 
By now, Pinion is the only company to distribute this specific gearbox technology. Thus, it only has 
to compete with its technological alternatives. Those have been introduced and compared previ-
ously. However, Pinion needs to be aware of emerging and established market rivals. If the Pinion 
technology proves to be valuable, it is just a question of time until capable competitors will develop 
cannibalizing innovations and possibly enter the market (Schilling, 1998, p. 277). 
Market Barriers 
Initially, the Pinion team expected that the biggest obstacle to the market entrance would be the 
necessity to persuade frame-builders to design and produce a modified frame to integrate the 
gearbox. Therefore, a forged part needs to be welded at the bottom of the frame. The gearbox will 
be screwed to this forged part. In retrospective, the frame-building process was not a problem. 
Nearly all frames are produced in Asia and these manufacturers nearly do not care if they have to 
weld the bottom bracket tube to the frame or a forged part for the gearbox (Pinion, 2013b). 
The de facto biggest barrier to market entry was the challenge to persuade the bicycle manufactur-
ers to apply the Pinion technology. The main point that hampered the market introduction was the 
skepticism towards the new technology and even more towards the young company. This was the 
same with all bicycle manufacturers. They questioned the reliability of the young start-up and it 
took some time to trust Pinion. The way to become a serious partner within the bicycle industry is a 
long and tough one (Pinion, 2013b). 
Additionally, there are several mountain bike manufacturers that have some issues with the P1.18 
performance, mainly regarding loaded shifting and system weight. However, the major barrier is 
the existing question towards the reliability of a young start-up (Pinion, 2013b). 
Opportunity 
The global market for bicycles is tremendous. Every year over 130 million bikes are sold worldwide 
(GloboMeter). Understandably, Pinion initially started to address their German home market. With 
sales numbers of roughly 4 million bikes per year Germany accounts for 20% of the European 
market with approx. 19.7 million items in 2012 (Colibi, 2013, p. 19). The total value of the accumu-
lated bike sales in Germany was about 2.03 billion € (ZIV, 2013a, p. 13). In Europe, the German 
average price for a bicycle of 513 € was solely outreached by the Netherlands with 724 € (Colibi, 
2013, p. 21). With 260 million € Germany is responsible for 16% of the total 1.65 billion € for the 
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European production of bicycle parts and accessories (Colibi, 2013, p. 15). In sum, in2012 the 
approx. 50,000 employees of the German bicycle branch generated revenue of 4 billion €. With 71 
million bikes in Germany, there are 80% cyclists among the population (ZIV, 2013b, pp. 62–63). 
The average price per bike (513 €) in Germany is the second highest in Europe. This indicates that 
the quality requirements are accordingly high which is good for Pinion. The total revenue of 4 
billion € within the German bicycle branch displays its potential (ZIV, 2013b, p. 62). Correspond-
ingly, the total German bicycle market is very big and even the high-end sector of a submarket is 
very attractive with regard to the absolute numbers for a start-up like Pinion. There is still the 
option to potentially sell several thousand gearboxes (Pinion, 2013b). 
It seemed logic for the two founders to start at the high-end market with high prices and low vol-
umes. Not before the brand name has been shaped and an image of technological reliability has 
been developed, the mainstream market could successfully be addressed. Beyond that, it would not 
be possible for a start-up like Pinion to immediately purchase a large number of gearboxes due to 
their company infrastructure. Similarly, the bicycle manufacturers need to prepare their production 
as the P1.18 requires a design change of the frame (Pinion, 2013b). To sum up, choosing a market 
niche, like Pinion, seems to be the right way to commercialize a radical technological innovation 
like the P1.18 transmission. 
Organization 
The Pinion GmbH has officially been founded at the 29th of October 2008 in Stuttgart-Feuerbach. As 
the former company site gradually became too small, Pinion moved in April 2012 to larger produc-
tion facilities to Denkendorf, near Stuttgart (Pinion, 2013a, p. 3). The two founders are entered in 
the commercial register as executive directors (Creditreform Deutsche Firmenprofile, 2014). By 
2014, the two founders hold 23.24% of the company’s shares each and the Pomian GbR (probably 
Pinion’s main investor) 53.52% of the shares (Hoppenstedt Firmenprofile, 2014). Since the begin-
ning of 2014, Pinion has nine employees, besides the two founders (Pinion, 2013b). 
Strategy 
It is Pinion’s vision to develop and commercialize a competitive bicycle transmission in accordance 
with automotive standards. This bicycle transmission should become a natural alternative to the 
traditional bicycle shifting systems. Therefore, the two engineers have founded Pinion. Thus, it is 
the genuine purpose of the company to realize this vision. To reach this goal, Pinion developed 
primarily autonomously and waited a long time before presenting their gearbox to the public 
(Pinion, 2013b). At first, Pinion addresses the premium segment of the German mountain, trekking, 
and touring bikes market to get established. Later on, the company is targeting to cover the entire 
bicycle market in Germany, Europe, and finally, worldwide (Pinion, 2013b; Schäfer, 2013). 
Structure and Processes 
With nine employees and the two founders, the Pinion GmbH is a relatively small company. Hence, 
the structure and processes are relatively informal. There is a low power distance and little 
predefined processes with a low level of bureaucracy (Pinion, 2013b, 2014b). Thus, by 2014, the 
company had no organigram. In addition, the company is quite autonomous. Due to the fact, that 
the company was founded to commercialize the P 1.18 technology, it is not integrated into a coher-
ent whole of an established concern structure. The total structure was established to foster the 
technology commercialization process. Furthermore, the investor does not force the team to follow 
strict milestone-plans but leaves the operational management to the two founders (Pinion, 2013b). 
For the evolution of the highly innovative gearbox, this was beneficial as innovations could not 
evolve within tight structures and hierarchies (Holzschuher and Pechlaner, 2007, p. 45). Since 
2012, Pinion has reached series production and therewith reduced uncertainty. The need to be-
come more efficient with respect to its processes is obligatory. Therefore, Pinion hires experienced 
employees, such as a new assembly and quality assurance manager, in 2014, to establish clear 
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structures for processes like purchasing and quality management. Additionally, Pinion thinks about 
getting certified according to the DIN EN ISO 9001. For the bicycle-branch, this is not a prerequisite. 
Thus, Pinion does not strive for it just for the sake of the certificate, but for being forced to establish 
certain structures and processes (Pinion, 2014b). 
Company Culture 
An innovation-friendly company culture is essential to successfully realize technological innova-
tions. According to the interviewed founder, the company atmosphere is very good (Pinion, 2013b). 
The employees have a lot of ideas that are appreciated. In general, Pinion is quite open with respect 
to new ideas. Nevertheless, since the start of series production, the company has left its creative 
startup-phase. Now, Pinion has to prioritize the emerging ideas regarding the feasibility and rapid 
realizability due to certain obligations like concrete delivery dates. Being aware that this would 
hamper creativity, even more, the two founders are trying to hire experienced employees within 
the next recruiting round for establishing a solid company. With an eye to the future, they think of 
an independent advanced development division as a sort of creative pool for the development and 
realization of new ideas (Pinion, 2014b). 
The commercialization of technological innovations is a highly uncertain endeavor and thus, the 
need for an intensive information exchange is great (OECD, 1971, p. 13). At the moment, Pinion’s 
internal communication is primarily issue-specific and on an ad hoc basis. There are no regular 
meetings. In the case of an emerging topic or problem, the employees spontaneously walk and talk 
to the responsible colleagues. This leads to a rapid solution, but sometimes interrupts working 
processes and leads to a certain kind of inefficiency (Pinion, 2014b). 
In addition, the team is growing and to keep everybody informed, team- and topic-specific meetings 
need to be implemented. Previously, such continuous meetings have been unnecessary as the team 
was small and worked together in the same office (Pinion, 2014b). A central knowledge manage-
ment is not existent within Pinion. For archiving CAD-files, the company uses the integrated prod-
uct data management system of SolidWorks, Pinion’s CAD-system. The remaining data like Mi-
crosoft-Office-files is stored on a server solution (Pinion, 2014b). 
Funding and Commitment 
Gear manufacturing, in particular, the creation of prototypes, is expensive. Thus, the two founders 
decided to search for an investor even before they founded the company. Pinion had an advantage 
in their search since their product innovation was quite tangible. The majority of potential inves-
tors had a more or less close connection to the field of bicycles and furthermore, the advantages 
and disadvantages of traditional derailleur systems and internal hubs were easy to explain. Hence, 
it was not a big challenge for the team to get access to potential investors. The team carefully se-
lected its partners and even neglected the cooperation with one investor due to bad gut feeling. 
Finally, the two engineers got to know their future investor at an event organized by the Technolo-
gie-Transfer-Initiative GmbH (TTI) (Pinion, 2013b). The TTI at the University Stuttgart is the cen-
tral place to go for people, who need advice and support on all issues concerning company founda-
tion (TTI, 2014). At this event, several founders had the chance to introduce themselves and their 
business concept to a group of investors. On this occasion, the Pinion team met an investor, who 
was a supplier of the automotive industry from Pfullingen and showed great interest in the project. 
After several discussions and tough negotiations, the team officially founded the company together 
with this investor in October 2008 (Pinion, 2013b). 
In 2008, the team additionally received the EXIST-grant. This is a German government funding for 
the creation of start-ups. Repeatedly, the two founders applied for this sponsorship. Two times the 
application has been refused, during a period in which the two would have needed it most. When 
they finally obtained the grant, it was not absolutely necessary as they already found an investor 
(Pinion, 2013b). 
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By the end of 2008, the automobile crisis emerged quite fast and heavy. As the investor was active 
in the automotive industry, he informed the Pinion team in the beginning of 2009, that he was not 
able to further fund the company. He could not take the responsibility to invest risk capital into a 
start-up on the one hand, and send his employees into short-term work or even lay them off on the 
other (Pinion, 2013b). As a result, the Pinion team was left without an investor just a few months 
after contract signing (Reidl, 2012). 
The involved people from the company of the first investor regretted their exit and tried to support 
building and establishing contacts. Consequently, the two founders got in contact with a person 
from Munich, who was originally meant to provide contacts to potential investors within his broad 
network. Educated as a physicist, he worked in science and was part of the management board of 
several German industrial concerns. Furthermore, he founded and sold his own venture. Now in his 
advanced age of about 70 years, he is investing in miscellaneous projects and start-ups (Pinion, 
2013b). In the spring of 2009, the Pinion team arranged a meeting with him and presented their 
new gearbox design. Instead of exclusively discussing target markets and potential sales figures, the 
three were analyzing technical challenges and the details of the new design (Reidl, 2012). Beyond 
that, the future investor conducted a due-diligence investigation to work out in deep the main risks, 
strengths, and weaknesses of Pinion’s business. Due to this intensive evaluation period, the three 
got to know each other very well and were on good terms. Subsequently, the future investor left 
rather acquire another investor for the Pinion team. One week later, he called and told the team 
that he would like to participate on an equity basis himself. The Pinion team signed a cooperation 
contract with him in October 2009 (Pinion, 2013b, 2013a, p. 2). The new investor enjoyed full 
voting right but left the operative management to the two Pinion-founders, who maintained their 
position as main associates and executive directors of Pinion (Pinion, 2013b). 
With their new investor, the two founders were lucky, as he is enthusiastic about the product and 
provides not just money, but additionally technical and personal interest (Donner, 2012). Hence, he 
is not just an investor but mentor and consultant as well (Reidl, 2012). In the face of high uncertain-
ties and long-time horizons, technological innovations pose specific challenges not only to the 
founders but also to the investor. Deep support, cautiousness, and goodwill of the investor are 
required to reach market maturity and commercial success (Meier, 2007, p. 282). In the case of 
Pinion, this becomes apparent, as the team developed over a period of seven years without selling a 
single product and generating revenue (Donner, 2012). 
According to the interviewed founder, among the investor’s motives have been the joy and the 
ambition to participate and shape the future of this promising project. Thus, he does not follow 
strict rules of general institutional investors regarding return expectations and exit strategies 
(Pinion, 2013b). 
Since the conclusion of the contract, the partnership has been undisturbed. Once every six to eight 
weeks, both parties meet to discuss open issues and the current status. The investor is totally 
informed and the relationship bases on absolute mutual trust. Without this trust, it could have 
become pretty troublesome for Pinion, as there have been various challenges during initial produc-
tion phases. In general, new developments take time in the mechanical engineering sector. This is 
what happened to Pinion. When the two engineers destroyed several prototypes on the test rig and 
the spare parts frequently had a delivery time of three to four months, the progress stagnated. As 
Pinion mainly trusts on suppliers of the automobile branch, its bookings steadily slip to the end of 
the order list in times of high capacity utilization. Especially in these situations, true investor com-
mitment is crucial (Pinion, 2013b; Reidl, 2012). 
Entrepreneurial Team 
Since the beginning of 2014, Pinion has nine employees besides the two founders. The whole team 
is quite young with an age distribution of 26 to 36 years and is thus, very homogenous. The two 
founders are jointly responsible for managing the businesses of the company like financial affairs 
and negotiations with suppliers and customers. Additionally, they are working in the design engi-
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neering. By 2010, the first employee, a design engineer, was hired and is still on board by 2014. 
Furthermore, there are two sales representatives, two additional design engineers, an assembly 
worker, an assembly manager, a part-time accounting employee, and an office worker (Pinion, 
2013b, 2014b). 
According to the interviewed founder, the management and the team pull together and are highly 
motivated. They share a relaxed relationship among each other with a good atmosphere. The 
young, enthusiastic employees are very creative and have a lot of ideas. On the other hand, Pinion 
lacks experienced personnel that possesses serenity, sovereignty, and know-how to deal with 
challenging situations. The Pinion staff mainly consists of university graduates and first-time em-
ployees, who need to learn and expect guidelines from the management. The two founders are only 
able to make a limited contribution to providing the desired assistance, as they are equally doing it 
for the first time. Both are aware of this and are therefore planning to hire preferentially senior 
professionals within the next recruiting round (Pinion, 2013b, 2014b). 
Innovation Process 
Opportunity Identification 
In 2006, the two founders got to know each other when they were working students at the engine 
and transmission design department within the Porsche R&D-center in Weissach, Germany (Pinion, 
2013b). Soon, both detected that they shared enthusiasm not just for motorsport, but for mountain 
biking as well (Donner, 2012, p. 24). It was within this context that the initial idea for the founda-
tion of a company emerged. However, it was not entrepreneurship for its own sake that was the 
focus of the Pinion team. Rather it was the ambition to solve the central technological challenge that 
drove them to start their own business (Pinion, 2013b). The two founders were unsatisfied with 
traditional derailleur systems with their typical problems of stuck chains, bent derailleurs, and the 
need for time-consuming care and maintenance after each ride. Internal hubs did not provide a real 
alternative since they are less efficient in certain gears, did not meet high standards regarding 
bicycle handling and dynamics, and have an unfavorable weight distribution (Pinion, 2013a, p. 3). 
The two founders asked themselves why there should be maintenance free gearboxes in cars and 
motorbikes but not in bicycles (Pinion, 2013b). Having found no satisfactory answer to this ques-
tion, they decided to realize their vision of developing a competitive gearbox for bicycles in 
accordance with automotive standards in order to offer a real alternative to the traditional derail-
leur system. However, to get from mind to market, the team had to go a long way (Donner, 2012, p. 
24). 
Product Development 
After idea generation in 2006, the two founders developed the initial concept further in parallel 
with their university education and their employment as working students at the Porsche AG, 
activities that naturally limited their available time. Starting with rough paper sketches, the team 
refined their ideas to gain first CAD-drafts (Pinion, 2013b). During 2006 and 2007, various trans-
mission concepts were developed, discarded, and revised (Pinion, 2013a, p. 2). Ultimately, the team 
settled on one concept and elaborated it to such an extent that the main components were specified 
– practical realization seemed feasible (Pinion, 2013b).  
In order to test their gearbox-prototypes, the two engineers installed a test rig and subsequently 
examined their first prototype in November 2008 (Pinion, 2013a, p. 2). When Pinion lost its first 
investor in the beginning of 2009, the team used the arising unoccupied time to thoroughly revise 
their design concept (Pinion, 2013b). The initial gearbox design contained three intermediate 
shafts (Pinion, 2013a, p. 2). During the manufacturing and testing of the prototype, the team dis-
covered huge technical weaknesses of this initial design concept. According to the interviewed 
founder, in retrospect, this concept could not have been manufactured in serial production. As the 
former investor drove them by milestones and deadlines, the team probably would have been 
caught within this initial concept and forced to retain and refine it (Pinion, 2013b). Due to their 
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obligations towards their investor, they just had no time to fundamentally optimize and question 
their invention (Reidl, 2012). Thus, the interviewed founder summarized, that the exit of the inves-
tor at precisely this point in time, has been a stroke of good fortune (Pinion, 2013b). Within the 
subsequent unoccupied time of the first half of 2009, the team developed a design concept with two 
transmitting shafts which was brought to serial production later on and which is equivalent to the 
current design of the gearbox (Pinion, 2013a, p. 2). 
In December 2009, a newly developed test rig was commissioned (Pinion, 2013a, p. 3). On this test 
rig, the Pinion team tested primarily the load capacity and performance of the gearbox. Endurance 
and long-time tests have been conducted by experienced bikers on the track (Pinion, 2013b). The 
gearbox went through its baptism of fire when a friend of the two Pinion founders and extreme 
cyclist crossed the Himalaya riding a Pinion bicycle transmission prototype in the summer of 2010 
(Pinion, 2013a, p. 2). The team felt slightly uncomfortable, but their friend knew the risk and dared 
the adventure carrying a replacement gearbox in his luggage. The prototype overcame the strains 
of the tour and this has led to a huge media attention (Reidl, 2012). 
On the trade fair Eurobike 2010, the Pinion team exhibited an advanced prototype under the name 
Pinion P1 for the first time to the public (Pinion, 2013a, p. 3). Heretofore, the team has developed 
their innovation over four years without considerable contact to bicycle manufacturers. The reac-
tion and response to the product were overwhelming and strongly motivated the team (Reidl, 
2012). In the spring of the following year 2011, the first bicycle manufacturers began to develop a 
framework for the gearbox which bore the official name P 1.18 from then on. As a result, the first 
bikes equipped with a P 1.18 pre-series model were presented on the bicycle trade show Eurobike 
2011.  By the end of 2011, the team finally revised the design and lifted the P 1.18 from pre-series 
state to production standard. After that, general production began (Pinion, 2013a, p. 3). 
Lead User Integration 
It is decisive during the development process to ensure that the end product will match the market 
needs. Therefore, Pinion has conducted a market analysis in an early development phase and 
derived a requirements list together with a small bicycle manufacturer. Furthermore, the two 
founders themselves were passionate cyclists and had a broad network in the biking scene. Thus, 
they tested a lot on their own and discussed with friendly bikers. In due course, they involved lead 
users at testing gearbox prototypes to gain feedback. Primarily, these were skilled amateur cyclists 
that contributed to the product development by serving detailed feedback regarding performance 
and existing problems of the gearbox (Pinion, 2013b). Additionally, they provided concrete advice 
for modification, when they highlighted the potentials for improvement of the chain guide, a chain 
tensioner, or a gear indicator at the twist grip for instance (Donner, 2012, p. 25; Stahl, 2011). Be-
sides this, several of these cyclists documented their trials in test reports that were published in 
diverse bike magazines. This generated publicity and increased the awareness for the new shifting 
alternative. Accordingly, the breakthrough of the P1.18 was accomplished when in 2010 their 
friend crossed the Himalaya. Therefore, he made an important contribution to the commercializa-
tion of the P1.18 (Reidl, 2012). 
Development Partnerships 
Within the mechanical engineering branch, reaching the minimal viable product to gain suitable 
market feedback is not easy. It takes quite long to develop a mature technological innovation and 
half-baked products can easily lead to negative market feedback. Especially for technological inno-
vations negative market feedback during early development stages is commonly unfavorable as bad 
attitude towards an innovation is generally difficult to transform later on. Accordingly, Pinion 
developed primarily autonomously roughly over four years (Pinion, 2013b). 
Within the early stages and test phase, the two bicycle manufacturers Endorfin and Hot Chili partic-
ipated in Pinion’s development process. Furthermore, Pinion involved some additional manufac-
turers until series production of the gearbox. Furthermore, Pinion had to cooperate with frame-
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builders as well that designed and produced the modified frames for the gearbox later on (Pinion, 
2013b; Lermen, 2010). 
Risk and Quality Management 
Pinion had no structured risk and quality management system but used some methods to deal with 
risks and quality issues. In contrast to having a detailed risk analysis and evaluation procedure, the 
two founders mainly trusted their personal gut feeling and intuition. The interviewed founder 
assumed, that Pinion has only come this far not because, both founders did so many things the right 
way, but due to the fact that both refused to do certain things. In retrospect, they are happy that 
they have not accepted several offers or did not cooperate with certain firms. Mainly intuition and 
collective decision making after a short conversation were the base for their risk evaluation (Pinion, 
2014b). 
Another risk to deal with was the great technological challenge. As written above, the gearbox has 
to withstand a torque of 250 Nm. Due to the fact that the standardized calculation methods could 
not be applied for the P1.18 as they were designed for automobile gearboxes, a test rig was created. 
To simulate the effects of many years of use under realistic conditions in a short time frame, 
initially, a load spectrum of real-world peak forces was captured. By an iterative and empirical 
approach, the decisive parameters for designing a bicycle gearbox have been laboriously derived. 
Subsequently, the complete gearbox and each individual component were tested under repetitive 
use at extreme load to ensure durability and performance (Pinion, 2013b, 2013a, pp. 14–15, 2013a, 
p. 3). 
In times of series production, Pinion receives roughly 100 elements of the gearbox from approxi-
mately ten suppliers from the Stuttgart region. Not all of them delivered the expected quality right 
from the start. Accordingly, the incoming goods inspection and the subsequent product test on the 
test rig played an important role in quality assurance (Schäfer, 2013). 
One of the biggest risks Pinion still has to handle is the fact that its suppliers originate from the 
automobile industry. In times of economic upturn, Pinion will be the last to receive their products 
due to their lower purchase quantity. Pinion already suffered this condition when they had to 
postpone their launch of the first series gearboxes (Donner, 2012, pp. 25–26). 
Platform Strategy 
As far as possible, Pinion is trying to establish a common part and platform strategy. During the 
development of the 18-speed gearbox, the company has developed a modularized system with 
different components and mechanisms. At the conception of new products, these can be transferred 
with little modification as the basic development has been done. Accordingly, the fundamental 
shifting mechanism with its camshaft, pawls, and gearwheels is transferrable to any further product 
version. Equally, the sprocket geometry or the gearwheel design is versatile. At the establishment of 
a product family, this strategy approach could help Pinion (Pinion, 2014b). 
Pinion’s next product should be a gearbox with a reduced number of gears at a lower price level. 
The current P1.18 has a huge performance range with respect to the number of real shifts and its 
transmission ratio. According to the interviewed founder, average cyclists do not need this wide 
range of performance (Pinion, 2014b). Furthermore, Pinion has conducted a design study of an 
electric motor-gear unit for bicycles (Pinion, 2013a, p. 3). Nevertheless, in the medium term the 
company initially focuses on the classic gearbox transmissions (Pinion, 2014b). 
Intellectual Property 
It has not been possible to obtain a patent for the fundamental gearbox concept. The idea of a 
bottom bracket gearbox or a spur gear in the center of the bike was not new. Correspondingly, 
Pinion strives for protecting individual aspects of the principle concept. Primarily, several minor 
innovations for solving the technological challenge of the P1.18 form the main subjects of Pinion’s 
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patent applications. Recently, the company is trying to protect complementing parts like the shift-
ing mechanism of the system. The team handed in their first patent application in October 2007. By 
2014, Pinion had filed for eight to nine patent applications. Several of these have already been 
granted (Pinion, 2014b, 2013a, p. 2). 
Pinion’s scope of protection contains Europe, USA, and several Asian countries. Causally for this are 
market-relevant data and partly also the competitors’ approach. In Europe, Germany, and the 
Benelux states are most important. As the European Patent Law admits an overall protection at 
reasonable costs, Pinion opts for this option. Furthermore, the company assesses the U.S. and Japan 
market to become critical for the future (Pinion, 2014b). 
The IP-strategy of the company is also dependent on its financial situation. In general, Pinion 
strives for a patent protection with respect to inventions that are decisive for the consolidation and 
expansion of its market position from their point of view. According to the interviewed founder, 
Pinion could apply for more patents but due to the company’s financial situation, it has to be selec-
tive. Using their patent portfolio as a strategic lever is correspondingly not focused (Pinion, 2014b). 
The elaboration of Pinion’s patent applications is done by a patent attorney from Stuttgart. Due to 
the intense cooperation, he is used to the mechanisms of the gearbox. Based on a brief invention 
description and some additional drawings, he is able to independently elaborate the applications. 
After an iterative process the patent applications are submitted (Pinion, 2014b). 
Commercialization 
Value Proposition and Business Model 
Pinion does not directly sell their gearboxes to the end-user. The P1.18 transmission is solely 
available as an OEM component for volume bicycle manufacturers. Thus, they cooperate with 
several bicycle manufacturers, who are Pinion’s customers and the de facto technology dissemina-
tors. Finally, the bicycle dealers sell Pinion equipped bicycles to the end-users (Pinion, 2013b, 
2013a, p. 21). 
Besides the technical and economic benefits (cf. relative advantageousness), the value proposition 
of a company is shaped by its service and social benefits (Wouters, 2009, p. 1028). Pinion tries to 
ease and support the use of its gearbox for its customers. As the P1.18 is not completely mainte-
nance free, the company has uploaded several video guides to its homepage for each of the mainte-
nance tasks to be carried out. Additionally, Pinion offers a complete spare parts program, a contin-
ually expanding range of accessories, and specialist tools through its conventional distribution 
channels (Pinion, 2013a, p. 27, 2013a, p. 22). 
Furthermore, the company fosters the reputation of a high tech quality product that is able to give a 
signal towards urban mobility. Therewith, Pinion tries to shape the image of setting a social state-
ment by choosing the P1.18 (Pinion, 2013a, p. 16). 
Commercialization Partnerships 
The bicycle manufacturers, in general, played a very important role. It was the biggest barrier to 
market entry to persuade them to apply the Pinion technology. At the start of series production in 
2012, there have been 15 and by the end of 2013, 40 bicycle manufacturers offering Pinion 
equipped bikes with a steadily rising number (Pinion, 2013b, 2013a, p. 21). 
All parts of the gearbox were completely developed and designed by Pinion and subsequently, 
fabricated in contract production by ISO certified suppliers. Like Porsche in the automobile indus-
try, Pinion is a pure assembly-firm. Roughly 95% of Pinion’s suppliers originate from the automo-
tive supplier industry around the city of Stuttgart (Pinion, 2013b). On the one hand, this leads to a 
high level of product quality, but on the other hand, causes supplier shortages in times of economic 
upturn of the automotive industry (Donner, 2012, pp. 25–26).  
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With growing quantities of 
sales, Pinion is planning to 
build up new supplier 
relationships even for 
common parts to share the 
risk and reduce the de-
pendency on individual 
suppliers (Pinion, 2014b). 
Further important allianc-
es for the company exist 
with the dealers offering 
Pinion equipped bicycles. 
Looking at the dealer 
network in Europe (cf. 
Figure 59), it becomes 
obvious that Pinion’s 
current sales focus is 
clearly situated on the 
German market with 
strategically selected 




Figure 59: Pinion Dealer Network in Europe (Pinion, 2014a) 
Timing 
The optimal timing of entry is a crucial decision. Pinion has prepared their market introduction 
strategically. In 2010, the company exhibited at the trade fair Eurobike an advanced prototype 
(Pinion, 2013a, p. 3). According to the interviewed founder, the Eurobike which takes place every 
September in Friedrichshafen, is the most important bicycle trade fair in Europe and was corre-
spondingly adequate for presenting their innovation to a broader publicity. The team deliberately 
chose their first trade fair attendance to be early and before reaching series maturity. As Pinion’s 
customers need one to two years for preparing bicycle models for the usage with the P1.18 gear-
box, Pinion had to assume the specific moment in time when the series maturity of the gearbox 
could be reached within the next one to two years. If the development would last longer, potential 
earnings could be lost. However, presenting the bicycle transmission too early would be unfavora-
ble just the same. The emerging hype when showing the innovation to the public and the corre-
sponding interest for the product could fade away if Pinion could not deliver for a longer period. 
Thus, not an easy decision, but all in all Pinion’s assumptions were good as the company reached 
series maturity in 2012 (Pinion, 2014b). 
Additionally, a fortunate coincidence pushed Pinion’s prototype presentation at the Eurobike 2010. 
The Spiegel magazine reported in their Eurobike-article about Pinion just before the trade fair 
starts. Correspondingly, the attention of the visitors and media representatives at the trade fair was 
high (Pinion, 2014b). 
Marketing 
Pinion clearly addresses the premium market segment. Thus, the company is trying to position its 
gearbox as a high-quality, reliable, and long lasting bicycle component contrary to the putative 
disposable culture of the recent past (Pinion, 2013a, p. 8). Therewith, the company wants to em-
phasize its contribution to the modern urban mobility (Pinion, 2013a, p. 16). Pinion chose its sales 
strategy accordingly. To ensure the targeted quality and safety standards of the final bicycle, the 
company just sells its P1.18 transmission as an OEM component for volume bicycle manufacturers 
working to a high industrial quality standard. Thus, the gearbox is currently not available to the 
public via wholesale and retail (Pinion, 2013a, p. 21).  
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The company strategically plans its marketing efforts. In 2010, Pinion eventually exhibited for the 
first time on the Eurobike. The interest and enthusiasm were great and surprised the team as they 
had nearly no contact with the public before. Hence, it pushed the team and strongly motivated 
them for their further development and market introduction (Reidl, 2012). Since then, Pinion 
steadily exhibits at the Eurobike and presents its innovations to the public. After the first P1.18 
series products were produced, bike manufacturers were equipped with sample gearboxes to 
attract them (Pinion, 2013a, p. 3). At consciously chosen times, the team involves journalists to 
highlight its products. Additionally, Pinion provides links to certain test reports of the gearbox via 
its homepage (Pinion). Furthermore, Pinion cooperates with an external marketing agency regard-
ing issues like the external presentation of the company, corporate design, creation of the homep-
age, and generation of its image brochure (Pinion, 2013b). 
Innovation Success 
Sales Performance 
With the start of series production in 2012, Pinion cooperated with 15 bicycle manufacturers and 
ended up with three-digit sales figures.  2013 Pinion generated with 40 manufacturers a low four-
digit sales figures and roughly 1.1 million € revenue. The number of collaborations with bicycle 
manufacturers is rising on and on. Pinion expects to reach sales figures of a mid-four-digit range 
within the next years (Pinion, 2013b).  
According to the interviewed founder, on a scale from great skepticism, if Pinion will still have a 
product on the market in the future until the P1.18 is a natural alternative to the established shift-
ing components, Pinion is positioned right in the middle. By the end of 2013, he stated, most of the 
bicycle manufacturer have realized that the Pinion transmission is not just a flash in the pan, but 
will be a long-time business (Pinion, 2013b). 
Product Performance 
Since the Pinion P1.18 entered series production, more than 1,000 gearboxes have been sold by 
2014. The gearbox is a mature product that meets its high requirements with respect to load, 
durability, and performance (Pinion, 2013a, p. 3). Several benchmark tests have been conducted 
and the reaction and response to the gearbox were predominantly positive (Reidl, 2012). 
In comparison with the alternative shifting systems, the Pinion P1.18 has concrete advantages as 
well as concrete disadvantages (cf. relative advantageousness). Therefore, it is essential to hit the 
customer preferences of the chosen target group, mountain bikes and trekking and touring bikes. In 
both markets the P1.18 is beneficial (Pinion, 2013b, 2013a, p. 5).  
For the creation of the P1.18, Pinion was awarded the BIKE Milestone Award for the best bicycle 
component of 2011 (Pinion, 2013a, p. 3). 
Efficiency 
According to the interviewed founder, one of the decisive factors at commercializing technology is 
to possess an immense power of perseverance. He estimates that it takes seven to ten years from 
idea emergence of a technological innovation to its full establishment in the market. Since the idea 
generation of the Pinion gearbox, it has been seven years and risk of failure still exists. Therefore, it 
is important to take the time that is needed to develop a technological mature product and not to 
bring half-baked development results to the market. Being efficient is important, but just being fast 
is not the preferred method to take when it comes to the development and commercialization of 
radical technological innovations (Pinion, 2013b; Reidl, 2012). 
However, for the sake of efficiency, the development costs need to be kept down. The founders did 
not take high salaries and firstly worked with student licensees of their CAD-software SolidWorks. 
Not before company foundation, they finally bought a full license (Pinion, 2014b). As gearbox 
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manufacturing is expensive and prototypes, in particular, the team tries to save costs as far as 
possible. Initially, the prototypes have been tested externally on an automobile gearbox test rig. 
Since this was very expensive, Pinion decided early to develop and build its own test-rig (Pinion, 
2013b). 
Interestingly, the interviewed founder stated that the time at the Porsche R&D-center has not 
helped them to develop the P1.18 gearbox. According to him, the influence of Porsche with respect 
to the fundamental technique has been marginal and is mainly limited to inspiration. The team has 
not transferred any concept of Porsche gearboxes to their bicycle gearbox. Furthermore, no em-
ployee of Porsche helped them with their development and their engagement as working students 
did not enable them to gain deep insights into Porsche’s process structures (Pinion, 2014b). 
4) Case Study Report – Friction Disc by SKF 
Technology 
The requirements for power transmission within the industrial drive branch increased over the 
recent years. To satisfy this demand SKF engineers developed an innovative coating system for 
highly loaded flange couplings to increase the friction coefficient between the contact surfaces. 
Consequently, the frictional locking and correspondingly the power transmission could be signifi-
cantly enhanced. In general, there are two influencing variables of the frictional locking: the friction 
coefficient and the normal force (𝐹𝑅 = 𝜇 ∙ 𝐹𝑁). SKF addressed the frictional coefficient with the 
Friction Disc (Gläntz, 2011).  
A defined sum of sector shaped elements each with three holes forms a ring-type device (cf. Figure 
60). This device with an optimized friction coefficient is inserted in a bend-proof flange coupling 
and fastened with screws. The two flanges match up with the ring-type device. They are designed 
with through holes and threaded blind holes for mounting (Baumann, 2009, p. 35; Gläntz, 2011). 
 
The contact surfaces of the 
two flanges are required to 
have a certain degree of Ra-
roughness. The sector 
shaped elements of the ring-
type device are coated with 
a galvanic hard-dispersion 
layer (cf. Figure 2) on both 
sides (Baumann, 2009, p. 
36; Horling et al., 2009, pp. 
2–3).  
This hard-dispersion layer 
is galvanically applied in 
two layers on the surface of 
the ring-type device which 
serves as a coating substrate 
(cf. Figure 3). The first 
nickel layer has a wetting 








Figure 60: Friction Disc (Gläntz, 2011) 
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Thus, the second nickel 
layer has a much better 
basis for adhesion. This 
coating layer contains hard 
particles. The thickness of 
the two layers corresponds 
to approximately half of the 
average grain size of the 
particles. As the coating 
layer consists of galvanically 
applied nickel, the coating 
substrate is simultaneously 
protected against corrosion. 
The adhesive force of the 
nickel causes a solid em-
bedding of the hard parti-
cles within the layer (Bau-
mann, 2009, pp. 36–37; 
Horling et al., 2009, pp. 2–
3).  
 





Figure 62: Schematic Diagram of the Coating (Baumann, 2009, p. 37) 
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It is advantageous to use a substrate material that is harder or at least equally hard or has a higher 
tensile strength than the material of the flanges. Thus, the particles rising up out of the coating layer 
would primarily press into the flanges and not into the substrate material. As the flange material of 
spheroidal-graphite cast iron has been defined by SKF’s customer, SKF took a high-strength cold 
forming steel as a substrate material. If the coated ring-type device gets screw-fastened with the 
flange coupling, the hard particles will be pressed into the flange material. Thus, a mechanical 
interlock – a micro-positive contact – will be attained between the device and the two shaft ends 
(Baumann, 2009, p. 43, 2009, p. 38; Horling et al., 2009, pp. 2–3). 
Based on a conservative approach, the friction coefficient μ of the Friction Disc is 0.65. Further tests 
revealed even higher results showing that the SKF solution offers a high level of performance 
reserves and security against slipping. Furthermore, the long-time behavior and variation of the 
friction coefficient after several assembly and disassembly procedures was tested. It was found that 
the friction coefficient differs just slightly and the first prototypes withstood the practical test of 
two years without notable damages (Gläntz, 2011). 
Table 14: Technical Data of the Friction Disc (Baumann, 2009) 
Friction Coefficient μ ≥ 0.65 
Contact Pressure 80 – 150 MPa 
Coating Layer Material Nickel 
Substrate Material Cold Forming Steel 
Flange/Shaft Material Spheroidal-Graphite Cast Iron 
Feasibility and Maturity 
The Friction Disc is a mature product that was introduced to the market in 2009. By 2014, every 
wind turbine of SKF’s customer in the 3.3-MW-class was equipped with the discs and a middling 
three-digit number of pieces have been sold. This is the result of a cooperative and intense devel-
opment of SKF and its customer. The performance of the Friction Disc meets the customer require-
ments in all aspects and this was proven by field tests. By 2014, the Friction Disc was a certified 
product and the friction coefficient of 0.65 has been certified by an accredited certification organi-
zation (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
Technological Alternatives 
The Friction Disc is meant to increase the friction coefficient and thereby the power transmission 
capacity of the flange coupling. Investigations show there is just one other alternative in the market 
that is based on the same technological principle – 3M Friction Shims. Of course, another possibility 
is to just use the blank flange coupling instead on any intermediate objects. By 2014, this became 
the de facto standard in the market. Another credible technological alternative is the application of 
shrink discs. In this technology comparison, the focus will be on hydraulically adjustable shrink 
discs, especially as the ease of assembly has great advantages for the current application. Further-
more, some original equipment manufacturers utilize friction increasing pastes or coatings on the 
face side of the flanges. However, this is a complex process and is not considered to be a robust 
method. Consequently, the latter alternative will not be taken into account within the paper at hand 
(Baumann, 2009, p. 1; Gläntz, 2011). 
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3M Friction Shim 
The functional principle of 3M Friction 
Shims is very comparable to the Fric-
tion Disc technology of SKF. It is based 
on diamond particles embedded in a 
Nickel matrix. The coating is applied on 
thin steel foils. 3M serves three shims 
versions. For the application of flange 
couplings, the largest foil version is 
more suited. Thereby, the Nickel matrix 
has a thickness of 14 to 22 m and the 
particles have a mean size of 35 m. 
The complete thickness of the shim 
corresponds to 0.185 mm. At mounting, 
the diamonds are pressed into the 
counter surface and micro-positive 
contact is generated. According to 3M, 
static friction coefficients  of up to 0.6 
are possible. This creates the possibility 
for lightweight compact designs while 
the potential load and peak torque in 
bolt connections could be increased 
(3M, 2015a, 2015b, p. 2, 2015c). 
 
 
Figure 63: 3M Friction Shim (3M, 2015a, p. 1) 
Blank Flange Coupling 
Flange couplings, in particular, rigid 
non-shiftable types, are used to trans-
mit the operating torque in industrial 
drive trains by frictional connections. A 
defined amount of screw connections 
generate a preloading and thereby a 
strong joint between the two flanges 
that ultimately transmits the power. 
Most common is the material combina-
tion of steel-steel or steel-cast iron. In 
the case of blank flange couplings, 
according to technical literature, the 
friction coefficient for these material 
combinations range from  = 0.12 to 0.2 
(Baumann, 2009, p. 1; Gläntz, 2011).  
 
Figure 64: Blank Flange Coupling (Kurzawa, 1993) 
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Shrink Disc 
Shrink discs produce force-fit shaft-hub 
connections. In the case of linking the 
rotor with the generator shaft within 
the drive train of a wind turbine, the 
shrink disc has to be integrated into the 
generator shaft. Due to the tapered 
surfaces of the exterior components the 
inner diameter of the shrink disc will be 
reduced by axial displacement. A corre-
sponding interference fit between the 
shaft and the hub is generated. Thus, 
the shrink disc is not within the power 
flux as the torques and forces are 
transmitted at the joining surfaces of 
the shaft and the hub by force fit 
(Ringfeder, 2015). 
 
Figure 65: Shrink Disc (Michel, 2011) 
The required preload will be applied hydraulically. It is possible to use a hydraulic hand pump, as 
only a small amount of oil is needed to generate the required pressure (Michel, 2011). 
Relative Advantages 
To gain the relative advantages of the SKF Friction Disc compared with the alternatives, eight 
evaluation criteria have been established in consultation with a team member of the Friction Disc 
project at SKF: power transmission, robustness of solution, downsizing potential, cost saving poten-
tial, assembly/disassembly process, resistance to environmental impacts, design leeway, and price. 
The analysis is carried out with respect to the blank flange coupling as this is the de facto standard 
joint in the field. 
Power Transmission 
Power transmission is dependent on the strength of the joint between the shaft and the hub. The 
working principle of the joints of the Friction Disc, the Friction Shim, and the blank flange coupling 
is the same as all are based on the use of flange couplings and correspondingly frictional connec-
tions. As mentioned before, the two influencing variables of frictional locking are the friction coeffi-
cient and the normal force. The friction coefficient of the Friction Disc equates to a value of at least 
μ = 0.65. In comparison, 3M Friction Shims may have a maximum static friction coefficient of 0.6 
and the friction coefficient of blank flange couplings ranges from μ = 0.12 to 0.2. If a comparable 
normal force is assumed for these three options, the Friction Disc has the highest value, followed by 
Friction Shims and the blank flange couplings. The shrink disc, on the other hand, is generating an 
interference fit which results in the transmission of a very high level of torque (3M, 2015b, p. 2; 
Gläntz, 2011; Michel, 2011). 
Robustness of Solution 
Especially in the case of highly loaded drive trains of wind turbines the robustness and reliability of 
the applied solution is vital. Based on a conservative approach, the friction coefficient of the Fric-
tion Disc equates to μ = 0.65 with this value having been certified by an accredited certification 
organization. Further tests showed even higher results with the conclusion being that the SKF 
solution offers a high level of performance reserves and security against slipping. Furthermore, the 
long-term behavior and variation of the friction coefficient after several assembly and disassembly 
procedures was tested in a demanding application of wind turbines. It was found that the friction 
coefficient just differs slightly and the first prototypes withstood the practical test of two years 
without notable damages (Gläntz, 2011). 3M Friction Shims have been applied, tested, and certified 
by an accredited certification organization within the automotive industry. However, this solution 
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has not been approved yet for the more demanding application of wind turbines that is character-
ized by a completely different load distribution (3M, 2015b, p. 2). Blank flange couplings are the 
conventional standard approach and are thus reliable. But in the case of increasing the power range 
of the turbine, the main dimensions and particularly the screw connections have to be redesigned. 
This is partly due to higher specific loads which may lead to a critical level on individual compo-
nents (Gläntz, 2011). However, shrink discs provide a robust solution in the given power range and 
do not require any maintenance (Ringfeder, 2015). 
Downsizing Potential 
As the power class of wind turbines has increased massively over recent years, keeping the weight 
of individual items within the nacelle under control has become an important issue. Higher power 
transmission requirements lead to the need for more bolted joints and thus, bigger dimensions of 
the flange coupling. The SKF Friction Disc could help to solve this challenge. For the wind turbine of 
SKF’s customer, it was possible to significantly reduce the number of bolted joints at the same 
power transmission capacity. Thus, the main dimensions of the flange, the gearbox housing, and the 
neighboring bearings could be reduced resulting in a significant weight reduction (Gläntz, 2011). 
Equally, the usage of 3M Friction Shims enables a reduction of the component sizes and weights 
and hence the weight of the complete drive train. Compared to the Friction Disc, this reduction is 
less due to the lower power transmission capacity (3M, 2015b, p. 1). Concerning the high compo-
nent weight of shrink discs, there is no overall weight reduction potential. Instead, the overall drive 
train becomes heavier when using shrink discs (SKF, 2014d). 
Cost Saving Potential 
Due to the reduction in dimensions resulting from the Friction Disc and the Friction Shim, a consid-
erable amount of costs for the individual components could be saved. Furthermore, shrink discs 
and the Friction Disc have lower requirements regarding the surface tolerances. Thus, certain cost 
savings during the production process of the shaft and the flanges could be realized (SKF, 2014b; 
3M, 2015b, p. 1; Ringfeder, 2015). 
Assembly/Disassembly Process 
One key customer requirement is multiple usages, at least five to six times, of the utilized compo-
nents. Consequently both, the assembly and disassembly processes are important factors for the re-
usability of a potential solution. When using conventional flange couplings, the assembly process 
requires specialized tools to generate the required preload. In the case of disassembly, specialized 
tools are also needed, as the joints have often experienced severe wear or even massive seizure. 
The Friction Disc allows comparatively easy, cost effective assembly and disassembly procedures. 
For hydraulic shrink discs, both processes are even easier as the use of hydraulic hand pumps 
allows straight forward easy handling. Friction Shims, on the other hand, are not as simple to 
handle. In particular, fixing during assembly is more difficult. In general, multiple usages are possi-
ble, but sometimes the foils stick at the flange surfaces and are not easily removable (SKF, 2014b, 
2014d; 3M, 2015b, p. 1; Gläntz, 2011; Ringfeder, 2015). 
Resistance to Environmental Impacts 
The joint fit has to resist environmental effects like moisture, contamination or salty air. Corre-
spondingly, blank flange couplings face some problems as these influences could ultimately lead to 
a seizure. Friction Discs and Friction Shims are comparatively insensitive against contamination 
and even friction-reducing media. In the case of shrink discs, the fitting surfaces have to be cleaned 
before mounting. However, at the run time no dust, contamination or moisture should reach the 
functional surfaces (3M, 2015b, p. 1; Gläntz, 2011; Ringfeder, 2015). 
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Design Leeway 
The required safety factors for wind turbines with given external forces and torques give just little 
leeway for designers to create innovative solutions. Thus, the blank flange coupling concept and 
equally the shrink disc concept dictate the corresponding embodiment design. In contrast, the 
higher power transmission capacity of the Friction Disc and the Friction Shim allow new opportuni-
ties to be realized within the design process. As the Friction Disc is able to transmit higher forces 
and torques than the Friction Shim, the Friction Disc reached the highest level of the four alterna-
tives regarding design leeway (SKF, 2014d; 3M, 2015b, p. 1; Gläntz, 2011). 
Price 
With regard to the price level, the whole technical system has to be considered in the evaluation. 
Therefore, the price for a standard flange coupling has to be added to the prices of the individual 
components of Friction Shims and Friction Discs. Thus, the lowest price is generated by blank 
flange couplings as no additional components are required. Compared with the Friction Disc, 3M 
Friction Shims are cheaper. Shrink Discs exhibit the highest overall price (SKF, 2014b, 2014d; 
Baumann, 2009, p. 1). 
Overview of the relative Advantages of the Friction Disc 
To gain a better overview of the relative advantages of the Friction Disc, the different technological 
alternatives have been evaluated with respect to the degree to which they meet the eight evaluation 
criteria on a ten-point scale (cf. Figure 7). 
 
Figure 66: Overview of Relative Advantages of the Friction Disc 
The unique advantage of the Friction Disc compared to its alternatives is the great downsizing 
potential for the wind turbine that ultimately can lead to a huge cost saving. The Friction Disc offers 
much leeway for the designer and opens up great opportunities to create new and innovative 
solutions. However, the corresponding price of the Friction Disc has to be considered. Regarding 
the global trend of massively increasing power classes for wind turbines, particularly offshore, the 
Friction Disc offers a great opportunity for keeping the overall weight within the nacelle to a mini-
mum. In general, it is essential for the ultimate success of a radical technological innovation to 
clearly address the key requirements and needs of the target market. Therefore, the specific target 
market of the Friction Disc will be assessed in the following chapter. 
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Target Market 
The field of application for the Friction Disc is heavy mechanical engineering. Initially, the wind 
industry was addressed as a first target market. In 2006, the development was started for Senvion’s 
3.3-megawatt onshore turbine. SKF and its customer established a development contract and 
assured mutual exclusivity within the wind industry. Thus, SKF became single supplier (SKF, 
2014b, 2014d; Law, 2012, p. 5; Senvion, 2014, p. 1). 
Senvion is a global manufacturer of onshore and offshore wind turbines. Its product portfolio 
comprises wind turbines with nominal powers of 2.0 to 6.15 megawatts. The company’s core 
expertise lies in the production and installation of wind turbines. SKF’s customer develops, manu-
factures, sells and erects. With more than 3,700 employees it has installed more than 6,100 wind 
turbines globally. By 2014, the company has in Germany a market share of 9% in terms of installed 
wind turbines (IWES, 2015, p. 40, Senvion, 2015a, p. 10, 2015b). 
 
Figure 67: German Market Share of Onshore Wind Turbines by 2014 (IWES, 2015, p. 40) 
Industry Context 
The industry of the Friction Disc technology has been mainly positive. Wind energy has been clearly 
on the rise. During 2014 more than 51 Gigawatt’s installed capacity have created an unprecedented 
increase. In Germany, the share of electricity generated from wind energy made up nearly 10% of 
the gross electricity consumption. With 28%, overall the renewable energies delivered the highest 
share of the gross electricity consumption compared to any other energy source in 2014. Politically, 
these are important steps for the intended energy turnaround (IWES, 2015, p. 5). Consequently, 
this resulted in a clear trend towards larger power plants and massively increased power ranges. 
The challenge of minimizing the individual component weights within the nacelle presents a huge 
opportunity for the SKF Friction Disc (SKF, 2014b; Gläntz, 2011). 
However, there were also factors that hamper the acceptance of the Friction Disc in the industry. By 
2008 and 2009, the global economic crisis reduced the confidence of the team and hence the speed 
of implementation (SKF, 2014d). 
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Competitive Situation 
SKF is single supplier of the Friction Disc. Consequently, no other competitor is allowed to deliver a 
similar product for this specific application (SKF, 2014d; Law, 2012, p. 5). Thus, SKF has just to 
compete with its technological alternatives which have been introduced and compared previously. 
However, SKF needs to be aware of emerging and established market rivals that potentially could 
offer alternatives to their innovation (Schilling, 1998, p. 277). 
Market Barriers 
A general prerequisite to entering the wind energy market is the certification process. Any tech-
nical product has to be certified by an accredited certification organization before being used in a 
wind turbine and this also applied to the Friction Disc. Together with the TU Chemnitz, SKF applied 
and tested the friction coating. Ultimately, the team managed to achieve the required certification 
and thereby the permission to enter the market (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). Further market barriers were 
the requirements of SKF’s customer, but SKF was able to satisfy the customer needs (SKF, 2014b). 
Opportunity 
Due to the mutual exclusivity contract of SKF and its customer, the success of the Friction Disc was 
clearly linked to the success of SKF’s customer. Their 3.3-MW wind turbine was characterized by 
competitive energy efficiency, weight distribution advantages, reliability, and size. In profitability 
assessments of potential investors, the turbine was well ranked. This ultimately led and still leads 
to good sales figures for SKF’s customer (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
As mentioned previously, the wind energy industry is clearly on the rise. In the last few years, there 
is a clear trend to more powerful wind turbines. By 2014, the 3 to 4-MW class turbine size had 
considerably expanded and nearly reached the same installation rate as 2 to 3-MW class turbines. 
The latter category dominates the market (IWES, 2015, p. 38, 2015, p. 36). By then, the achieved 
volumes supported the commercialization of the Friction Disc and pushed its success. However, as 
this trend further evolves the 3.3-MW turbine may be outdated in the near future (SKF, 2014d). 
Besides the wind industry, there are additional opportunities for the Friction Disc particularly in 
applications where the requirement is to transmit high torques by rigid couplings, e.g. in industries 
like rolling mills, turbo-machines, marine and marine renewables, or power plant constructions 
(SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
Organization 
The Friction Disc has been developed within SKF Germany. The SKF Group is a leading global 
supplier of products, solutions, seals, mechatronics, services associated with roller bearings, and 
lubrication systems (SKF, 2015, p. 1). By 2014, the company had more than 48,500 employees and 
generated net sales of 7.6 billion € (SKF, 2015). In 2006, the project was initiated within the inno-
vation department Flexi Force and was later transferred to the project management department 
New Business. Following on from this, it was carried out by a cross-functional/divisional team 
(SKF, 2014d). 
Strategy 
SKF’s vision in the recent years is “[t]o equip the world with SKF knowledge. To take all the 
knowledge gained over more than 100 years to develop and deliver products, solutions and services 
which enable customers to be more successful and profitable in their business” (SKF, 2015, p. 29). 
Therefore, the company established the SKF Care strategy model with four dimensions: Business 
Care, Environmental Care, Employee Care and Community Care. These four categories are the 
guiding principles of SKF in terms of how they operate and do business (SKF, 2015, p. 11).  
Appendix III – Primary Case Studies 
223 
For the Friction Disc project, Business Care and Environmental Care were especially relevant. 
Within the project, a dedicated customer focus when delivering sustainable value was realized ( 
Business Care). Furthermore, SKF wanted to provide customers with innovative technologies, 
products, and services that reduced environmental impact ( Environmental Care). Both dimen-
sions were perfectly addressed by the Friction Disc. The product offers a great downsizing potential 
for the overall wind turbine drive train that ultimately leads to huge cost savings and reduces the 
environmental impact when serving a renewable energy device (SKF, 2015, p. 11). 
The objectives of Flexi Force and New Business were complemented within the Friction Disc pro-
ject. Thus, the Friction Disc project was actually in line with the SKF group goals as well as with the 
Flexi Force and New Business department goals (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
Structure and Processes 
Since the project started in 2006, there have been two reorganizations of SKF’s structure. As of 1st 
January 2015, SKF merged its two industrial business areas, Strategic Industries and Regional Sales 
and Service to be more efficient in addressing industrial customer needs. Since then, SKF operates 
through three business areas: Industrial Market, Automotive Market, and Specialty Business. Alt-
hough the Friction Disc project was included within the industrial market, finding a suitable prod-
uct home was a challenge for the team (SKF, 2015, p. 35). The standard portfolio of SKF contains 
rolling bearings and units, seals, mechatronics, services, and lubrication systems. As the Friction 
Disc could not be allocated to one of these categories, the former tooling and prototyping machine 
shop was chosen to become product home (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
The product innovation process of the Friction Disc was realized based on the SKF internal New 
Customer Offer (NCO) process. This development process is mainly based on the Stage-Gate pro-
cess according to Cooper and is meant to develop and launch a product for one specific customer. 
This process worked well and allowed enough flexibility for the team. On the other hand, the trans-
fer into series production turned out to be more difficult. The Friction Disc was meant to be a niche 
product. However, the SKF is well positioned to handle high volumes, but the handling of brand-
new innovations is a different challenge due to initially low volumes (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
Company Culture 
The overall company culture within SKF was mainly shaped by a low level of failure acceptance and 
little appreciation for radical innovative initiatives like the Friction Disc. Accordingly, this situation 
presented real challenges for the Friction Disc project. In the beginning, the team had to defend 
their project against tough internal criticism. This situation lasted until the first testing of the 
Friction Disc showed very good results (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
Funding and Commitment 
Initially, it was not easy to persuade project sponsors and stakeholders to support the Friction Disc 
project and invest in validation testing and analysis. It was important for the success of the project 
that the first test results turned out to be positive. Following this, senior management supported 
the project and sanctioned any project expenses without major discussions having to take place. 
Due to the organizational structure of the SKF, project budgeting was difficult from the beginning. 
Especially for urgent cash requirements this situation was unfavorable. Thus, it was essential to 
maintain the high level of upper management commitment so that the team could overcome these 
hurdles. The support from upper management was not only for the funding aspect important but 
also when it came to production priorities. This helped considerably when a short-term availability 
of the manufacturing facilities was required for prototype production (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
Entrepreneurial Team 
During the innovation process, the core entrepreneurial team within SKF consisted of three people: 
an innovation manager, a project manager, and the key account manager for SKF’s customer. The 
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people fulfilling these roles had a high level of experience and professional competence. The inno-
vation manager had very specific knowledge regarding coatings that he gained throughout his 
career as an engineer in the production line. The project manager was very familiar with the tech-
nical aspects and requirements of power transmission applications due to his previous job as an 
application engineer, whilst the key account manager provided insights into customer needs. 
Having these attributes meant that, the team saved a lot of time and costs during the innovation 
process of the Friction Disc (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
Despite several setbacks during the project caused by internal and external skepticism and contra-
dictions, the core team members showed great perseverance. They were highly motivated to bring 
the project to a successful conclusion and were convinced of its potential. Furthermore, they trust-
ed each other and worked as a team (SKF, 2014b). 
After the development contract with the customer was signed, the core team was joined by further 
representatives from production, design, and quality management. Having this broad and profound 
team network in place ensured an efficient innovation process. Due to contrary objectives of daily 
and innovation business, challenges emerged, e.g. in the case of prototype versus high volume 
production on the machines of one manufacturing channel (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
Innovation Process 
Opportunity Identification 
SKF’s key account manager had to constantly have his finger on the pulse when it came to the 
customer and had to monitor the market closely. Therefore, in 2006, he realized that SKF’s custom-
er faced technical challenges during the conception phase of the 3.3-MW wind turbine, the largest 
onshore wind turbine at that point in time. A major challenge was to design the turbine in such a 
way that it was still transportable on the streets. Thus, the customer needed a solution that was 
compact, reliable, and feasible (SKF, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d; Baumann, 2009, p. 1). 
Based on discussions with the customer and joint brainstorming sessions, the core project team 
worked on a possible solution. From this, an idea emerged that a friction increasing intermediate 
disc for flange couplings could enhance the transmissible torque capacity. Until that point in time, 
the intended friction increasing coating procedure had just been applied for relatively small surfac-
es like drills and tools. Thus, the team followed an iterative process to align the application re-
quirements to the product (SKF, 2014b, 2014c). In general, the timing was right as SKF’s customer 
was just developing its new 3.3-MW wind turbine and needed an adequate technical solution (SKF, 
2014b). 
Product Development 
After idea generation, the concept of the Friction Disc had been verified by conduction of several 
preliminary friction tests. The idea had been checked to determine if it had the potential to be 
utilized for bigger surfaces as well. Afterward, during the validation phase, several tests had been 
conducted to optimize the material composition and the particle density of the coating. After proto-
type testing, the Friction Disc had reached application maturity and could be introduced to the 
market (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
Lead User Integration 
SKF’s customer was similarly lead user of this product. According to Eric von Hippel, lead users face 
needs that will be general in a marketplace but face them earlier than those in the mainstream 
market. Furthermore, they benefit significantly by obtaining a solution to those needs (Hippel, 
1986, p. 796). This was the case with SKF’s customer when the company developed one of the 
biggest onshore wind turbines at that point in time and needed a solution to transmit the high 
torques. SKF and its customer initially signed a non-disclosure agreement and subsequently con-
cluded a development contract as a basis for their cooperation. Thus, SKF’s customer was closely 
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integrated into the product development and was updated frequently on a regular basis. A further 
benefit was that SKF had a reference case in the market with the Friction Disc was proving itself in 
a real life running environment. After two years in use, the first Friction Disc prototypes were 
dismantled and showed almost no traces of wear (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
Development Partnerships 
SKF involved two further strategic partners in the development process of the Friction Disc. One of 
these partners was the company that took responsibility for the coating process. SKF deliberately 
selected this company because of their previous experience in coating parts with comparable 
dimensions for industrial use. With optimized parameters high process reliability could be realized 
(SKF, 2014b, 2014d). Furthermore, SKF chose the technical university of Chemnitz as a strategic 
partner for testing the ultimate friction coefficient of the Friction Disc. Previously, SKF had contact-
ed several scientific institutes and universities that were unable to deal with these high values of 
the friction coefficient. The technical university of Chemnitz had the essential equipment and could 
prove their expertise by their participation in several comparable industrial projects (SKF, 2014b, 
2014d). 
Risk and Quality Management 
During the process, SKF undertook a detailed risk assessment and followed a strict quality man-
agement process. As mentioned before, the product innovation process of the Friction Disc was 
based on a Stage-Gate process. Consequently, the progress of the process was constantly reviewed 
at certain milestones by a project committee. Furthermore, SKF has high quality standards for their 
own production and suppliers. This quality standard is realized by detailed specifications for pro-
duction and the final product. The first requirements for the Friction Disc were formulated and 
subsequently validated by having adequate test procedures in place. However, formulating a relia-
ble test procedure for the Friction Disc was one of the main challenges of the product development 
process. Together with the technical university of Chemnitz the team ultimately managed it to 
reliably test the friction coefficient. Based on the validated test results, the internal production and 
the supplier specifications were elaborated (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
An essential part of quality management within the product innovation process is risk manage-
ment. Potential risks from technical as well as from a market perspective were constantly analyzed 
in short intervals by the team. Every risk and its possible countermeasure was discussed and 
subsequently documented in detail (SKF, 2014b). 
Platform Strategy 
The basic result of the Friction Disc product development process that SKF finally achieved was an 
assured coating process. This process could be utilized not just for the Friction Disc, but for many 
other shapes of blanks. There is no geometric limit besides the fact that the parts need to be placed 
in the coating bath. According to the project manager of the Friction Disc project, the interest in the 
power transmission branch is quite high for such friction increasing coatings (SKF, 2014d). 
In general, the Friction Disc is not a standard product that can be used for any application. The disc 
needs to be customized in close cooperation with the customer and depending on the specific 
requirements of the application. However, there is further potential for the Friction Disc within the 
power transmission industry (SKF, 2014c; Gläntz, 2011). 
Intellectual Property 
SKF’s customer is the patent owner and SKF received the license to produce the Friction Disc for 
their own purposes and in any other but not for applications within the wind industry. SKF subse-
quently protected the coating process, its associated measurement method, and the technical 
configuration of the Friction Disc (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
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Commercialization 
Because of the mutual exclusivity regulated in the contractual agreement, commercialization of the 
Friction Disc in the wind industry is limited to this customer. In other industries, SKF is free to 
commercialize (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
Value Proposition and Business Model 
From a customer perspective, the central value proposition of the Friction Disc is the possibility to 
downsize the main dimensions of the powertrain, its associated potential for weight reduction, and 
the simplified assembly process. Since 2009, the Friction Disc is a mature and certified product. 
Correspondingly, the customer can rely on the agreed performance (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
Besides the actual Friction Disc, SKF consults extensively its customers regarding application 
engineering. In cooperation with the customer, each disc needs to be customized with respect to a 
given application. Based on this, the specific Friction Disc is designed. In general, the SKF value 
creation contains product development, application engineering, parts of the manufacturing pro-
cess, and taking the overall responsibility for the final product. For any further value-creating step, 
SKF involves partners (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
Commercialization Partnerships 
According to the structure of the company, SKF is dependent on suppliers. Within the Friction Disc 
project, SKF strategically cooperates with a supplier that produces the disc blanks and with another 
company that takes responsibility for the coating process. SKF and its partners developed an elabo-
rate process for product tracking and documentation that was subsequently realized by them. The 
Friction Disc is sold directly to SKF’s customers. Furthermore, customer service and logistics are 
SKF’s responsibility and the company has full responsibility for distribution (SKF, 2014d). 
Timing 
The timing of market introduction was exactly right as SKF managed to synchronize the develop-
ment process of the Friction Disc with that of the wind turbine powertrain of SKF’s customer. While 
SKF’s customer developed its wind turbine, SKF simultaneously worked on the Friction Disc. Ulti-
mately, the Friction Disc was available on time as a mature and certified product when SKF’s cus-
tomer started series production of their 3.3-MW wind turbine. Regarding time to market, this 
represented a perfect fit for SKF (SKF, 2014d). 
Marketing 
As mentioned before, the former tooling and prototyping machine shop was chosen to be the 
product home. The product home is responsible for marketing according to SKF’s strategy. They are 
required to produce promotional material and provide this to the sales unit for communication to 
their customers (SKF, 2014d). 
A few trade fair exhibitions and some supporting promotional material attracted some customer 
attention. However, to increase customer awareness of the Friction Disc and its benefits, a greater 
focus on marketing should have taken place. In general, this is an essential part of the diffusion 
process of technical products. This is especially true when it comes to radical technological innova-
tions. In these circumstances, a clear explanation of the technical benefits is required if they are not 
intuitively obvious. Therefore, adequate promotional material and marketing help to highlight the 
advantages of the solution (SKF, 2014c, 2014d). 
  




Today, every wind turbine of SKF’s customer in the 3.3-MW-class is equipped with the Friction Disc. 
Since its market introduction in 2009, the yearly sales figures have been constantly rising and by 
2014, a medium three-digit sales number has been reached. The Friction Disc became a particularly 
profitable and sustainable business for SKF and overall it has provided a very good return on 
investment (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
However, notwithstanding the great potential of the Friction Disc for further applications in other 
industries, there are just a few alternative applications that have been equipped with the Friction 
Disc. By now, the wind industry is by far the largest application field. As the Friction Disc is not a 
standard product and can only be applied to the specific customer application, resources are need-
ed for reliable application engineering and design adaption. According to SKF’s strategy, this is the 
task and responsibility of the organizational product home (SKF, 2014c, 2014d). 
Product Performance 
The product performance of the Friction Disc is very high and meets the exact requirements of the 
customer. Several field tests have proven its performance and the friction coefficient which is the 
main feature of the Friction Disc has been certified by an accredited certification organization. Even 
after several years of use, the Friction Disc exhibits no loss of quality and by 2014, SKF had not a 
single return from the customer (SKF, 2014d). 
Efficiency 
The overall efficiency of the innovation process was considered quite high regarding both dimen-
sions – costs and duration. The period between the first customer contact and series production of 
the Friction Disc amounted to a very short duration of 2.5 years. This is due to the fact that SKF and 
its customer synchronized their development processes till the point when series production of the 
3.3-MW wind turbine began. Furthermore, the team took particular care to keep the development 
costs down. The tests of the Friction Disc at the technical university of Chemnitz have been relative-
ly low (SKF, 2014b, 2014d). 
5) Case Study Report – Cryogenic Machining by 5ME 
Technology 
Machining generates heat at the cutting edge due to friction, shearing, and abrasion. The faster the 
cutting speed the higher the heat. With rising heat tool wear and thus, costs increase rapidly. Corre-
spondingly, the heat needs to be dissipated. Any cooling media helps to reduce the cutting heat. 
Traditional flood coolants operate at ambient temperature (+70°F/+20°C) and provide therefore 
insufficient heat removal in cases of particular challenging situations. This could be caused by high 
speed requirements or in the case of machining difficult materials like stainless steel and other 
hard alloys like titanium, hardened steels, or carbon fiber composites (5ME, 2014c; MAG IAS, p. 2; 
MAG IAS, 2012, p. 6).  
In such cases, the cryogenic machining technology of 5ME is able to realize extended tool life, faster 
cutting speeds, and increased material removal compared to conventional coolants. This is possible 
as the cryogenic system operates at a temperature level of -321°F/-196°C giving the cryogenic 
machining a -400°F/-220°C advantage in many processes (5ME, 2014b; MAG IAS, p. 2).  
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This significant difference allows up to five 
times higher processing speeds and a potential 
increase of tool life by the factor of ten in some 
applications (5ME, 2014a, p. 1, 2014b; MAG 
IAS, p. 2). 
In the past, cryogenic machining was difficult 
and costly. Mostly, the liquid CO2 or nitrogen 
was sprayed at high volume at the tool and in 
one ill-fated test the entire workpiece surface 
had been submerged in liquid nitrogen. 
Sprayed systems allowed the nitrogen to 
contact more than the tool and over cool the 
workpiece and the machine components. 
Consequently, it was nearly impossible to 
implement cryogenic machining for larger 
products (5ME, 2014b). 
 
Figure 68: Cryogenic Machining (5ME, 2014i, p. 30)  
In contrast, the 5ME technology (cf. Figure 69) utilizes vacuum jacketed feed lines for transmitting 
small flow rates (~0.04-0.08 l/min/cutting edge) of liquid nitrogen (LN2) at -321°F (-196°C) 
through the machine, through the spindle, and through the tool directly to the cutting edge to 
maximize cooling effectiveness (5ME, 2013, p. 1, 2014b, 2014i, p. 32; MAG IAS, p. 2). 
 
Figure 69: The 5ME Cryogenic-System (5ME, 2014g) 
For an easy handling of the cryogenic sourcing, the liquid nitrogen is stored in a central storage 
location and then fed into the cryogenic machining system. As the system is self-pressurizing, the 
need for pumps and another additional power consuming assets is eliminated. In principle, there 
are three options for storing the liquid nitrogen: individual machine storage for standalone ma-
chines, cellular storage for small cells of two to six machines, or a centralized external storage for 
large-scale installations (5ME, 2014g). 
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The feed system consists of vacuum jacketed feed 
lines from the liquid nitrogen storage to the 
spindle, ram or turret system, depending on the 
machine concept. The feed system is critical to 
seal out ambient heat and deliver the liquid 
nitrogen at a constant temperature level of -321°F 
(-196°C) to its point of use (5ME, 2014g). Within 
the sub-cooler, the liquid nitrogen is cooled down 
to its average saturation temperature (~-292°F/-
180°C at 2 bar) by following the principles of heat 
exchangers. The incoming LN2 is split within a 
valve. The minor part of LN2 (-321°F/-196°C at 0 
bar) cools down the major part that is piped 
through a spiral tube within the sub-cooler (pre-
viously: ~-292°F/-180°C at 2 bar; and after sub-
cooling: -321°F/-196°C at 2 bar). The flow rate of 
LN2 within the whole cryogenic system is con-
trolled with an outgoing valve of the sub-cooler 
which is regulated by the cryogenic control unit 
(5ME, 2014i, p. 35). 
 
Figure 70: Sub-Cooler (5ME, 2014i, p. 35) 
The cryogenic control unit is a programmable numerical control based system. It allows operators 
to program the automatic control parameters for the flow rate of liquid nitrogen through the feed 
system. Depending on the appropriate amount of liquid nitrogen for each individual cutting tool 
type, it is possible to realize the most efficient and cost effective machining process. The control 
system allows an auto override to emergency shut off or avoids an overflow of the system (5ME, 
2014b, 2014g). 
For the 5ME cryogenic system, a specifically designed lance needs to be used. This lance is a vacu-
um insulated tube that is inserted thru the spindle. As the feed lines and the lance are insulated, the 
liquid nitrogen can be transferred through the spindle without influencing the functional tempera-
tures of these critical machine components (5ME, 2014g). This can be realized for new machines or 
for existing machines as the 5ME cryogenic system can easily be retrofitted in the form of a kit into 
almost any existing OEM spindle, turret, or ram (5ME, 2014a, p. 2, 2014g). 
The tools for cryogenic machining need to be specifically designed to interface with the cryogenic 
system for reasons of proper functionality and safety. Correspondingly, 5ME offers a wide range of 
tools specifically designed and insulated to accept liquid nitrogen in the liquid state and keep it 
liquid until it reaches the cutting edge. This ensures an efficient use of the liquid nitrogen and 
optimal cooling at the point of cut (5ME, 2014g). 
Table 15: Technical Data of 5ME`s Cryogenic Machining (5ME, 2014i) 
Coolant Medium Liquid Nitrogen – LN2 
System Output Liquid Nitrogen / Nitrogen gas-mix  – LN2/ N2 
Machining Operations Drilling, Milling, Turning, Reaming, Boring 
Targeted Materials CGI,  Ti, Al, Composites, Hardened/Stainless 
Steel, Alloys, Inconel 
Temperature of LN2 -321°F / -196°C 
Flow Rate ~0.04 to 0.08 l / min / Cutting Edge 
System Pressure ~2 bar (self-pressurizing) 
Available Tools Rotary Cutting Tools, Indexable Cutting Tools, 
Turning Tools, Custom-made Tools 
Feed Lines Vacuum-Jacketed Tube 
Coolant Delivery Through Spindle 
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Feasibility and Maturity 
The LN2 cryogenic machining has been brought into industrial use. Thus, the technology has left the 
laboratory and testing status. According to 5ME’s Cryogenic Engineering Manager, the engineering 
team managed to bring the cryogenic delivery system from an art to a science. Cryogenic flow 
algorithms and math models are used to calculate the appropriate flow delivery for the target 
cooling effect. Now, the system has reached high quality and reliable cryogenic liquid flow. On the 
other hand, the market is not familiar with the technology in depth. Correspondingly, it could 
currently be perceived as not fully mature (5ME, 2014j, 2014n). 
Technological Alternatives 
There are several alternative cooling methods to dissipate the heat generated by the machining 
process. 5ME will target hard to machine materials like titanium, compact graphite iron (CGI), 
stainless steel, and alloys. In the following, technological alternatives will be presented that also 
address this kind of material. According to 5ME, there are five alternatives to the LN2 cryogenic 
machining worth analyzing: conventional flood cooling, high pressure cooling, CO2 cooling technol-
ogy, dry machining with carbides, and dry machining with ceramics / cubic bore nitride (5ME, 
2014k). 
Conventional Flood Cooling 
Currently, the most common method for dissi-
pating machining heat is the conventional flood 
cooling technology (cf. Figure 71). Moreover, the 
flood coolant serves as lubrication medium and 
facilitates the chip transportation. In general, 
two types are differentiated: water-based 
coolants and cutting oils. For the focal 
comparison, water-based coolants will be 
focused. These are emulsions composed of 
petroleum-based lubricant oil (<3%) and water 
as lubricant carrier (>97%). By external feed 
lines, the coolant is piped to the cutting edge at 
ambient temperature and a high flow rate (~30 
l/min – 60 l/min). The coolant recirculates but 
needs to be disposed, after a certain amount of 
time (Pušavec and Kopač, 2011, pp. 639–641; 
Reich and Böswetter, 2002, p. 8). 
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High Pressure Cooling 
High pressure cooling is a technology that 
delivers the fluid with high pressure to 
the tool and machined material. Most 
common is an internal delivery of the 
coolant through the cutting tools, tool 
holders, and spindle interface (Diniz and 
Micaroni, 2007, p. 247; Richt, 2011). 
Depending on the application, it is possi-
ble to employ different pressures 
(Sandvik recommends 80 bar) and flow 
rates (5–75 l/min) by using different 
sized nozzles ( 0.8–1.4mm) (Lawal et 
al., 2013, p. 211; Sandvik, 2010, pp. 5–6). 
The high fluid pressure allows a better 
fluid delivery to the cutting zone, thus 
providing a better cooling effect and 
decreasing tool wear through lubrication 
of the contact areas (Diniz and Micaroni, 
2007, p. 247). Furthermore, high 
pressure cooling has a better chip break-
ability as the jet has, on the one hand, a 
forming effect, and on the other hand, the 
cooled chip is brittle and easy to break 
(Richt, 2011).  
 
Figure 72: High Pressure Cooling (Richt, 2011) 
 
CO2 Cooling Technology 
At the approach of CO2 cooling technolo-
gy, compressed gaseous CO2 is refrigerat-
ed into the liquid phase. The chilled liquid 
is transported through a capillary tube 
through the machine, spindle, tool holder, 
and tool to the cutting edge in a liquid 
state. This is done at a certain pressure 
and at ambient temperature. The cooling 
of the CO2 to a maximum of -99.4°F/-73°C 
occurs at the nozzle, when the CO2 ex-
pands. This technology gains its biggest 
advantages at machining high 
temperature alloys such as titanium, 
Inconel, stainless steel, and composites. 
With this technology, users can machine 
faster or receive an extended tool life 
compared to conventional flood cooling. 
Furthermore, the CO2 cooling technology 
has advantages with respect to environ-
mental, health, and sustainability issues 
(CoolClean Technologies, 2014a; Walter, 
2013). 
 
Figure 73: CO2 Cooling Technology (Walter, 2013) 
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Dry Machining with Carbide and with Ceramics / Cubic Bore Nitride 
In principle, there are three different tool 
materials used for dry machining of hard 
materials: carbide, ceramics, and cubic 
bore nitride (CBN). Carbide tooling can 
cut material with hardness up to 55 on 
the Rockwell hardness scale (HRC). From 
the hard-to-machine materials, carbides 
are mainly used to cut titanium. Ceramic 
and CBN inserts work well when hard-
ness exceeds 50 HRC. For example, 
ceramic tools are used for machining 
Inconel 718 and CBN for hard turning 
processes. Furthermore, ceramics and 
CBN need to be dry, as they may crack in 
case of cooling due to high thermal differ-
ences. As dry machining with ceramics 
and CBN mainly exhibits the same charac-
teristics, it makes sense to treat them as 
one single technology category (5ME, 
2014k; CIM, 2011). 
 
Figure 74: Dry Machining (Machinery Market, 2013) 
At the process of dry machining in general, there is no usage of any coolant. Correspondingly, this is 
ecologically desirable and offers cost reduction opportunities as the conventional coolant infra-
structure is made obsolete. As the friction and adhesion between chip and tool tend to be higher at 
dry machining, the temperatures and wear rates are higher and consequently, the tool lives shorter 
(Galanis et al., 2008, p. 91). Just getting rid of the cooling system and simultaneously keeping the 
previous manufacturing parameters, will not be successful (Reich and Böswetter, 2002, p. 9). For 
efficient manufacturing, the tools need to be specified with respect to materials and geometry 
(Kissler, 2004, p. 18). To gain reliable control over chip formation, it is necessary to use cutting 
inserts with, especially adapted chip shaping grooves (Galanis et al., 2008, p. 92). 
Relative Advantageousness 
To gain the relative advantageousness of the LN2 cryogenic machining of 5ME with respect to the 
existent cooling alternatives, ten evaluation criteria have been established in consultation with 
5ME’s Cryogenic Engineering Manager: ability to machine tough material, tool life, cycle time, 
product quality, health and safety, environment and sustainability, investment costs, running costs, 
uptime/downtime, and construction change of machine infrastructure. The analysis is carried out 
with respect to the conventional flood cooling technology as this is the de facto standard technology 
in the field (5ME, 2014k). 
Ability to Machine Tough Material 
Advanced engineering materials, such as titanium, special alloy, and some stainless steel offer a 
unique combination of properties like high strength, resistance to chemical degradation, and wear 
resistance. Therefore, these advanced materials are being frequently requested in industry. One of 
the main obstacles towards the fast commercialization of these materials is the difficulty in machin-
ing them to required shapes and the related high machining costs. These difficulties are due to the 
high heat generation at the energy intensive machining process and the relatively low thermal 
conductivity of these materials (Wang and Rajurkar, 2000, p. 168). The latter attribute makes it 
difficult to transport heat away from the machining area and consecutively promoting thermally-
related wear. Accordingly, the ability to machine these materials depends on the cooling ability of 
the considered technology (Richt, 2011; Su et al., 2006, p. 760). As the high cutting temperature acts 
close to the cutting edge, the LN2 cryogenic machining of 5ME is advantageous compared to its 
alternatives. The LN2 is indirectly applied to the cutting edge at -321°F/-196°C. Traditional flood 
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coolants have temperatures around +70°F/+20°C, giving cryogenic machining a -400°F/-220°C 
advantage (5ME, 2014b). The cooling with CO2 happens at -99.4°F/-73°C next to the cutting edge 
what corresponds to a -220°F/-140°C advantage for 5ME`s technology (Walter, 2013). High 
pressure coolants have the same temperature level as conventional flood coolants, but due to their 
high pressure and optimized nozzle design, the coolant is closer delivered to the cutting edge than 
with conventional flood cooling. In contrast to carbide, ceramics and CBN resist a high amount of 
heat and are accordingly appropriate for machining tough material (5ME, 2014k). 
Tool Life 
Metal machining produces extreme temperatures that are the primary cause of tool failure. By 
using the cryogenic system of 5ME, an increased tool life of up to ten times the tool life of conven-
tional flood coolants could be realized. Longer lasting tools allow decreased direct costs for each 
part (5ME, 2014f). Within diverse test runs, 5ME could realize a tool life increase of ten times for 
compacted graphite iron, three times for titanium, and a 40% increase for diverse composites 
(5ME, 2014e). For the CO2 cooling technology, several studies showed a potential tool life increase 
of 20%-200% depending on the machined material (CoolClean Technologies, 2014c). Similarly, the 
application of coolant at high pressure could increase the tool life up to three times (Lawal et al., 
2013). For dry machining, the tool life of ceramics and CBN are comparatively limited, but the tool 
life of carbide is worst (5ME, 2014k). 
Cycle Time 
Besides the tool life, the machining cycle time is one of the main factors influencing process profita-
bility. With the 5ME cryogenic machining, it is possible to run two to five times faster for hard-to-
machine materials than with conventional cooling. For compacted graphite iron a five times in-
crease in finishing cutting speed, for titanium a two times increase in semi-finish cutting speed, and 
for steel alloys a 1.6 times increase in semi-finish cutting speed could be realized with the LN2 
cryogenic system compared to conventional flood cooling (5ME, 2014a, pp. 1–2). The CO2 cooling 
technology enables 20-75% faster cycle times and with high pressure cooling approximately 40% 
faster cycle times are possible compared to flood cooling (CoolClean Technologies, 2014b; Sandvik, 
2010, p. 11). As the machining heat rises with increasing speed and similarly tool wear, just a low 
cycle time level is realizable with carbide tooling at dry machining. With ceramics and CBN very 
high cutting speeds and correspondingly cycle times are possible (5ME, 2014k; CIM, 2011). 
Product Quality 
As the addressed materials are hard-to-machine, product quality is an important distinguishing 
characteristic for the alternative technologies. Test results of 5ME have shown that their LN2 cryo-
genic machining solution has improved overall surface integrity and part quality. Benefits such as a 
reduction in white layer, grain boundary distortion, and burr formation have been especially im-
portant for the aero structure and aero engine customers (5ME, 2014f). 5ME states that according 
to their tested parts, the LN2 cooling technology has produced smoother and more reliable finished 
items than traditional cooling methods (5ME, 2014c). CoolClean technologies, a provider of a CO2 
cooling system, report of their ChilAire System to leave a good finish after machining. According to 
their website, the system produces a superior surface finish that frequently will not require a finish 
cut (CoolClean Technologies, 2014b). Due to low cutting forces generated by the improved cooling 
and lubrication ability of high pressure cooling, surface finish is at a high level and free from physi-
cal damages (Lawal et al., 2013, p. 211). In dry machining operations, cooling and lubrication 
functions are not available. By comparison, wet machining has correspondingly better part quality 
and less tool wear than dry machining. For carbide tools, this difference is significantly bigger than 
for ceramic and CBN inserts (5ME, 2014k; Galanis et al., 2008, pp. 91–92).  
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Health and Safety 
In conventional machining, the coolant emulsions are containing mineral oil and surfactants based 
on petroleum (Pušavec and Kopač, 2011, p. 639). Prolonged contacts of machine operators with 
these cutting fluids may cause skin and respiratory diseases (Su et al., 2006, pp. 760–761). There-
fore, special care needs to be taken in case of conventional flood coolant for reasons of health and 
safety. As high pressure cooling utilizes the same coolant, these technologies range on the same 
level. LN2 cooling has significant advantages with respect to safety and health related issues. When 
liquid nitrogen touches the air, it evaporates, leaving only nitrogen, a safe, breathable, non-
flammable gas which makes up 78% of the air we breathe. There is no contamination of the work 
environment in the form of fumes and slippery surfaces (5ME, 2014f). The only health concern is 
that there is too much nitrogen, but this risk is minor (5ME, 2014m). Similarly, the use of the CO2 
cooling technology eliminates these coolant issues and reduces health risks. As CO2 is a greenhouse 
gas and less healthy than LN2, this technology has been ranked below 5ME`s technology. For both 
dry machining categories, there are no concerns with respect to hazardous coolants or further 
safety issues like technology education requirements (Galanis et al., 2008, p. 91). 
Environment and Sustainability 
Conventional flood coolants have many drawbacks which negatively impact the environment and 
sustainability during their production, use, and disposal. Flood cooling may lead to workpiece 
contamination and environmental hazards (5ME, 2014f). An improper disposal of cutting fluids 
could result in ground, water, or air pollution (Su et al., 2006, pp. 760–761). Aggravating this situa-
tion, there is increased energy consumption with high pressure cooling leading to an even worse 
evaluation compared to conventional flood cooling. Since the LN2 cryogenic machining and the CO2 
cooling technology cut without coolant, there is no need for mist collection, filtration, or disposal of 
coolant waste. Energy consumption is lower without coolant fans, pumps, and drives. In addition, 
chips and workpieces remain dry and uncontaminated for a safer work area and easier recycling 
(5ME, 2014f; CoolClean Technologies, 2014a). In contrast to the greenhouse gas CO2 of the corre-
sponding cooling technology, the evaporated nitrogen of the LN2 cryogenic machining technology is 
a non-toxic, breathable, atmospheric, non-greenhouse gas (5ME, 2014a, p. 2, 2014b). By not using 
any cutting fluid, dry machining (carbide and ceramics/CBN) is ecologically desirable and corre-
spondingly obtains the highest evaluation (Galanis et al., 2008, p. 91). 
Investment Costs 
The cryogenic system of 5ME could be realized for existing machines just like for new machines. 
Correspondingly, the investment costs for both business cases need to be distinguished. Existing 
machines will be retrofitted by adding a cryogenic retrofit kit. Thus, the costs for this kit are an 
additional investment if you start with a conventional flood cooled machine. Nevertheless, if you 
want to turn to any of the other cooling alternatives (high pressure, dry, CO2), there are also chang-
ing costs that need to be considered. At the focal analysis, the focus will be on the investment costs 
for a new machine (5ME, 2014m, 2014a, p. 2, 2014g). 
As the cooling alternatives should be compared, the costs for the underlying machine will not be 
considered. For dry machining with carbides, there are no additional elements and accordingly 
costs. This is the case for dry machining with ceramics/CBN as well, but the cutting tools itself cost 
more. A conventional flood cooled machine is equipped with a coolant pump, a coolant tank, and a 
filtration system for the used coolant. According to 5ME’s Cryogenic Engineering Manager, the 
equipment of the cryogenic LN2 machine (sub-cooler, tank, controller, tools) would currently cost 
roughly 25% more than a conventional cooling system. While launching this new technology into 
the market, this issue is one of 5ME`s challenges and the company is continually reducing the costs 
of its cryogenic system. However, according to 5ME the customers’ cost benefit outweighs their 
investment. The high pressure system would add high pressure pumps to the conventional cooling 
system and possibly an increased coolant tank. The CO2 system (tank, pump, controller, tools) costs 
less but is slightly more expensive than a conventional coolant system (5ME, 2014k, 2014m). 
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Running Costs 
The running costs for the traditional cooling system mainly include the costs for coolants, coolant 
disposal, energy costs, personnel costs, and costs for tool exchange. The coolant recirculates at a 
high flow rate (~30 l/min – 60 l/min) but needs to be disposed after a certain time period (Pušavec 
and Kopač, 2011, pp. 639–641; Reich and Böswetter, 2002, p. 8). Disposal of these coolants is costly 
and time-consuming. In the case of LN2, CO2, and the two dry machining alternatives, these disposal 
costs do not incur, at high pressure cooling they do. Conventional cooling requires pumps and 
filters which increase energy consumption. This is worse for high pressure cooling, as this technol-
ogy demands, even more, energy. The cooling methods LN2, CO2, and the two dry machining tech-
nologies consume much less energy. Personnel costs incur at all technologies and will not be fur-
ther considered. Costs for conventional tools are on the same level for the technologies convention-
al flood cooling, high pressure cooling, and CO2 cooling. Currently with low production volumes, the 
tools used for LN2 cooling are approximately 20-30% more expensive than conventional tools. With 
higher volumes this price difference can be reduced by another 50%. Ceramics are expensive, but 
carbides and CBN are most expensive. Multiplied with its tool life the corresponding tooling costs 
for each technology could be calculated. With a flow rate of ~0.04-0.08 l/min/cutting edge and 
costs of 0.06$/l, the LN2 coolant is comparatively cheap. CO2 is consumed at high volumes and 
accordingly high costs. In summary, LN2 cooling has the lowest running costs, followed by dry 
machining with ceramics/CBN, CO2 cooling, dry machining with carbides, conventional flood cool-
ing, and high pressure cooling (5ME, 2014j, 2014k, 2014f, 2014i, p. 51; CIM, 2011). 
Uptime / Downtime 
One of the critical parameters of process productivity is uptime respectively downtime of a ma-
chine. 5ME conducted an analysis of reasons for machine downtime. According to 5ME’s Cryogenic 
Engineering Manager, more or less two thirds of all machine downtimes could be associated with 
coolant issues: problems with coolant pumps, coolant filtration, or coolant chips. These problems 
do not occur at LN2 cooling, CO2 cooling and dry machining technologies. Nevertheless, 5ME has not 
run production enough to understand if there are some preventative maintenance issues to consid-
er (5ME, 2014m). Another important influence parameter on downtime is the necessity of tool 
change. Each time a tool fails, the machine needs to be shut down, the tool removed, a new tool 
located, installed, and then the program needs to be restarted. This causes productivity loss and can 
be directly attributed to tool life (5ME, 2014f; CoolClean Technologies, 2014b). 
Construction Change of Machine Infrastructure 
According to 5ME, their cryogenic system is brand agnostic and can be applied to almost any exist-
ing process or by retrofitting even to any existing machine (5ME, 2014c). Nevertheless, LN2 cooling 
is a new technology with a new system that causes changes within the existing machine infrastruc-
ture of 5ME`s customers. Changing an operating system commonly causes difficulties, but occasion-
ally offers opportunities on the other hand. 
Most machine tools are designed for wet machining. Accordingly, this is the standard version and 
causes no changing effort (Kissler, 2004, p. 19). Dry machining requires the least modification effort 
of the alternative cooling technologies. Mainly the cutting tools need to be adapted. Hereby, ceramic 
and CBN tools are slightly more work-intensive than carbide tools. Additionally, the cooling system 
can be left away at dry machining which is advantageous from the cost perspective. Equally, this 
could be done for LN2 cooling and CO2 cooling. Concerning CO2 cooling less effort is needed to 
change the machine tool system compared to LN2 cooling (5ME, 2014m, 2014f). 
There are a few prerequisites for integrating high pressure coolant into a machine. The system`s 
seals and valves should be able to handle the high pressure. Moreover, special nozzles and high 
pressure pumps need to be added to achieve the required flow rate. Sometimes an extended filtra-
tion system or a bigger tank is needed. Accordingly, an additional infrastructure needs to be added 
to the existing one for high pressure cooling (5ME, 2014m; Richt, 2011). 
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Overview of the Relative Advantages of 5ME`s LN2 Cryogenic Machining 
To gain a better overview of the relative advantages of 5ME`s LN2 cryogenic machining, the alterna-
tive cooling technologies have been evaluated with respect to the degree to which they meet the ten 
evaluation criteria on a ten-stage ordinate scale (cf. Figure 27).  
With respect to eight of ten evaluation criteria, the LN2 cryogenic machining of 5ME is top ranked. 
Especially, for tough-to-machine materials the technology has great advantages regarding tool life, 
cycle time, and product quality. Accordingly, the productivity of this process is on a very high level 
compared to its alternatives. This becomes additionally apparent if the low running costs and low 
downtime rates are focused which leads to a higher profitability of the focal process. Furthermore, 
LN2 cryogenic machining is a very green and safe technology. Concerning this matter, the technolo-
gy is on the same level as dry machining, as no toxic coolants are used and nitrogen is an atmos-
pheric gas. 
 
Figure 75: Overview of Relative Advantages of 5ME`s LN2 Cryogenic Machining 
The two dimensions in which the technology is among the lowest ranked technologies are invest-
ment costs and construction change of the machine infrastructure. These two characteristics seem 
to be typical for a disruptive, new technology as there are several obstacles and barriers in the 
emerging phase that hamper the market entrance of radically new technologies. According to 5ME’s 
Cryogenic Engineering Manager, 5ME is aware of these issues and is reducing the investment costs 
for the cryogenic system (5ME, 2014m). Equally, 5ME is working on business models to address 
these factors. 
Moreover, in the current emerging phase of this technology, it is essential to address the right 
market segment to gain references in the market and to proof industrial application maturity. 
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Therefore, the selected target market for 5ME`s radical LN2 cryogenic machining technology will be 
analyzed.  
Target Market 
5ME’s long-term vision is to basically eliminate coolants on every machining operation and shift the 
market to cryogenic machining. In the short term, the company is focusing on the difficult-to-
machine materials as these applications gain an intermediate effect from the new technology (5ME, 
2014j). Initially, the biggest benefits for cryogenic machining were found in materials like titanium, 
hardened and stainless steel, gray and compacted graphite iron, and carbon fiber composites. These 
materials are most commonly used for applications such as aero-structure, aero-engines, cylinder 
blocks and heads, pumps, and turbines. Correspondingly, the prime focus of 5ME contains four 
industries: aerospace, oil & gas, automotive, and construction and agriculture. Due to the costs of 
the cryogenic system and the tools, the return on investment is better for larger tools and parts. 
Thus, medium to large size machines with a table size of 500 mm and larger are addressed. Fur-
thermore, a single spindle horizontal machine is preferred, as the gravity would help to transport 
away the chips. In contrast to endless cutting processes, interrupted cuts as they exist in the case of 
milling provide the advantage of tool re-cooling at cryogenic machining (5ME, 2014l, 2014o). 
Since 5ME is located in Cincinnati and Detroit the geographic focus is the Northern American 
market for roughly the first three years. Due to limited resources, the company is in the process of 
attaining a couple of machines as references and commercial successes into running production in 
close proximity, so they could quickly support them. This geographic focus corresponds to the 
location where the machine is brought to production, not where the machine tool builder is head-
quartered (5ME, 2014l, 2014o). 
From a customer standpoint, 5ME follows a two group strategy. One group of customers consists of 
companies that machine parts. They have machines that are already in production and 5ME would 
sell the cryogenic system to them in the form of retrofit kits. The other group of customers consists 
of machine tool builders and machine tool distributors. 5ME will work with them to apply cryogen-
ic machining to their machines before they are shipped to the end-user (5ME, 2014n). 
According to 5ME's Marketing & Product Manager, the company’s target end-users will be those 
working with expensive or difficult-to-machine materials, employing a large number of assets, with 
high costs for consumables and energy, and committed to organizational change (5ME, 2014l, 2013, 
p. 2). 
Industry Context 
The North American industry has just emerged from one of the deepest depths since the great 
depression. This has led to a heightened understanding of 5ME’s potential customers that efficiency 
and productivity are important drivers of global competitiveness and having a sustainable business 
in the end. LN2 cryogenic machining exactly addresses these needs (5ME, 2014l). In November 
2014, the United States and China agreed on targets for carbon emissions reductions for the next 
years during a summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in Beijing (Landler, 2014). This is 
one indicator, inter alia, of the ever stricter laws and regulations addressing environmental impacts 
within the U.S. market. According to 5ME’s Cryogenic Business Development Manager, the Europe-
an market is quite ahead, but environmental impacts get more and more serious in the U.S. industry 
as well (5ME, 2014o). The regulations are not as strict as they should be, but environmental friend-
liness becomes increasingly a central factor in the American industry (5ME, 2014l). 
Compared to its alternatives, LN2 cryogenic machining has great advantages with respect to its 
environmental friendliness. Correspondingly, 5ME has not come across any government related 
regulations that have been a barrier for the technology. In contrast, ever tougher environmental 
regulations have a positive impact on the commercialization of this technology (5ME, 2014o). 
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Competitive Situation 
The internal cooling technique of LN2 cryogenic machining is unique to 5ME. Correspondingly, 
there is no competitive situation with respect to this specific technology (5ME, 2014l). According to 
5ME, it is not competing with other cooling solutions or solution providers to win orders. From a 
product standpoint, 5ME is not seeing a real competitive issue right now. Of course, there are a lot 
of questions relative to alternative coolant methods. 5ME’s job is more about educating and con-
vincing the end-user to change the way they traditionally machine parts (5ME, 2014o). 
Market Barriers 
When entering a market with a new technology obligatory approvals are among the basic barriers. 
These differ fundamentally in the different industries. With respect to the primarily focused indus-
tries of 5ME, the highest requirements for technology approval exist in the aerospace industry, 
followed by the automotive industry. Oil & gas and construction machinery have the lowest re-
quirements (5ME, 2014o). 
Due to the critical nature of the parts that go to an airplane, every change that has been done with 
respect to the materials or the machining process has to be approved by the aircraft manufacturer. 
This is a very time-consuming procedure and also needs to be done with every aircraft manufactur-
er. For example, it took 5ME two years to get the approval by Lockheed Martin for rough and finish 
machining of titanium. Once it is approved, all suppliers are allowed to machine parts according to 
the certified process (5ME, 2014j, 2014o). 
Within the automotive industry, there is no formal certification process, but there are multiple 
phases of technology implementation. After several test rounds, the automotive OEMs run offline 
production for several months to check repeatability and robustness of the technology. As men-
tioned above, the oil & gas industry and the construction machinery have the lowest approval 
requirements. According to 5ME’s Cryogenic Business Development Manager, the single issues 
were operator health and safety. Therefore, 5ME conducted an audit for their first oil & gas custom-
er to remove his concerns if the evaporating nitrogen affects the health of the machine operator 
(5ME, 2014o). 
Apart from the certification requirements, cryogenic machining is a radical new technology that 
requires a lot of change. It is not only changing the machine, but it is also changing the supply chain, 
the tools, and the minds of those who operate and manage the manufacturing operation. Further-
more, the process parameters completely change as the traditional manufacturing rules cannot be 
applied. Understandably, this leads to a great uncertainty on the customer side. Most of the poten-
tial customers want to see references. Once 5ME has established references in each industry, it will 
be much easier to convince new customers to switch to cryogenic machining, but initially, this is a 
barrier to overcome (5ME, 2014j, 2014n, 2014o). 
Another barrier to overcome is the fact that 5ME is a small start-up company with no established 
reputation. Correspondingly, it takes a lot of effort to convince suppliers and customers that 5ME is 
viable and stable. The terms and conditions of contracts to be closed are frequently worse than for 
big companies (5ME, 2014l, 2014n). 
Opportunity 
By 2014, the American metalworking machinery manufacturing industry has rebounded from the 
recession. Dramatic growth in money supply, high and rapidly growing capacity utilization, strong 
and improving business conditions, and a historically high durable goods production have led to an 
increased demand for machine tools. According to the 2015 Capital Spending Survey by Gardner 
Research, U.S. metalworking facilities will spend $ 8.822 billion on new metal cutting equipment in 
2015, an increase of almost 37% compared to the latest estimate for 2014 of $ 6.463 billion (Gard-
ner Research, 2014, p. 2; IBISWorld, 2014). Both, the automotive and the aerospace industry, 
contribute highly to this development. With respect to aerospace, there is a great ramp up of pro-
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duction all across the new generations of aircraft for commercial and military usage over the next 
few years. Boeing is planning to increase the medium-term production of the “Dreamliner 787” and 
the medium-haul aircraft “Boeing 737” significantly. Similarly, the production of the “F-35 JSF” by 
Lockheed Martin and the “A350” by Airbus will be started (5ME, 2014o; Janetzke, 2014). 
The following table indicates the estimated spending on new metal cutting equipment for 2014 and 
2015 of 5ME’s focus industries in the U.S.: 
Table 16: Estimated Spending on New Metal Cutting Equipment in Different U.S. Industries (Gardner 
Research, 2014, p. 4) 





2014: $ 561.1m 2014: $ 167.4m 2014: $ 235.1m 2014: $ 122.8m 
2015: $ 759.3m 2015: $ 307.4m 2015: $ 165.8m 2015: $ 163.3m 
According to Kline, roughly 50% of the companies buying a new machine in 2015 are doing this to 
increase their machine/equipment capacity and roughly 45% want to reduce their costs (Kline, 
2014, p. 21). This motivation corresponds to the main advantages of 5ME’s cryogenic machining. 
Due to the increased demand for production capacity, these national industry trends strongly 
support the establishment of cryogenic machining. 5ME initially expects the market for retrofit 
machines to be bigger than for new machines. As they already have machines on their floor, 5ME’s 
customers can increase their productivity with a reasonable investment. These customers have 
historical data on parts that were running on those machines like tool life and throughput. Corre-
spondingly, it is easier for them to compare and calculate their return on investment. Furthermore, 
there are much more machines in the field that could be equipped with cryogenic machining than 
new machines will be sold over the next few years (5ME, 2014o).  
Several machine tool builders are very interested in 5ME’s technology. However, most of them wait 
until their customers require new machines with an integrated cryogenic system. Thus, 75% of 
5ME’s focus is on retrofitting machines over the next two years (5ME, 2014l, 2014o). Assuming that 
the resources are available, there are roughly 100 machines that could realistically be retrofitted 
just from the four to five customers 5ME is already working with. From a market opportunity 
standpoint, 5ME’s Cryogenic Business Development Manager assumes that there are probably 
thousands of machines that fit the criteria of cryogenic machining. 5ME expects tremendous de-
mand, once each of 5ME’s focus industries has a cryogenic machine running in production (5ME, 
2014o). 
By now, 5ME has delivered their first cryogenic system to a customer from the oil & gas industry 
and has sold another kit to a machine tool manufacturer. Several positive test runs have been 
carried out during 2014 at 5ME’s Tech Center. On this basis, the company expects to get eight to ten 
incoming orders throughout 2015. If everything goes to plan, 5ME anticipates greater than a 100% 
order increase every year over the next three years. After that, 5ME estimates to have enough 
market acceptance to quicker win further orders (5ME, 2014o). 
Organization 
In July 2013, the non-machinery units of the former MAG IAS machine tool manufacturer were 
spun-off and emerged as 5ME from then on. The new company consists of the former MAG IAS 
business units Cryogenics Machining Technology, Manufacturing Software, and Manufacturing 
Solutions. The company’s facilities are in Cincinnati and Detroit (5ME, 2013, p. 1, 2014i, p. 19). 
Strategy 
Nowadays, manufacturers are under increasing pressure from agile competitors, capacity con-
straints, material cost increases, and skilled labor shortages. To deal with these immense pressures 
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requires achieving optimal machine performance. Therefore, 5ME wants to increase their custom-
ers’ manufacturing efficiency to generate profitable, competitive, and sustainable businesses. This 
vision is reflected in 5ME’s brand name. The company aims to address the five "M's" of man, mate-
rial, machines, methods, and metrics, to improve a manufacturing enterprise's efficiency (the "E") 
(5ME, 2013, p. 1, 2014d).  
5ME composes a suite of technologies, hardware, software, and services to reach higher productivi-
ty, improved quality, and lower working capital for their customers. The company follows a brand 
and process agnostic strategy, and therefore is able to work with all types of machinery and manu-
facturing systems. With respect to cryogenic machining, the long-term strategy of 5ME is to elimi-
nate coolants on every machining operation and establish cryogenic machining as the standard 
machining process. In the short-term, the company primarily targets the difficult-to-machine 
materials (5ME, 2014j, 2014d, 2014i, p. 19). 
Structure and Processes 
The incorporated former MAG IAS business units form the basic pillars of 5ME’s business: Cryogen-
ic Machining, Manufacturing Solutions, and Manufacturing Software. The organization’s structure 
(cf. Figure 76) constitutes accordingly. According to 5ME, at start-up, it was difficult to change the 
culture from the former organizational structure of three separate business units to that of “one” 
company, 5ME. So while 5ME goes to market with three business segments, its operations and 
organization are consolidated with functional managers having companywide responsibility. Fur-
thermore, project managers are directly allocated to projects from each business sector. The follow-
ing centralized functions support 5ME’s business: Engineering, Business Development, Project 
Management, Finance, Regional Sales, and Marketing and Product Management (5ME, 2014d, 
2015). 
 
 Figure 76: 5ME’s Organizational Structure (5ME, 2015) 
5ME’s President emphasized that the organization is very flat from an organizational standpoint. 
For the most part, it is two levels and just a few employees are organized in a third level (5ME, 
2014n). This becomes apparent when looking at the organizational chart (cf. Figure 76). 
Correspondingly, the decision making processes within the company are very lean. Due to the 
flexibility of a start-up, 5ME is able to adapt its technology goals and strategy roadmap very quickly 
according to the feedback of its customers. 5ME has defined concrete business processes that its 
employees follow in their daily work. Furthermore, a business system was established that com-
bines the functionalities of an ERP, CRM, and project management system. Everybody in the com-
pany has access to it and every project, purchase, or customer offer needs to be documented within 
this system (5ME, 2014n). 
Company Culture 
The innovation climate is very good within 5ME. The management team establishes a kind of think-
ing among their employees that everyone does his best to push the technology forward and to 
question the way things have been done traditionally. 5ME’s President stated that there are high 
risk tolerance and failure acceptance in the company. He said the team has innovated and devel-
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oped a lot by mistake. There is no detailed road map for each test. The technology goals are set and 
the team can freely innovate to achieve this goal. Afterward the results need to be documented and 
understood. 5ME’s President emphasized that if you tell people exactly what they should do and not 
accept any other way, you would limit creativity. By giving them the authority to try things and use 
their best judgment, great innovations are achievable (5ME, 2014n). Furthermore, the whole team 
is absolutely committed to the technology and the company. Everybody within 5ME believes in the 
technological advantages of cryogenic machining and provides the passion and the drive to make it 
a success (5ME, 2014l). 
Another issue contributing to a vital innovation climate within a company is internal communica-
tion. 5ME’s management team evaluates the internal communication within 5ME as good. When the 
company was started, there were three separate businesses and the management team worked 
hard to make it one company. Communication in written and verbal form is very important. Within 
the projects, there is formal communication on a weekly basis. Additionally, for reaching high 
transparency and visibility among all team members, project reports have to be written and any 
important information needs to be documented in the business system. This promotes efficient 
communication as just the decisive questions arise (5ME, 2014n). 
Funding and Commitment 
During the time at MAG IAS, the development of the cryogenic machining technology was funded as 
a part of the company’s R&D budget. The owner of the previous company MAG IAS and investor of 
the technology since the spin-off is the owner of 5ME (5ME, 2014n). 
5ME estimates that it will take millions of dollars to take cryogenic machining technology to the 
mainstream market. Break-even sales will not be achieved in the first two full years of the compa-
ny’s business (5ME, 2014n). In the face of this risky endeavor, strong management and owner 
commitment are essential. 5ME’s owner and the management team are absolutely committed to the 
technology and the company. It is their vision and passion to commercialize this technology and 
turn it to the mainstream machining technology (5ME, 2014l, 2014n). 
Another funding source for 5ME to develop cryogenic machining is customers. 5ME’s goal is to get 
as much customer funding as possible for financing test runs. Correspondingly, 5ME has primarily 
been focusing on large OEMs and tier one suppliers, as they typically have funds as a part of their 
business budget to test new technologies. 5ME managed to get customer money for most of their 
test runs. Furthermore, 5ME has internal R&D budget. So if the customer funds have been exhaust-
ed and no satisfying results have been achieved, 5ME puts in internal money to complete the test 
runs and come up with a satisfying result. For tool development, 5ME primarily uses internal 
funding to claim ownership to potential intellectual property (5ME, 2014j, 2014o). 
Entrepreneurial Team 
5ME has about 45 employees. The team consists of managers, engineers, and employees that have 
originally worked for the former MAG IAS business units which have been incorporated when 
spinning-off. Most of them have already been engaged in the disciplines 5ME is executing during 
their time at MAG IAS (5ME, 2014n, 2013, p. 1).  
Within the cryogenic machining discipline, the team has been very experienced right from the start 
with respect to their machine tool background and the standard machining operations. Corre-
spondingly, they already knew how to make a chip effectively. To profoundly understand the cryo-
genic part, the theory, and physics behind it, 5ME hired a couple of cryogenic experts. Some of them 
have done their Ph.D. within the field of cryogenic machining. With this combination of knowledge, 
5ME managed to bring the technology from an art to a science (5ME, 2014j, 2014n). 
The engineering team has to focus on the following four issues: safety, quality, reliability, and costs. 
As their product designs are the base for the commercialization of the technology, the cryogenic 
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engineers really have a decisive role. On the other hand, there are people in purchasing and sales 
that negotiate for 5ME to get the costs and profits in the right place (5ME, 2014n). 
At selecting the right people to work for 5ME, two areas are essential: professional competence and 
passion. 5ME’s President elucidates that professional competence is an obligatory precondition, but 
enthusiasm and passion for the focal job are the decisive factors when hiring employees. Potential 
candidates need to be absolutely committed, passionate, and willing to take risks. By now, 5ME has 
not grown the employment base, in spite of the fact that the company is planning to grow. 5ME 
wants to be a 100-million-$-business in five to seven years. However, only after orders are coming 
in, 5ME starts to add headcounts for not consuming too much money during the ramp up phase. 
Currently, if people leave the company, 5ME adds employees in those areas the company is invest-
ing in (5ME, 2014l, 2014n). 
Innovation Process 
Opportunity Identification 
The through-spindle, through-cutting tool LN2 cryogenic machining technology was initially devel-
oped by Creare, an engineering and development firm located in Hanover, New Hampshire. Be-
tween 2003 and 2007, Creare developed and optimized the technology within a U.S. government 
funded Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) project together with U.S. Navy, NavAir, and Bell 
Helicopter to reduce the costs of machining titanium parts (5ME, 2014h; Creare, 2014, p. 1).  
In 2007, a visit of the Creare laboratories was made by MAG IAS management. Once they witnessed 
what Creare was doing with that technology, MAG IAS basically negotiated an agreement with the 
R&D firm to exclusively license the technology which was primarily based on three patents. With 
this agreement, MAG IAS received the right to continue to develop the technology, to manufacture, 
use, and sell it exclusively, globally. From 2007 until 2010, there was a small team formed within 
MAG IAS to take a look at the technology and to start developing it further. The aim was to figure 
out, how the technology could be applied to MAG IAS machines and what the benefits would be. 
This assessment has been done from a technical and a market perspective (5ME, 2014n). 
Between 2010 and 2013, there was more effort and budget put into the development of the tech-
nology within MAG IAS. A team of four people, three technicians and one marketing representative, 
was established at MAG America. It was aimed to get closer to application maturity and to specifi-
cally address the market. Between 2010 and 2011 MAG Germany also started to get involved in the 
development of the technology and mainly replicated what MAG America was doing. Within MAG 
Germany, roughly eight people were involved. The results of technology development have been 
showcased at the industry trade shows IMTS 2010, imX 2011, EMO 2011, and IMTS 2012. Finally, 
the non-machinery company units of MAG IAS were spun-off in July 2013 and emerge as 5ME since 
that time. Spinning-out was due to two main reasons. The first reason was the former limitation to 
just one single machine tool manufacturer. Inside MAG IAS, cryogenic machining could not be 
implemented on machines from other machine tool companies. By taking it outside of MAG IAS, 
5ME was immediately open to other brands and opportunities (5ME, 2014n, 2013, p. 1, 2014h). 
The second reason for spinning out 5ME was the fact that inside MAG IAS, it has not been possible 
to focus on this new technology. Cryogenic machining is radically new. Correspondingly, potential 
customers need to be addressed. Now, 5ME advertises itself as a cryogenic company and has a very 
dedicated marketing focused on the commercialization of cryogenic machining. Within MAG IAS, 
cryogenic machining was only a minor part of the overall company. Accordingly, just a minor part 
of the overall communication efforts was put on cryogenic machining. Furthermore, 5ME estab-
lished a Tech Center in Detroit to show potential customers the technology and to run customer 
tests. Having a dedicated training and testing center was not possible within MAG IAS (5ME, 
2014n). 
Especially in the early stages, commercializing a radical technology like cryogenic machining is 
accompanied by a huge amount of uncertainty (Bullinger, 1994, p. 96). Coping with this uncertainty 
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and being sensitive to the market needs is a precondition for being successful. 5ME is aware of this 
situation that there are many things that they do not know (5ME, 2014o). As the technology is so 
new and different to the standard machining approach, it requires much change and a lot of moving 
pieces (5ME, 2014n). From a market standpoint, 5ME needs to prioritize which industries to ad-
dress first. This should be done with respect to the greatest possible opportunity. 5ME is focusing 
on the aerospace, automotive, oil & gas, and construction industries due to their great opportunities 
for cryogenic machining. A great chance from a customer standpoint offers the F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter (JSF) program in the aerospace industry. The prime contractor of the F-35 JSF program, 
Lockheed Martin, has been involved in the development of cryogenic machining right from the 
start. Lockheed Martin endorsed the technology for machining F-35 titanium components during 
the SBIR program with Creare as the technology’s advantages have been demonstrated. 5ME has 
good relationships with high level decision makers of Lockheed Martin who help to promote cryo-
genic machining throughout their supply chain (5ME, 2014o; Creare, 2012, p. 1). 
Furthermore, the timing for commercializing cryogenic machining seems perfect. Besides the 
opportunities within the aerospace industry, large customers in the automotive and oil & gas 
industry made significant capital investment approximately 15 to 20 years ago and are up to retool-
ing their facilities in the near term. This could be a great chance for 5ME and cryogenic machining 
(5ME, 2014o). 
Product Development 
Lead User Integration 
5ME is addressing two entities of customers, end-users and machine tool manufacturers. The end-
users play a specific role in commercializing this technology. First of all, persuading a well-known 
end-user to turn to cryogenic machining will be a very good reference and testimonial in the indus-
try. It will show acceptance by the industry. An installed machine will leverage the technology and 
can be shown to other potential customers (5ME, 2014l, 2014n, 2014o).  
Especially in the ramp-up phase of a radical new technology, it is essential to have a close relation-
ship with the first users of the focal technology. Not everything goes right at the forefront of tech-
nology implementation. Thus, it is important to find those customers that have the right culture and 
mindset to dare the risks. In the early technology phases, constant feedback is decisive (5ME, 
2014o). 
For 5ME, these early customers play another big role as they fund test runs. Correspondingly, they 
help to offset 5ME’s costs. Furthermore, they shape the applications, the portfolio of products, and 
the types of machines 5ME is targeting on with their feedback. By listening to these lead-users, 5ME 
understands where to commercialize first (5ME, 2014n). 
Due to the obligatory certification process lead-users are even more important within the aero-
space industry. It does not make any sense for 5ME to go to companies that build aircraft parts and 
try to offer cryogenic machining. They do not have the authority to make this change. Thus, 5ME 
directly addresses the aircraft manufacturer and tries to get their approval. Once this has been 
achieved, they would allow their tier suppliers to use the technology. Correspondingly, there is no 
other chance of commercializing the technology to this industry. On the other hand, this opens up 
great chances. Typically, supply chains in the aircraft industry a tightly woven of middle-sized 
companies that are unknown to 5ME. With the aircraft manufacturer leveraging cryogenic machin-
ing, 5ME gets access to a huge pool of companies that all supply parts to these aircraft manufactur-
ers (5ME, 2014j, 2014l). 
Development Partnerships 
5ME established a limited number of strategically chosen development partnerships with several 
customers. When approaching the customers, there has been great interest in the technology, but 
the customers wanted to see the technology in action and get some validated results (5ME, 2014o). 
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Correspondingly, 5ME tries to establish references in each of its target markets. OEMs and machine 
tool builders are the two best references 5ME can have as this would show acceptance by the 
industry. With these customers, 5ME is closely working together during the development phase. 
The company tries to understand their customer’s manufacturing processes in detail and communi-
cate very much on a regular basis (5ME, 2014o). These early customers fulfill two essential roles for 
5ME. Firstly, they fund the test runs at the Tech Center and help to cover 5ME’s development costs. 
Secondly, they deliver essential feedback for product development and furthermore shape the 
portfolio of applications and machines 5ME is targeting (5ME, 2014n). 
Moreover, 5ME cooperated with certain universities at bringing cryogenic machining to practice. 
Several research projects were started to scientifically leverage technology development (5ME, 
2014n). 
Risk and Quality Management 
5ME has not a detailed risk and quality management system, but established some instruments to 
deal with emerging risks and quality issues. Every cryogenic kit that is shipped to customers is 
checked accurately to avoid that the kit would not work and lead to negative publicity in the market 
(5ME, 2014n, 2014o). 
Similarly, 5ME starts to market their technology in the USA in close proximity and cooperation with 
a few well-selected customers. 5ME has concrete criteria to select the right customer to work with. 
In weekly calls, the company supports their customers and wants to figure out if problems occur. If 
any of the shipped kits would run poorly, it could lead to doubt in the technology and draw back the 
progress of commercialization (5ME, 2014j, 2014o). 
For their technology testing, 5ME does not follow a strict formal structure like the design of 
experiment. 5ME directly tests what they estimate to be a successful target. Nevertheless, the 
methodology of running a test is much disciplined. Everything is highly documented and the com-
pany put a lot of importance on the feedback from the result analysis after the test (5ME, 2014j). 
One of the biggest risks of commercializing cryogenic machining is based on the fact that the tech-
nology is radically new. The customers cannot compare it to any existing technology. This leads to 
long sales cycles as the customer needs to be persuaded to take the change and move to the new 
technology. On the other hand, it takes time to develop and engineer the technology adaption to 
different machine platforms. If it is sometimes not possible to quickly show the customer positive 
results based on the parts that they have asked 5ME to test, this may lead to customer frustration. 
Furthermore, 5ME is the single supplier to provide it. So some customers may be afraid of being 
locked to just one supplier (5ME, 2014j, 2014l, 2014o). 
Platform Strategy 
5ME is working towards a platform strategy to share common parts. However, everything up to this 
point has been unique on the first sets of machines that 5ME has equipped. Once the company has 
one or two machines in each of the four primarily addressed industries, 5ME will be in the position 
to sell more of similar or alike machines to those customers and set up a common part strategy 
accordingly. By now, the company has realized standardization as far as possible at this point in 
time. All the elements that do not change based on the size of the machine have been standardized 
like the LN2 storage and the sub-cooler. Apart from that, the lines, the lance, and the tools will all 
vary in size based on the machine types. Any standardization is volume driven. Correspondingly, 
the more machines of the same type will be sold, the more standardization will be possible (5ME, 
2014o).  
On the other hand, tools that have been developed by 5ME are easily scalable. As the design will not 
change for these applications 5ME has already equipped, it is just a matter of scaling. The applica-
tions that 5ME has not done are getting few (5ME, 2014j). 
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Intellectual Property 
5ME puts special emphasize on the protection of its intellectual property. The company is building 
value as intellectual property is developed. This reduces the risk for 5ME’s investors and will pay 
back the investment in the future. The technology of internal cooling was licensed originally to MAG 
IAS from Creare. The foundation for this agreement was primarily three patents that protect the 
internal LN2 delivery through the spindle and through the tool. These patents were transferred to 
5ME and form the base of their technology (5ME, 2014j, 2014n). 
As 5ME has developed optimizations, this justified further patents. Since those original three pa-
tents, 5ME has added another six addressing the technology to prevent people from copying 5ME’s 
system. Any time 5ME comes up with a good idea that has a vital commercial potential, the compa-
ny tries to protect it and files for a patent. Most of 5ME’s patents are on cryogenic machining (5ME, 
2014j). 
Commercialization 
Value Proposition and Business Model 
5ME positions itself on three separate business fields: Cryogenic Machining, Manufacturing Solu-
tions, and Manufacturing Software. Within the Cryogenic Machining, 5ME is evolving its environ-
mentally friendly machining technology to increase throughput, quality, tool life, and profitability 
for its customers while reducing energy consumption and facilitating a safer work environment for 
plant floor personnel. Manufacturing Solutions offer the corresponding portfolio of manufacturing 
consumables like tools and coolants and productivity supporting services. Manufacturing Software 
uncovers inefficiencies and leads to overall process transparency. The three different businesses do 
not depend on but complement each other (5ME, 2014l, 2014n, 2014d). 
From a customer perspective, cryogenic machining offers faster machining times, better surfaces, 
and little to no cleanup or waste compared to traditional cooling methods. There is no need for mist 
collection, filtration or collection of waste coolant. Energy costs associated with coolant fans, pumps 
and drives do not occur. As the equipment and workpieces are not contaminated, secondary pro-
cesses become obsolete and no slippery work surfaces or toxic fumes emerge (5ME, 2014a, p. 2, 
2014c).  
Besides its core product, which is the cryogenic system kit, 5ME supports its customers especially 
during the first few months of production. Application engineers help to bring up the process to 
high efficiency. Furthermore, 5ME is working on a handbook with basic rules and parameters for 
cryogenic machining as the conventional manufacturing rules are obsolete with this new technolo-
gy (5ME, 2014j, 2014l). 
5ME does not manufacture any part of their cryogenic system on their own. Their competence lies 
in the engineering, the designing, and the assembly of the kits. Each component is shipped to 5ME’s 
facility in Detroit and assembled, tested, and shipped to the end-users. A cryogenic kit is typically 
composed of the source, feed, the lance, and the control unit. Usually, kits and cutting tools are 
quoted separately. A general rule of thumb says that the price for a kit accounts to 30 – 40% of the 
price of a new medium-sized or larger machine. Cutting tools are consumables and need to be 
replaced after a certain amount of time. Therefore, the biggest revenue opportunity for cryogenic 
machining is cutting tool related. 5ME tries to establish a business model that can be compared to 
the one of the razors and the razor blades. The razor is sold once and the blades are continuously 
replaced. With every kit come years of revenue for the cutting tools, assuming the machine stays in 
production. As the margins are even higher for the tools, the revenue opportunities of cutting tools 
will be much higher than for the kits (5ME, 2014o). 
The business model would be to generate the main revenue out of the peripheral tooling. Selling the 
cryogenic kits at an entry cost would additionally help to get established as the barriers would be 
lower for customers to step in. Especially in the early commercialization phase, getting kits in 
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production and generating market references is decisive. For additionally lowering the entrance 
barriers and developing further testimonials, 5ME has contemplated leasing kits to special well 
known customers over a certain amount of time (5ME, 2014j). 
Another potential revenue stream could be generated by license fees. By now, 5ME has specific 
partners that manufacture and supply the 5ME-designed cutting tools to them. They subsequently 
commercialize the tools exclusively. Potentially, 5ME could offer particular cutting tool manufac-
turers a license to manufacture 5ME-designed cryogenic cutting tools and market them inde-
pendently to end-users. This requires an appropriately installed base of kits to be interesting for 
cutting tool manufacturers. Thus, this opportunity could evolve in the next year or two (5ME, 
2014n). 
Commercialization Partnerships 
5ME has several strategically chosen partnerships with selected customers. The company focuses 
on these customers to fully support them and closely cooperate at bringing cryogenic machining to 
practice. If any of those projects fails, it could put back 5ME several steps in the process of technol-
ogy commercialization. Correspondingly, 5ME maintains close relations with its customers and 
similarly, expects them to be totally committed to commercializing cryogenic machining. Appropri-
ate customers should enjoy being at the forefront of technology implementation, have the right 
culture, be less risk averse, and allocate adequate resources for the project (5ME, 2014o). 
In principle, there are two entities of customers for 5ME: machine tool builders and end-users. The 
machine tool builders help to leverage cryogenic machining by equipping their machines with this 
technology and offer potential end-users cryogenic equipped machines as an alternative to the 
conventional machines (5ME, 2014n). Among the most cooperative machine tool builders are 
Okuma and MAG Automotive. Both companies have a showroom at their facility and showcase 
cryogenic machining to potential customers on their machines (5ME, 2014l). Between MAG Auto-
motive and 5ME is no legal relation anymore and consequently, there is no difference from a busi-
ness perspective compared to other customers. Nevertheless, 5ME is familiar with MAG Automo-
tive’s product portfolio and MAG Automotive with cryogenic machining. This facilitates the discus-
sion and thus the technology commercialization (5ME, 2014n).  
By addressing the end-users of cryogenic machining, the technology could be spread across the 
entire end user's supply chain. Especially in the case of a very tightly woven supply chain net of 
mainly middle-sized companies potentially unknown to 5ME, this opens up great opportunities for 
5ME (5ME, 2014l). 
5ME’s business model is to design and engineer all parts of the cryogenic system, but not to pro-
duce them. Thus, all components are manufactured by suppliers according to 5ME’s specification 
and shipped to Detroit. In the Tech Center, 5ME assembles, flow-tests, and ships the kits to its 
customers. Therefore, 5ME needs to have competent suppliers. From a component standpoint, the 
suppliers of the lance and the cutting tools need to be very strategic partners as these parts are 
particularly demanding. Correspondingly, 5ME’s development team maintains a close relationship 
with weekly meetings (5ME, 2014j, 2014o). 
Furthermore, 5ME facilitates strategic partnerships to certain universities and industry trade 
publications authors. This supports the publication and subsequently acceptance of the technologi-
cal advantages of cryogenic machining across the industry by scientific and industry-specific re-
porting (5ME, 2014o). 
Timing 
By the end of 2014, the industry in North America, which will be 5ME’s focus over the next few 
years, has just come out of one of the greatest depths since the great depression. The value of 
efficiency and the concept of global competitiveness have become very present and this is beneficial 
for cryogenic machining (5ME, 2014l). 
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Furthermore, some markets are especially interesting for 5ME’s new technology. Above all, the 
aerospace industry is just in front of a huge production ramp up across the new aircraft generations 
for commercial and military use. According to customer data, the available production capacity will 
exceed what directly affects the commercialization of cryogenic machining. For this industry 5ME’s 
Cryogenic Business Development Manager rated 5ME’s timing to be perfect (5ME, 2014o). 
The timing to enter 5ME’s further target industries automotive and oil & gas are good as well. As 
several larger automotive and oil & gas customers made significant capital investments 15 to 20 
years ago, a lot of them are planning to retool their facilities within the next years. This additionally 
fosters the commercialization of cryogenic machining (5ME, 2014o). 
Marketing 
5ME is currently positioning cryogenic machining as a premium solution for niche applications of 
tough material (5ME, 2014l). Due to the early technology stadium, 5ME started to focus on the large 
customers with R&D-funding budgets for testing cryogenic machining to offset their development 
costs. Subsequently, the selling process is slow as the approval procedures within those organiza-
tions are time-consuming. By now, the mode has been to approach interested target customers. 
Then, these customers usually like to see their material being run in the Tech Center to get validat-
ed test results. Afterward, they take these test data and make up a business case by calculating their 
individual return on investment for selling it to their upper management. Not until the investment 
is internally approved, a cryogenic system order is placed (5ME, 2014n, 2014o). 
Since spinning out, 5ME does considerably more marketing. The company addresses the market 
with a new brand-name and positions itself as completely dedicated to manufacturing efficiency 
and cryogenic machining. Within MAG IAS, this was not possible as the parent company was a 
machine tool company and cryogenic machining was just a part of it (5ME, 2014n). By 2014, 5ME 
had a focused marketing approach. The company established a dedicated website with detailed 
information and case studies on cryogenic machining. Furthermore, 5ME leverages social media via 
YouTube and LinkedIn, installed some blogs, and attends several trade shows to exhibit the benefits 
of cryogenic machining (5ME, 2014l). 
Innovation Success 
Sales Performance 
Since foundation, 5ME continues to grow its revenue for cryogenic machining. Thus far, virtually all 
of that revenue was generated by customer testing. The first customer and user machine is already 
shipped and installed and will be going into production in the first quarter of 2015. The second one 
will be shipped by beginning of 2015. Due to positive test runs in 2014, 5ME expects to win another 
eight to ten retrofit orders during 2015 (5ME, 2014o). 
This would start to cover 5ME’s investments. Because of the lead times of these systems, 5ME 
estimates to reach the break-even point for cryogenic machining within 2017. From then on, the 
cryogenic machining business unit will be profitable (5ME, 2014n). 
For 2015, 5ME expects cryogenic machining to be 25% of the company’s total new business. An 
equal revenue share of one third for each of the three business segments is anticipated over the 
next two to three years. By the end of 2018, 5ME estimates cryogenic machining and manufacturing 
software to account for 75% and manufacturing solutions for 25% of the company’s overall reve-
nue (5ME, 2014o). 
Product Performance 
Within the Tech Center, the performance results of cryogenic machining have been successful. 5ME 
had ten to twelve positive test runs for customers during 2014. Different materials were tested to 
run with cryogenic machining on turning centers, horizontal, and vertical machining centers. The 
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results were robust, repeatable, and thus reliable. Furthermore, the involved customers were very 
excited with respect to the achieved test results. Accordingly, 5ME brought cryogenic machining 
into industrial use at its first customer. This machine will be in production in the first quarter of 
2015. Thus, no industry performance data are available by the end of 2014(5ME, 2014n, 2014o).  
However, 5ME received several awards for establishing cryogenic machining: the MM Award for 
Innovation (2011), the New Equipment Digest King Award (2012), and the Frost & Sullivan Best 
Practice Award (2013) (5ME, 2014h). 
Efficiency 
While there is a high investment in the development of cryogenic machining technology, 5ME 
sustains a certain level of income to stay liquid. Therefore, the company has a run rate business of 
tools and coolant it offers through its manufacturing solution business segment and sells machine 
monitoring software through its manufacturing software business segment. Exposures are limited 
within an agreed budget for each year by 5ME’s investor. The achievement of these objectives is 
measured on a monthly, quarterly, and yearly basis and correspondingly adapted (5ME, 2014j). 
To keep the costs down, 5ME tries to get test funding by customers. Most of the test runs have been 
funded by potential customers. For tests that are outside the scope of the customer or tests that do 
not deliver a satisfying result after the customer money was consumed, 5ME has internal R&D 
funding. To keep the intellectual property, tool development is exclusively funded with internal 
R&D-money (5ME, 2014j, 2014n). 
Furthermore, the engineering team saves time and resources by following a smart testing approach. 
Instead of testing a huge spectrum of parameters, 5ME directly targets the highest level of require-
ments. By following this approach, 5ME was able to set several land speed records on different 
materials, i.e. machining these materials faster than anybody ever before (5ME, 2014j). 
However, commercializing this radical technology takes time, as it has a great level of novelty and 
differentness. It took 5ME a whole year to get the first customer on board and the cryogenic system 
into industrial use. Probably, the following ones are faster, but as cryogenic machining requires a 
high level of change on behalf of the customer, 5ME estimates that each sales cycle will take at least 
a period of six months (5ME, 2014n, 2014o). 
5ME is satisfied with its technological development in the short term of cryogenic machining thus 
far. The customer feedback has been good and several customers asked 5ME to quote cryogenic 
systems. However, with respect to the concrete commercialization, the low amount of incoming 
orders is frustrating as 5ME wants to see things happen much faster. One reason therefor is the 
reluctant behavior of the technology adopters that have a lot of questions and fear. On a scale from 
one to ten, 5ME ascribes the technological development a seven and the commercialization a five 
(5ME, 2014n). 
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Appendix IV – Variables and Hypotheses 








Figure 78: Operationalization of the Category “Technology“ 
  




Figure 79: Operationalization of the Category “Target Market” 
Organization 
 
Figure 80: Operationalization of the Category “Organization“ 
  




Figure 81: Operationalization of the Category “Entrepreneurial Team” 
Innovation Process 
 
Figure 82: Operationalization of the Category “Innovation Process“ 
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Appendix V – Quantitative Survey 
1) Survey Wording and Previous Studies 
Table 17: Survey Wording (Dahl, 2015, pp. 93–97) 
Variable Survey Wording Previous Studies Wording within these 
Studies 
Innovation Success 
Sales Figures Der erzielte Umsatz entsprach in 
vollem Umfang den zu Projektbeginn 
formulierten Erwartungen. 
 -   
Market Share Der mit der Innovation erreichte 
Marktanteil entsprach den zu 
Projektbeginn formulierten Erwar-
tungen. 
 -   
Customer Satisfaction Der Kunde war mit der erreichten 
Produktperformance der Innovation 
unzufrieden. 
Mu, Peng, MacLachlan – 
Effect of risk manage-
ment strategy on NPD 
performance 
Overall performance of 
the product is satisfacto-
ry. 
Internal Satisfaction Die Produktperformance der Innova-
tion entsprach den zu Beginn des 
Projektes formulierten Vorgaben. 
Mu, Peng, MacLachlan – 
Effect of risk manage-
ment strategy on NPD 
performance 
The product meets 
intended functions. 
Product Quality Die erreichte Qualität des neu 
entwickelten Produktes war auf 
einem hohen Niveau. 
-  
Speed Die Geschwindigkeit des Entwick-
lungsprojektes war hoch. 
Mu, Peng, MacLachlan – 
Effect of risk manage-
ment strategy on NPD 
performance 
Overall performance of 
the NPD process is good. 
Costs Die vorhandenen Ressourcen wurden 
im Innovationsprojekt effizient 
eingesetzt. 
Mu, Peng, MacLachlan – 
Effect of risk manage-
ment strategy on NPD 
performance 
The cost management of 
NPD is satisfactory. 
In Time Der zu Beginn formulierte Zeitplan 
für das Innovationsprojekt konnte 
nicht eingehalten werden. 
Mu, Peng, MacLachlan – 
Effect of risk manage-
ment strategy on NPD 
performance 
The product reaches the 
market timely. 
In Budget Das zu Projektbeginn kalkulierte 
Budget wurde nicht überschritten. 
-  
Technology    
Performance 
Advantages 
Aus Kundensicht war die Technologie 
leistungsfähiger als mögliche Alterna-
tivtechnologien. 
Cooper, Kleinschmidt – 
New Products: What 
Separates Winners from 
Losers? 
Product offered unique 
benefits to the customer  
- benefits not found in 
competitive products 
Cost Advantages Über die gesamte 
Produktlebensdauer betrachtet 





Reliability & Safety Aus Kundensicht war die 
Technologie verlässlich und 
sicher. 
-  
Technology Potential Die Technologie kann 
grundsätzlich in weiteren 
Produkten eingesetzt werden 
(z.B. in anderen Firmen/Branchen). 
Wind, Mahajan - Issues 
and Opportunities in 
New Product Develop-
ment: An Introduction to 
the Special Issue 
Our NPD focus is 
increasingly on the 
development of product 
platforms, including the 
development of multi-
generation products 
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    Gruber, MacPhearson - 
Look Before You Leap: 
Market Opportunity 
Identification in Emerg-
ing Technology Firms  
Generality of Technology 
Execution Challenges Die technologische Entwicklung 
der Produktinnovation bis zur 
Anwendungsreife war mit 
Schwierigkeiten verbunden. 
Cooper – Identifying 




complexity of the 
product 
Application Maturity Die Technologie wurde schon in 
anderen Produkten (z.B. in 
anderen Firmen/Branchen) 
eingesetzt. 
Fortune, White – Fram-
ing of project critical 
success factors by a 
systems model 
Proven / familiar 
technology 
Investment Efforts Für die technologische 
Entwicklung der 
Produktinnovation bis zur 




Market Size Der ausgewählte Zielmarkt war 
aufgrund seiner Größe 
interessant. 
Cooper - Identifying 




Market Barriers Es gab kaum Barrieren auf dem 
Markt, welche die 
Markteinführung der 
Produktinnovation behinderten. 
    
Environmental Impacts Die externen Einflüsse, z.B. 
politischer oder makro-ökonomischer 
Art, 
behinderten die Markteinfüh-rung 
der Produktinnovation. 
Fortune, White - Framing 
of project critical success 
factors by a systems 
model 
Environmental influ-
ences were taken into 
account successfully 
Competition Es gab bei der Markteinführung 
der Produktinnovation großen 
Wettbewerb auf dem Markt. 
Cooper - Identifying 
Industrial New Product 
Success: Project New-
Prod 
Degree of competition in 
the market 
    Cooper, Kleinschmidt - 
New Products: What 
Separates Winners from 
Losers? 
Intensity of competition 
in the marketplace 
Market Match Aus heutiger Sicht wäre es 
besser gewesen die 
Produktinnovation auf einem 
anderen Markt einzuführen. 
 -   
Timeliness Aus heutiger Sicht betrachtet 
war der Zeitpunkt der 
Markteinführung richtig. 
-  
Market Growth Der ausgewählte Zielmarkt wies zum 
Zeitpunkt des Markt-eintritts gute 




Internal Communication Die interne Kommunikation war 
offen und ehrlich. 
Hoegel, Gemuenden - 
Teamwork Quality and 
the Success of Innovative 
Projects 
Is there sufficiently 
frequent, informal, 
direct, and open com-
munication? 
    C. Brooke Dobni, 
(2008),"Measuring 
innovation culture in 
organizations", European 
Journal of Innovation 
Communications are 
open and honest. 
Adequate Ressource 
Allocation 
Im Rahmen des 
Innovationsprojekts konnten wir 
auf alle für die Umsetzung 
notwendigen Ressourcen 
zurückgreifen. 
Fortune, White - Framing 
of project critical success 
factors by a systems 
model 
All types of resources 
were sufficient and well 
allocated. 
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    Mu, Peng, MacLachlan - 
Effect of risk manage-
ment strategy on NPD 
performance 
There are stable 
monetary and other 
resources for the 
project. 
Management Support  Unser Management half uns 
dabei Hindernisse bei der 
Innovationsumsetzung zu 
überwinden. 
Cooper, Kleinschmidt - 
New Products: What 




management guidance / 
direction for the project 
   Brooke Dobni, 
(2008),"Measuring 
innovation culture in 
organizations", European 
Journal of Innovation 
Our management helps 
break down barriers 
that stand in the way of 
implementation. 
Risk Tolerance & 
Failure Acceptance 
Bei der Innovationsumsetzung 
zeichnete sich unsere Organi-sation 
durch ein Klima aus, in welchem 
Risiken toleriert 
und Misserfolge akzeptiert 
wurden. 
-  
Flexibility Die Organisationsstruktur des 
Unternehmens ermöglichte 
eine flexible Umsetzung des 
Innovationsprojekts. 
Wind, Mahajan - Issues 
and Opportunities in 
New Product Develop-
ment: An Introduction to 
the Special Issue 
Our development efforts 
allow for flexibility and 
the utilization of 
alternative NPD ap-
proaches and associated 
marketing research and 
modeling, depending on 
the specific situation. 
   Mu, Peng, MacLachlan - 
Effect of risk manage-
ment strategy on NPD 
performance 
The firm can respond 
quickly to its NPD plan 
in case of dramatic 
changes. 
Product Home Nach Projektabschluss war es 
schwierig einen 
Zuständigkeitsbereich für die 
Produktinnovation in der 
Organisation zu finden. 
Griffin - PDMA research 
on new product devel-
opment practices- 
Updating trends and 
benchmarking best 
practices 
Which of the following 
best describes the way 
the new product effort is 
structured in your 
organization: 1. New 
product department 
with permanent staff 
members. 2. Distinct 
division or venture 
group. 3. A new product 
committee oversees all 
development efforts. 4. 
Each business unitʼs 
general manager directs 
their own NPD efforts. 5. 
A single function is 
responsible for NPD: 
(Which function?) ( 
R&D, engineering, 
planning, marketing) 6. 
A product development 
process owner helps 
deploy our process 
across the firm. 
Lean Decision Making Die Prozesse zur 
Entscheidungsfindung im 
Rahmen des Innovationspro-jekts 
waren schlank. 
-  
Strategy Fit Die strategische Ausrichtung 
des Unternehmens war für die 
Umsetzung der 
Produktinnovation hinderlich. 
Griffin – PDMA research 
on new product devel-
opment practices- 
Updating trends and 
benchmarking best 
practices 
Does your organization 
have a specific strategy 
for its new product 
activities which directs 
and integrates the entire 
new product program? 
   Lilien, Von Hippel – 
Performance Assessment 
for Lead-User Idea 
Generation Process 
Fit with current strategic 
plan of our business unit 
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Dedication to  
Innovation 
Unser Unternehmen ist geprägt 
von einer starken 
Innovationskultur und einer 
Fokussierung auf die 
Entwicklung neuer Produkte. 
-  
Entrepreneurial Team 
Teamwork Die beteiligten Personen 
arbeiteten gut im Team 
zusammen. 
Hoegel, Gemuenden - 
Teamwork Quality and 
the Success of Innovative 
Projects 
Are team members 
motivated to maintain 
the team? Is there team 
spirit? 
    Brooke Dobni - 
Measuring innovation 
culture in organizations", 
European Journal of 
Innovation 
The employees in my 
area act as a team. 
Professional  
Competence 
Im Hinblick auf die benötigten 
fachlichen Kompetenzen 
waren genau die richtigen 
Personen am Innovations-projekt 
beteiligt. 




and innovative effort 
Most of our staff are 
highly skilled and 
qualified 
Perseverance / Attitude Die beteiligten Personen 
wollten trotz aller Schwierig-keiten 
das Innovationsprojekt 
unbedingt zum Erfolg 
bringen. 
Hoegel, Gemuenden - 
Teamwork Quality and 
the Success of Innovative 
Projects 
Do team members exert 
all efforts to the team's 
tasks? 




People put in maximal 
effort 
Social Competence Die beteiligten Personen hatten 
eine niedrig ausgeprägte 
Sozialkompetenz. 
-  
Interdisciplinarity Bei der Innovationsumsetzung 
waren Personen mit 
verschiedenen Kompetenzen betei-
ligt, z.B. aus 
verschiedenen Organisations-
bereichen wie Marketing, 
Vertrieb und Entwicklung. 
-  
Personal Network Die beteiligten Personen 
verfügten über ein großes 
persönliches Netzwerk, was bei der 
Innovationsumsetzung 
hilfreich war. 
Lilien, Von Hippel – 
Performance Assessment 
for Lead-User Idea 
Generation Process for 
NPD 
Establish a network of 
valuable internal 
contacts 
   Lilien, Von Hippel – 
Performance Assessment 
for Lead-User Idea 
Generation Process for 
NPD 
Develop contacts with 
external experts 
Experience Die beteiligten Personen hatten 
wenig Erfahrung bei der 
Durchführung von derartigen 
Innovationsprojekten. 
Fortune, White - Framing 
of project critical success 
factors by a systems 
model 
All members had 
worked on earlier 
projects using the same 
'in-house' Project 
Management Method 
and most had worked 
with the project manag-
er before 
    Mu, Peng, MacLachlan - 
Effect of risk manage-
ment strategy on NPD 
performance 
The new product 
management team is 
experienced in new 
project development. 
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Innovation Process 
 Bitte geben Sie an, wie viel Wert im 
konkreten Innovationsprojekt auf die 
folgenden Maßnahmen gelegt wurde: 
  
Intellectual Property  Schutz von geistigem Eigentum  -   
Lead User Integration Integration von Lead-Usern bei der 
Innovationsumsetzung 
Wind, Mahajan - Issues 
and Opportunities in 
New Product Develop-
ment: An Introduction to 
the Special Issue 
Our NPD process 
incorporates the voice of 
the customer at all 
levels. 
  Coviello, Joseph - 
Creating innovations 
with customers 
Customer engages in 
hands-on development 
and trials through 
development and 
testing. 
Customer Feedback Einbeziehen von Kundenfeedback in 
die Innovationsumsetzung 
Coviello, Joseph –  
Creating innovations 
with customers 
Firm asks customer for 
feedback on the concept, 
product. or market (can 
occur throughout NPD) 




sive opinions, feedback, 
or data on the concept, 
product, or market (can 
occur throughout NPD) 
Promotion Gezielte Kommunikationsmaßnah-
men (z.B. Messeauftritte, Pressebe-
richte, Broschüren) 
-  
Platform Strategy Verfolgung einer Plattformstrategie 
für eine gezielte Produktportfoliopla-
nung 
Wind, Mahajan - Issues 
and Opportunities in 
New Product Develop-
ment: An Introduction to 
the Special Issue 
Our NPD focus is 
increasingly on the 
development of product 
platforms, including the 
development of multi-
generation products 
Positioning Bewusste Positionierung des Pro-
dukts am Markt (z.B. als 
Premiumprodukt) 
-  
Timing Bewusste Wahl des Zeitpunkts für 
den Markteintritt 
Cooper - Identifying 
Industrial New Product 
Success: Project New-
Prod 
First to the market 
Strategic Partnerships Bildung strategischer Partnerschaften Zahra, Bogner - Technol-
ogy Strategy and Soft-
ware New Ventures 
Performance_ Exploring 
the Moderating Effect of 
the Competitive Envi-
ronment 
Is heavily engaged in 
strategic alliances. 




and innovative effort 
We have developed new 
products and/or 
processes in collabora-
tion with other firms 
Quality Management Qualitätsmanagement -  
Risk Management Risikomanagement Mu, Peng, MacLachlan - 
Effect of risk manage-
ment strategy on NPD 
performance 
We take action to 
minimize the uncertain-
ty of total project 
investment. 
Open Innovation Open Innovation -  
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2) Survey Design 
Table 18: Survey Design 
Survey Parts No. of 
Questions 
Scales 
1. Lead-In Questions 2 Dichotomous/Ordinal 
2. Warm-Up Questions 6 Dichotomous/Nominal/Ordinal 
3. Questions addressing the Independent Variables (Innovation Context) 
  Target Market 7 Interval (5-point Likert Scale) 
  Organization 9 Interval (5-point Likert Scale) 
  Technology 7 Interval (5-point Likert Scale) 
  Entrepreneurial Team 7 Interval (5-point Likert Scale) 
4. Questions addressing the Dependent Variables (Innovation Success) 
  Innovation Success 9 Interval (5-point Likert Scale) 
5. Questions addressing the Independent Variables (Innovation Process) 
 Innovation Process 
(descriptive – Part 1) 
5 Nominal/Interval/Ordinal 
  Innovation Process 11 Interval (5-point Likert Scale) 
 Innovation Process 
(descriptive – Part 2) 
10 Nominal/Interval/Ordinal 
6. Demographic Questions 3 Nominal/Interval/Ordinal 
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3) Survey Instrument 
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4) Pretest Form 
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5) Test of Normal Distribution 
Table 19: Overview of Skewness & Kurtosis 
  TM_1 TM_2 TM_3 TM_4 TM_5 TM_6 TM_7         
Skewness -1,258 ,016 -,598 -,090 -1,071 -,600 -1,034         
Kurtosis 1,576 -1,275 -,645 -1,090 1,027 -,359 1,512         
  TEC_1 TEC_2 TEC_3 TEC_4 TEC_5 TEC_6 TEC_7         
Skewness -1,229 -,501 -,690 -,900 ,922 ,035 ,557         
Kurtosis 2,007 -,112 ,637 ,530 1,534 -1,199 -,537         
  ORG_1 ORG_2 ORG_3 ORG_4 ORG_5 ORG_6 ORG_7 ORG_8 ORG_9     
Skewness -1,148 -,070 -,328 -,243 -,477 -,276 -,155 -,412 -,249     
Kurtosis 1,447 -1,024 -,604 -,795 -,668 -,989 -,976 -,799 -,897     
  ET_1 ET_2 ET_3 ET_4 ET_5 ET_6 ET_7         
Skewness -1,200 -,728 -1,123 -,726 -1,034 -,537 -,224         
Kurtosis 1,618 -,098 1,130 ,385 ,456 ,071 -,809         
  PI_1 PI_2 PI_3 PI_4 PI_5 PI_6 PI_7 PI_8 PI_9 PI_10 PI_11 
Skewness -1,030 -,087 -,496 -,299 -,455 -,760 ,222 -,069 -,549 -,283 ,497 
Kurtosis ,500 -1,120 -,662 -,951 -,802 -,222 -,739 -,882 -,548 -,705 -,477 
  IS_1 IS_2 IS_3 IS_4 IS_5 IS_6 IS_7 IS_8 IS_9     
Skewness -,197 -,450 ,528 ,370 -,288 -,974 -1,097 -,171 -,132     
Kurtosis -,901 -,462 -,671 -,679 -,969 1,011 1,908 -,722 -,900     
 
 
Figure 83: Frequency Histogram of TEC_1 
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6) Explorative Factor Analysis 
Table 20: KMO and Barlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. 
,654 





Table 21: Evaluation-Table for KMO & MSA-Values (Brosius, 2013, p. 798)  
Value Evaluation 
0.9 – 1.0 marvelous 
0.8 – 0.9 meritorious 
0.7 – 0.8 middling 
0.6 – 0.7 mediocre 
0.5 – 0.6 miserable 
< 0.5 unacceptable 
 
Table 22: Anti-Image Matrices 
  IS_1 IS_2 IS_6 IS_7 IS_8 IS_9 
Anti-image 
Covariance 
IS_1 ,629 -,326 -,005 ,118 -,002 -,059 
IS_2 -,326 ,614 -,103 -,099 -,029 ,021 
IS_6 -,005 -,103 ,691 -,269 -,031 -,002 
IS_7 ,118 -,099 -,269 ,647 ,026 -,093 
IS_8 -,002 -,029 -,031 ,026 ,257 -,203 





 -,524 -,008 ,184 -,005 -,152 
IS_2 -,524 ,667
a
 -,159 -,157 -,072 ,056 
IS_6 -,008 -,159 ,760
a
 -,403 -,074 -,005 
IS_7 ,184 -,157 -,403 ,690
a
 ,065 -,236 
IS_8 -,005 -,072 -,074 ,065 ,629
a
 -,817 
IS_9 -,152 ,056 -,005 -,236 -,817 ,621
a
 
a. Measures of Sampling Adequacy(MSA) 
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1 2,856 47,595 47,595 2,856 47,595 47,595 2,291 
2 1,159 19,317 66,911 1,159 19,317 66,911 1,850 
3 ,974 16,239 83,150 ,974 16,239 83,150 1,899 
4 ,488 8,131 91,281         
5 ,388 6,472 97,752         
6 ,135 2,248 100,000         
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 




Figure 84: Scree Plot 
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Table 24: Communalities 
  Initial Extraction 
IS_1 1,000 ,825 
IS_2 1,000 ,801 
IS_6 1,000 ,750 
IS_7 1,000 ,761 
IS_8  1,000 ,921 
IS_9  1,000 ,930 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
 
Table 25: Pattern Matrix 
  Component     
  1 2 3 
IS_8 Der erzielte Umsatz 
entsprach den zu Projektbeginn 
formulierten Erwartungen. 
,950 ,022 ,007 
IS_9 Der mit der Innovation 
erreichte Marktanteil entsprach 
den zu Projektbeginn formulier-
ten Erwartungen. 
,937 ,015 ,060 
IS_1 Die Geschwindigkeit des 
Entwicklungsprojektes war 
hoch. 
,140 ,883 -,176 
IS_2 Die vorhandenen Res-
sourcen wurden im Innovations-
projekt effizient eingesetzt. -,078 ,846 ,227 
IS_6 Die Produktperformance 
der Innovation entsprach den zu 
Beginn des Projektes formulier-
ten Vorgaben. 
-,032 ,118 ,845 
IS_7 Die erreichte Qualität des 
neu entwickelten Produktes war 
auf einem hohen Niveau. 
,136 -,099 ,835 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.
a
 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
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7) Reliability Analysis 
Sales Performance 
Table 26: Reliability Statistics "Sales Performance" 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
,924 ,924 2 
 
Table 27: Inter-Item Correlation Matrix "Sales Performance" 
  
IS_8 Der erzielte Umsatz 
entsprach den zu Projekt-
beginn formulierten Erwar-
tungen. 
IS_9 Der mit der Innovation erreichte 
Marktanteil entsprach den zu Projekt-
beginn formulierten Erwartungen. 
IS_8 Der erzielte Umsatz 




IS_9 Der mit der Innovati-
on erreichte Marktanteil 






























3,13 1,412 ,859 ,739   









3,14 1,261 ,859 ,739   
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Efficiency 
Table 29: Reliability Statistics "Efficiency" 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
,714 ,718 2 
 
Table 30: Inter-Item Correlation Matrix "Efficiency" 
  
IS_1 Die Geschwindigkeit 
des Entwicklungsprojektes 
war hoch. 
IS_2 Die vorhandenen Ressourcen 
wurden im Innovationsprojekt effizient 
eingesetzt. 




IS_2 Die vorhandenen 


































3,21 1,169 ,560 ,313   
 
Product Performance 
Table 32: Reliability Statistics "Product Performance" 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
,673 ,673 2 
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Innovation entsprach den zu 
Beginn des Projektes 
formulierten Vorgaben. 
IS_7 Die erreichte Qulität des neu 




Innovation entsprach den 
zu Beginn des Projektes 
formulierten Vorgaben. 
1,000 ,507 
IS_7 Die erreichte Qulität 
des neu entwickleten 






























4,03 ,744 ,507 ,257   
IS_7 Die erreichte 
Qulität des neu 
entwickleten Pro-
duktes war auf 
einem hohen 
Niveau. 
3,96 ,734 ,507 ,257   
 
8) Correlation Analysis 
Table 35: Orientation-Table for “Pearson r” (Brosius, 2013, p. 523) 
Value of Pearson r Potential Interpretation 
0 No correlation 
0 –  0.2 Very weak correlation 
0.2 – 0.4 Weak correlation 
0.4 – 0.6 Middling correlation 
0.6 – 0.8 Strong correlation 
0.8 – 1 Very strong correlation 
1 Perfect correlation 
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9) Larger Version of the Adjusted ICPS Framework 
 
Figure 85: Larger Version of the Adjusted ICPS Framework 
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10) Cluster Analysis 
 
Figure 86: Dendogram 
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11) Analysis of Variance 
Table 36: Levene-Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
 Levene 
Statistic 
df1 df2 Sig. 
PI_1 Schutz von geistigem Eigentum 
4,224 4 142 ,003 
PI_2 Integration von Lead-Usern bei der Innovation-
sumsetzung 1,205 4 142 ,311 
PI_3 Einbeziehen von Kundenfeedback in die Innova-
tionsumsetzung 6,874 4 142 ,000 
PI_4 Gezielte Kommunikationsmaßnahmen (z.B. 
Messeauftritte, Presseberichte, Broschüren) 1,903 4 142 ,113 
PI_5 Verfolgung einer Plattformstrategie für eine 
gezielte Produktportfolioplanung 4,230 4 142 ,003 
PI_6 Bewusste Positionierung des Produkts am Markt 
(z.B. als Premiumprodukt) 5,155 4 142 ,001 
PI_7 Bewusste Wahl des Zeipunkts für den Marktein-
tritt 1,461 4 142 ,217 
PI_8 Bildung strategischer Partnerschaften 
1,814 4 142 ,129 
PI_9 Qualitätsmanagement 
4,648 4 142 ,001 
PI_10 Risikomanagement 
1,508 4 142 ,203 
PI_11 Open Innovation 3,440 4 142 ,010 
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Square F Sig. 
PI_1 Schutz von 
geistigem Eigen-
tum 
Between Groups 19,395 4 4,849 4,520 ,002 
Within Groups 152,325 142 1,073     
Total 171,720 146       
PI_2 Integration 
von Lead-Usern bei 
der Innovation-
sumsetzung 
Between Groups 56,365 4 14,091 10,498 ,000 
Within Groups 190,611 142 1,342     
Total 246,976 146       
PI_3 Einbeziehen 
von Kundenfeed-
back in die Innova-
tionsumsetzung 
Between Groups 79,718 4 19,929 19,704 ,000 
Within Groups 143,627 142 1,011     








38,395 4 9,599 6,915 ,000 
Within Groups 
197,119 142 1,388     
Total 
235,514 146       
PI_5 Verfolgung 
einer Plattformstra-




61,433 4 15,358 12,420 ,000 
Within Groups 175,596 142 1,237     
Total 237,030 146       
PI_6 Bewusste 
Positionierung des 
Produkts am Markt 
(z.B. als Premium-
produkt) 
Between Groups 53,896 4 13,474 14,543 ,000 
Within Groups 
131,566 142 ,927     
Total 185,462 146       
PI_7 Bewusste 
Wahl des Zei-
punkts für den 
Markteintritt 
Between Groups 
76,979 4 19,245 20,735 ,000 
Within Groups 131,795 142 ,928     




Between Groups 18,386 4 4,596 3,261 ,014 
Within Groups 200,158 142 1,410     
Total 218,544 146       
PI_9 Qualitätsma-
nagement 
Between Groups 63,582 4 15,895 23,893 ,000 
Within Groups 94,468 142 ,665     
Total 158,050 146       
PI_10 Risikoma-
nagement 
Between Groups 54,122 4 13,531 17,942 ,000 
Within Groups 107,087 142 ,754     
Total 161,209 146       
PI_11 Open 
Innovation 
Between Groups 31,315 4 7,829 7,070 ,000 
Within Groups 157,244 142 1,107     
Total 188,559 146       
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Table 38: Welch-Test 
  Statistic
a
 df1 df2 Sig. 
PI_1 Schutz von geistigem Eigentum Welch 
6,855 4 58,579 ,000 
PI_2 Integration von Lead-Usern bei der 
Innovationsumsetzung 
Welch 
11,647 4 65,786 ,000 
PI_3 Einbeziehen von Kundenfeedback 
in die Innovationsumsetzung 
Welch 
18,579 4 63,739 ,000 
PI_4 Gezielte Kommunikationsmaß-
nahmen (z.B. Messeauftritte, Pressebe-
richte, Broschüren) 
Welch 
8,032 4 65,774 ,000 
PI_5 Verfolgung einer Plattformstrategie 
für eine gezielte Produktportfolioplanung 
Welch 
16,877 4 67,192 ,000 
PI_6 Bewusste Positionierung des 
Produkts am Markt (z.B. als Premium-
produkt) 
Welch 
16,654 4 63,935 ,000 
PI_7 Bewusste Wahl des Zeipunkts für 
den Markteintritt 
Welch 
22,069 4 66,530 ,000 
PI_8 Bildung strategischer Partnerschaf-
ten 
Welch 
3,226 4 65,528 ,018 
PI_9 Qualitätsmanagement Welch 25,702 4 61,650 ,000 
PI_10 Risikomanagement Welch 16,202 4 66,006 ,000 
PI_11 Open Innovation Welch 6,851 4 64,597 ,000 
a. Asymptotically F distributed. 
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Appendix VI – Operational Framework 
1) Discriminant Analysis 
Table 39: Test of Equality of Group Means 
  
Wilks' 
Lambda F df1 df2 Sig. 
TM_2 ,928 2,763 4 142 ,030 
TM_5_REC ,904 3,767 4 142 ,006 
TM_6 ,871 5,272 4 142 ,001 
ORG_1 ,753 11,646 4 142 ,000 
ORG_2 ,593 24,318 4 142 ,000 
ORG_3 ,586 25,097 4 142 ,000 
ORG_4 ,693 15,739 4 142 ,000 
ORG_5 ,616 22,100 4 142 ,000 
ORG_6_REC ,761 11,178 4 142 ,000 
ORG_7 ,822 7,663 4 142 ,000 
ORG_8_REC ,613 22,440 4 142 ,000 
ORG_9 ,706 14,811 4 142 ,000 
TEC_1 ,955 1,657 4 142 ,163 
TEC_3 ,878 4,930 4 142 ,001 
TEC_5_REC ,963 1,378 4 142 ,245 
TEC_6 ,791 9,352 4 142 ,000 
ET_1 ,822 7,699 4 142 ,000 
ET_2 ,790 9,418 4 142 ,000 
ET_3 ,835 7,009 4 142 ,000 
ET_4_REC ,906 3,664 4 142 ,007 
ET_5 ,835 6,999 4 142 ,000 
ET_6 ,906 3,688 4 142 ,007 
ET_7_REC ,880 4,858 4 142 ,001 
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 72,5 72,5 ,858 
2 ,513
b
 13,3 85,8 ,582 
3 ,358
b
 9,3 95,1 ,513 
4 ,188 4,9 100,0 ,398 
a. Maximum number of functions is 3. 
b. First 3 canonical discriminant functions were used in the analysis. 
 




Lambda Chi-square df Sig. 
1 through 4 ,108 296,007 84 ,000 
2 through 4 ,410 118,664 60 ,000 
3 through 4 ,620 63,627 38 ,006 
4 ,842 22,934 18 ,193 
 
Table 42: Functions at Group Centroids 
CLU5_1 
Function 
1 2 3 
1 2,160 ,147 ,830 
2 -1,260 ,958 -,448 
3 1,150 -,646 -,678 
4 ,413 ,728 ,238 
5 -2,379 -,741 ,489 
Unstandardized canonical discriminant functions evaluat-
ed at group means 
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Table 43: Structure Matrix of the Discriminant Function Coefficients 
  
Function 
1 2 3 
ORG_3 ,501
*
 -,002 ,052 
ORG_2 ,487
*
 -,183 ,075 
ORG_5 ,464
*
 -,159 ,044 
ORG_8_REC ,461
*
 ,021 ,290 
ORG_4 ,391
*
 -,117 ,080 
ORG_9 ,383
*
 -,076 ,108 
ORG_6_REC ,322
*
 ,154 -,189 
ET_2 ,303
*
 ,033 -,084 
ET_1 ,266
*
 -,149 -,151 
TM_6 ,220
*
 ,142 -,075 
ET_7_REC ,177
*
 -,099 ,142 
ET_4_REC ,162
*













ET_6 ,101 ,101 -,430
*
 
ET_5 ,187 ,248 -,419
*
 
TEC_3 ,185 -,104 -,289
*
 
ET_3 ,231 ,005 -,270
*
 
TM_5_REC ,135 -,239 ,266
*
 
Pooled within-groups correlations between discriminating 
variables and standardized canonical discriminant func-
tions  
 Variables ordered by absolute size of correlation within 
function. 
*. Largest absolute correlation between each variable and 
any discriminant function 
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Table 44: Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients 
  
Function 
1 2 3 
TM_2 -,172 -,436 -,076 
TM_5_REC -,172 -,292 ,468 
TM_6 ,040 ,179 -,125 
ORG_1 ,182 -,294 ,081 
ORG_2 ,405 -,151 ,191 
ORG_3 ,037 -,006 -,040 
ORG_4 ,146 -,079 ,004 
ORG_5 ,168 -,066 -,023 
ORG_6_REC ,277 ,160 -,293 
ORG_7 ,133 ,533 ,278 
ORG_8_REC ,479 ,061 ,284 
ORG_9 ,320 -,120 ,045 
TEC_3 ,307 ,035 -,338 
TEC_6 ,023 ,669 ,457 
ET_1 -,086 -,103 -,179 
ET_2 ,335 ,315 ,123 
ET_3 ,062 ,175 -,096 
ET_4_REC ,174 ,077 -,097 
ET_5 ,022 ,206 -,505 
ET_6 -,079 -,131 -,439 
ET_7_REC -,144 ,151 ,430 
 
Table 45: Classification Results 
CLU5_1 
Predicted Group Membership 





21 0 4 1 0 26 
2 0 24 2 3 2 31 
3 6 2 30 2 0 40 
4 1 1 4 13 1 20 
5 0 3 1 1 25 30 
% 1 80,8 0,0 15,4 3,8 0,0 100,0 
2 0,0 77,4 6,5 9,7 6,5 100,0 
3 15,0 5,0 75,0 5,0 0,0 100,0 
4 5,0 5,0 20,0 65,0 5,0 100,0 
5 0,0 10,0 3,3 3,3 83,3 100,0 
a. 76,9% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
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Table 46: Box-M-Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices 
Log Determinants  
CLU5_1 Rank Log Determinant 
 
1 21 -23,011  
2 21 -11,442  






5 21 -13,632  
Pooled within-
groups 21 -7,269 
 
The ranks and natural logarithms of determi-
nants printed are those of the group covariance 
matrices. 
 
a. Rank < 20  
b. Too few cases to be non-singular  
Test Results  
Box's M 1526,344  
F Approx. 1,488  
df1 693  
df2 27226,595  
Sig. ,000  
Tests null hypothesis of equal population 
covariance matrices. 
 
a. Some covariance matrices are singular and the usual  
procedure will not work. The non-singular groups will be  
tested against their own pooled within-groups covariance  
matrix. The log of its determinant is -4,252. 
 
 
Figure 87: Syntax for Discriminant Analysis 
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2) Questionnaire for Operational Framework 
Questionnaire Part 1 
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Questionnaire Part 2 
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3) Cluster Assignment for the Cases of Pinion, SKF, and 5ME 
Table 47: Answers to the Questionnaire for the Cases of Pinion, SKF, and 5ME 
 Pinion SKF 5ME 
TM_2: There are rarely market barriers which hamper the 
market launch of the respective innovation. 
4 4 3 
TM_5: The addressed market does not seem to have a good 
match with the innovation 
1 1 1 
TM_6: The intended date for the market introduction of the 
innovation seems to fit well. 
5 5 5 
ORG_1: The internal communication is open and honest. 5 4 5 
ORG_2: For realizing the innovation project, the team has access 
to any needed resources. 
4 4 5 
ORG_3: The management totally supports the project team at 
realizing the innovation. 
5 4 5 
ORG_4: The organization is shaped by a climate in which risks 
are tolerated and failures are accepted. 
5 2 4 
ORG_5: The organizational structure of the company enables a 
flexible realization of the innovation project. 
5 3 5 
ORG_6: From today’s point of view, it seems to be quite difficult 
to find an organizational home for the respective innovation. 
1 3 1 
ORG_7: The processes for decision making within the innovation 
project are lean. 
5 3 4 
ORG_8: The strategic direction of the company is hampering 
innovation realization. 
1 1 1 
ORG_9: The company is shaped by a strong innovation culture 
and a focus on the development of new products. 
5 2 5 
TEC_3: From the customer perspective, the technology that 
underlies the innovation is reliable and safe. 
5 5 4 
TEC_6: The technology that underlies the innovation has been 
implemented within previous products (e.g. in different compa-
nies or industries). 
3 2 2 
ET_1: The people being involved in the innovation project work 
together as a team. 
5 5 5 
ET_2: With respect to the essential professional competences, 
the right people are involved at innovation realization. 
4 4 5 
ET_3: Despite any obstacles, the involved people want to bring 
the respective innovation to success. 
5 5 5 
ET_4: The involved people have a low level of social competence. 2 2 2 
ET_5: At realizing the innovation, people with different  
competences are involved, e.g. people from different organiza-
tional units like marketing, sales, and development. 
4 4 4 
ET_6: The involved people have a great personal network which 
supports innovation realization. 
3 5 4 
ET_7: The involved people are not very experienced with the 
implementation of such innovation projects. 
4 4 3 
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Centroid p df 
148* ungrouped 1 ,235 3 ,725 4,258 3 ,274 6,982 
149** ungrouped 3 ,925 3 ,791 ,471 4 ,128 3,871 
150*** ungrouped 1 ,167 3 ,727 5,066 3 ,273 7,803 
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